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ABSTRACT

THE SPIRIT AS THE LORD AND THE GIVER OF LIFE: RECOVERING
RELATIONAL PNEUMATOLOGYAND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
FOR BEING CHURCH IN POSTCOLONIAL NIGERIA

By
Okechukwu Camillus Njoku
May 2012
Dissertation supervised by Professor Gerald M. Boodoo
This dissertation seeks to recover the relational quality of the Holy Spirit who is
the Lord and the Giver of life as enshrined in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (381).
Neo-Scholastic theology had utilized the conceptual categories of Aristotelian
metaphysics with its orientation to foundationalism and immobility in a manner
destructive of difference, plurality, and the relational language of the Spirit as witnessed
in the Bible. One of the upshots became the totalizing bent of Western epistemology
which eventually found concretion in colonialism and the slavery of Africans among
others. This dissertation utilizes the category of “relationality,” a core tenet of West
African Weltanschauungen, as an organizing and interpretive device for reinterpreting the
creedal affirmation in a way that allows for new understandings of the Spirit. In our
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world in which there is an increasing awareness of the simultaneity of the dialectic of
differences and interconnectedness due to the process of globalization, we are compelled
to seek ways of living together without subordinating difference to the regime of
sameness. The thesis is that relational pneumatology provides template for negotiating an
other discourse on the Triune God which recognizes and respects equality-in-difference.
To develop this thesis, I utilize an anthropological, interdisciplinary, critical, and
descriptive approach. I argue that relational pneumatology invites that subalternized
epistemic potentials be foregrounded and legitimized in a manner that fosters “solidarity
of others.” I also draw the implications of this perspective for the Nigerian church with
regard to ecclesial structures and authority, interreligious dialogue, and the question of
holistic liberation that fosters justice and peace.
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Introduction
0.1The

State of the Question

This dissertation is inspired firstly by my experience of how the question of
difference has not too infrequently been used negatively as a tool for oppression,
domination, and exclusion. The tragedy of colonialism and African slavery substantiate
this view. How was it that in relating to the African other, Europeans saw Africans as less
than human, a legacy which has continued to be perpetuated by neocolonial elites?
Another, is the dominance of Spirit-experience in West African Christianity that invites
an investigative and critical theological articulation. Currently, no theological work exists
from an Etche-West African pneumatological perspective specifically with regard to the
question of rearticulating difference for the purpose of a greater enrichment of the church
and of humanity. This work, therefore, seeks to fill the gap. This dissertation attempts a
reinterpretation of the Third Article of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan (381) creedal
affirmation of the Holy Spirit as: “The Lord and the Giver of Life.” In order to do this, I
draw on “relationality,” a core tenet of Etche (West African) cosmo-religious tradition, as
an interpretive and organizing framework for this task. In connection with this
interpretive tool, I seek to understand the Lord and Giver of life as the relational Spirit
who not only creates our differences but also enriches same through communion.
In the making of the modernity/coloniality world system culminating in the
phenomenon that has come to be known today as globalization, we are confronted with
its ambivalence. Firstly, it pertains to the stark reality of fragmentation and of plurality
stemming from an increased awareness of differences (in culture, religion, gender, class,
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sex, ethnicity, and so on). Secondly, we come face to face with the reality of the
interconnected and interdependent nature of the world. In this seemingly “antithetical
dialectic of simultaneous differentiation and interdependence,”1 we are compelled to find
a way of negotiating the boundaries of difference in a non-totalizing manner. This
unlocks the door to theologies in a World Church that would no longer be a matter of
unidimensional consumerism of Western global designs but of a plurilateral and
pluriversal collaboration. More precisely, this study seeks to understand “the reign of
God” inaugurated and proclaimed by Jesus as good news to mean, among others, that
those on the margins and the excluded have become part of the larger conversation.
Let me briefly historicize the modern/colonial world system2 mentioned above in
order to focus our understanding of the Etche/West African context that informs our task
of reinterpreting the creedal appellation of the Holy Spirit. The Medieval synthesis and
neo-Scholastic theistic theology had utilized Greek metaphysical and epistemological
categories in talking about God-human relationship. But because Greek philosophy
thinks in terms of substance and causality, God was conceived as the First Uncaused
Cause in a series of chain of causes. God was seen through the prism of absolute
foundation. And God’s relation to humans was understood in terms of an instrumental,
mechanical, productionist causality of an impassible, immutable, and All-Perfect Being
without any personal relationality.3 Hence, from the very beginning, Greek philosophy as
1

Anselm K. Min, The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology after
Postmodernism (New York and London: T & T Clark International, 2004), 1.
2

For a detailed explication of the contours of modernity/coloniality world system, see below Chapter 4,
sec. 4.5, of this work below.
3

See William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington,
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 210.
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the progenitor of Western epistemological thought has always been oriented to thinking
in terms of foundations, stasis, absolutes, and thus, totality. It is this thinking in absolute,
“delocalized and ahistorical” terms (if at all, there is such a thing) that would ground the
epistemological production of the modern/colonial world system between the 16th and the
late middle of the 20th centuries climaxing in global colonialism.
The 15th through the 18th centuries marked the consolidation of the
modern/coloniality world system driven by capitalism and European frontier
expansionism. This was facilitated through the “coloniality of power”4 and active
colonialism which created peripheries all over the planet outside the metropolitan centers
in Europe. Structurally, the modern system, created the inside borders (that is, inside
modernity) and the outside borders (outside modernity). This “outside” of modernity is
what decolonial thinkers have described as the “colonial difference.”5 In this connection,
Eurocentric epistemologies emanating from the Greek legacy and refined as the
Enlightenment instrumental, pure, objective, “zero-point” rationality, were invented,
exported, and imposed on the populations classified as outside modernity as the only
normative way of knowing. Those categorized in the region of the colonial difference
were dislocated, their own local histories/epistemologies disdained and discredited as
inadequate, unscientific, and irrational, and hence, they were forcefully taught to discard
them. Besides, the populations inhabiting the outside of modernity along with their

4

The coloniality of power has been described as a “conflict of knowledges and structures of power.”
See Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border
Thinking (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 16. The clarification of the cluster of
terms used here, such as: coloniality, colonial difference, global designs, pluriversal, and so on, can be
found in Chapter 4, sec. 4.5.
5

Ibid., ix.
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cultures and traditions were only of interest as objects (not subjects) of study and
knowable only through the normative matrix of Eurocentric totalizing episteme. In this
way, the epistemic potentials of the outside borders of modernity were subalternized and
silenced philosophically, theologically, and otherwise. Worse still, because the
populations in the outside of modernity were viewed as objects, some of them (such as
Africans) were oppressed, repressed, and exploited through slavery. But even after the
era of active colonialism and slavery, coloniality, sadly enough, is still alive and well in
the form of global coloniality (socio-economically, politically, and even ecclesiastically)
which continues to wield and structure the discourse of power and the modern totalizing
project under the guise of universal (but only Eurocentric local knowledges) assumptions.
This work is therefore, a contribution to the endeavor in intellectual
decolonization6 which entails an exploration in an “other paradigm” of thinking that is
non-totalitarian. My thesis is that relational pneumatology provides a template for
negotiating differences through the fostering of a “solidarity of others”7 that is respectful

6

See Chukwudum B. Okolo, Toward Decolonizing the Church: An African Liberation Theology
(Onitsha, Nigeria: Tabansi Press, 1976); see also David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts
in Theology of Mission (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 448.
7

Throughout this work, I will maintain the expression “solidarity of others” rather than “solidarity with
others.” My use of solidarity of others, an expression that, of course, is grammatically correct, is beholden
to the insight of Anselm Min cited above. He makes a subtle distinction between the two expressions.
Accordingly, the expression “solidarity with others” implies some underlying vantage point from which
“we look at others as other and choose which others to enter into solidarity with. Furthermore, we tend to
look at these others as victims needing…our assistance; we tend to be paternalistic.” Whereas solidarity of
others “implies that there is no privileged perspective, that all are others to one another…and that all are
subjects, not objects.” The word “Other” is to be understood in the Levinasian sense, and is used here in
referring to human beings whose alterity forbid any reduction to the regime of sameness or totality. And
sociologically, it refers to those who have actually been excluded, dislocated, subjugated, and subalternized
through the “coloniality of power.” Solidarity of others, therefore, serves as a critique of the socio-political
and religious structures that create subalternity as areas to be studied and subalterns as objects of study
rather than to be seen and treated as subjects with equality-in-difference. Solidarity of others thus calls for

xviii

of equality-in-difference in a life-affirming way.The study aims to unsubjugate and
foreground silenced African local knowledges/histories, and to legitimize the region as an
authentic epistemic location with subjects who possess epistemic potentials that should
no longer continue to be silenced. I argue in this work that African Christian theology, a
branch of which is pneumatology, occupies the same local epistemic status as any
European theologies (which are also local theologies). It should thus be recognized
according to the framework of equality-in-difference. Besides, it is also an authentic
contribution from a subaltern perspective which expands the dimensions of the gospel
and enriches the living (not static) tradition of the church. Sometime ago, Aylward
Shorter, echoing Jean-Marc Èla, underlined that “The church in Africa…may be growing
in numbers, but it is not growing in awareness.”8 While there may be elements of truth to
this statement, what it ignores to highlight is that since the era of Independence in most of
Africa in the 1960s, there has continued to be an increasing awareness of the huge social
changes taking place in Africa, of the efforts to contextualize and decolonize both
ecclesial structures and theology.But then we are still existing in the modern/colonial
world system in which coloniality of power is still alive and well.
0.2The

Scope and Methodology

The scope of this project is limited to a particular hermeneutical retrieval of the
ancient appellation of the Spirit as the Lord and Giver of Life to articulate a relational
pneumatology. My aim is to reinterpret this Third Article in a way that allows for new

many differences and many worlds living and fitting together in one world without reduction to sameness.
See Ibid., 82.
8

See Aylward Shorter, Toward a Theology of Inculturation (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books,
1988), 247.
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understandings of the Person of the Holy Spirit in the light of contemporary African
situation. It is, therefore, not an exercise in rehearsing the old apologetics and polemics
with regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit either from the Father alone
(Monopatrism) or from the Father and the Son (Filioquism). An important area I hope to
explore in the future is the place of the relational Spirit with regard to ecology.
Methodologically, my approach is focused by the anthropological assumptions of
Etche/West African cosmo-religious world-views. Using the Etche tradition as a
reference point allows me to utilize its core tenet of relationality as my interpretive and
organizing framework for an alternative template in arguing for a better insight into
pneumatology. Through this framework, there emerges to view a new understanding of
the Triune God’s transcendence as dynamically creative of harmony through differential
relations. Let me also be clear that the Etche cosmo-religious world-view is
predominantly an oral tradition. I will, therefore, be drawing on its rich repository of
symbols, art, proverbs, rituals, folktalks, and so forth, as well as on my personal local
experience as one who inhabits that world-view. Since our context and space fall within
the modern/colonial world system, my method shall also include a critical socio-cultural
and historical analysis of the African context. In the light of the outcome of this analysis,
our interpretive tool will allow us to critically reread the Bible and Christian traditions so
as to have new understandings of the Person and proprium of the Holy Spirit that are
liberative. Moreover, I shall also draw on the insights of postcolonial and decolonial
thought and from the social sciences and history as well. My approach is, therefore,
archaeologico-critical, anthropological, hermeneutical, interdisciplinary, and descriptive.
And finally, my adoption of the framework of relationality which abhors absolutism
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allows me to seek the best in both the African and non-African traditions shun of
romanticism or essentialism in order to challenge systemic and systematic structures of
evil that have continued to be life-denying for Africans.
0.3 The

Value of the Study

This dissertation will be relevant to theology in several ways. As an effort toward
creating a pathway for negotiating differences and engendering harmonious living amidst
differences, this work holds great potentials for: Trinitarian theology, communion
ecclesiology, interreligious/ecumenical dialogue, ecology, Feminist theology,
intercultural hermeneutics, soteriology and Liberation theology, theological
anthropology, missiology, and Public theology (since our understanding of the Spirit
would be crucial for the transformation of African imagination and the social
transformation of Africa as well). These are some of the important areas that need
continual expansion in relation to African Christian theology, and this dissertation
provides building blocks for such a prospect.
0.4The

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter historicizes the
loss of the relational quality of the Triune God—mediated by the Spirit—in Western
Latin theological tradition by tracing its root back to the legacy of Greek metaphysics. I
contend that caught up in the trap of ahistorical absolutes in matters of God-Spirit talk,
Western theology assumed a totalitarian bent and thereby undermined relationality and
the dignity of equality-in-difference. I also argue that the loss of relationality (hence, the
forgetfulness of the Spirit) enthroned Eurocentric absolutism used to legitimate and
justify colonialism and the slavery of Africans. This constitutes a crisis in Latin theology,
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and hence, the need for an “other paradigm of thinking.”
Chapter two digs into the Etche cosmo-religious world-view in search of an
“other paradigm” and an interpretive tool. The concept of relationality which is a core
tenet of the Etche religious universe would be explored as helpful for overcoming the
dualism between the sacred and the mundane, the supernatural and the natural, and hence,
the involvement or engagement of the divine (mediated by the Universal Holy Spirit) in
the world of human beings. In this way, absolutism which led to the dislocation and
subalternization of Africa is dismantled and the dignity of difference and plurality is
restored.
In chapter three, utilizing relationality as an interpretive device, certain biblical
and Patristic tropes on the Holy Spirit are critically reread and reinterpreted to allow for
new understandings of the relational Spirit as the Giver of life. I argue that the relational
Spirit gives life and bestows differences as a gift. Yet, the relational Spirit as Lord resists
and subverts whatever negative forces that try to diminish the Spirit-given life and/or to
destroy differences. I draw on contemporary theological sources to illustrate this stance.
The fourth chapter envisions hospitality/friendship as practical ways to concretize
relationality in relating to others who may be different from us (due to religion, gender,
ethnicity, and so forth). My main interest here is in evincing the subversive, resistant, and
interpellatory nature of hospitality in confronting the structures of power configurations
that exclude, oppress, subjugate, and silence the other. I submit that solidarity of others
require that genuine relationships of friendship be enacted on the basis of a balance of
power shun of paternalism. As members of the body of Christ who have been befriended
by the hospitable God, we are to embody God’s dance of love for the world. It remains an
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excellent model for an African theology.
Chapter five is an effort toward constructing an African Christian pneumatology.
Utilizing the valuable resources from the Etche and West African dimensions of spiritexperience, I rearticulate and rework an understanding of the Universal Holy Spirit
whose manifold operations are manifested through the instrumentality of the “many
spirits” of African ancestral religions. I draw on and at the same time expand the insights
of African Independent Church’s (AICs). Finally, the implications of this new
understanding along with suggestions for being church today in Africa as a whole and
particularly in Nigeria, is treated.
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Chapter 1
The Crisis of Pneumatology in Western Systematic
Theology
1.0 Introduction
This first chapter unpacks the knapsack of the crisis that has for too long plagued
pneumatology in Western (Latin) systematic theology.1 The chapter makes the case that
the tragic encounter between Africa and the West culminating in slavery, colonialism,
neocolonialism, and the current experience of globalization is not entirely unconnected
with the inadequate and lopsided attention to the person, autonomy, and proprium of the
Spirit in Western theology. Some of the key factors that fomented the said crisis,
including neo-Scholastic substance-theistic ontology and the subordination of the Spirit
in Christology would be examined among others. The neo-Scholastic bent toward
absolute abstraction—a heritage of Greek metaphysical tradition—paved the way for the
logocentrism of the modernity/coloniality world system. Modernity which arose from the
ashes of the breakdown of medieval synthesis played a key role in the furtherance of the
eclipse of the Spirit will equally be investigated. It is my contention here that a recovery
of the understanding of the Spirit as relational would be helpful in the negotiation of the
boundaries of difference and in overcoming the use of difference for oppressive and
1

It is worth noting that there was a rich tradition of spirituality especially in the medieval era which
focused more on the action of the Spirit in the spiritual life.However, there was a lack of the same
concentration in systematic theology to express the proprium of the Spirit.For a detailed consideration of
the place of the Spirit in the spirituality of the Middle Ages, see Elizabeth A. Dreyer, Holy Power, Holy
Presence: Rediscovering Medieval Metaphors for the Holy Spirit (New York and Mahwah, New Jersey:
Paulist Press, 2007); Stanley M. Burgess, The Holy Spirit:Medieval Roman Catholic and Reformation
Traditions (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1997).
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exclusionary purposes. It would also provide a template for negotiating “an other”
discourse on the Trinitarian God that recognizes the Spirit as person and not just force or
energy. This approach will, thus, allow for an opening of new and enriching possibilities
and vistas in the “Self – Other” encounter, individually, institutionally, and communally.
To be treated also are certain clarifications of some key terminologies that will feature
frequently in this work.
1.2 The

Inadequate Attention to Pneumatology

For too long a certain crisis has dogged the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the
history of Western theology. This crisis borders predominantly on the inadequate and
unbalanced attention paid to the third person of the Trinity in comparison to the Father
and the Son. Even the Creeds of Nicaea 325 and Constantinople 381 in comparison with
the Father and the Son, could not use homoousios for the Holy Spirit.2 About the Father
and the Son, volumes have been written, specifying their proper character, personhood,
and function, but the same has yet to be elaborately accomplished with respect to the
Holy Spirit. The neglect of the Spirit in whom God relates to the world through Christ
led, among other things, to a very transcendentalized and abstract conception of God that
clearly severed the supernatural from the natural. Such neglect of the Holy Spirit is not
without consequences for both Western theology, the general history of the church, and
Western relationship with non-Western “Others.”
2

Gary D. Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids,
Michigan, and Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 45-61; Walter Kasper
comments that this “lack of use of homoousios in the article of faith on the Holy Spirit as it is used in the
article on Jesus Christ is, indeed, striking.” Kasper, nonetheless, observes that “churchmen had learned a
lesson from the confusion that followed on Nicaea; and so it is likely, therefore, that they deliberately
avoided this disputed term, which was open to misunderstanding and was not attested in scripture.” Walter
Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 213.

2

The Spirit is variously depicted as the principle of relationality,3 the bond of love,
and the source of unity within God’s Triune identity. An understanding of God as
essentially relational or otherwise shapes an understanding of who we are and what kind
of vocation we have in the world we inhabit. As a loving communion and loving
relationality, the Triune God, in opening out to the other calls into being creation and
human beings who have the potential for realizing loving relationality. As the principle of
relationality and mediation, the Spirit safeguards not only the equality-in-difference
between the Father and the Son, but also that between humans in their communion with
the Triune God. To talk of the Triune God as relational is simply not the product of
human speculation or construction. It is rather an inference—to the question of “who”
God is—drawn from God’s self-revelation as is evident in the oikonomia, in the missions
of the Son and the Holy Spirit as enshrined in the Scriptures. This rich biblical
understanding and important ancient Christian insight into the identity of the Spirit and
God as relational was lost sight of in the Western (particularly Latin) theological tradition
in later centuries.
3

For a consideration of a number of theologians who call attention to the category of relationality and
its importance to God’s identity, see Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ; Elochukwu E. Uzukwu, A Listening
Church: Autonomy and Communion in African Churches (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books and Reprint
Enugu, Nigeria: SNAAP Press, 1996); Eberhard Jüngel, God As the Mystery of the World (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1983); Clark H. Pinnock, Flame of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Downers
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996); Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in
Divine Life (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/ John Knox, 1993); Catherine M. LaCugna, “The
Relational God: Aquinas and Beyond,” Theological Studies 46 (1985): 647-63; idem, God For Us: The
Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco, California: HarperCollins, 1992). Also some feminist
theologians have stressed on the meaningfulness of loving relationality as a fundamental character of God
and reality: see Rosemary Radford Reuther, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1983); Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is:The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological
Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992). Also John D Zizioulas, Being As Communion: Studies in
Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985); William C.
Placher, Narratives of a Vulnerable God (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox, 1994).
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To gain some appreciation of the situation, it may be helpful to briefly highlight
what constitutes a crisis. According to Wilfried Härle: a crisis can be seen as comprising,
inter alia, the following characteristics: [1] it constitutes a threat to the being of an
individual or a community which can concern its very existence, validity of its meaning
system and its identity; [2] it is necessarily ambivalent, its outcome is still open; [3] it
does not come unprepared, but is the culmination of often hidden factors and forces
which have been there for a long time; [4] it divides the past and the future so that the
appropriation of the past in the present determines the possibilities of the future; and last
but not least, [5] it necessitates change.4 All of the above aspects of a crisis apply to the
current state of pneumatology. The crisis may truly be profound; it is, nonetheless, in the
nature of a crisis to be ambivalent and so open to new possibilities and change. Such
characteristic ambivalence which holds out promise, in some respects, is a reason for
hope and for the present effort at recovering relational pneumatology. But a
reconstruction of pneumatology that will be relevant for our current context can only be
achieved by a successful identification and clarification of the causes of the crisis ab
initio. One key factor, among others, that led to the eclipse of the Spirit in Latin theology
is the theological framework of neo-Scholasticism.
1.2.1 The Medieval Synthesis and Neo-Scholastic Substance-Theistic

Theology
The emergence of Christianity from the Jewish subculture and its incarnation into
the more dominant culture of the pure Greco-Roman world was not just a boon but also

4

Wilfried Härle, “Krise in theologischer Sicht,” in Wege Zum Menschen28(1977): 408-16 cited in
Christoph Schwöbel, “Christology and Trinitarian Thought,” in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on
Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T. &T. Clark, 1995), 114.
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problematic for the Christian faith. In the long history of Greek philosophical thought, it
is clear that the divine is characterized as an eternal, impersonal, impassible, immutable,
perfect, stable, and transcendent principle. The divine, for instance, for Plato is the Idea,
Form, or the Good—which, as a universal—manifests or mirrors itself only dimly in the
many subordinate particular alterable entities in the cosmos but itself remains
unalterable.5 Aristotle calls it the Unmoved Mover or Pure Act. In Aristotelian
metaphysics—the finest articulation of Greek genius—the Pure Act is characterized as
changeless, simple,6 having no personal relation with the world, and simply contemplates
itself, hence, a self-thinking-thought or substance.7 The self which thinks itself lacks
5

See Plato, Republic 7. 509b.

6

For Aristotle, the pure act precisely as pure act is devoid of potentiality and, hence, outside the sphere
of numerical plurality. It is pure simplicity devoid of individuation. According to Aristotle, “all things that
are many in number have matter.” But the unmovable first mover is one both in definition and in number.
In this way, Aristotle attempted to dissociate part of the religious beliefs of his time, precisely, that the
divine encloses the whole of nature, from philosophical discourse. Aristotle in his treatise “On the Soul,”
reports the religious and theological statement of Thales that “all things are full of gods,” a statement which
Aristotle thought was inspired by the commonplace opinions then that “the soul is diffused throughout the
whole universe.” See De Anima, I, 5, 411a 8-9. For Aristotle, then, to assert the intermingling of the divine
and nature is to introduce matter into the divine rather than seeing it as pure essence. In other words, the
divine is diametrically unrelated to matter. See Aristotle, Met, XII, 8, 1074a 34, 36, 1074b 2.
7

Aristotle maintains that “the divine substance which thinks nothing but itself does so because, if it
were to think of something other than itself, then that means that the divine substance itself does not
constitute the act of thinking, and therefore, is a potency, and not the best substance; there would then
evidently be something more precious than itself, namely, that which it thinks. It is, therefore, not possible
for the Aristotelian divine substance to think of matter which would be like thinking the worst thing in the
world. Therefore, it must be about itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of
things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.” The divine self contemplation excludes everything that
is not God. God in Aristotle exists apart and lives in isolation. See Met, XII, 9, 1074b 15-23, 29-34. Again,
because the pure act is the most excellent of things, it is the most desirable and because it is the most
desirable, its relation to the cosmos in Aristotelian metaphysics is not in the mode of efficient causality.
The cosmos relates to pure act only in the manner of finality. Indeed, God in Aristotelian philosophical
theology does not know a world he did not create. This is contrary to the Christian claim that the triune God
is the creator, the life-giver, the sustainer, and redeemer of the world, as well as the eschatological end and
consummation of the world; God is “the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and
the End” (Rev 22:13), for it is “in him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28).
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relationality or openness to the other outside itself. At best, the self-thinking-thought is
deistic whose function is limited precisely to being the first/unmoved mover which
ignites a series of other movers. Thus, Divinity’s relation to the world and humans was
conceived in terms of mechanistic causality. From the outset, this conceptuality is
irreconcilable with the Christian claim that God—whose self-communication or self-gift
understood as grace which is a gracious and gratuitous non-object—is essentially
relational and personal. As represented by both Plato and Aristotle, it is obvious that the
Hellenistic depiction of the divine essentially entails unchangeability and impassibility.8
8

It is important at this point to make some clarifications with regard to those inherited Hellenistic
attributes used to qualify the divine, particularly, transcendence, immutability/perfection, impassibility, and
omnipotence. I aim here to a re-conceptualization of these attributes in the light of recent scholarship. To
begin with, William Placher, in his illuminating book, The Domestication of Transcendence, makes the
case that it was modern (more precisely, seventeenth century) philosophers/theologians rather than
medieval/neo-scholastic or classical theologians who domesticated transcendence. They Domesticated
transcendence in the following ways: first, by their vigorous confidence and optimism about the capacity of
human reason to comprehend God perfectly, and secondly, by their conceptualization of God as an utter
otherness, radically different and unrelated to the created order; hence, their contrastive understanding of
transcendence—saying that God is distant, remote, unaffected—and immanence, meaning that God is close
and involved. See William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence:How Modern Thinking about
God Went Wrong(Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 1- 17, especially chap. 7.
While I concur with Placher that seventeenth century theology which shared the same epistemic background with modern philosophy was theistic, I do, however, have reservations on his position with regard
to classical theism. It is fair to admit that classical theologians were aware that it was about the living God
of the Bible that they attempted to make intelligible utilizing the Greek categories of Perfect Being,
immutability, and necessity, and others. But it is also true that their “ passion for intelligibility meant,
historically, an overemphasis upon the categories of nature and substance, a consciousness of cosmos to the
neglect of history, a preference for the universal and the necessary over the individual and undetermined.”
See William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 210. Indeed, there is no gainsaying the fact that medieval and
classical theology so radicalized divine omnipotence and freedom as to turn God into a tyrant. This view
was no more evident than in medieval Nominalism which “carried the idea of God’s omnipotence and
freedom to an extreme, turning God into an absolutist deity who acts in an arbitrary manner.” See Kasper,
The God of Jesus Christ, 17. Not surprisingly, it is this classical idea of God who is oppressive to human
freedom that is in part, the presupposition for the revolt in modern thought to liberate the autonomy of
subjectivity from the tyranny of theonomy. Of course, the conceptualization of omnipotence of deity was
mirrored in the power of the one emperor, one church, one theology, one tradition, one Pope. Challenge to
these hierarchies by way of alternative conceptualities was under penalty of death by burning on the stakes.
To this extent, I maintain that classical theism is a fact.
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In current scholarship, there is a growing change of understanding with regard to the categories
under consideration. Marcel Sarot in his breathtaking opus has not only carried out a fascinating research
on God’s passibility but has also provided an intimidating bibliography on the subject and other
concomitant issues. See Marcel Sarot, God, Passibility and Corporeality (Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok
Pharos Publishing House, 1992). To begin with, it is important to make a distinction between impassibility
and immutability. The term impassibility from the Latin “impassibilitas” or the Greek “apatheia,”
originally means “incapable of being acted upon by an outside force.” On a little expansion, the meaning
includes incapable of being acted upon either by an outside or inside force (Sarot, 26). This outside or
inside force may include passions, feelings, suffering, etc. It is in this sense that impassibility is often seen
as synonymous with immutability. Sarot, utilizing Vincent Brümmer’s conceptualities, nicely distinguishes
between: being affected in a personal way and being causally influenced. Causal influence engenders a
necessary reaction in that which is acted upon; e.g., causally influencing a bell to ring, or hypnotizing
someone to carry out the hypnotist’s suggestion. But to affect someone in a personal way, even though such
an affecting may be persuasive, the affected, to some extent, still has a choice as to the manner s/he allows
herself/himself to be affected. Many passibilist theologians maintain that the second distinction, more than
of humans, is true of God who is supremely master of himself. For passibilists, therefore, God can be
influenced in a personal way only and never in a causal way since God can never be under causal constraint
(27-9). For the advocates of this position to which I incline, God can be influenced by what happens in the
world but only in a personal way, in that God remains master of his own reactions, as well as remains
immutable in his nature, will, and knowledge. The passibilist position flies in the face of the classical ideals
of apatheia and ataraxeia—which see certain experiences: suffering, sympathy, etc., as evil and as such,
incompatible with the divine perfection (32). But it must be admitted that the passibilist ascription of such
experiences to God is somehow by way of analogy or metaphor. An impassible God is not able to
adequately express divine concern for his suffering creature. An impassible God is not capable of
vulnerable love, because love involves vulnerability. Since a genuinely personal love is essentially
sacrificial and costly, it is then difficult if not impossible to love in an invulnerable manner (156-9).
Vulnerability entails “susceptibility to unpleasant and noxious experiences. A vulnerable person is not able
or not willing to protect herself against these experiences, and is therefore easily wounded by them” (176).
The “pathos” of the triune God entails God’s involvement in history and engagement in the plight of
humanity. Such terms as “pathos” and “passio” are often combined with other terms to denote passibility in
God: such terms include sym-patheia/sun-paschein – suffering with, em-patheia – sharing in another’s
feelings or emotions, and compassio/compati – suffering with. William C. Placher in his Narratives of a
Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and Scripture (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press,
1994), captures the purpose served by divine impassibility in its Hellenistic context; it was the same
meaning that was transposed into classical Christian theology. According to Placher, “Divine impassibility
served two functions. It ruled out vulgar passions: no more rapes, no more private vengeance. At the same
time, it preserved divine power. Part of what power…[means] is that one can affect others for good or ill
but yet remain unthreatened by them, invulnerable. It is the most powerful ruler who is safe and secure
from external threat…without any risks from outside. For God, then, impassibility guarantees
omnipotence” (5). What is significant here is Placher’s notice of how impassibility was an expression of
omnipotence. Such a powerful God was an utterly transcendent God, uninvolved in human predicament,
lest he become passible, and whose power is for domination, and if need be, through violence.
But the Christian God of revelation, the Triune God, and the God who is encountered in the
narratives of the Bible, is a God who is vulnerable in love (Ibid., 6-7), and a God whose power is manifest
in weakness and self-giving, and not a power to dominate others. Thus, God is both transcendent and
immanent and at the same time is beyond transcendence and immanence. God as the truly infinite is not
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It was this Greek metaphysical legacy that the Christianity of the first six to thirteen
centuries inherited to articulate the faith.
This inherited Hellenistic matrix was problematic for the patristic and medieval
periods and remains so for modern theology. It is so when considered in light of the
Christian claim that the God who revealed himself through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit
is, in fact, a personal God who is present to humans in the world and actively involved in
their history. It became a matter of struggle for the patristic period to reconcile the
discrepant Greek metaphysical presupposition and the Christian claim. This struggle in
the patristic tradition came to a climax: “first in the creed of 325 confessing that the Son
was ὁμοούσιος with the Father, secondly in the creed of 381 which then drew the
conclusion from that first symbol and the subsequent debates about the Holy Spirit that
God was a Trinity of Father, Son, and Spirit, and finally at Chalcedon in 451 where the
doctrine of the two natures of Christ was affirmed.”9 It is historically obvious that the
differing interpretations of the Hellenistic conceptualities employed by the councils and
enshrined in the creeds have been church-dividing. In all these councils and creeds the
Greek philosophical conceptuality, undoubtedly, provided a framework for articulating
the Christian claim. Nevertheless, both traditions remained unreconciled.

simply the opposite of the finite but also transcends such opposition. God cannot just be fully
conceptualized in the binarisms that have been constructed to comprehend him. God, in his selfdetermination, out of love freely chooses his manner of relationality with humans. Granted, God is
immutable by nature; however, in his freedom of self-determination, God personally and freely decides in
love to be passible.In the God of revelation, what Christians encounter is not so much about ‘what” as
about “who” God is. And God is Love; a communion of persons. See Hill, The Three-Personed God, 211.
To claim that God is not passible is to deny freedom to God and to ascribe necessity to him as if God
cannot freely choose to be vulnerable in love.
9

Bradford E. Hinze and D. Lyle Dabney, eds. Advents of the Spirit: An Introduction to the Current
Study of Pneumatology (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: MarquetteUniversity Press, 2001), 13.
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It was not until the medieval epoch that a synthesis would be worked out. Some
philosophers cum theologians of the medieval era readily employed the Platonic/
Aristotelian metaphysical categories for the construction of their theologies. This was
achieved in Western theology starting earlier with Augustine of Hippo (using Platonism
prior to the medieval era); others who furthered the synthesis include, Boethius, Anselm
of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas (using Aristotelianism proper), Duns Scotus, William of
Occam, and others.10 But even with the forging of such synthesis, the Christian God was
more or less posited as a philosophical postulate and not really as the personal, relational
God of the Bible.
With this medieval synthesis between the Christian tradition and the Greek
cultural and philosophical architectonic, the path was already charted for what would
eventually emerge as classical neo-Scholastic theism. With its substance ontology and
theism, neo-Scholasticism presented God as static rather than dynamic, as transcendent
and almost uninvolved in and untouched by the world. In attempting to prove God’s
existence, for instance, God became the Unmoved Mover, the Perfect Being, and Pure
Simplicity with no room for complexity “whereas in the gospel the divine nature is
essentially a dynamic communion of love and a transcendence capable of immanence by
virtue of it.”11 Its preoccupation became the unity of “what” God is in his essence rather
than “who” God is as revealed in the missions of the Son and the Spirit. Conceived as the
Perfect Being, the Being of beings, the God of revelation was reduced to the god of
10

See Ibid.
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Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1991), 2132, 61-79. See also François-Xavier Durrwell, Holy Spirit of God: An Essay in Biblical Theology, trans.
Sister Benedict Davies, O.S.U. (Cincinnati, Ohio: Servant Books, 2006), 21.
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philosophy, hence, the emergence of ontotheology. 12 Solicitous to preserve divine
transcendence, neo-Scholastic ontology consequently espoused theistic rigidified
dualisms like—supernatural-natural, sacred-profane, spirit-matter, soul-body, and so
forth—as separate substances with no commonality whatsoever between them. But God’s
relation with humans through Christ in the Spirit remains an en-worlded and embodied
experience as Philip Clayton affirms.13 God is permanently pervading the universe. God
in his freedom has radically permeated humanity in the mystery of the incarnation, the
self-gift of God to the world. Thus, we can rightly talk of the humanity of God; God who
exists, walks with, and is involved in the vagaries and sufferings of his people. God’s
humanity is, indeed, “a radical affirmation of divine Self-definition as Deus pro
nobis.”14In the neo-Scholastic substance framework, therefore, the Spirit stopped
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Jean-Luc Marion regards such ontotheological assumptions about the God of revelation as idolatrous
and rather proffers the metaphor of icon for speaking about the disclosure of the divine. To speak of God in
terms of Being as Being is delimiting and essentializing because God is beyond being or otherwise than
being. See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1995) and Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1998).
13

Philip Clayton, “In Whom We Have our Being: Philosophical Resources for the Doctrine of the
Spirit,” in Advents of the Spirit, 200.
14

Michael J. Scanlon, “Trinity and Transcendence” in Transcendence and Beyond: A Postmodern
Inquiry, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 2007), 75. Also Karl Barth in his later writings realizes and emphasizes the importance of the
“humanity of God” for us which was more or less discounted in his earlier works where he feared the
magnification of human beings at the expense of God or the conflation of God with humanity, and thus,
God confronts humanity as the totaliter aliter ‘totally other.’ Hence, his earlier theology was essentially
dialectical. But in his mature theology, Barth starts with confession of faith in Jesus Christ the God-man as
the basis of talk about God. In this way, Barth came to understand the failure of his dialectical theology to
comprehend God in the sense that who God is does not consist in his being totally other but rather in his
being for humanity; that “the divinity of the living God has its meaning and power only in the context of his
history and of his dialogue with humanity, and therefore in his togetherness with humanity.” Thus, “god’s
divinity rightly understood includes his humanity.” See Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. John
Newton Thomas and Thomas Wieser (London: Collins, 1961); Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of
Love,172-175; also Eberhard Jüngel speaks of God as essentially relational and radically involved in the
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speaking to human embodied experiences.
Since for Plato, matter/body was considered the prison of the spirit from which
the spirit ceaselessly seeks release; and for Aristotle, matter was considered the principle
of individuation and hence, of numerical plurality, and therefore, inferior, then God must
have nothing to do with bodiliness since God must be viewed as pure simplicity. It is
against such a backdrop that the divine, especially in the late medieval period became
over-spiritualized, over-intellectualized, and indeed, platonized. Since how we conceive
God also affects how we view ourselves, it is not surprising that the epoch in question
depicted the person as “individua substantia naturae rationalis,” (an individual substance
of a rational nature). This is the Boethian definition of person. In this understanding,
person was divorced from relationality and salvation was limited to saving rational souls
rather than the human person. The imago Dei was construed as present only in the human
soul since God could not be identified with matter or body. That this is unsurprising is
also partly because of the Western religious heritage which witnesses a bifurcation of
thought/intellect and feeling/affectivity, theology (neo-Scholastic) and piety, spiritual
experience and reflective tradition. English theologian, Sarah Coakley poignantly
captures the situation in the later medieval period, precisely, in the fourteenth century:
there was a discernible, and tragic, disjunction occurring between intellectual, scholastic approaches to God on the one hand, and pietistic feeling-and
-body-oriented approaches on the other. This was carried over in a different
way into theories of prayer, so that, for instance, ‘contemplation’ could be
construed either as the pure ‘intellect’ communing with God or, quite differently, as a deliberate shutting down of the mind in favour of the will or ‘affe-

world. See Eberhard Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s Being is in Becoming (Edinburgh: Scottish
Academic Press, 1976).
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ctivity.’ In a variety of ways piety and theology were being rent apart in the
West.15
The observations of Coakley only confirm the ossified theistic dualisms of neoScholastic theology especially between body and spirit. The human body and its
passions were seen as inimical to the spirit, as evil, and inclined to iniquity, and hence,
not a dimension of God’s involvement because inferior to the spirit.16 But Christian
experience and practice indicate the contrary. In the communion of the church the Spirit
has already effectuated a unity of the divine and the human, the inner and the outer, soul
and body. This is most exemplified in the Eucharist, the other sacraments and practices
of the church. The task of theology is to discern, follow, reflect upon, and clarify this
antecedent action of the Spirit with the awareness that neither the church nor theology
constructs or constitutes this communion or unity. On the contrary, just about the same
15

Sarah Coakley, “Charismatic Experience: Praying in the Spirit,” in The Holy Spirit: Classic and
Contemporary Readings, ed. Eugene F. Rogers, Jr. (Malden, MA and West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell,
2009), 72-3.
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This view is not unconnected with the ancient approach that privileges spirit over body/matter. From
Greco-Roman antiquity through the middle ages, emphasis was always placed on the control and
moderation of the body and its passions and motions as a mark of virtue, heroism, and elitism. Such
approach was modeled on the immobility and impassibility of the divine, which ideal became the standard
for elites, nobles, philosophers, rhetoriticians, orators, spiritual masters, etc. Such godlike immobility was
viewed as superior and so preferred to bodily mobility which was reckoned inferior; hence, the spirit
preferred to the body. The spirit became characterized by immobility as opposed to the body whose basic
lineament became motions. This forms part of the background to Stoic asceticism which requires immobile
indifference to pain and suffering as a mark of heroic virtue. To be godlike, then is for the spirit/mind to
exercise dominion over the body. The body as noted above is, according to Plato, a prison for the soul;
thus, a burden that needs to be done away with. As a Platonist, Augustine of Hippo in his interpretation of
the Fall (his lapsus), construes the body as fallen which can only be elevated through grace. This ideal of
moderating and mortifying the body is well exemplified in monastic ascetic traditions. But it is the case that
the human person is a more holistic and complex entity—consisting of a complexity of spirit, mind, soul,
body, relations, emotions, etc. The Western dualistic conception of the human person in the world has its
rootage in the metaphysical and theological conceptions of the transcendent and impassible God. For more
on this see Peter Brown, The Body and Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988);Augustine,
“Against Two Letters of Pelagius,” 4.7, in P. Scaff and H. Wace, eds. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of
the Church, 2nd Series, vol. V (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1986).
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time in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, Gregory Palamas was championing the defense
“of ‘hesychast’ practices…defending the use of the body in prayer and effecting in the
East an extraordinary and unexpected synthesis (emphasis original) of ‘affective’ and
‘intellectual’ traditions of prayer in that context, [while] the West was busy driving a
wedge between them.”17 Palamas understands the need to view the human person more
holistically. Since for the West, the spiritual or intellectual dimension trumped the
corporeal, God was associated with the soul or spiritual aspect instead of the whole
person. Again, in the Orthodox tradition, the question of iconography remains prevalent.
This tradition recognizes the fact that divine activities and realities are always mediated.
Thus icons become the possible material means and symbols through which the divine
self is personally communicated in the Spirit and as such the pledge of our
sanctification.18 All in all, the nature of the revelation of the Triune God does not call for
such sclerotic dualisms that have plagued Western theistic theology.
1.2.2 The Subordination of the Spirit
More than anything else, theism as described above was the matrix that
undergirded Christian theological discourse on the Triune God spanning from the
medieval era, the Reformation through the modern period. In the wake of the
Reformation and in the Post-Tridentine theology, the Spirit was not only assimilated into
Logos (Christology), subordinated to the mission of the Son, but also confined to the
margins of ecclesiastical juridicism. Granted, the Spirit is self-effacing, in the sense that
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rather than drawing attention to the self, the Spirit always reveals Christ and his work
culminating in the glory of the Father. To be sure, this type of conception of the Spirit
has led many a theologian both past and present to neglect the characteristic proprium
and person of the Spirit. It is this tendency that has more often than not, led to what
Yves Congar describes as the christologization19 of the Spirit with a consequent
disavowal of the Spirit’s autonomy. Besides, by revealing Christ, and through Christ
revealing the Father, the Spirit reveals the Spirit as the means or medium of revelation.
It is in the light and transparency of the Spirit that we see the Son and the Father. There
has also been a propensity to conflate the Spirit with the glorified Christ. Admittedly,
intimations of this tendency are present in the Scripture, for example, the Pauline
references to Christ as the last Adam who has become a life-giving spirit (cf. 1 Cor
15:45); “the Lord is spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom” ( 2 Cor
3: 17), and “the Lord who is spirit” (1 Cor 3: 18). The seeming identification of the
glorified Christ and the Spirit is, as Congar puts it, “functional, that is to say, it is an
operative unity.”20 It is not ontological, since both Christ and Spirit have their distinct
identities (hypostaseis) though inseparably and mutually related. No doubt, the Spirit is
the Spirit of the Lord, the Spirit of the Son (Gal 4:6), and the Spirit of Christ (Rom 8:9;
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Phil 1:19). At the same time, Jesus is also of the Spirit, not only in his conception, but
also in his messianic activity and in his being raised to the quality of ‘Lord.’21 Indeed,
Christ and the Spirit, as Scriptures attest to, are always inseparably linked together but
should not be confused. In the words of Walter Kasper, “the famous formula: ‘The Lord
is the Spirit’ (2 Cor 3:17) means that the Spirit is the effective mode of presence and the
present effectiveness of the exalted Lord in the Church and in the World.”22 The Spirit
continues to make the exalted Christ present without being identical with him.
Central to the pneumatological crisis in Western theology is the fact that the Spirit
was not studied in the Spirit’s own personhood. Indeed, during this long history of
subordination, the Spirit had come to be known as the “silent” or “shy” member of the
Trinity.23 As Kilian McDonnell puts it, “pneumatology…was… constructed in…[a]
way…that not even the available biblical witness was utilized and [as such] no real
theological reflection took place. Divine life and revelation were all bound to the
Logos.24 Thus, as much as possible, “one should not tie pneumatology to Christology in
such a manner as to deprive the Spirit of a proper, specific personhood and function.”25
The eclipse of the distinct identity and autonomy of the relational Spirit meant
fundamentally the obliteration of difference, the consequences of which are historically
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obvious.
With regard to ecclesiastical juridicism the Spirit merely functioned as a
guarantee of magisterial teachings while enabling the religious assent of Christians to
such teachings. Indeed, at some point, it appeared the Spirit and the function of the Spirit
were supplanted and overshadowed by the Pope, the Eucharist, and the Virgin Mary.26
In this perspective, the Spirit was perceived to be under the authority of the church; the
Pope rather than the Holy Spirit became the source of church unity, and the Eucharist
was simply confected by the power of the priest and the pronunciation of the words of
institution devoid of epiklesis. Ecclesiastical juridicism, as Donald L. Gelpi has
succinctly expressed, “attempts to direct the action of the Spirit into channels that are
socially proper and canonically acceptable to ecclesiastical bureaucrats [and rigidified
structures]; but it ends by stifling Spirit consciousness in predictable religious routines.
[It domesticates]…the divine and…[keeps] it within the realm of the familiar, the
predictable, and the controllable.”27 Consequently, the neglect of the Spirit who is the
source of unity and communion amounted to the obliteration of difference by reducing
otherness to the regime of sameness. And since at the time, there was intimate
identification of church and state, equality-in-difference degenerated into a calcified
uniformity. The idea of diversity and plurality in the one church was lost and, as a result,
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the theology of the local church was lost until rediscovered by Vatican II.28 A particular
Western inculturated Christianity and local theology and epistemology, became
absolutized and exported to all parts of the planet as the only form normal for all.
Abstract speculations grounded in Greek foundationalism that ended only in concepts
with no bearing to quotidian lived reality became the stock-in-trade. The Christian
confession became distanced from the tensions that form the fabric of existential
situations and contextual experiences. Since Europe was predominantly Christian at the
time, European humanity, Christianity, history, and indeed, Eurocentricism came to be
viewed as normative—not only as the quintessential humanity as such— but also as the
apex of universality and historicity.
Western epistemological framework (which undergirds Western theology) lays
claim to totality as universality. Such a claim is traceable to Plato’s epistemological
construal as anamnesis.29 For Plato, every particular knowledge comes merely as a
recollection of its universal which is eternal, immutable, absolute, and transcendent, and
of which only a certain category of people capable of the highest exercise of reason, can
grasp. This view holds that the experience of a particular perception only recalls to mind
its universal since all knowledge is already immanent in oneself; and therefore, one
always already knows in advance all that one intends to know. Knowledge as episteme is
absolute as opposed to doxa which is the realm of opinions. In this sense, there is no
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room for newness or spontaneity. Newness is suppressed to fit into the regime of the
already known categories so that all will be just the same. Even when alterity, otherness,
or difference is recognized, it is always only in order to possess, suppress, or incorporate
it within the empire of sameness.30 There is no room for genuine encounter with the
other since the other is always condemned to objectification in order to be appropriated.
This is tantamount to totalization because the subject/self or sameness objectifies and
assimilates every other thing but is itself not open to receiving or learning anything from
outside that it does not or cannot know or have. This dualistic framework between the
‘same and the other’ is inimical to the operations of the Spirit who blows spontaneously
wherever, whenever, and however the Spirit wills; it is destructive of equality-indifference, communion, creativity, and hence, of relationality. Such dualism
domesticates the Spirit in a manner quite contrary to the Pauline injunction: “Do not
stifle the Spirit” (1 Thess 5:16).
As stated earlier, the abstract speculations of the Schoolmen using Hellenistic
conceptual framework imprisoned God in concepts with no real relation to reality.
Indeed, at the time in question, abstract concepts were taken for reality. This easily
brings to mind the issue of the well known controversy in the later medieval era between
Nominalism31and Realism. According to Kasper, “Nominalism carried the idea of God’s
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omnipotence and freedom to an extreme, turning him into an absolutist deity who acts in
an arbitrary manner.”32 It is this idea of God that is rebelled against in subsequent
modern thought. The architectonic of modernity was, therefore, poised to dethrone this
arbitrary God in order to liberate the subject’s freedom, autonomy, and thus legitimate
self-legislation and self-assertion. Modern thought got rid of nominalists’ preoccupation
with conceptualism and replaced it with a concentration on the human subject and
subjectivity. It is a revolt against “an overwhelming transcendence that enslaves human
beings, as well as against ecclesiastical structures that had become rigid, reactionary,
and repressive.”33 Theism as articulated by neo-Scholasticism was pushed up to the hilt
by the Enlightenment and modern philosophers. The said philosophers no longer saw
any relevance in the explanation of reality through the mode of such abstractions which
by default severed the relation between the natural and the supernatural. It may not be
far from the truth to say that the dualism and theism of the neo-Scholastic epoch became
the seedbed of the agnosticism, atheism, and the imperial ideology that characterized
modernity. Indeed, scholars like J. B. Metz, M. Weber, K. Löwith, and a host of others
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suggest that modern secularism is the consequence of Christianity;34 that the
transcendent conception of God/Spirit as separated from the world paved the way for an
immanentistic worldly conception of the world. The issues that have been x-rayed so far
are not to be viewed as a polemic against medieval and neo-scholastic substance
theology. The point is rather to indicate its inadequacies in order to characterize a
theology that is more relevant and more adequate to our contemporary situation. Above
all, it is to point out how such theology also prepared the way for what would eventually
emerge as domination of the “other” by the “same” under the disguise of civilization
with the collusion of Christianity in the making of the modern/colonial world system.
1.3 Dialectical

Philosophy, Europeandom, and the Modern/Colonial
World System
The dialectical philosophies of history which dominated the discourse of

difference from the time of European expansionism through the second half of the
twentieth century did not emerge from a vacuum. Rather the way was already prepared
for them by the medieval vision of reality and the sterile Scholastic/neo-Scholastic
abstractions and conceptualism.35 These dialectical philosophies which shaped the
ontology and epistemology of the said centuries got stuck in the dualisms they created.
To a large measure, this was because they lacked the capacity to sustain the dialectic
without letting it collapse into absolutism, normativity, or homogenization. Some
34
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distinguished moments of this dialectical landscape include: the theistic contentions of
Descartes, Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, Kant, and Hegel; the positivism and socio-cultural
evolutionism of Auguste Comte, M. Schlick, Herbert Spencer; and the proponents of
African primitivism—primitive native and primitive monotheism—such as Placide
Tempels. In what follows, we shall establish how such philosophies furnished a powerful
rhetorical device that served the justification for colonialism and slavery in which the
Western church to a large extent colluded with the state. We shall focus here on R.
Descartes, D. Hume, I. Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, A. Comte, H. Spencer, and P. Tempels as
representative of this development.
1.3.1 René Descartes
With the groundwork of the severance of the supernatural from the natural already
hatched out in neo-Scholastic theology, if anything, by default, it remains only for
modern philosophers to stretch it to its logical conclusion. Descartes (1596-1650)
subjects the medieval foundation (authority) of knowledge to a methodic doubt in order
to establish another basis that is clear and distinct. He registers his dissatisfaction with the
medieval sterile abstractions and numinous conception of reality. He regards such basis
for knowledge (which he captures in the metaphor of the evil genius – genius malignus)
as deceptive and incapable of guaranteeing certainty. While doubting the apparent
deceptions of the body (senses)—which for him means everything that has the quality of
magnitude or extension—Descartes comes to the conclusion that the only thing that
affords him clarity and certainty is consciousness. From this, Descartes devises his
famous axiom “Cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I am). In this way, Descartes
radicalizes the medieval substance ontology not only by an exhaustive dualism between
21

res extensa and res cogitans but also between religion and science. With the Cartesian
mathematical style axiom, the immanence of consciousness with its innatism or
nativism36 becomes the basis for knowing and explicating the corporeal world rather than
the long held prejudices of sensory experience and doctrinal abstractions of the previous
epochs. By asserting the self as primarily “a thinking being,”37 Descartes privileges the
subject and subjectivity over every other consideration and foundation.38 Consequently,
religion, ethics, the question of God and the Spirit come to be subject to the arbitration of
the mind while being divorced from any causal relation to the material world. Put
differently, the question of God and Spirit arises only within the compass of human
subjectivity and interiority devoid of any reference to real objectivity.
As a matter of fact, having arrived at the certainty of the cogito, Descartes
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examined a cluster of other ideas present in his mind with the hope of ascertaining other
truths that possessed the same sort of clarity and distinctness as the cogito. One of such
ideas in his mind was the idea of a supreme God who is eternal, perfect, immutable,
infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and creator of all things that exist apart from him.39
Descartes’ idea of a perfect God is for the purpose of arguing that such a God is not
deceptive since he must be immutable unlike other ideas that are prone to change and
illusion. From this, Descartes infers that such a God must exist. Anchored on such sure
foundation then, Descartes convinces himself that if he uses the faculties that this nondeceptive God has given him accordingly, then, he (Descartes) will not be deceived. It is
only from such an intramental certainty that Descartes is able to recover most of the
extramental world. It is, therefore, from the perfect, immutable, and non-deceptive nature
of God as conceived by Descartes that he is able to argue for the certainty of the world.
God as understood by Descartes surely becomes an idol of metaphysics just for
the functional purpose of serving as the sure foundation of his whole system of scientific
and certain knowledge.40 God is no longer seen as the Triune God who reveals God’s self
at God’s own instance but only as God whose nature is clearly captured as perfect and in
the concepts of subjectivity. Although, Descartes claims to have an idea of a perfect,
infinite, and creator God, he ends up positing God as merely a guarantee for the certainty
of the sensible world. The world comes to be explained mechanistically on the basis of its
own immanentistic principles as perceived by subjectivity. The supernatural, including
God and the spiritual, is completely other and has no commonality with such immanent
39
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principles of the natural realm. Precisely because in Descartes the ens cogitans enjoys
priority as opposed to the pre-Cartesian period when God was understood as Ens
Subsistens (Self-sufficient Being) and the necessary ground of every ens non subsistens,
God has been displaced and relegated to the ambience of pure thought. In both Descartes
and post-Cartesian philosophy, both God as the Creator and the created world would
remain to be understood only within and through the ambit of the cogito and purely as the
content of human consciousness. Reduced to an element of the cogito (consciousness),
God could no longer be considered the ultimate cause and explanation of the human sum
and all of existence. Henceforth, modern philosophy became preoccupied with “beings
qua content of consciousness and not qua existing independently of it.”41 In this way, the
Triune God of revelation and faith, the hidden God, and the God who contains and
pervades the whole world, is eclipsed. Invariably, the Cartesian claim to clear and distinct
knowledge including the purported grasp of God’s perfect nature with precision, only
amounts to the subject’s self positing, and ultimately, as Friedrich Nietzsche opines, will
to power.
The Cartesian cogito thus lies at the explicit source of the autonomous
individualism distinctive of the modern Western construal of person. No doubt, this
Western view of person is legitimate as it is based on particular contextual cultural
experiences and philosophical assumptions. But then, it is only one perspective among
others and its legitimacy does not grant it a claim to be the sole conception of person as
eventually became the case. With the Cartesian radical catapulting of God and the
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spiritual merely to the realm of the symbolic and the metaphoric with no real relation to
the material world, Cartesianism is essentially suffused with Godlessness.42 In this radical
conceptual framework, “the world becomes godless; God becomes worldless,”43 as
Kasper vividly puts it. Henceforward, Religion and the God/Spirit-question would be
reduced to a private matter of subjectivity, and would thus become superfluous in the
coherent explication of the world, life, and reality.44 Henceforth, Western mentality
informed by Cartesianism becomes associated with pure rationality and homogeneity; it
imposes predictability and foreseeability upon reality. Since religious categories such as
God/Spirit resist such predictability, such categories are relegated to the domain of
subjectivity, irrationality, implausibility, and the exotic.45 In modernity the Holy Spirit
matters little less than an empty promise and an intellectual construct, a by-product of
mental fiction and fantasy. Without a doubt it is in part on this axis that the entire
subsequent history of Western modern thought revolves. And where the question of
God/Spirit is eclipsed, human beings easily become gods, and for that matter, tyrannical
42
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and oppressive gods as was witnessed by the succeeding centuries. With the Cartesian
self positing of subjectivity, God becomes merely a sublimation or projection of the
human subject in the philosophy of Feuerbach. But as has become obvious from the
preceding section, the way was already paved for this autonomous self-positing of the
modern subject way back in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
1.3.2 David Hume
Although Descartes, the father of modern Western rationalism locates the basis of
knowledge in his theory of innatism, Hume (1711-1776), taking his cue from John Locke,
the father of empiricism, situates the basis of knowledge in his theory of “impressions.”46
Knowledge actually comes about by the association of different ideas arising from the
impressions in the mind. This comes about due to the power of the mind to combine,
compound, transpose, and augment the different ideas emanating from the impressions
afforded us by the senses. For example, to think of a golden mountain for Hume is merely
to combine two ideas, gold and mountain, ideas with which we are already acquainted.
The exercise of mixing and composing reality thus belongs alone to the mind. Following
this line of thinking, therefore, Hume asserts that, “the idea of God, as meaning an
infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our
own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom.”47 In

46

By impressions, Hume refers to perceptions originating from sensation. In this case, Hume means
specifically the perceptions in themselves independent of any reference to their causal relation to their
originating sources. Hence, Hume is not interested in the how or the manner in which those perceptions are
produced in the human mind but merely in the perceptions themselves. He distinguishes impressions from
ideas/thoughts in the sense that the latter are the products of reflection on the former and of which we
become conscious. And for Hume, the most vivacious thought is still inferior to the dullest impression.
47

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis and
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 11.

26

this way, God is no longer viewed as a supernatural reality but merely as a construction
of the mind. And since the idea of Spirit appears abstract, faint, and obscure, all that one
is required to do is to enquire from what impression the supposed idea is derived; and
where it is impossible to assign any, then such an idea must be held suspect or to be
erroneous. Hume holds that this manner of knowing is universal. It is important to note
that the universality Hume refers to here is distinctive only of Europeans.
Thus, Hume maintains that some categories of people, because of their natural
deficiency in terms of intelligence, may not be able to compose such ideas just as a blind
man cannot form the idea of colors and a deaf man the idea of sound. But if you restore
either of them the sense in which they are deficient, then they will be able to form the
ideas. Extrapolating from this, Hume conceives negroes as naturally intellectually
deficient and unable to form great and universal ideas. But what emerges to view is that
once the Humean claim to universality is denied a certain group of people, then it is no
longer universal. Hume writes in the footnote to his essay “On National Character”:
I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers, no arts, no
sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites…have still something eminent about them…. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen…if nature had not made original distinction betwixt
these breeds of men.48
What is significant to note here is how this Humean philosophical framing of
“difference” placed African humanity outside the realm of “normal” (European)
humanity. Hume not only imposes his naïvely conceived notion of inferiority on
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Africans, but what is even more absurd is his simplistic conclusion that the purported
inferiority is natural. Armed with such conclusion, Hume holds that just like the blind
man who can form universal ideas only by the healing and restoration of his deficient
sense, so the negroes can become capable of intelligence only by conquest and
colonialism. This type of philosophically formulated bias against Africans easily became
the stock-in-trade within the circle of European modern philosophers. This marks the
metaphysical negation of the difference, the identity, and humanity of the non-European
“other.”
1.3.3 Immanuel Kant
The Cartesian enthronement of subjectivity over and against all traditional
authority and sources of knowledge, as well as the severance of the supernatural from
the natural in the explanation of the constitution of the order of the world was further
radicalized by Kant (1724-1804). While for Descartes, the principal philosophical
question is subjectivity, for Kant, it becomes an epistemological question. For Kant, the
philosophical problem becomes: how does reality relate to the subjective processes of
consciousness? In order to resolve this problem, Kant rejected both the rationalism of
Descartes (including Leibniz and Spinoza) and the empiricism of Hume (including
Locke and Berkeley). In their place, Kant rather sought a method that would guarantee
the limits and use of reason. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant challenged the
possibility of human reason knowing noumenal realities, or Ding an sich, the “thing-initself” such as the existence and nature of God, the immortality of the soul, and freedom.
According to him, human reason can only know phenomena. Devising his famous
Copernican revolution as a strategy to move beyond the problems of metaphysics, Kant
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compares his own anthropocentricism in philosophy and Copernicus’ heliocentricism in
astronomy.49
According to Kant then, human experience and reasoning are limited to
phenomena. But knowledge of phenomena is obtained not simply through sense
perception. Kant holds that the human mind possesses a priori structures (that is,
logically prior to the materials they synthesize and unify) which constitute the necessary
components of the human mind. These synthetic a priori forms not only synthesize and
unify the data of sense, they, in fact, constitute the necessary conditions of experience,
and are valid in experience only. Since their validity is confined to experience only,
these a priori structures cannot be applied to objects transcending experience. Since to
be known is to appear in consciousness, noumenal reality cannot be known by pure
reason. Kant’s critical philosophy disavowed the possibility of metaphysics. The
intuition of God cannot be given in sense perception since the idea of God cannot be
given in cognition a priori. Therefore, such noumenal realities as God and Spirit,
likewise other metaphysical concepts, are rationally unknown and unknowable by pure
reason. Since it is possible to think what is not known or knowable, noumena are
49
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thought but not known.50 The notion of God, for Kant, can only be posited by practical
reason in order to guarantee the ground for moral discourse. The Kantian understanding
of the “practical” merely associates the Spirit with a cipher for enabling the engagement
of moral and spiritual valuation. The result becomes an autonomous morality grounded
on subjective convictions with no reference to the reality of the objectivity of God’s
being. Reality as such no longer has any relation to God except only as it is posited by
the aprioristic categories of the human mind. For Kant, the question of God or the Spirit
is a sterile and dull discourse. Hence, the Spirit of God was domesticated and simply
reduced to human consciousness as a cipher for guaranteeing the religio-ethical ideals of
the Kantian kingdom of ends and universal brotherhood of man. With the elimination of
God from rational discourse, the Cartesian cogito becomes the Kantian autonomous selflegislating subject who legislates for himself or herself (and not dependent on any
outside source of verity, lest there be heteronomy) universal and universalizable
categorical imperatives. The point being made here is not that Kant’s categorical
imperatives are non-rational. Rather, it is that, for Kant, they are allegedly purely
rational (that is, based on rationality qua rationality), disengaged from any concrete
tradition, delocalized, and having a zero-point neutrality and objectivity for every
rational subject. But it remains a truism that this Kantian perspective is necessarily
grounded in the tradition of liberalism. As such, it is not really free-floating as Kant is
wont to suggest. With Kant as with Descartes, the certainty of truth no longer depends
upon the relation and interaction between things and the subject but upon the structures
of consciousness and the mind. American Ethicit, Stanley Hauerwas captures the
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ramifications of the situation when he writes: “Ethics now becomes an autonomous area
of human behavior that can be distinguished from religion and etiquette. Just as we can
only know X or Y is true insofar as we are able to divorce our knowing from any
concrete tradition, so morality can only be a correlative of an account of rationality qua
rationality.”51 Indeed, with Kant, ethics or morality must now be relegated to the space
of the autonomous. By the same token, religion (and, therefore, God/Spirit-talk) is
henceforth relegated to the domain of the private.
With the Kantian anthropologization of metaphysics and autonomous morality,
the human subject becomes properly the “homo mensura.”52 Without doubt the
beginning point of Kant’s categorical imperative is the dignity and freedom of the
human person. The imperative is expressed in two forms. The first is: “Act only
according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a
universal law.”53 And the second is: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but

51

Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom? How the Church Is to Behave If Freedom, Justice, and a
Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas (Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1999), 29.
52

“Homo mensura” meaning “man is the measure of all things” refers to the claim of the character,
Protagoras, in Plato’s Theaetetus. See Plato, Theaetetus, 152aff. Plato uses this claim to argue that true
knowledge is grounded in being rather than rooted merely in the fleeting perceptions of the knower. But in
modernity, this Platonic insight has been relativized through the replacement of God with the modern
subject. The modern subject now creates his own truths and values to suit himself from the immanence of
his own interiority. Although the modern subject conceives his own truths and values common to all
humankind and thus, universal, he fails to understand that there are no such presuppositionless universal
truths as they are always underpinned and colored by cultural root-metaphors and particular linguistic
contents and conventions. Indeed, it is even relativistic to absolutize one particular contextual form of
knowledge and make it universal.
53

Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Thomas K. Abbott
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949), 260.

31

always at the same time as an end.”54 To be sure, these Kantian categorical imperatives
seem to give due priority to the human person in the moral order, in the social
intercourse with others. It goes without saying, however, that these Kantian maxims
were merely formalistic and good only de jure. De facto in concrete existential situation,
the maxims with their orchestration of one’s freedom and that of others who should
never be treated as means to an end but as ends in themselves, fell flat in Kant’s
discourse on race. The scope of the humanity which should be treated with dignity and
respect, whether in one’s own person or in the person of any other appears in Kant to be
limited to only European humanity.
With the enthronement of the Kantian autonomous subject, the self-legislating
individual universalizes his interior cognitions and imposes them on the other outside of
himself. Small wonder Nietzsche unmistakably declares the death of God55 as a mark of
the decadence of both modernity and Christianity. Truly, along with the “death of God”
also comes the death of humanity and its inalienable rights and freedom, as well as the
obliteration of difference. The purported Kantian (Western) universal rationality became
the yardstick and the norm for judging others who are different. Hume who Kant
acknowledges as the one who woke him from his dogmatic slumber is directly appealed
to by Kant in his discourse on race. Thus Kant asserts that “so fundamental is the
difference between the two races of men (following Hume who claims that negroes are
naturally inferior to whites), and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities
54
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as in color.”56 For Kant, therefore, a clear proof of the evidence of rational capacity or
the lack of it becomes skin color (white or black).57 In keeping with this particular
Western conception of universal rationality, the position of Kant further justifies
colonialism and slavery on the grounds of the supposed inferiority of negroes to whites.
Kant’s claim that, “I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my
maxim should be become a universal law,” proves duplicitous since he (Kant) would not
wish that anyone should dehumanize him.
1.3.4 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
In the wake of classical theism culminating in modern philosophical theism which
introduced a hiatus between the supernatural and the natural, Hegel (1770-1831) comes
on board to once again recover the question of spirit (Geist) and spirit-language. He
actually sees himself at the explicit beginning of a shift from substance ontology which
dominated the medieval and early modern period to a philosophy of spirit. Hegel is said
to be the first to characterize his philosophical approach as a phenomenology. He
realizes this by conceptualizing reality not as “Being-in-Itself” (as substance) but as
“Being-for-Itself” (as Absolute Spirit). In his magnum opus, The Phenomenology of
Spirit, Hegel asserts:
everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally Subject…. Further, the living Substance is being which is in
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truth Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only insofar as it is the
movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself.58
Hegel thus conceives being as Geist and as movement which posits itself, becoming
other with itself or as a relation to itself. The contour of this movement is a triadic
dialectic between thesis and antithesis which resolves itself in a synthesis, and which in
turn becomes another thesis. The dialectic moves from identity to the negation of that
identity, then to a negation of the negation at which point the Spirit achieves a synthetic
reconciliation. In this unfolding movement, Spirit posits itself in each moment towards
its goal of becoming the Absolute Spirit. In the different moments of Spirit’s unfolding
movement, every reality becomes a self-expression or manifestation of Spirit.59 The
Absolute Spirit—which is the highest synthesis—is the apex and fullest expression of
Spirit’s movement in relating to or becoming itself. The Hegelian Spirit thus becomes
the necessary ontological unification of all reality and the ultimate principle of all
rationality. Because all reality is the necessary expression or unfolding of the Absolute
Spirit, according to Hegel’s conceptualization, then, even creation becomes a necessary
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creation. Again, because everything eventually becomes the Absolute Spirit, the
Hegelian spirit is totalizing and assimilating.60 This Hegelian position representing the
height of the articulation of German Idealism61 is problematic on further examination.
In a move from Kantian subjectivity to history, Hegel extrapolated from his Spirit
philosophical concept and applied it to his understanding of history and humanity. Hegel
sees history and humanity as the phenomenal dialectic of the self unfolding and
expression of Geist within consciousness. For Hegel then, European humanity, culture,
and historicity constitute the highest and fullest phenomenal manifestation of Weltgeist
(world-spirit and world-historical process). European humanity becomes not only
universal but the avatar and the norm of humanity as such. This Hegelian view, as
Kirsteen Kim rightly suggests: “tended to tie the Spirit to Western civilization as
representing the best ethical standards, the most developed consciousness, and the
highest reaches of human development.”62 The movement of the Spirit was not
considered to be evidenced in cultures other than the European. Understood in this light,
different categories or species of humanity other than the European came to be depicted
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as sub-human. In his Lectures on Philosophy of History,63 Hegel placed Africa outside
the historical beginning of the unfolding of Geist. Since the movement of spirit also
entails the unfolding of rationality, and since Africans are outside of the history of spirit,
Africans were thus depicted as lacking in rational thought and moral conduct, as
cannibals with no laws, and as enmeshed in fetishism. Moreover, since European culture
and humanity become the highest manifestation of Geist—which itself is essentially and
necessarily totalizing and assimilating of everything in its unfolding movement—then
colonial and capitalist expansionism becomes the logical necessity for the actualization
of the purported universal European historicity and humanity.
Indeed, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Right, Hegel silhouettes in detail the
theoretical architectonic that serves the justification and explication of colonialism as the
ineluctable outcome of the unfolding of spirit in history (European, of course).64
Because Africans have been depicted as irrational, it is unsurprising that Hegel denies
them rights as he clearly points out: “the civilized nation (and by this, Europe) is
conscious that the rights of the barbarians (Africans) are unequal to its own and treats
their autonomy as only a formality.”65 By thus negating at the metaphysical level the
cultural difference and humanity/historicity of the non-European African other, Europe
is able to posit the particularity and specificity of its own culture, historicity, and thus its
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own humanity as the ideal one. Whereas Europe represented itself as the ideal of
rationality and its understanding of spirit (God) as the only possible way, irrationality
and savagery, primitivism and fetishism were philosophically projected unto Africa.
Whereas Africans are demonized as half-devils and denigrated as half-children, Africa
then required the putative civilizing and Christianizing colonialism of European soldiers
and missionaries to dominate it, exorcise it, impose order, law, and morality, and bring
the child to maturity using the European as the norm of human existence as such. For
Hegel, Africans as sub-humans deserved to be enslaved in order to benefit them by
cross-pollinating them with European rationality, culture, and morality. The negation of
the humanity and the cultural difference of the African other aptly capture the violence
and oppressiveness that characterized the colonial, capitalist, and missionary expansion
of Europe.
All in all, Hegel’s attempt to recover spirit philosophically veered toward
dialecticism which degenerated into the abstraction of absolute spirit and with the
dialecticism collapsing into totalization and domination of the other. The absolutization
of European humanity and historicity constitute a certain form of idolatry. Such idolatry
entails the absolutization of a finite reality―European humanity, nation, race, and so
forth. As Kasper notes: “Such an absolutization…does in fact by its nature lead to
morally reprehensible actions and to the alienation not only to human beings from God
but of human beings from one another and of the individual from himself.”66 This
Hegelian construal became recycled among many subsequent European philosophers
who simply reinstated and re-inscribed it without much originality.
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1.3.5 Auguste Comte
The revolution began by Descartes to account for the natural world with no causal
relation to God found expansion in later positivist and evolutionary theories. Auguste
Comte devised positivism as a rational and scientific foundation for ethics and social
system. Of particular interest to us here is Comtean social philosophy. Comte conceives
that in the development of social and political organization, humans have to go through
three stages which he identifies as: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive.
Accordingly, during the theological stage, humans on account of their ignorance and
haste to organize society based their first moral order and social discipline on a
theological explication of the universe by referring the constitution of nature to a supreme
Creator of the world. For Comte, the trajectory of the theological is from Fetishism to
Polytheism and then to Monotheism. Comte views this contour from Fetishism through
Polytheism to Monotheism as really the gradual withdrawal of theological explication of
the universe to pave way for a more general and abstract approach—the metaphysical.
Metaphysical abstractions which were taken to be real entities thus substituted the
theological transcendent explanation of the universe. But for Comte, even the
metaphysical was merely disguising the abandonment of all transcendent explanations
whatsoever, while charting the course for the burgeoning strength of positive science for
positive explanations of the universe. Comte concludes that in the existing order of the
universe, the cause of phenomena is not supernatural but natural. Thus, God, the Spirit,
and the spiritual no longer have any relation to the material world. To backtrack a little
bit, in the Comtean exposition of the theological stage, certain so-called races were
identified as belonging to that milieu. Particularly, Comte says: “we are not aware that in
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any tribe of savages or negroes who have been observed, Fetishism has been found
totally unmixed with polytheism, and it is probable that the two coexisted from the
earliest period.”67 Thus, in his social philosophy, Comte conceives that society courses
through a certain trajectory from: magic through religion to positive science; from
promiscuity through matrilineal to patrilineal system of family, and from savagery
through barbarism to civilization.The enormous influence of this Comtean view of the socalled “savages” on later Western philosophers, colonizers, anthropologists, and even
Christian missionaries, cannot be overemphasized.
1.3.6 Herbert Spencer
Spencer revolutionized sociology through the extension of Charles Darwin’s
evolutionary theory. Taking Darwin and the intellectual climate of the late midnineteenth century as his point of departure, Spencer posits that the “law determining the
effects of contact of species [both intra and inter], races, varieties [and so forth,] among
many animals may be summed up under the formula of ‘the struggle for life [existence]
and the survival of the fittest.’”68 Spencer was the first to use the expression “the survival
of the fittest” and applied it to social evolution.69 Although, Darwin may have had a
socio-political agenda in his theory of evolution, he concentrated more on biological
evolution. It was Spencer and his cronies who, however, popularized what in the middle
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of the nineteenth century came to be known as social Darwinism which played a very
significant part, and not without unparalleled but unfortunate ramifications, in the history
of social and political ideas. Spencer transposed the evolutionary concept of adaptation
from biology to sociology. He agrees with Darwin that the relationship between
organisms (predators and preys) in the light of the availability of the means of subsistence
and the condition of the environment was an incessant cause of mutual adaptation which
produced improvements in senses and organs.70 In this struggle and rivalry for resources
between organisms which engender adaptation and the growth of organs, the organisms
that fail to adapt or improve their organs face extinction by natural selection, whereas
“successful modifications were inherited by subsequent generations, leading to
cumulative and progressive development.”71
Just like all organisms, Spencer conceives warfare as analogous to predation
among animals with the potential of engendering the survival of the fittest and the
strongest. Although violent aggression and warfare between societies were not to be
permanent, they evolve into what Spencer calls the industrial war which, nevertheless,
sustains the survival of the fittest: “after this stage [of violent aggression] has been
reached, the purifying process, continuing still an important one, remains to be carried on
by industrial war – by a competition of societies during which the best, physically,
emotionally, and intellectually, spread most, and leave the least capable to disappear
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gradually.”72 In this way, Spencer constructed two distinct models of human interaction
in the process of social organization in the world—the militant and the industrial—and
both of which are the by-products of the distinct stages of the evolving human nature.73
According to his conception of the different stages of human evolution, Spencer
distinguished between the higher race and the lower race, with the former always
assuming control because advanced and superior and the latter always subordinated
because inferior, and like savages, remained fixed at primitive evolutionary levels.
Spencer characterized the so-called lower and primitive race with the traits of a child.
The members of the barbarous race, due to their rudimentary moral and intellectual
capabilities had no concept of abstract ideas including any conception of truth, while their
imagination is but poorly developed.74 Thus, the so-called negro race was conceived as
still in childhood and, hence, constitutionally incapable of looking after itself as it has not
yet learned to walk alone in the paths of civilization.75 These characters of the lower race,
like the negro, which indicate that it is at the primitive or early stage of evolution, warrant
that slavery was appropriate for its subordination. Spencer opined that for the continued
survival of the higher race, war, brute force, and aggression were required to facilitate the
creation of larger social units through conquest and slavery to benefit the higher race.
Thus, through force, smaller groups were to be wielded into larger tribes and the latter
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into small, and then large, nations. These developments were also to engender the
expansion of morality which Spencer claims the savages are incapable of in the first
place.76 From the foregoing, it is obvious to see how the construction of Social
Darwinism has been harnessed as an expository device to justify imperialist ideological
policies that have oppressed, marginalized, and negated the humanity, cultural difference,
and historicity of the African other.
1.3.7 Placide Tempels
In 1945, Father Placide Tempels, a Belgian missionary who worked for many
years in the Democratic Republic of Congo wrote a book entitled Bantu Philosophy.77
Tempels’ aim was to furnish the colonial rulers and missionaries with an understanding
of indigenous African “philosophy.” Equipped with such an understanding, he hoped it
would be easier to implant the missionary message and civilizationary project right into
the subjectivity and interiority of Africans in a more sustainable fashion. Tempels’ work
is thus predominantly an exposition of the Baluba (an ethnic group in Congo) ontology
which grounded and regulated the daily ethical, political, economic, and religious
existence of Baluba Africans. Although, one of Tempels’ objectives was to enable the
success of European colonial missionary and civilisational enterprise in Africa, his work
holds great significance for African thought specifically his use of “philosophy” (ethnophilosophy) to characterize African ontology. Tempels conceived the Bantu world as
undergirded by “vital-force” which can be strengthened or diminished. The Bantu’s daily
struggle appears to be to overcome other forces that may diminish this vital force.
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As it has become obvious from the preceding sections, nearly all European
philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and even ecclesiastics spoke of Africans in
terms of savage mentality, incapability of rational thought, and a lack of moral content.
Others managed to speak of primitive thought that is permanently fixed at the lowest rung
of the evolutionary scale. In his groundbreaking book, Tempels spoke, however, of
philosophy, a term which to the Western mind symbolizes the highest exercise of reason.
The book’s title by default amounted to an admission of the existence of an African
reason; and by inference, the existence of an African humanity. However, since Tempels
could not completely extricate himself from the intellectual climate of the time, he only
recognized African Traditional Religion (hereafter ATR) as some form of primitive
monotheism. This recognition is very much akin to the Comtean sense of paving way for
something higher and better.78 Valentin Mudimbe is probably correct in saying that
“Perhaps one should also evaluate Tempels’s enterprise within the context of an era in
which Lévy-Bruhl’s dogmas were congruent with the colonizing objectives as well as
with the Christian mission expressed in an evolutionary grid.”79 For Tempels, Bantu’s
vitalistic (non-static) world-view was to be assimilated into European thought and culture
which became synonymous with the Christian tradition in order to become perfected and
civilized. Religious language within the missionary context in Africa became transcoded
for imperial and assimilationist purposes. Hence, Tempels could say: “our civilizing
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mission alone can justify our occupation of the lands of uncivilized peoples.”80 Tempels
has his critics especially from the Bantu hermeneutical and linguistic school who accuse
him of establishing equivalence between force and being as a simulacrum.81 For such
critics, the framework adopted by Tempels makes the Bantu force unthinkable without
instrumentalizing Western conceptuality. This is as Tempels himself grants, that “Bantu
ontology can be thought of and made explicit only because of the conceptual frame of
Western philosophy:” “It is we [Europeans] who will be able to tell them [the Bantu
Africans] in precise terms, what their inmost concept of being is.”82
By and large, Tempels is not without disciples. His work has inspired significant
philosophical and theological production in the Bantu nations (in the Central African
region). Such disciples include Rwandan philosopher, Alexis Kagamé, and pioneer
African (Congolese) theologians, Vincent Mulago, Tharcisse Tshibangu, etc.83 They have
argued for the pertinence of Tempels’ insights particularly with regard to the question of
dynamism (how every created being is an active dynamic force in interaction with a
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multitude of other forces and each influencing one another), life-force perpetuating
lineage, family (Jamaa), and community. Again, a group of African priests published Des
Prêtres Noirs s’interrogent (Paris, 1956) which drew on the achievements of Negritude
and African Personality while incorporating Tempels’ philosophical insights.
At any rate, the unmitigated colonial violence (occupation) with its economic,
political, and its other concomitant forms of exploitation was delusionally validated under
the disguise of a civilizing and Christianizing mission. Thus, in colonizing, Christian
Europe saw itself as carrying out the divine mandate to spread the faith to all parts of the
world and to impose on all, God’s law as incarnated by European culture.84 To
accomplish these, God, therefore, legitimates the employment of all possible means
including the use of violence.
1.4 Appraisal

of Modernity and its Promised Utopia

By way of synopsis, Kasper clearly accedes that the reasons for the eclipse of the
Spirit in modern Western tradition lie in the intellectual climate of the time. According to
him, “after the passing of Goethe, Hegel, and Schleiermacher this philosophy of spirit
suddenly collapsed. Since that time the idealist interpretation of spirit has largely yielded
the field to a materialistic and evolutionary interpretation.”85 Kasper goes on to say:
reality is no longer viewed as a manifestation of spirit, but rather spirit is understood as an epiphenomenon of reality, being conceived as a superstructure built on the economic and social process or as a surrogate and sublimation
of man who is defined as a being made up of needs. Finally, a positivist and
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supposedly ‘exact’ understanding of science demanded the renunciation of
the concept of ‘spirit’ because of its multiplicity of meanings and the impossibility of providing an exact definition of it; it demanded that we remain silent
regarding that which we cannot define with precision.86
Such evolutionary and positivistic progress became a utopian vision which transformed
into oppressive binarisms between superior and inferior, civilized and savage, white and
black, higher and lower, advanced and fixed, better and worse, mature and childish, and
so on. These binarisms which were determined by the presence of physical,
physiognomic, and psychic characteristics were hammered out merely on the anvil of
unrealistic theories that ignored the data of experience of the victimized; they became the
barometers used to calibrate the racial worth of African peoples, institutions, and sociocultural organizations.
Whenever the formulation of God/Spirit-language is crafted in complete
metaphysical abstraction or is substituted by wholesale subjectivity, it often leads to
dualism—either between spirit and body or a thoroughgoing dualism between the divine
Spirit and humans which in turn places the imago Dei under erasure. In the case of the
latter, the divine Spirit/God becomes merely a sublimated subjectivity. We see this
process which radically started with Descartes through Kant, and all the way to Hegel,
become theoretically formulated in Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872). Feuerbach opines
that the notion of God is just a projection of man’s desire for infinity on to God; hence,
“man makes a god of what he is not but would like to be.”87 The indelible importance of
Feuerbach is obvious, for instance, in K. Marx, J.-P. Sartre, M. Merleau-Ponty, but
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expressed most aptly in Sigmund Freud’s (1856-1939) psychoanalytic explication of
religion. A sublimated subjectivity in turn asserts “will to power” in order to lord it over
others. If there is any diagnostic index of modern culture, it is clearly the “death of God.”
But the displacement of God always entails a replacement with human ideology.
As John Paul II notes, beginning with the Enlightenment through Descartes to
post-Cartesian era, man (Western) has remained alone: “alone as creator of his own
history and his own civilization; alone as one who decides what is good and what is bad,
as one who would exist and operate etsi Deus non daretur, even if there were no God.”
Put another way, the modern autonomous subject can know as true only phenomena
which are given within the matrix of consciousness, thus all noumenal realities, including
God or Spirit, can only be postulates as demanded for moral conduct. In this connection,
because God becomes only a postulate, modernity creates a social order in which ethics is
dependent on the autonomy of the individual subjectivity under the presumption that God
does not exist or even if God exists, the autonomous individual must live as if God does
not matter. Continuing, the Pope clearly and logically argues that “if man can decide by
himself, without God, what is good and what is bad, he can also determine that a group of
people is to be annihilated [and by extension through the violence of slavery and
colonialism].”88 Thus, where sublimated human subjectivity becomes God, then the death
of God and the death of humans, to a large extent, go together. As Badcock underscores,
“The preachers of freedom, in short, have not delivered their promised utopia. Indeed,
quite the reverse has occurred. The age of freedom has been the single greatest era of
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human barbarity in history.”89 It is crystal clear especially from the historical events
during the twentieth century that the purported ideal of freedom as construed by modern
objective rationality has in fact been violently dehumanizing.
With the eclipse of God/Spirit, human freedom actually dies along with human
inalienable rights. Civilization transmutes into barbarism. According to Chinua Achebe in
“An Image of Africa,” citing Irish Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, the West uses
Africa to define itself and to establish its own superiority as civilized as opposed to
primitive Africa.90 Showing how crucial this kind of constructed dialectic is to European
self-definition, Edward Said notes, “if colonized people are irrational, Europeans are
rational; if the former are barbaric, sensual, and lazy, Europe is civilization itself, with its
sexual appetites under control and its dominant ethic that of hard work.”91 The goal of
such dialectic is to portray the non-European other as not the kind of people that “we”
(Europeans) are. With this “self-deceiving moral smugness,”92 the colossal brutality and
violence that accompanied the colonial project were simply explained away to serve
European interests.
Because the dialectical and dualistic philosophies spawned by the
modernity/coloniality project failed to sustain the dualisms it created without collapsing
into homogenization, assimilation, exclusion, and domination, they ended up serving the
justification of colonialism and slavery of the African other. The language of “difference
89
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in kind” was introduced by Europeans “as a way of justifying unspeakable exploitation
and denigration of Africans.93 The worst evil and “the most harmful harm” is often the
one perpetrated against the other by the “good” [and the so called civilized] who have the
luxury of power and the apparatus to exercise domination.94 In the light of contemporary
awareness of our pluralistic contexts and historical consciousness, it becomes necessary
to broach a different category that is capable of enhancing a better appreciation and
integration of “difference,” “identity,” and “alterity.” This work aims to establish that
relational pneumatology would do just that. The recovery of relational pneumatology is
even more urgent today as oppressive ideologies and new forms of marginalization have
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been reconstituted in other ways especially in the form of neocolonialism and
globalization.
1.5 A

New Turn to Pneumatology
Beginning from the second half of the twentieth century, ample evidence indicates

an increasing attention to pneumatology from a smorgasbord of perspectives and
traditions. This phenomenon has been described by some scholars as: “a new advent of
the Spirit in both the theology and the life of the churches.”95 This is not to imply that the
Spirit has been completely absent. Rather, as has been abundantly made clear in the
foregoing section, the Spirit who is the Lord and Giver of life, whose presence fills the
whole world and the church, and who indwells humans, has for too long been neglected
due to inadequate and unbalanced attention. Obviously, neo-Scholastic theology had so
absorbed a static understanding of God inherited from classical Greek metaphysics that
the dynamism and communal love that characterize the Triune God were lost sight of.96
This work seeks to recover and explicate the relationality and self-giving love of the
Triune God as it is actualized through the ceaseless activity and creativity of the Spirit,
and what it may mean for relating to those regarded as other and for the construction of
identity. This approach resonates with contemporary understanding of reality as no longer
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a static and mechanistic entity constituted by disparate and atomized parts, but as a web
of dynamic communion, interconnectedness, and complex relationships. It is redolent
with the overall thrust of “Systems Theory,”97 personalist philosophy, chaos theory, and
above all, West African world-views which conceive relationality as a key characteristic
of reality. The question then becomes how the Church may effectively safeguard both the
identities of Africans—their cultural, socio-political, and religious difference—and the
specificity of the Christian faith, and thus become a credible agent of change in the social
transformation of Africa.
The Trinitarian communion of persons and self-giving love as effectuated by the
Spirit serves as a paradigm for an understanding of identity in relation to otherness to be
pursued in this work. The Spirit of fellowship safeguards the Persons of the Trinity from
indulging in self-enclosed love. At the same time, the Spirit of fellowship and
relationality who sustains the nonself-enclosed love of the persons of the Trinity creates
space in God for fellowship with humanity, as well as fellowship and communion among
humans. In the Trinity, as Miroslav Volf puts it, “The one divine person is not that person
only, but includes the other divine persons in itself; it is what it is only through the
indwelling of the others.”98 Nevertheless, this mutual indwelling of the persons neither
results to the dissolution of the particularity of the self into some form of indistinct
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identity nor the absorption of the others into the self, such that the self becomes all of
reality. This paradigm of relational pneumatology will be explored subsequently with
attention to its implications for Christian practice of relating to its neighbors and to those
viewed as different. At this juncture, however, it is of decisive importance to clarify how
the person of the Holy Spirit is to be understood herein.
1.5.1 The Person and Proprium of the Spirit
In various ways the idea of the identity and Person of the Holy Spirit had been
relegated to a secondary position, if the Spirit is not even completely denied any
personhood in Western theology. Besides the Latin tradition, one also finds this
phenomenon to be prevalent in Process and certain Protestant Theologies, which in one
way or another, wield influence on some Catholic theologies. Process Theology, for
instance, views the Holy Spirit not as Person (as a distinct hypostasis in the mystery of
the Triune God) but as a term to designate the necessary immanence of God in the world.
The Spirit becomes simply a metaphor for expressing religiously an attribute of God’s
nature, as a “mode of God’s universal presence” in the cosmos.99
Again, Karl Barth, who, in some ways, influenced Karl Rahner, understands the
Holy Spirit as a “mode of being” of God both in the inner-trinitarian relationship between
the Father and the Son, and the realization of God’s self-revelation in the human being.
Put simply, the Holy Spirit is the event of divine self-relating. Barth’s perspective not
only leads to the eclipse of the Holy Spirit’s distinct identity but is also beset by a
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modalist tendency.100 Truly, Barth allots centrality to the Trinity in his theology, yet he
“gives the appearance of thinking of God as a single Person existing in three unidentified
modes.”101 Looking at the immanent Trinity in such agnostic manner has definitely
landed some of Barth’s disciples into Unitarianism.102 In his critique of Barth, Robert
Jenson reads that in Barth, the Holy Spirit is reduced to the power of Jesus Christ’s being;
the Spirit is what happens when Jesus Christ exercises his power. In this way, the Spirit is
explained as something rather than as someone.103
Hendrikus Berkhof toes the line of Barth but introduces a nuance in the
understanding of the Spirit as person. According to Berkhof:
The triune God does not embrace three persons; he himself is person, meeting us
in the Son and in his Spirit. Jesus Christ is not a person beside the person of God.
In him the person of God becomes the shape of a human person. And the Spirit is
not a person beside the persons of God and Christ. In creation he [the Spirit] is the
acting person of God, in re-creation he [the Spirit] is the acting person of Christ,
who is no other than the acting person of God. Therefore, we must reject all presentation of the Spirit as an impersonal force. The Spirit is person because he is
God acting as a person. He is a person in relation to us, not in relation to God; for
he is the personal God himself in relation to us.104
Berkhof’s affirmations seem to deny any genuine inner differentiation in the identity of
the persons of the Trinity, and as such inclines toward Sabellianism or modalism. He,
therefore, conceives God as a single Person or Subject with different modes of outward
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expression and not as a Tri-unity of persons. Equally, in accordance with Geoffrey
Lampe, the Spirit is neither an “impersonal influence nor a divine entity or hypostasis
which is a third person of the Godhead, but God himself, his personal presence, as active
and related.”105 For Lampe, then, the Holy Spirit simply refers to God himself and not to
a distinct person, the third person of the Trinity. These perspectives that have been
considered here undermine the missions of the second and third persons in the economic
Trinity since they tend to deny any authentic inner distinctions in the immanent Trinity
which grounds the missions in the economic Trinity.
There is no doubt that if distinctiveness can be ascribed to the Father and the Son,
it is also ascribable to the Spirit. If the three members of the Trinity are described as
persons, are they equally persons in the same way? Yet, because of the familiar family
imageries associated with the terms, Father and Son, it is easier to have at least, a tangible
sense of the designations in terms of persons. The Spirit, however, presents a unique
challenge because of the absence of a similar familiar family imagery to designate her
personhood.106 So in what way can the Spirit be said to be a person? The objection to use
the term person to designate the trinitarian hypostases, and especially in the identification
of the third hypostasis is made much more formidable by Western understanding of
person, beginning from Descartes, as a stable, autonomous, and independent center of
consciousness. Going by this construal of person, the trinitarian persons may amount to
tritheism, as three gods and three centers of consciousness. It is in view of such modern
sensibility that Barth prefers the alternative term “mode of being” to person whereas
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Rahner speaks of “Subsisting Relations,” “three relatively distinct ways of existing,” or
“ways of being.”107 It is true as Rahner grants that the category of person is not a biblical
concept but a theological construct which is one of his reasons for pushing for setting it
aside. Rahner hopes that consciously dropping the concept of person would not
jeopardize our understanding of the Trinity as it is revealed.108 Rahner’s concepts act as
functional analogies rather than personal ones for delineating the complexity of God’s
being.109 The fact, however, remains that Rahner’s alternative terms still suggest some
form of neomodalism as Hill contends.110 If Rahner accepts the term “Trinity” in order to
articulate its mode of existing, is it not also the case that the term is non-biblical and a
theological construct? To be sure, Rahner knows that the term Trinity, although not a
biblical concept, justifiably preserves the truth of Scripture (that the Godhead comprises
the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; three but one and only true God) than a mere
preoccupation with words of Scripture. So how then can we continue to speak of three
persons but one God?
Apart from the sensibility towards the modern construal of person, which is a
genuine concern, is it sufficient to dismiss the term “person” on grounds of its nonbiblical status but only a theological construct? I suggest that it would still be helpful to
retain the term “Person” notwithstanding its non-biblical foundation to preserve the
biblical truth that the members of the Trinity co-exist in mutual relationship of reciprocal
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self-giving and receiving love and are more than mere “manifestation of God in three
roles”111 as any functional analogies tend to suggest. God is not merely a single
undifferentiated unity but a triadic complex communion of persons in love.112 It is not
within the scope of this work to trace the long development of the term “Person” as much
of that has already been done by other scholars.113 Suffice it to say that in this corpus, the
term “person” should be understood as a distinct identity who enters into relationships
with otherness and does not exist without or apart from the others. So understood then,
the term Person makes sense only in terms of relationships/relationality. As a distinct
identity, a person is uniquely centered but not necessarily self-enclosed or self-centered.
Persons, as Paul Fiddes nicely points out, “are ‘ecstatic,’ that is self-transcending in
communication with others, especially in the movement of love. …the person lives from
openness beyond itself to others; it is a centre in the sense of being a centre of
communication. What is primary is not self-reflection [in the sense of the Cartesian
cogito], but action in relationships.”114 To be person, therefore, transcends simply being
an individual but one who is not apart from otherness. It is in this sense that we would
understand person as used with regard to the Trinity. It is thus, in this light that we speak
of the Spirit as a distinct Person, indeed as the third Person of the Trinity. Ultimately,
Fiddes’ caveat is to be heeded, that “personal language for God remains an analogy, but it
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has the capacity to be a language of participation, pointing to engagement in God and
drawing us into such involvement.”115 The language of person and relationality in God
resonates with what we do in worship, for instance, and so is significant for “the
corporate life of a community.”116
1.5.2 Biblical Testimony to the Personhood of the Spirit
As noted earlier, there has been a tendency in Western theology to deny
personhood to the Spirit and view her simply as the power of Christ. It is not right, as
Gregory of Nazianzus rightly warned, to “give Essence to the Father and deny
Personality to the Others, and make Them only Powers of God.”117 In the biblical stories
of the New Testament, we can easily recognize the three Characters, Father, Son, and
Spirit, interact and relate among themselves, at least in the oikonomia which is about the
mission of the Son and the Spirit from the Father in the world.118 At a minimal level, the
concept of person suggests a “being who can say ‘I’ with self-reflexivity or… with
awareness.”119 Instances abound in the Bible in which God is presented as speaking in the
first-person singular pronoun. A typical example, among several others, is found in
Exodus 3:14 where God says “I AM.” Again, at the baptism of Jesus in which the
trinitarian persons are seen to be interacting, the Father says “You are my Son, this day I
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have begotten you” [(Lk 3:23), emphasis mine]. The case of Jesus is not difficult to
discern since he became human with a human face and spoke human language. But
among several instances of where Jesus uses the first-person pronoun, one that has a tinge
of emphasis to it has to do with his response, at his trial, to the crowds’ chorused
interrogation, “‘So you are the Son of God?’ And Jesus said to them, ‘You are right, I
am’” (Lk 22:70). In the case of the Holy Spirit, there is clearly a paucity of instances
where the Spirit speaks in the first-person. However, one obvious evidence is found in
Acts 13:2 where the Holy Spirit speaks in the first-person when giving direction to the
church at Antioch to commission Barnabas and Paul for mission work, “Set apart for me
Barnabas and Paul for the work to which I have called them (emphasis mine).” This firstperson perspective with regard to the Holy Spirit is, as Cole concurs, “a sufficient
condition for personhood;” while admitting at the same time its slenderness as a basis on
which to establish a robust doctrine of the personhood of the Spirit.120
In any case, the New Testament is replete with evidences that indicate the
construal of the Holy Spirit as a Person. John’s Gospel, more often than not, speaks of the
hypostatic Holy Spirit that Jesus would send to his disciples in the wake of his departure
to return to the Father. Thus, in what is described as his Last Discourse, Jesus promises to
send “another Comforter” (paraklētos); also “Helper” or “Advocate” or “Counselor.” By
saying “another Comforter,” Jesus appears to imply that the Comforter would be “another
of the same kind as Jesus”121 himself; someone “who is equi-hypostatic in relation to the
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hypostatic Logos.”122 Just as mentioned above, apart from the one clear instance where
the Holy Spirit speaks in the first-person, other references that speak of the Spirit as a
person, particularly, the Johannine Last Discourse, use the third-person personal pronoun.
The following instances, therefore, suggest that the Holy Spirit can be spoken of
as a person: “I will ask the Father and he will send you another Comforter to be with you
forever, that Spirit of truth whom the world cannot receive because it neither sees him nor
knows him. But you know him, for he is with you and will be in you” (Jn 14:16-17); “But
the Comforter, the Holy Spirit…he will teach you all things” (v. 26); “When the
Comforter comes…the Spirit of truth, he will testify about me” (15:26); “I will send him
to you and when he comes, he will convict the world” (16: 7-8); “when he, the Spirit of
truth comes, he will guide you into all truth. He will not speak on his own; he will speak
only what he hears, and he will tell you what is yet to come. He will bring glory to me by
taking from what is mine and making it known to you” [(vv. 13-14), all emphasis mine].
Sergius Bulgakov contends that all these references can be understood only if we view
them “as spoken with reference to a person [not mere personification] and, moreover, to a
person who is perfectly similar to the person of the other Comforter, Christ.”123 We
should make no mistake about this. Bulgakov is not suggesting that Christ and the Spirit
are identical without any distinction. Of course, for Jesus’ promise of “another” implies a
second after the first, and hence, a distinction in identity. It is on the basis of this promise
of another Comforter with a personal coefficient that Bulgakov argues that the event of
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the Pentecost could be nothing other “the descent of the third hypostasis Himself into the
world; not of spirit but of the Spirit, not of the gifts only, but of their Source, the
Paraclete.”124 An understanding of the personhood of the Spirit as articulated above is
helpful in avoiding the reduction of the Spirit to just God acting or simply “an impersonal
force from God.”125 As Gregory of Nazianzus points out about speaking of the Spirit as
God’s action or act, “act language reduces the Spirit to an accident of God.”126
Other New Testament testimonies that allude to the personal character of the Holy
Spirit include, inter alia, the following: in the epistle to the Romans, Paul writes of the
witness of “the Spirit [who] assures our spirit that we are God’s children” (8:16); “the
Spirit helps us in our weakness. …the Spirit himself intercedes for us with groans that
words cannot express. And he (God) who searches our hearts knows the mind of the
Spirit, because the Spirit intercedes for the saints in accordance with God’s will” (vv. 2627). It is only a person in the true sense of the word that can pray or intercede for another;
that can be said to have a mind, and that can intercede according God’s will. A sheer
impersonal force cannot perform any of such personal acts. The “mind” of the Spirit (to
phronēma tou pneumatos) can only be spoken of a person rather than of a blind force or
power. The Spirit must then be a person in order to perform such actions. Again, in 1
Corinthians 2:10, “The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God.”
Furthermore, the text, “All these are the work of one and the same Spirit, and he gives
them to each one, just as he determines” (1 Cor 12:11) also confirms the personal
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character of the Spirit. Again, if God is personal, it is legitimate to say that by the same
token, the Spirit of God belongs in some sense to the same nature as God’s from whom
she proceeds. As proceeding from the Father (as in an “act” of the Father) who is the
origin of divinity, since “act” follows “the manner of being,” then the Spirit who
proceeds from the Father belongs to the nature of God who is Person. As Paul says: “only
the Spirit of God searches the depths of God” (1 Cor 2: 10-12); for the Spirit to search the
depths of God, then she must be a Person in a sense and not merely power or an
impersonal force. Moreover, Ephesians 4:30 characterizes the Holy Spirit as a person
who can be grieved and so warns: “do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, with whom you
were sealed for the day of redemption.” One can grieve only a person but not a sheer
force. The fact that Holy Spirit remains invisible does not necessarily militate against her
personality; “that…belongs to the category of Paraclete―Teacher, Director, Protector,
[and] Counselor―this invests…[her] with all the essential attributes of that which we
understand by personality.”127
We have so far established that the Holy Spirit is a Person rather than an
impersonal force. Yet, the Bible is replete with impersonal metaphors used to describe
the Spirit and her activities. For example, the Spirit is spoken of as wind, fire, breath,
dove, water, and so on. How do we reconcile such impersonal metaphors with the
identity of the Spirit as a person who is also personal? Ralph Del Colle has argued for
the “complementarity of impersonal and personal images of the Holy Spirit.” He
contends that a trajectory that moves from the category of “presence to power to
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personhood”128 would generate a more robust trinitarian pneumatology. According to Del
Colle, “The Spirit’s presencing is donative and life-giving but self-effacing in regard to
the Spirit’s own Person.”129 Thanks to her self-effacement, in both economic and
immanent Trinity, the Holy Spirit manifests the Persons of the Father and the Son and is
constituent of their distinction from each other.130 Thus, the Spirit of relationality
prevents the Triune Persons from either collapsing into each other or remaining selfenclosed without openness to the other. In this way too, the Spirit creates space in the
Trinity into which she ushers humans to participate in Trinitarian love. It is only as
person, as Del Colle notes, that the Spirit “can recreate persons in community ecstatically
oriented to the other.”131 The Spirit sustains the ecstasy of the divine life, the loving
relationships within the Trinity, as well as its overflow in creation and history. Even
though in the traditional Trinitarian taxis, the Spirit appears as a third Person, she
nevertheless, remains the contact Person in whom God through Christ reaches out to the
world in love, as well as in whom we have access to the Father through Christ.132
1.5.3 The Spirit and Gender
As hinted at earlier, gender identity has for too long been one of the ways by
which difference has been used negatively to suppress and dominate the other. There is
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no question that gender discourse is a very sensitive issue in almost every area of
contemporary studies, more so, in theological scholarship.133 Masculinity has often been
conceived as superior to femininity which, by the same token, has been consistently
deemed inferior, and hence, the frequent mistreatment and marginalization of women by
men. Such construal has had several implications for women who have been suppressed
variedly: economically, politically, socially, culturally, religiously, and so on. Gender
issue calls for cultivation of sensitivity and attention to the language of gender about
God, and more particularly, about the Holy Spirit. The revolution in gender scholarship
has, among other things, engendered the use of inclusive language currently in speaking
to issues of general concern as well as a reconsideration of patriarchy.
Some feminist theologians have vehemently interpellated the dominant and
exclusive use of male metaphors for the Triune God. According to such view, the
exclusive use of male metaphors for God does not offer women a horizon within God; it
makes women find no place of belonging in God.134 In order, therefore, to provide a
horizon for women in God, and to make for what some regard as equality of genders,
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some other feminist theologians have advocated for making one of the Persons of the
Trinity, precisely the Holy Spirit, feminine; or more radically, to use exclusively female
metaphors for all the trinitarian Persons.135 A possible strong reason for all this push
about gender language in God is that an equilibration of God’s gender would go a long
way in accounting for the equal dignity of men and women. Without trivializing this
argument for the equal dignity of men and women since patriarchy has been dominant for
too long, the fact remains that God is neither male nor female. God is essentially
genderless or transgender.
Again, even the question of making one of the Triune Persons feminine in order
to foster the equality of men and women is still not sufficiently balanced since the other
two members remain males. Moreover, pushing for wholesale female metaphors for the
Triune Persons ends up excluding men entirely. In that sense, it reinscribes what it is
trying to overcome. The point is that we must cultivate sensitivity to the fact that God is
beyond all gender distinctions. At best, the language of gender distinctions in God is due
to the limitation of human language which speaks about persons in terms of sexual
distinctions as either male or female. Indeed, the current revolution in sexual orientations
problematizes language of sexual distinctions in God: is God male or female,
homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, transsexual, and so on? Since God is beyond all
gender, “gendered language about God should not be used to legitimize a particular
construction of gender identity”136 such as masculinity is superior because God is male
whereas femininity is inferior because God is not feminine. “All employment of God
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language for construction of gender identity is illegitimate and ought to be resisted.
…Whether we use masculine or feminine metaphors for God, God models our common
humanity, not our gender specificity.”137 God mirrors qualities characteristic of both
fatherhood and motherhood. Volf maintains that whereas gender identity is rooted in our
sexed bodies, its content is culturally and socially constructed, interpreted, negotiated,
and re-negotiated over time and space.138
Going by the traditional metaphors used for the trinitarian persons, while the
Father and the Son are specifically male metaphors, the Spirit is not gender-specific. In
Hebrew, the term Spirit (rûah) is said to be usually but not always grammatically
feminine. The Spirit, rendered as (pneuma) in Greek is grammatically neuter. But in
Latin, the word Spirit (spiritus) is grammatically masculine, whereas in Syriac, Spirit is
also feminine. In the Johannine Gospel, the Spirit (paraklētos) is masculine, hence,
John’s use of the pronouns “he,” “his,” and “him,” when speaking of the Holy Spirit.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the question of the metaphorical gender of the
Spirit is far from settled but remains an open one. Thus, one can use any of the
pronouns―he, she, or it―for the Holy Spirit.139 But since we have already established
beyond reasonable doubt that the Holy Spirit possesses personhood, using the pronoun
“it” detracts from that personhood, thingifies or reifies it, and thus renders the Spirit as an
impersonal force or power. Furthermore, since the Spirit can be viewed as both feminine
and masculine, using exclusively feminine metaphor for the Spirit would tend to ossify
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gender distinctions in God and gloss over or even deny the feminine dimensions of Father
and Son. While it remains imperative for us to be sensitive to gender issues especially as
gender differences have for a long time been used to totalize and suppress others, it is,
nevertheless, far from being clear that the ascription of feminine metaphor to the Spirit
solves rather than creates more problems. The fact that it is obvious that different
Christian traditions use different genders for the Spirit, implies that God transcends
gender. This is a fact to which we must be sensitive. Since God is genderless, any gender
language about God must be very sensitive to this fact and must not use gender
differences to legitimate such oppressive binaristic hierarchies as superior/inferior,
strong/weak, diligent/lazy, and so on. Since the Spirit can be spoken of using different
gender metaphors depending on the context and tradition, this work will be faithful to the
gender pronoun for the Spirit when making reference to any of the said traditions. But
overall, we shall just use the term “Spirit” and particularly when referring to the work of
the Spirit as the one who births life, we shall use the female pronoun. All in all, “The
Spirit of God gives rise to a multiplace force field that is sensitive to differences. In this
force field, enjoyment of creaturely, invigorating differences can be cultivated while
unjust, debilitating differences can be removed in love, mercy, and gentleness.”140 The
“unity of the Spirit” is not destructive of differences but rather effectively cultivates and
sustains such differences in the differentiated community that is the body of Christ.141
This action of the Spirit with regard to differences inspires sensitivity to difference and
challenges all manner of “uncontrolled generalizations made from a specific, typical
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perspective.”142 The unity of the Spirit is not, therefore, a simplistic monohierarchical
uniformity but rather entails an enriching, life-giving, “life-enhancing, invigorating
pluralism of the Spirit.”143 Admittedly, within the equality-in-difference cultivated by the
Spirit, equality does not obliterate differences; “men do not become women and women
do not become men,”144 Greeks are not Jews and Jews are not Greeks. Yet each enriches
and benefits from the other in a relationality that yields openness to identity construction.
1.6 Terminological

Clarifications

1.6.1 Alterity/Other and Same/Self
Etymologically, the term alterity is derived from the Latin alter – těra – těrum
which has a number of semantic possibilities. It could mean “one of two;” as a numeral, it
means “second;” of similarity, it means “another” or “a second,” and, of difference, it
means “other.” The term is further related to the Latin alteritat; alteritas which means
“the state of being ‘other’ or ‘different.’”145 Other synonyms of the term include: alter
ego, alternation, and so forth. Thus, the term alterity points to the particularity,
distinctiveness, and irreducibility of the “other.” It is a matter of saying that the other as
one of two, as the second in the set cannot simply be reduced or collapsed into the one or
the self. The identity of the other cannot be annihilated.
Western philosophical tradition especially under the aspects of modernity
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constructed “an ontology of ‘sameness.’” Such ontology was embedded on the
immanence of consciousness as the matrix for knowledge and signification. Since the
time of Descartes, Kant, Husserl and others, the essences of objective reality (noemata) in
the world have to give themselves to consciousness and its acts (noesis) in order to
constitute knowledge and meaning making. In this way not only were phenomena but
also human beings were reduced to concepts in order to be objects of knowledge. In
Husserlian phenomenological tradition of eidetic or egological reduction, for instance,
what is knowable and known, is that which in intentionality becomes one with
consciousness as the object intended.146 To speak of knowledge of the other then, all that
the subject or the self has to do is simply to solipsistically return to self devoid of any
relation to the exteriority and objectivity of the other as other. In this solipsistic noetic
movement, the other is only realized by the self as an objectified and thematized
“included self” and who thus brings the other into presence via intentional consciousness.
The other becomes merely a duplicate of the self and is not related to as a subject. This
amounts to ontological violence and epistemic imperialism.
Until Levinas, in Western philosophy, the other has always been suppressed and
reduced to the regime of sameness. Sameness in this sense is that which assimilates both
actually and potentially everything which lies outside it.147 The same, going by this
construal totalizes the other par excellence; it incorporates alterity within the hegemony
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and empire of sameness.148 Against this backdrop, Levinas’ intellectual breakthroughs
aimed at not only a break with this imperial ontology in order to preserve the
irreducibility of alterity but equally at the preservation of the relationship between the
same and the other without the dissolution of either.149 Whether or not Levinas succeeded
in such an attempt is a matter of debate. Nevertheless, it is to his credit to have pointed
out this subterranean but insidious current prevailing in Western production of
knowledge.
In current philosophy especially since Levinas, the term alterity has shifted the
focus on the other from being conceived merely as an epistemic other― the other whose
significance merely lies in the extent to which s/he can be known as the object of
consciousness―to the particular, objective, and concrete other “who is actually located in
a political, cultural, linguistic or religious context.”150 Since genuine encounter is possible
only where an other is recognized as such, it is such a recognition that can engender the
possibility of “a transference across and between differences of culture, gender, class,
[religion], and other social categories.151 The other is to be recognized as an other and not
merely tolerated. For operative under toleration is the assumption that the self is still
superior to the other who happens to be different from the self; thus the self merely
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tolerates the other without actually acknowledging the difference of the other.152 In this
work, therefore, the “other” is to be understood as one who is always located and
sedimented within a particular context and may not be subsumed under some form of
universal and universalizing category.
1.6.2 Identity and Difference
As seen from the foregoing, especially in modernity, conceptions of ontology and
epistemology seem to gravitate around a stable self who interpellates reality by subjecting
it to the categories of the mind in order to arrive at the truth of knowledge. This essential
self perseveres in being in the manner of Spinoza’s essendi. But identity is not about
essentialism or nativism. Identity is about the self, while maintaining an “I” becomes an
“I” that is able to be open to an other in an encounter. Without being destroyed, the “I” in
the encounter with the other in a milieu of “giving and receiving” is rather transformed
and enriched as well as the other. In order to shed some light with regard to how identity
is to be understood in this work, a cursory look at one way of understanding identity
according Homi Bhabha would be helpful. In his innovative work, The Location of
Culture,153 Bhabha specifies three conditions that underlie the process of identification
from the perspective of postcolonial discourse.
The first is that “to exist is to be called into being in relation to an otherness, its
look or locus.”154 Bhabha here brings out the importance of locatedness and context in
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the forging of identity. Genuine identity can only be forged in relation to an other who is
different in a space that holds the possibility of the inversion of roles like those between a
host and a guest. Identity is, therefore, not about perseverance in being, insistence on
essendi or stable essence, but an openness to the giving of self to the other as well as
receiving the other into the self. The self necessarily has to step out of its consolidating
essence in openness to the other “and undertake a re-adjustment of its identity in light of
the other’s alterity.”155 In this process, identity construction is “constantly in statu
nascendi rather than essendi, brought over again into being.”156 Such a process often
creates differing identities not only by repetitive encounters with the other but also when
there is a change in the complex social structuration of relationships in the space that the
self and the other inhabit.
In the second condition, Bhabha notes that “the very place of identification…is a
space of splitting."157 The insight of Bhabha here is suggestive of the ambivalence of
identity construction especially under such oppressive and repressive condition as
colonialism. The colonized and totalized other asserts his irreducibility to the same by
subverting the self’s artifice inscribed on the body of the other.158 The other mimics the
same without actually becoming the same. Depending on the situation, there is a certain
masking or personage that goes with the process of identification which in turn points to
the agency of the other. Thus, identity is always negotiated and renegotiated in the
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interstitial space of encounter. The other is one who cannot simply be completely
totalized; the other possesses a surplus of meaning and possibilities that can never be
completely known or simply be incorporated into sameness. There is no such thing as
absolute knowledge of the other as totality claims.
Finally, the third is that “the question of identification is never the affirmation of a
pre-given identity, never a self-fulfilling prophecy – it is always the production of an
image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image. The
demand of identification, that is, to be for an Other – entails the representation of the
subject in the differentiating order of otherness.”159 This reinforces the point that identity
production is not merely a return to a native pre-originary essence but always a
transformation of the subject in the encounter with the other at distinct levels of
differential relationships in the space of the “in-between.” More than perseverance in
being, identity production is about ways of existing, about how relationships are forged
through constant negotiation, splitting, repetition, and re-adjusment in the third space or
interstice.
The phenomenon of difference is indicative of the fact that all reality is
differentiated. There seems to be a subtle distinction between diversity and difference.
Whereas, according to Letty Russell, “Diversity is about variety in general. …difference
refers to concrete elements in our lives that distinguish, contrast, or separate one group or
person from another.”160 As Al Condeluci has pointed out, “Difference can come in all
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shapes and form. Some people are different in appearance, or skin color, or culture [or
race, or religion, or gender, or class]. Others are different in the way they think, or act, or
relate. Still others are different because they are poor, inept, or unhealthy; tall, short or
squat.”161 Understood in this sense, difference is a given. Indeed, “Differences
themselves are a God-given gift.”162 In itself, difference alone is not necessarily cause
for negative experience, hostility, or rejection. As a matter of fact, the reality of the
mosaic of differences makes interrelationships and relationality possible. For it is from
within the riches of one’s difference that one is able to step out into the space of the “inbetween” to enrich the other and be enriched by the other. Difference can be used either
as a tool for, or a weapon against fostering communication and understanding one
another. Put another way, difference can be used either for good or for ill. It is used as a
weapon when, “the notion of difference is…experienced from its shadow side.”163 That
is, when it is used as a rationale to oppress, downgrade, exclude, and denigrate the other.
This is usually the case when a particular understanding of difference is viewed as the
norm and serves as the standard for otherizing and measuring other particular differences.
In that case, difference becomes “constructed as a tool for oppression and
manipulation.”164 It is little wonder Canadian Jesuit theologian, Lonergan, rebukes “those
people and cultures who read themselves as normative, while they assume that ‘the rest
of the world is made up of strangers and the strangers are totally strange, totally
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odd…inscrutably Oriental’ [or African].”165 This normativity is used to essentialize,
otherize, inferiorize, distantiate, and exclude those other particular differences―peoples,
cultures, religions, gender, and others―that are found, or thought to be outside of the
norm. To put it differently, those that fail to fit into the normative matrix are construed as
abnormal. Such construal of abnormality usually becomes a justification to subjugate the
other who because of the question of being different from the self or the same is viewed
as evil.
Absurdly enough, there is often an assumption that persons who are different are
bad, evil, savage, lazy, and inept because it is their responsibility and fault to have
allowed the difference to occur. Since such persons who are different fall outside the
canon of the constructed parameter or norm, they are often treated in negative, hostile,
and shunning ways. The “other” is simply despised as an object of scorn, excluded and,
regarded as an inferior person. As A. Kohn has put it, “Rivalry and cruelty thrive on
distance because distance allows us to turn people [the other] into abstractions.”166 When
difference is essentialized, people are treated and marked out as having no common
nature with those who set the yardstick for normality.
Another strong reason for alienating the other who is different is fear which may
be embedded in ignorance of the other. As Russell rightly points out, “The problem that
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we face is not that we are different, but that we often fear that difference and reject those
outside our church, our community, our nation, [our race, our class, and so on].”167 There
could also be another subterranean reason for the fear and the consequent avoidance of
the other. Simply avoiding or alienating the other is always the easier alternative than to
deal with such feeling more appropriately by unmasking the undergirding rationale for
such trepidation. Lonergan, who is good at deciphering the root of our various sensations,
such as love, fear, jealousy, anger, attraction, and so on, when encountering another, has
offered us a reasonable approach. Accordingly, a better approach is to interrogate at a
more conscious level the subject’s experience in the encounter with the other in order to
ascertain if the other actually poses any danger or whether the simple reason for the fear
is bias.168 Bias is a flight, and indeed, an aberration of understanding. Where bias is
allowed to scuttle understanding, the demands of concrete situations on intelligence and
morality in practical living become distorted. “Bias creeps into one’s outlook,
rationalization into one’s morals, ideology into one’s thought.”169 Consequently, a
corruption of values occurs, “So one may come to hate the truly good, and love the really
evil. Nor is that calamity limited to individuals. It can happen to groups, to nations, to
blocks of nations, to mankind. It can take different, opposed, belligerent forms to divide
mankind and to menace civilization with destruction.”170 Lonergan’s contention is that
bias prevents the subject from gaining self-understanding through the insights that may
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arise in the encounter with another. Indeed, bias leads the self to censor and suffocate any
new insights emanating from the encounter that appear to pose a threat to the self’s
identity, certitudes, and securities. In Lonergan’s terminology, this type of disposition is
called scotosis which leaves the self with a blind spot—scotoma—which s/he can come
to see only through the eyes of the Other.171 Bias thus fosters misunderstanding both in
the subject and in the other leading to alienation. Because of this bias which stems from
fear and leads to misunderstanding, differences which are ordinarily good come to be
essentialized and reconstituted in a negative manner. Such fear could also be the fear of
losing one’s privilege of being the dominating group or person.
Lonergan further contends that bias deprives oneself of the possibility of realizing
oneself in self-transcendence. One only “achieves authenticity in self-transcendence. One
can live in a world, have a horizon, just in the measure that one is not locked up in
oneself.”172 Authentic self-transcendence is manifested in not simply living for oneself
and satisfying one’s own personal desires, but in actually bringing about the good of
others. It is only in relationality, in the encounter with the other that one’s selfunderstanding and horizon can be tested. This is because encounter entails “the meeting
of persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing
one’s living to be challenged at its roots by their words and by their deeds.”173 Thus, if
bias is the reason for the subject’s feeling of fear toward the other, then one really needs
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to appreciate how that bias hinders appropriate engagement with the other in ways that
are life-affirming. If the bias is not properly addressed, the dialectic between the self and
the other easily degenerates into interpersonal estrangement and/or violence.174
Conversion is therefore, realized through authentic self-transcendence. It is a long
process that allows for the overcoming of bias, be it individual or group bias. Lonergan
challenges the subject―individual and social―to conversion on three levels: intellectual,
moral, and religious. The goal of this conversion is to overcome bias which prevents the
subject from understanding the other, which understanding leads to a shift in horizon
regarding the other, and resulting in authentic living for others and bringing about their
good and well-being. Overcoming bias, therefore, repositions the subject from engaging
the other in dialectical conflict and normality to solidarity of others in friendship and
love.175
As noted above, differences are for interrelationships and interdependence. It is in
this sense that Volf describes “differentiation” as the “creative activity of ‘separatingand-binding’ that results in patterns of interdependence.”176 The idea of separating-andbinding is very insightful. It points to the ambiguity and complexity involved in identity
production. While the aspect of ‘separating’ highlights the distinctiveness of the self and
the other, the aspect of ‘binding’ underscores the interrelationship between them.
Separateness entails that the other must be recognized in his/her otherness without being
assimilated into sameness or be subjugated to the self. Separateness also means that
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particularities, boundaries, and distinctness “are part of the creative process of
differentiation”177 and identity production. Volf is right when he contends that “without
boundaries there would be no discrete identities, and without discrete identities there
could be no relation to the other.”178 Thus, identity includes at the same time,
difference/particularity/distance and connection/relatedness/intimacy, and, indeed,
heterogeneity. As Volf aptly puts it, “we are who we are not because we are separate
from the others who are next to us, but because we are both separate and connected, both
distinct and related; the boundaries that mark our identities are both barriers and bridges
(emphasis original).”179 Identity, therefore, arises out of the complexity of differentiation
in which both the self and the other step out of their enclosed boundaries into the space of
the in-between to negotiate their identities via relationality. The “selfhood of oneself
implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the
other.”180
Nevertheless, in spite of the definitive intimacy and proximity involved in the
process of identity production, the otherness with which the relationship is imbued calls
for respect and responsibility of care rather than domination and control. It is this
challenge to recognize the otherness of the other that currently drives the thrust of the
“politics of difference” which is a campaign against the continuous assimilation of the
distinctiveness that marks the other into a dominant or majority identity either overtly or

177

Ibid., 66.

178

Ibid., 67.

179

Ibid.

180

Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 3.

78

covertly.181 It is in this sense of stepping out of the enclosed totalizing self in openness to
the other; in the recognition of the unique identity of the other, and in the mutual
interaction of self-giving and receiving that identity is to be understood in this work.
1.6.3 Relationality as an “Other Paradigm”
Relationality is the overarching conceptual framework through which the fabrics
of the different aspects of this oeuvre are woven together. Let me be clear from the outset
that relationality should not be understood as the polar opposite of the dualistic
framework that has already been debunked. The paradigm of relationality we have in
mind here is not so much an entirely new construction as the recovery and foregrounding
of a relegated and subalternized value. The turn to the paradigm of relationality is rather
important because it allows us to understand reality from an “other or different
perspective” as not necessarily structured according to rigidified hierarchies where one
end of the polarity stands as superior to the other conceived as inferior. The framework of
relationality that I envision here is one whose operational logic is conjunctive (that is,
both/and) rather than disjunctive (that is, either/or) which is the logic of empire; either
you homogenize or get excluded. According to the disjunctive logic, for instance,
“Whiteness” would be normative and thus superior while “Blackness” would be outside
the norm and, therefore, inferior. The conjunctive logic of relationality, which recognizes
that genuine differences should be respected and can live together, helps us to challenge
and resist all dehumanizing hierarchies. Relationality recognizes the fact that reality is
not merely a simple unity but rather a complexity which implies the idea of difference,
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plurality, multiplicity, and diversity. Thus reality is characterized by a certain degree of
fluidity, dynamism, and flexibility rather than stasis which finds expression in rigidified
and polarized hierarchies that have no relations to each other. It is on this ground that the
paradigm of relationality we envisage creates openness for inclusivity whereby those who
have been consistently denigrated, pushed to the margins, silenced, or excluded can be
recognized, respected, and included on the grounds of equality-in-difference.
Relationality pulls down barriers while perforating boundaries for interaction and crossepistemological conversation. That is why I would be hesitant to use such an expression
as doing theology from below to represent our vision. The simple reason is that the
language of “below” and its correlate “above” reinstitutes the notion of rigidified
hierarchies.182
It must also be pointed out that relationality is not another normative gaze from
which vantage point otherness is viewed. This is because relationality rather valorizes the
interconnectedness, interdependence, and complementarity inherent in reality. Through
relationality, even dichotomous and seemingly contradictory perspectives instead of
being seen simply as binaries are rather considered as paradoxes, ambiguities/promises
for creativity out of which the emergence of newness might blossom forth. Two
conflicting approaches may not necessarily mean that one is true and the other false. It
may well mean (and quite often) that each simply represents a different perspective and
vision of producing reality informed by social location, culture, and context. Even where
tensions are irresolvable, relationality enables us to consider that the opposing relations
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could still exist in a healthy tension as long as one side does not assimilate the Other into
Sameness, or absolutize one position as universal for all. This has been the core of
Western universalism—that ghost of Plato—that has, ever since, haunted the Western
imagination. In this approach, conclusions about complex systems of reality are drawn
from a particular and local epistemic standpoint and then universalized to be the same for
all (global designs, à la Mignolo). This approach consistently reduces relationships in the
complex system to conditions in the simpler (particular) system and then reconstructs
them from there. A particular system, be it religious, cultural, epistemological, sociopolitical, and so on, becomes ideological and totalitarian when it claims that it possesses
all the truth, that it enjoys a monopoly of the truth and approach, and thus resists and
fights against diversity and difference. Universalism usually turns the truth claims of one
single group or culture into the norm for measuring the humanity of others. As this is a
caricature of human dignity, it more often than not results in tragic situations as people
are ready to kill and destroy others because they believe that they are in possession of the
right truth while others who disagree with them are in error. All the religious wars and
skirmishes in human history with all the blood letting, be it between Christians and
Muslims, Catholics and Protestants or Orthodox, boil down to one specific: the belief that
there is one and only one correct truth and that one possesses it oneself183 or only one’s
religious Founder has and embodies it all. No doubt, heavenly truth transcends space and
time but human perception and interpretation of that truth is always bounded by space
and time, and hence, the light of that truth must be refracted through finite human

183

See Jonathan Sacks, The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations (London and
New York: Continuum, 2004), 64.

81

understanding.184 But the approach of relationality that we are foregrounding here
recognizes that the complex cannot simply be reduced to the particular. Rather the
particular as an aspect of the complex because it is capable of being integrated by the
more complex system functions to shed light on and to expand the dimensions of the
complex.185 Truth, as Immanuel Wallerstein succinctly puts it, lies in “explaining [the]
ever greater layers of complexity.”186 And quite frankly, there is no one universal way of
looking at and explaining reality. Relationality as understood here is conscious of the
particularity of every truth claim and of the social context of all value judgments. This is
why, the relationality thus proposed prizes mutual listening and empathetic Verstehen
(understanding) in an encounter with the other, collaboration, solidarity, and valuing the
perspectives and contributions of all groups especially those that have been historically
and consistently denigrated and silenced. Relationality necessarily requires inclusivity.
Additionally, relationality should not be understood as relativism. For relativism
radically emerges only where and when each group claims that its own truth claims are
the only valid ones and hence, universal for all while at the same time relativizing and
excluding others without allowing room for communication. In such a situation where
every claim and even every innovation not based in some sort of tradition assumes
unparalled universal validity without any relation to something of a more holistic reality,
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the result is radical relativism.187 Relationality rather grants that there may be a universal
ideal but that it is always ungiven, not present in its raw factualness. Reality is never
unmediated. We have to search for it and interpret it. But even when it impinges itself on
us, we still need to interpret it based on the categories available to us in order for meaning
and understanding to take place. And since we have to find a way of articulating and
describing reality that is not a given, we necessarily have to fall back on utilizing
categories that do not exist in a vacuum but form part and parcel of particular linguistic
repertoires in order to engender understanding. Consequently, there is no such thing as a
presuppositionless and absolutist conception of reality. As Rabbi Jonathan Sacks rightly
puts it:
Each language is the product of a specific community and its history, its
shared experiences and sensibilities. There is no universal language. There
is no way we can speak, or communicate or even think without placing
ourselves within the constraints of a particular language whose contours
were shaped by hundreds of generations of speakers, storytellers, artists
and visionaries who came before us, whose legacy we inherit and of
whose story we become a part.188
Because we cannot but utilize linguistic categories that we already know in order to
describe that which is ungiven, we definitely then bring our own perceptions and
presuppositions informed by our social contexts and epistemic repositories to our
production of reality. Thus, unmediated reality becomes mediated for us through the
medium of language which is always particular with its own specific symbols, meaning
systems, and context. This is also partly because of the characteristic epistemic potential
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of every language to be able to say something new from the wellspring of the already.
That is why relationality requires openness, respect, honesty, and humility as we
approach others’ perspectives. Solidarity of others is the atmosphere in which a more
holistic truth could be attained and in which we can also learn from and be enriched by
other perspectives in the spirit of mutual respect. In this way, through the paradigm of
relationality, we are able to live together without destroying our differences but which
rather become valuable assets for mutual enrichment. Relationality, therefore, creates a
space of the “in-between,” for “border thinking,”189 where difference is negotiated,
identity reconfigured, and where we are transformed through mutual openness to learning
from the other. Relationality thus overcomes the logic of the domination system, the logic
of discriminatory hierarchies, and the logic of hegemonic epistemology which translates
into the process of homogenization or reduction of otherness to sameness. The litmus test
of any order—religious, political, socio-economic, and indeed, any civilization—is
whether or not it makes room for otherness and recognizes the dignity of equality-indifference. It is on this note that the relational pneumatology we propose here would help
us to tap into ways that would affirm the beauty and importance of difference of all
people and the whole creation while equipping us with valuable tools for navigating the
boundaries of difference in the spirit of hospitality and deference.This is all the more
important in the light of our globalized and interconnected society which “calls us to join
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across differences [in recognition of our common humanity and] in our common work of
sharing in God’s creation.”190 And this is solidarity of others par excellence.
1.7 Conclusion
We have so far investigated the crisis that has bedeviled pneumatology in the
Western theological tradition. Among other things, we saw how the neo-Scholastic
substance-theistic ontology prepared the way for modernity/coloniality world system.
With its concentration on subjectivity, modern thought excised the objectivity of the
Triune God, and, therefore, relegated God/Spirit-language to the realm of human
subjectivity and construction. With the eclipse of the relational Spirit and the consequent
metaphysical negation of the historicity, humanity, and difference of the non-European
African other, colonialism and slavery were formally justified. The church to a large
extent colluded in such legitimation. The recognition of this crisis invites a recovery of
relational pneumatology. Relational pneumatology ensures that the unity of the Spirit is
not inimical to difference and plurality. Relational pneumatology guarantees that human
subjects, irrespective of their differences on the basis of race, gender, sex, class, ability,
culture, religion, and so on, can fit together in one world. They can do so while enriching
and complementing each other by learning something new about the self or otherwise via
the transformative encounter with the other. Relational pneumatology, therefore, provides
an other template for negotiating another discourse on the Trinitarian God and, hence, on
difference, and for identity production in a way that enables us to participate in God’s
love and hospitality toward all people and all of creation in a globalized world.
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Chapter 2
Dimensions of Spirit Experience in African
Weltanschauungen
2.1 Introduction
In the first chapter we investigated the crisis of pneumatology in Western
Systematic Theology. The issue that emerged to view was the loss of the relational nature
of God and the Spirit especially as articulated in neo-Scholastic substance ontotheology.
The consequences of that loss include the deployment of difference for exclusionary,
oppressive, and exploitative purposes culminating in slavery and colonialism. In the light
of these preliminary considerations, this second chapter aims at examining the Etche1
cosmo-religious weltanschauung. It is one example of West African world-views whose
focus on relationality as the core mode of being-in-the-world can be harnessed for
1
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as Ikechi Nwogu et al., The History of Etche (Owerri, Nigeria: Springfield Publishers, 2003). This work not
only provides enormous insight into the history of Etche but also ample ethnographic data on other aspects.
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negotiating the boundaries of difference. Such relationality characterized by dynamism,
multiplicity, and flexibility, and which aims at the well-being of human beings and the
community is more glaring in no other than the dimensions of spirit experience. The
Spirit may have been relegated to the background in much of Western historical/
systematic Christian thought. By contrast, The Etche religious universe has been and is
still suffused with spirit phenomena, for the dimensions of spirits is the horizon within
which life is possible and lived. We shall, therefore, examine the structure of the Etche
world-view; the taxonomy of the deities and the problems their relationships pose to the
conception of One (Supreme) God. The relational understanding of person and the
importance of mediation/spirit-possession will be discussed as well. Finally, we shall
evaluate the pitfalls and strengths of the Etche relational religious anthropology for
religion and society in our globalized world. Overall, our contention here is that relational
pneumatology provides a template for negotiating difference and another discourse on the
Trinitarian God.
2.2 Etche-African

Cosmo-Religious World-View

A people’s world-view consists not only, on the conscious level, in the complex
of their belief systems, concepts, institutions, shared history and attitudes, language, and
their general outlook on the universe around them. Even more so, it fundamentally
consists, on the unconscious level, in the underlying symbolic and philosophical order. It
is the symbolic dimension, the order of root-metaphors and root paradigms that
determines the superstructure of belief systems, meaning-systems and rituals, social
organizations and institutions, laws and ethics, and all other aspects of a people’s life.
What is of ultimate value which determines and shapes a people’s measure of other
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values, life itself, and what is worth living for, is disclosed through their symbolic
universe expressed in symbols, myths, folktalks, narratives, art and music, proverbs,
customs, and so on. In the Etche religious ontology, the mould of being is undergirded by
relationality; it is the magnetic field around which everything gravitates; it is indeed the
cardinal characteristic of reality.2 All beings in this religious world-view belong to either
the visible or invisible world but with constant interaction between the two realms. While
my concentration is on the Etche world, I shall also point to similarities or draw support
from other West African groups especially, the Akan (Ghana) and the Yoruba (Nigeria).
Let me at this point isolate some key component elements that have generally been
identified by scholars as structural to West African religious universe, namely: goodness
of creation, dynamism, harmony, holism, and humanism.3 I will summarize them briefly.
Goodness of Creation: The world either as created by God or as originally
intended by God through a demiurge, is fundamentally good. Imperfection or evil in the
world is not ultimately attributable to God and can only be comprehended within a
relational framework thereby granting evil only a moral but never an ontological status.4
Dynamism: West African world-views abhor stasis. They are characterized by
2
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dynamism, flexibility, flux, motion, and relationality. These qualities undergird the
relationships among the different beings that populate these world-views as we shall see
shortly. Hierarchy or order in this universe is conceived in fundamentally relational
terms. Every being is a dynamic entity; each is always a part and parcel of a multiplicity
and plurality of relationships, all of them influencing each other with nothing being
absolute. Such dynamic interactivity can either strengthen or diminish life; forces could
be deployed or instrumentalized for good or for ill.
Harmony: In this universe, all beings are interlinked and constantly interact with
one another in a dynamic way. To be, in this world-view, is to be related, and the
overriding goal of relationships is to establish harmony. The possibility of the
deployment of power for negative and antisocial purposes invites the need for constant
checks and balances. This calls for a balance of power relations in the socio-political
process and for mediators at the mystical/spiritual level who under the guidance of the
right deities function therapeutically for the realization of human destiny and the
restoration of wholeness.
Holism: The West African universe is one that abhors dichotomy and
departmentalization of the world into the sacred/profane, spiritual/material, etc. Rather,
the sacred and the profane, the invisible and the visible why conceived as distinct, they
are not separated but overlap into each other.
Humanism: Without a doubt, the West African world-views focus fundamentally
on the well-being of the human person. The actions of the divinities are geared toward the
divinization of human beings as well as the humanization of the world by working out
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human flourinshing, destiny actualization, and so enhance and promote solidarity of
others and non-violent negotiation of differences in a way respectful of human dignity.
2.2.1 The Taxonomy of Spirits in the Etche Religious Universe
In order to gain a better appreciation of how relationality operates in the Etche
universe, it is necessary to examine its understanding of the structuration or organization
of beings that populate its universe. According to Nwogu et al., the Etche religious
universe is organized around five component elements. These are: “(1) belief in a
Supreme Deity (God), (2) belief in deities, (3) belief in spiritual forces, (4) belief in
ancestral spirits, and (5) practice of charms and medicines.”5 Let me briefly talk about
each of these components.
God: This term is used to refer to the Creator, the Unoriginate Origin of all
existents, and who enjoys an overall supremacy in a dynamic relationship with all other
beings as their Ultimate Source. Among the Etche, this belief enjoys a diachronic and
pre-originary status as rooted in folktalks and narratives. In the Akan traditional religion,
John Pobee writes: God (Onyame) “the Supreme Being has delegated authority to the
abosom [deities which derive from Onyame as rivers from their source]…and to the
mpanyinfo (the ancestors)….”6
Deities/Divinities: Emefie Ikenga-Metuh observes that the terms deity and
divinity “refer to that ‘which has the quality of being divine,’ in a comprehensive sense
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and also to a particular divine being.”7 He equally points out that certain African worldviews regard the deities as manifestations, refractions, servants, or intermediaries of God.
For the Akan, the deities are viewed, according to Pobee, as Nyame mba (children or sons
of God which highlights both their derived nature and derived power).8 Among the Fon
of Dahomey, “Mawu-Lisa (God) gave birth to all the deities (Vodu) and assigned to each
a part of the universe to govern [like Sakpata, incharge of earth; Sogbo, incharge of
atmospheric phenomenon; Agbe-Naete, incharge of the sea, and Age, incharge of the
waters and the wild fields].”9 In the Etche world, the deities are generally described as
Umu-Mmuo. According to Nwogu et al, in the Etche religion, Umu-Mmuo are perceived
to be “in their domain where they play specialized roles.”10 It is legitimate to say that the
deities collaborate with God in their assigned but competent areas of specialization
toward the realization of God’s purpose and the dispensing of divine beneficence for the
well-being of humanity and the world. But they also enjoy independence of their own
within the logic of a flexible, dynamic, and relational divine hierarchy. They are also
sometimes referred to as “nature deities” because they are often associated with natural
symbolic objects or phenomena like rock, rivers, sun, thunder, and so on. It, however,
amounts to a category mistake to extrapolate from such “association with” to
“identification of the deities with” the said natural objects or phenomena. The deities are
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powerful beings who can either bring good fortunes by ameliorating human destiny or
misfortunes if their laws are contravened. The deities are usually grounded, having their
own sacred groves, cults, dovotees, and priests. They also have their own personal names.
Spirit-Forces: This term is used to refer to non-human spirits which are not the
deities in the sense that “generally they have not acquired a distinct personality and cult
like the deities.”11 The Etche call them arushi. Among the Ashanti of Ghana, they are
designated asuman (derived from the deities). The spirit-forces can act irrationally and
can be manipulated or instrumentalized by spirit adepts for good or for ill.12
Ancestors: This refers to the “living-dead” who have acquired the highest
spiritual status. Because their spiritual status brings them into closer proximity with God,
they are able to bring blessings and benfits to their kins and the community. Their
nearness or closeness to their families and the community is highlighted in such rituals as
libation and through Eshe music in the Etche world. The pouring of libation is one of the
cultural practices of the Etche which is a reminder about the intertwinness of the people
with God, Ala deity, the spirits, and the ancestors.13 Eshe is “a high spiritual music loaded
with messages for the…[living-dead] whose spirits are believed to be present, when
played.”14 The ancestors are never treated with contempt but always held in reverence.
There is an ongoing interaction between the living and the living-dead.
Finally, Charms and Medicines: Both charms and medicines are called by the

11

Metuh, Comparative Studies of African Traditional Religions, 55.

12

Ibid.

13

See O. J. Achonwa, Kolokoche, vol. 1, no. 1 (Port Harcourt: Chida Press, 1980), 4.

14

Nwogu et al., The History of Etche, 72.

92

same name in the Etche world as Ogwu. The Akan refer to them as suman, the Ewe call
them gbo, the Baluba term them bwanga, and so forth.15 Ogwu is believed to possess
mystical powers that could be used for good or for ill. Adepts in the field of African
medical practice (dibia—medicine man or diviner—in Etche, babalawo in Yoruba,
nganga in Bantu, etc.) who possess the requisite knowledge and ability can tap and use
the natural potency of ogwu for good or for ill. Ogwu is understood as medicine when it
is used for therapeutic purposes. As charms, ogwu could be used for self-protection (like
amulets, talisman) or negatively for harming others especially one’s enemies (like poison
– nshi). Here, we see the convergence of the material and the spiritual/mystical.16
Through divination, the dibias are able to diagnose the spiritual cause of sickness and
determine the potency and efficacy of a particular ogwu that would ameliorate the
situation.17 These are, therefore, the five component elements that constitute the Etche
spiritual universe. In what follows, I draw on Metuh’s work to show the certain models of
the organization of West African religious world-views.
2.2.2 Models of West African Religious World-Views
Metuh has helpfully articulated four models that one may encounter in African
world-views, namely, the pyramidal, ecological, cosmic, and social.18 A brief summary
of these models is in order.
The Pyramidal: Drawing on the insights of Edwin.W. Smith, Metuh relates how
15
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some African societies understand the structure of the invisible world in the form of a
pyramid or triangle. According to this vision, four categories of spiritual beings are
recognized: God, nature deities, ancestors, and magical powers. While God is at the apex,
nature deities and ancestors are on the opposite sides of the triangle, and magical powers
at the base.19 Metuh does observe, following Smith, that whereas the Bantu speaking
societies of East and Central Africa do not have places for nature spirits in their
cosmologies, they are prominent in West African cosmologies which, therefore,
recognize five rather than four categories of spiritual beings.20 Suggestively, the
pyramidal model tends to give the impression of a top-down command and unilateral
hierarchical structure. But we shall show that in the Etche world-view, hierarchy is
conceived in a relational and dynamic sense.
The Ecological: In this model, Metuh samples the Asante of Ghana and the
Kalabari of Nigeria. The former inhabit an area whose many parts are watered by a
network of rivers, lakes, and seas, whereas the latter occupy the creeks of the Niger
Delta. Both, therefore, use the ecological model in classifying the spiritual beings in their
cosmologies. Particularly, in the Asante myth, Onyame (God) is imaged as the source of
all beings including the divinities or deities (Abosom) who are conceived as the sons and
manifestations of God. In a dynamic fashion, the deities flow from Onyame as rivers
derive from their source. They are sent by God to the earth in order to receive blessings
that they are in turn to confer upon humankind. There on earth, these deities as sons of
God become manifest as rivers, lakes, and seas: we have Tano (the great river), Bea
19

Ibid., 52.

20

Ibid., 52-3.

94

(river), Bosmtwe (lake), and Opo (sea). Again, the distributaries of these rivers become
spirits or spirit-forces (Asuman) as offsprings of the river deities. All these deities and
spirit-forces together with ancestral spirits flow dynamically into the human community
to interact with human beings where also charms (suman) and malevolent spirits/witches
work to disorient relationality and threaten human life. In this vision, as Metuh observes,
God (Onyame) has placed each deity, as his intermediaries, “in charge of a different
section of the universe or human need.”21 They work together with the ancestors
(Samanfo or mpanyinfo) for the realization of divine purpose for human destiny.
The Cosmic: According to Metuh, the Igbo of Nigeria use this model. In this
vision patterned on the heaven-earth relationship, Chukwu (the Great God) or Chineke
(the Creator God) dwells in the heavens and is surrounded by sky deities such as the Sundeity (Anyanwu), Thunder-deity (Amadioha), and Sky-deity (Igwe). On the earth aspect,
Ala (the Earth Mother) presides on earth and over the deities that inhabit that domain.
The main earth deities include the Yam-deity (Ajoku ji incharge of Agriculture),
Divination-deity (Agwu incharge of medicine and health), Fortune-deity (Ikenga),
Coercion-deity (Agbara), War-deity (Ekwensu), and so on. Ala together with ancestral
spirits oversees morality, the adjudication of justice, the guardianship of traditional laws
and customs. There is also a host of malevolent spirit-forces, witches, and sorcerers who
instrumentalize mystical power for anti-social ends. According to this vision, different
deities are believed to be agents of God assigned different spheres of influence to meet
different human needs.22
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The Social: This model is exemplified by the Yoruba of Nigeria. Their worldview is patterned on their socio-political structuration which is centered around a
centralized administration under a supreme chief (oba). In this model, Olodumare or
Olorun (God) is resident in the sky where he controls the world from a distance.
Although ultimate authority resides in Olorun, he does not get involved in the details of
administration. Rather Olorun entrusts such responsibility to the major divinities called
Orisha and understood as his sub-chiefs, ministers, or agents. These major deities include
Orishanla or Obatala (the arch-divinity or demiurge entrusted with the task of creation);
Oduduwa (mythical hero and founder of divine kingship at Ile-Ife); Onile (Earth Mother);
Orunmilla or Ifa (deity of divination, medicine, and health); Ogun (Iron and war deity);
Shango (Thunder deity); Eshu (messenger of the deities and incharge of
communications). These major deities (Orisa) also have their subordinates called the
Ebora.23 By and large, Metuh acknowledges that these models are by no means
exhaustive. The reason is that there are still certain West African world-views that
display more complexities and overlappings than what has been described above. What is
important is that the models described are representative of some of the typical West
African world-views.
Let us now proceed with the Etche world-view. From the outset, I should perhaps
underline that the Etche cosmo-religious world-view fits well into the cosmic model as
described by Metuh. The Supreme Deity (a terminology which is, however, no longer

23

Ibid., 60-1.

96

fashionable for its deistic connotation)24 is called Chukwu (the Great God), Chineke (the
Creator), or Ekemkere-Uwa (God who created the universe). The deities include both sky
and land divinities. The sky ones are Anyanwu (Sun-deity), Amadioha-di-Nwanyiomugwo
(Thunder-deity), and Igwe-ka-ala (Sky-deity). In the Etche pantheon, “There is no known
deity associated with the moon.”25 Among the land deities are Ala (Earth Mother), Ekii
(deity of harvest), Ahajoku ji (deity of yam), Otamiriochhe (River deity), Agwushi (deity
of divination and medicine), and so on. These major deities (whether sky or land) have
been grounded and so they have their sacred groves, cults, votaries, and priests as well as
their images iconized.26 The Etche believe that the spirit-forces may be benevolent or
malevolent in that they may benefit or threaten human life and the community.27 The
ancestors together with the major deities function to ensure health, wealth, and good
fortune for humankind.28 This appears to be the major concern of religion in the Etche
universe. Now that we have established the structure of the Etche religious universe, let
me proceed to examine the nature of interaction among the different beings that populate
this universe.
2.3 The

Nature of Interaction of Beings in the Etche World-View

24
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The first point that has to be made is as it has been stated earlier, that relationality,
dynamism, or flexibility guide interaction among the multiplicity of beings that populate
the Etche religious universe. It is a universe that abhors stasis. In this religious universe,
as Ozo-Mekuri Ndimele correctly observes, the spirit and human worlds are reputed to
maintain a pendulum fluid network of relationships.29 It is a religious universe in which
every being is interconnected with others in a plurality of relationships. In this universe,
nothing stands alone, to use the Igbo proverb popularized by Chinua Achebe: “ihe kwuru
ihe esobe ya”—Wherever Something stands, Something Else will stand beside it. In this
way, Achebe underlines how the Igbo universe abhors absolutism; “Nothing is
absolute.”30 It is this dynamism and relationality that allow access to the divine.
That relationality, duality or multiplicity, and dynamism undergird the essential
hallmark of being in the Etche world is illustrated in its art and sculpture, music and
masquerade, among others. One such prominent site in the Etche world that enshrines
this question of twinness and dynamism is the famous mbari houses. Mbari houses which
are found in many parts of Etcheland (especially in such towns as Mba, Umuoye, Ozuzu,
etc.) provide us with significant insight into something beyond the aesthetic value of the
Etche world. The word mbari literally means “decorated.” Usually, the construction of
mbari houses takes the effort of the whole community in the spirit of a’we-ethos” that
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fosters solidarity.31 Such houses contain art works and sculptures by the communities’
artists which, inter alia, “depict the portraits of great men of the past…or the conception
of the activities of the…[deities].”32 What is interesting to note is that through mbari art,
the Etche world attempts to aesthetically ground an alien or powerful force (spiritual or
otherwise) in a physical figure that captures its conceivable attributes or qualities with the
aim of interpreting that force. This explains why mbari figures are not only depictions of
deities but could also be of alien human figures perceived as a threat to the safety of life
and the community, like certain colonial officers. Since the Etche world is flexible and
open to the irruption of alien spiritual forces, mbari art figures serve a mediating role
especially in the face of a major crisis33 by aesthetically capturing the attributes of such
forces in order to overcome the element of strangeness and threat and to ameliorate
relationships. This implies that mbari art forms are characterized as a process of an
ongoing artistic creation not only because the Etche world is flexible but also because
new spiritual forces are always likely to surface in the scene.34 Mbari is, therefore, a
transitional shrine erected to capture the attributes of forces in order to bring wholeness to
the community especially after a major crisis.35 The prominent figure of Ala (a feminine
symbol of fertility, justice, life, and human flourishing), for instance, is a creative way of
transmuting the sinister power of evil and human suffering into the power of life, love,
31
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and human flourishing. Thus, mbari is an artistic process that represents the coomunity’s
attempt to bring about renewal and to fashion an alternative history that enshrines the
desired experiences of the community. So, even art abhors stasis. Because the likelihood
of the irruption of new forces was a real one in the Etche world, art becomes an ongoing
process with a continuing recognition that tension, change, and movement are constant;
that they form a part and parcel of life and that new visions of other relationships are
always possible. Indeed, the dynamism, relationality, and openness to flexibility
prevalent in the Etche world endorse the maxim that no condition but only change is what
is inexorably permanent. Mbari art figures provide a significant clue to how the Etche
world attempts to wrestle with and think through the paradoxes and ambiguities of
relationships in life. Therefore, mbari art entrenches an ongoing process of retelling and
recreating in search of an alternative history in the face of the ambiguities of life in the
community in order to restore wholeness and harmony.
With regard to duality, twinness as underpinning the Etche world, the observation
of Amaury Talbot, a colonial historian, provides important and insightful evidence:
In nearly all towns of importance in the Etche country, elaborate Mbari
shrines are to be found, built in honor of the Thunder God. In most, just
within the principal entrance, may be seen seated figure of the deity, while
from head to foot and bearing in the right hand a sword, spear or bayonet,
and in the left an initiation of one the old or one of the long iron scepter
—rattles, or possibly another sword or dagger. By his side sits his consent,
to whom various names are given, most of them apparently synonyms for
the earth goddess, Ale, Ala, Ana, Aja. At Ibodo [Igbodo]…the figure represented Ala—Bride of the Bladed Thunder.36
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Perhaps it is necessary to dwell a little bit on this observation of Talbot. Although the
Etche believe that Chukwu or Chineke is the Creator of everything, they do not have an
elaborate creation myth of origin.37 They do not also have mbari depictions or images of
Chukwu but only of the deities. Prince Amaele correctly notes that among the Etche,
“there is a general belief…that God is too majestic to be always approached directly. To
this fact, He (God) became worshipped through the different things He created. The most
important pantheon in Etche…is the Amadioha…in Ozuzu…. Ala, the deity of the land
also falls within the hierarchy….”38 When Amaele speaks of God being “worshipped
through the different things He created,” one is persuaded to understand this to suggest,
especially in the context of the mention of pantheon, that the deities are intermediaries of
God in ameliorating harmony in the world and ensuring human well-being. After Chukwu
(the Creator of all), the most powerful deities known in Etche are Amadioha with his
greatest sacred grove in Ozuzu and Ala. Indeed, Amadioha Ozuzu became so popular and
powerful a deity that he more or less eclipsed Chukwu. This is corroborated by Ndimele’s
submission that “Among the Etche, especially those to the West of the Otamiri River,
Amadioha Ozuzu has practically usurped the place of Chi (meant Chukwu)…and reigns
as supreme deity.”39 Amadioha together with his Bride, Ala (Earth Mother) presides over
justice, morality, and the protection of humans and the community. How powerful
Amadioha was in dispensing justice, as Nwogu et al grants, won him such a popularity
that “even extended to other parts of the Lower Niger from where visitors trooped to his
37
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shrine to seek justice and protection.”40 In a December 20, 2000 interview, Eze Monday
Amaechi acknowledged how Amadioha not only assumed the status of a national deity in
the Etche world but also how, to the present, it still has votaries across various
communities in Etche.41
From the evidence provided above, it is clear that in the Etche religious universe,
Chukwu (God) is neither gendered nor has a wife; Chukwu has no daughter or son. Ala,
the powerful Earth Mother who presides over all the earth deities, is the bride of
Amadioha rather than of Chukwu as depicted in the mbari art as seen above. There do not
exist any mbari arts (or houses) figuring Chukwu (who, by the way, is imageless because
never represented in any concrete form)42 seated with Ala by the side as bride. Only the
deities and others form the Etche mbari pantheon; Chukwu is not one among them. This
complete absence of any patrilineage ascribed to Chukwu in the Etche universe is very
instructive. It preserves the real transcendence of God as the wholly, albeit, relational
other. We shall return to this later. But suffice it for the moment to underline that the
mbari art figure of Amadioha with Ala by his side, as documented by Talbot, highlights
the fact of relationality and twinness as the hallmarks of the Etche pantheon which entails
a mixed community of divinities of both female and male. For nothing stands alone,
nothing is absolute. Twinness as the ground of relationality fosters a balancing act in
ameliorating harmony of interrelationships in the Etche spiritual universe. Amadioha’s
40
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influence as the powerful male Sky-deity seems to be counterbalanced and checked by
the powerful Ala as a female deity. This has enormous implications with regard to the
experience of power relationships between women and men in the different areas of life
in the society, be it politics, economy, religion, and so on. In her book, Daughters of
Anowa, Mercy Amba Oduyoye studied some Ghanaian and Nigerian myths of origins
and religions (precisely, Yoruba, Ijaw, and Ibibio of Nigeria). She drew attention to the
prominent role played by female deities, some of which assumed the status of the
Supreme Creator God. By and large, she systematically came to the conclusion that in
male-dominated cultures, the only women who are given a modicum of respect are those
who do not resist letting themselves be sacrificed for the follies of men with the reward of
deification (as in the case of Aiyelala who became the Okitipupa deity of sexual morality
and fair play).43 Thus when twinness, flexibility, dynamism, and relationality are
distorted or corraded, it introduces disharmony, marginalization, oppression, and
subjugation in women-men relationship. Such a corraded relationality lets the men off the
hook while making women the sacrificial lambs. Imperative is, therefore, the need to
maintain a delicate balance between matrifocality and patrifocality as evidenced not only
in world-views but even currently as practiced in certain West African societies such as
the Akan of Ghana. Oduyoye is on the mark when she writes:
Neither patriarchy nor matriarchy alone can transform relationships between men and women. Indeed, these relationships comprise a good deal of
what we mean by living fully. If we view patriarchy and matriarchy with
the image of a pendulum, we see them at opposite sides, and we know that
the pendulum eventually will stand still in the middle. If, instead, we look
at the relations between men and women as a spiral, we see that life is move-
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ment and being, a continuum of dynamic creative and empowering relationships moving ever upwards.44
Oduyoye’s insight here is very pertinent. Unlike radical Western feminist resistance
rhetoric that calls for the supplanting of patriarchy with matriarchy as an only alternative,
it is germane to underline that neither patriarchy nor matriarchy alone suffices. EtcheAfrican motif of relationality abhors absolutism. Difference is only found, strengthened,
and enriched in relationality.
In the Etche religious space, all the beings that populate it are enmeshed in a
constant movement of interrelationships. There is continual flow of traffic between the
visible world inhabited by humans and the invisible realm inhabited by God, the
divinities, other spirit-forces, and the ancestors as shown in the cosmic model above. As
Justin Ukpong notes, “while these [dimensions] are [recognized as] distinct spheres of
life, they are to be seen as interrelated and mutually influencing one another.”45 It is
evident from the taxonomy of spirits in the different models described above that each
deity is assigned a different competent area of human need. The numerous spirits,
therefore, play specialized roles or functions (in their areas of competency/agency) within
the overall framework of divine economy. The goal of interaction of the different beings
in the Etche world-view is for the realization of divine purpose for human well-being and
44
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cosmic harmony.46 The holistic quality of the Etche world-view (which abhors dichotomy
but not distinction between the sacred and the profane) shows that dynamic relationships
bear resonances in the social, economic, religious, and political concerns of the Etche
society.47 Because of the constant traffic between the sacred and profane realms of
existence in the Etche universe, every aspect of quotidian everyday life becomes not only
a sanctified but also a spiritualized experience.48 One area in the Etche universe that
evidences the interactivity and interconnectedness of the two realms is in the diagnosis of
disease by dibias (medicine men or diviners). As Robin Horton has illustrated:
Through the length and breadth of the African continent, sick or afflicted
people go to consult diviners as to the causes of their troubles. Usually, the
answer they receive involves a god or other spiritual agency, and the remedy prescribed involves the propitiation or calling-off of this being. But this
is very seldom the whole story. For the diviner who diagnoses the intervention of a spiritual agency is also expected to give some acceptable account
of what moved the agency in question to intervene. And this account very
commonly involves reference to some event in the world off visible tangible
happenings.49
It is clear from this that for the Etche (African), the spirit world and the material realm
form a spider-like web of relationships such that what happens in one realm has impact
on the other. For the Etche, the two worlds cohere and interweave and the human being is
at the center of it. It can be described as anthropocentric. Metuh is right in observing that
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“the dichotomy which is so characteristic of Graeco-Christian world-view is strikingly
absent in African world-view. There is no…opposition between the visible and the
invisible, the material and spiritual, the temporal and non-temporal, the sacred and the
profane.”50 This belief is exemplified, inter alia, in the association of deities with material
objects (like rocks, rivers, trees, mountains, sun, moon) and natual phenomena; and this
association should not be understood to mean identicality as some who would be quick to
term it animism51 are wont to do. Contrary to this view is the Durkheimian functionalist
reduction of the soul of religion to the idea of society and communal (social) needs which
has nothing to do with the material/profane order reduced to the realm of private and
personal concerns.52
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2.4 God

as Transcendent-Immanent

Although, as mentioned above, the Etche do not have any elaborate myth of
creation, yet it is believed that there exists One (Supreme Deity) God who is the creator
of all. According to Amaele:
The acknowledgement and worship of God in Etche right from origin has
not been in doubt. It did not come as a result of Western interference as
some…hold. Hence, Chukwu (big God), Ekemkere-uwa (the creator of the
universe), Chineke (the spirit that creates), Onyenwe-uwa (the owner of the
world), are among the different names of God in Etcheland. These names
have been in use before the coming of the missionaries.53
There is no account of how this God created whether directly or indirectly through a
demiurge (as in the case of the Yoruba cosmology in which Olorun assigns Obatala with
the task of creation). But the naming of God in the Etche world-view as in the Igbo
tradition invites further scrutiny. What does it really mean to say that among the Etche,
Chukwu, as Amaele points out, has been acknowledged and worshipped right from origin
without any shred of doubt? How can we justify this stress on the worship of One
(Supreme) God and the question of a multiplicity of spirits? Why the multiplicity of
spirits and of what is their use to religion? How can we explain the manner of the
relationship between God and the numerous deities as well as that between God, the
deities, and human beings? Is this God the same God that the Etche West African
Christians also acknowledge and worship as the Trinity of Persons (God-Christ-Spirit)? If
so, how are they the same and where lies the novelty? These questions will occupy us.
In the first place, just as the Etche acknowledge Chukwu, the Ashanti Onyame, the
Yoruba Olodumare, as the One God, no one today seriously believes that the concept of
53
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God in ATR is a missionary fabrication or a borrowed one. However, among Igbo
scholars, matters of controversy over the use of the nomenclatures, Chineke and Chukwu
(Creator and Supreme Deity), has not been avoided. Achebe has drawn attention to the
hypothesis that the word Chineke could be a hasty merging of the names of two distinct
deities Chi and eke by the early missionaries to designate the Creator God of Christianity
without taking cognizance of the tonality of the Igbo language.54 In a non-cosmological
sense chi refers to the alternation of daylight and night, that is, the going and returning of
daylight (chi-obubo and chi-ojiji) or to simply day (ubochi). But in a cosmo-religious
sense Chi may mean God, guardian spirit or deity, or the idea of purveyor of
destiny/fortune. Whereas Eke is a word which translates several things depending on
tonality and usage: market day, to tie, to share, to create, snake, a spirit. Thus, the
meaning of a combination of the two terms “Chi-na-eke” depends on the tonality
assigned to the word “na” (which could mean who/which, does, or the conjunctive and).
In the first instance, Chineke would mean Chi who/which creates; in the second, Chi does
create, and in the third, it becomes Chi and eke. Because of the Igbo penchant to think in
terms of duality, Achebe is inclined to upholding the missionary hasty fusion of a dual
deity, chi and eke.55 The issue, however, remains unresolved.
With regard to the word Chukwu used to refer to the Igbo Supreme Deity,
Donatus Nwoga and Christopher Ezekwugo, among others,56 would prefer that the word
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be dropped. Against the backdrop of Igbo republicanism, Nwoga contends that the
concept of Chukwu as Supreme and Absolute Being is an aberration and a stranger to
Igbo traditional thought. Again, from a pragmatic and utilitarian viewpoint, Nwoga
argues that Chi (the true Igbo God) satisfied all the needs that the Igbo would expect from
transcendence and hence rendered redundant the idea of a Supreme God since there was
no felt need for him.57 These scholars claim that the name, Chukwu, was the epithet of a
local deity of the Arochukwu clan which became valorized and imposed on all of
Igboland. According to this position, the missionaries to Igboland found the name
apropros and immediately adopted and uncritically identified it with the Supreme Being
of deism and with the Yahweh of the Judeo-Christian tradition. With fascinatingly
documented evidence, these scholars attempt to rather prove that Chi is the only God in
traditional Igbo thought. Whether or not Nwoga and the others have proved their case
beyond reasonable doubt remains to be said. Achebe, however, rejects the claims of the
Arochukwu or missionary invention of Chukwu. From the beginning, “Igbo traditional
thought in its own way and style,” Achebe writes, “did recognize Chukwu as the
Supreme Creator, speculating only on the modalities, on how He accomplished the work
and through what agencies and intermediaries. As we have seen He appears to work
through chi to create man (emphasis original).”58
Whereas Nwoga deems the question of Chukwu (Supreme Being) as
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irreconcilable with the ethos of Igbo republicanism, Achebe locates their congruity in the
dynamism, flexibility, and relationality that characterize Chukwu’s supremacy. Thus, in
recalling the myth of Igbo origin, Achebe draws attention to how Chukwu (God)
exercised power/authority in a consultative manner with Nri and Adama, the founding
kings of the Igbo nation:
Ezenri and Ezadama came from heaven and rested on an ant heap; all was
water. Cuku (Chukwu) asked who was sitting there and they answered “We
are the kings of Nri and Adama,” thereupon Cuku gave them each a piece
of yam; yams were at that time unknown to man, for human beings walked
in the bush like animals…59
This myth narrative did not just end there. Achebe remarks that “Later on Chukwu tells
Ezenri how to plant and tend the yam, but Ezenri complains that the ground was too wet;
and Chukwu advises him to send for Awka people—workers in iron—to blow on the
earth with their bellows and make it dry.”60 The narrative, according to Achebe,
highlights Chukwu as exercising his power in relational and dynamic way by engaging
the founding heroes in conversation. To my mind, it is clear from this Igbo (West
African) myth sample, that God’s power is not exercised to dominate and homogenize
but is rather respectful of difference. It is exercised as “power-with” rather than as
“power-over.” Precisely as power-with, it promotes collaboration, participatory
engagement which encourages genuine plurality. Indeed, the “Supreme God in the
African religious world view is conceived to be accommodating of other powers as he is
ecumenical. It is this religious belief in the ecumenical character of God, together with
59
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his flexibility, that helps us make sense of the welcoming and accommodating
character—a spirit of unity in diversity—prevalent in Africa’s traditional religion.”61 And
what is more, Achebe continues, “Chukwu Himself in all His power and glory did not
make the world by fiat. He held conversations with mankind; He talked with those
archetypal men of Nri and Adama and even enlisted their good offices to make the earth
firm and productive.”62 In this way, Achebe conceives Chukwu’s dynamic, flexible, and
relational sovereignty as not incompatible with the Igbo ethos of republicanism. Metuh
has also drawn attention to different parts of Igboland that used Chukwu simultaneously
as the epithet for God which cannot be traced to either the alleged Aro clan colonialism
or missionary invention.63 At any rate, the pay-off of the thesis of Nwoga’s school is that
we may not naïvely affirm the supremacy of One God amidst the multiplicity of spirits as
well as the identity of the God of ATR in relation to the Judeo-Christian God without
caution or rigorous effort and critical justification.
Moreover, on the question of the relationship between God and the deities, some
theories have been put forward. One such theory is that espoused by Mircea Eliade which
borders on the withdrawal of the Sky god from the world. Eliade had opined that in
primitive societies, “the god of the sky seems so far beyond human reach that other
religious conceptions must come in to replace him. Often these new conceptions are gods
of the rain and storm, deities who are more concrete and personal, more directly involved
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in human life because they specialize in one task.”64 Other stories with regard to how
God used to live in close proximity with human beings in an original state of equanimity
before withdrawing far away from the world of humans are widespread.65 But does the
myth of the withdrawn God really mean that the God of ATR is otiose? Is God’s
transcendence or distance coextensive with otioseness? Contra Eliade, I do not think that
the alleged withdrawal of the so-called Sky god is the condition of possibility for the
emergence of the deities or, for that matter, of religion in any African world-views. As
we have seen from the different models of the West African world-views above, God is
conceived to be the Source of all other beings. For the Etche, Chineke is the Creator of
all; for the Akan, the deities (Abosom the source of Asuman) derive from Onyame as from
a river Source; for the Yoruba, Obatala (demiurge) is assigned by Olodumare with the
task of creating the world and human beings. Yet God’s dynamic and flexible
transcendence rather seems to allow for the independence of the deities in their
collaborative agency toward the realization of divine economy for the well-being of
humans and the world.
No doubt, in the Etche world, Chukwu (God) only has a name but not image
because as we saw above, there is never any artistic representation of the image of God in

64

Cited in Daniel L. Pals, Eight Theories of Religion, 2nd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 206; see also Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism,
trans. Philip Mairet (New York: Sheed & Ward [1952 French] 1969); idem, “Methodological Remarks on
the Study of Religious Symboloism,” in The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, ed. Mircea
Eliade and Joseph Kitagawa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), esp. 103; idem, The Sacred and
the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, [1956
French] 1957).
65

See Edwin Smith, ed., African Ideas of God (Edinburgh: House, 1950), 216 and 233; Geoffrey
Parrinder, African Traditional Religion (London: SPCK, 1962 and New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 40-1.

112

the mbari houses. It speaks to the mysterious quality of God. It is only the deities that
figure in the mbari houses. Besides, God, in the Etche world-view is also never depicted
as having a wife. God is transgender and transsex. Only the deities such as Amadioha and
Ala have gender and sex ascribed to them. Again, there is no sacred grove or temple
dedicated to Chukwu in Etche, no cult, no special devotees, and no institutionalized
priesthood.66 This is all a pointer to the transcendence of God which allows God to
maintain an equi-distance with each and all. Everyone and not merely some special
devotees or chosen can turn to God in prayer at any time and anywhere. For example,
Amaele makes this instructive observation:
In Etche, although God is believed to be everywhere at every time, yet His
abode is up the sky. This is why an average man or woman when forced to
unbearable circumstances by neighbours raises up his or her two palms to
the sky saying: ‘My God see my two palms, they are clean, if I merit what
I am suffering you know better. If not, then you that fight for the widow or
helpless or childless should please interfere.’ God is perceived as an impartial judge, overseer, and loving.67
This is a way of saying that the same God who is believed to dwell in the heavens is
equally present and near, caring and providing, listening and protecting. God can be
invoked by anybody like the man/woman referred to by Amaele or even by the
community. In the above instance, the prayer is addressed directly to God without any
recourse to the deities or ancestors as the case may be. Amaele maintains that one of the
proofs for the belief in the nearness of God among the Etche is evident in the theophoric
proper names that they take or that parents give to their children. Such names are, for
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example: Chukwudi (God exists), Heanyichukwu (nothing is beyond God’s control);
others are Chinonso (God is near), Chinazo (God protects), Chinwikpe (God is the
impartial judge), Chibuzo (God is the way), Chibuike (God is strength), Chinaza (God
who answers), Daberechi (leaning on God), Chimamkpa (God knows a person’s pressing
need), and so on.68
Nevertheless, albeit God can be approached directly as in the case of the
man/woman praying directly to God with uplifted hands toward the sky, yet the deities,
the ancestors, and other mediums function in their areas of competency assigned to them
by God for the amelioration of human good and the world. Among the Ashanti of Ghana,
there is also no temple for Nyame. The closest there is is the “Nyamedua, a three-forked
branch supporting a pot into which food items are put as offerings to God.”69 The pot
which also contains rainwater symbolizes how the nearness of God provides for the needs
of humans. But even at that, it is clear that the Nyamedua (God’s tree) is not an image of
Nyame but only a symbolic three-pronged branch. And even among the Igbo, Francis
Arinze has drawn attention to sacrifices made directly to God but they are so rare that the
ordinary Igboman/woman may not be aware that they are offered at all.70 Also, the Nupe
of northern Nigeria speak of the nature of God as Soko lokpa, which means, “God is far
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away, yet…he is present always and everywhere.”71 When all is said and done, these
examples indicate that God is believed to be truly transcendent; yet that transcendent God
is “still considered to be close enough to be approached formally in worship [like the
offering of sacrifices], and more especially informally in ejaculatory statements featuring
the God-name….”72 From all this, it becomes obvious that, according to facts on ground,
the myth of the withdrawn God in ATR who is ordinarily approached through
intermediaries or ministers, does not present the entire picture. While the fact of
mediation is the case, it is clear that direct prayers and sacrifices are also made to God
without recourse to the intermediary of the deities. Besides, prayerful and worshipful
attitudes are also exhibited toward the deities and ancestors as though they were selfsufficient.73 One must admit that the issues are complicated and so may not easily be
resolved or explained away.
Transcendence or distance as understood in the Etche African matrix is not
coextensive with absence. Rather, God as the transcendent is concretely mediated.
Perhaps this explains why Amaele states broadly that “there is a general belief among the
people [of Etcheland] that God is too majestic to be always approached directly. To this
fact, He became worshipped through the different things He created. The most
important…are… Amadioha…Ozuzu and…Ala, the deity of the land.”74 This suggests an
understanding of the nature of God’s transcendence as a mediated presence. Although,
71
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Amaele admits that direct prayers are made to God as seen above, his position still does
not say it all since the deities in the Etche world are also often approached (independently
devoid of any reference to God) in a worshipful attitude suggestive of their autonomy.
His position, nevertheless, draws attention to the fact that reality is never unmediated.
Amaele’s reference to divine majesty as the condition for God being worshipped
indirectly tends to resonate with a particular insight of Evans Zeusse: “Power unmediated
is terrific and breaks boundaries. Power as it is disseminated in articulated divine order is
good.” He goes on to remark, “God does not involve himself too directly in the world that
he sustains, for too particular and intense an involvement might destroy the fabric of the
divine order he sustains.”75 Is it really because unmediated divine power is terrific and
perhaps destructive that God becomes distant or withdrawn as Zeusse seems to suggest?
To my mind, I would rather think that transcendence preserves the holy Mystery which is
God such that even if God is present, such presencing does not exhaust the reality that is
God. The holy mystery of God is not provisional by nature so as to veer toward the nonmysterious once unraveled and elucidated. Mystery is characteristically essential to
God.76 For a God that is completely known and appropriated becomes an idol.77
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Therefore, the distance which is of the nature of God should rightly be characterized as a
transcendent-immanent and as a mediated presence but never absence or abdication.
Bénézet Bujo is right on target when he writes:
Much of what has been written about Africa’s ‘absent God’ must be considered mistaken. God is not far from the African world. All relationships, between person and person, living and dead, and between persons and nature,
are rooted in God and point towards God and towards the end of all things in
God. They (all those relationships) have a sacramental nature, proclaiming
that every person’s future lies with God (emphasis mine).78
One significant point that needs to be made is that the understanding of God’s
transcendence in a dynamic, flexible, and relational sense carries social and political
ramifications which bear out in the Etche world. The operational liberty—informed by
God’s transcendence—with which the deities function in their specialized roles toward
the realization of God’s provident purpose for the world impacts on the Etche sociopolitical organization. As Amaele aptly puts it:
In Etche generally, democratic process of administration…is essential because every village is a republic of its own. The local administration is
the responsibility of the council of elders…and…community assembly of
which every grown-up is a member. The entire community congregation de-
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cides important issues affecting the villagers…. Every grown-up…has the
right to express his views on any matter raised.79
One sees here how the Etche world-view impacts, inter alia, how life is organized in the
society. Rather than threatening God’s supremacy and authority, the dynamism and
flexibility of divine hierarchy promotes, as we have seen above, inclusive and
participatory relationships in divine administration. In the Etche socio-political
engineering everyone has the right to express one’s views on any issues. This right which
is often expressed as “onye kwuo uche ya” (let each say his/her mind on matters of
concern to him/her) highlights the respect accorded the dignity and independence of
every human being. Discussion and consensus rather than imposition by absolute fiat are
ideals held in highest esteem in the socio-political process by the Etche. Social and
political administration in the Etche world appears to be patterned on such inclusive and
participatory model informed by its world-view. Amaele is right on target when he
observes: “It is evident that in Etcheland, political powers are shared among various
groups, bodies and individuals. The absence of any centralized authority as the basic
political unit is the feature of the Etche people.”80 It is clear that in this kind of
administrative structure, authority rather than being threatened is balanced and enhanced
through the participatory and collaborative genius of all involved in the process. This
kind of republicanism, no doubt, neutralizes the tendency to dictatoship and autarchic
unilateralism.
Interestingly, it is striking to note that even among the Yoruba who practice a
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centralized political system of administration under a supreme chief (Oba), power is not
exercised in a strictly authoritarian way. Yoruba myths portray Olodumare as King and
the Orisa (deities as shown in the social model above) as divine representatives or subchiefs, or administrators of the kingdom. Power and authority in the Yoruba kingdoms
are “widely dispersed among partly independent town units, whose leaders are chosen by
the people as counterweights to the central authority.”81 The Yoruba Oba is viewed as a
divine king. His sacrality shields him from immediate contact with the people since
sacredness, whether of human or divine, has to be mediated. Hence he rather governs the
kingdom by a widely dispersed exercise of power through his sub-chiefs in council who
are closer to the people. Typically, it is an oligarchic monarchy. This kind of
participatory administration rather than threatening or diminishing or compromising the
power of the Oba as Metuh is wont to suggest,82 enhances it while at the same time
neutralizing autocratic tendencies. Consequently, “the Yoruba Oba, in spite of the
religious aura which surrounded him as a divine King, if found unpopular, could be
deposed…by his council.”83 Thus, despite their centralized socio-political organization
under a supreme divine king to whom they owe obedience and loyalty, the Yoruba abhor
absolutism. Neither are they “unquestioning in expressing their allegiance to authority.”84
These societies we have been considering differ from the Hausa-Fulani societies in
northern Nigeria, for instance. Islamic jihadists in the late 18th and early 19th centuries
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championed by Uthman dan Fodio had “brought the North under a centralized authority
that was vertically hierarchical, despotic in character and highly stratifying of the
polity.”85 In such autocratic monarchy, as in the case of northern Nigeria, authority is
given a sacred sanction by the Islamic religion and the Hausa emir could only be deposed
by his overlord, the Sultan of Sokoto.
Perhaps it is also worth noting that prior to the advent of Islam and Christianity in
Nigeria, for instance, there were no religious conflicts in the name of the Supreme God of
ATR. As Iheanyi Enwerem underlines, “people in Africa were not involved in religious
conflicts until the intrusion by the Islamic and Christian religions, each claiming to
possess the only true God and, consequently, each less than tolerant of other religious
world views.”86 But as we have seen above, the dynamic, flexible, and relational
transcendence of God in the Etche (or Igbo, Yoruba, Akan) cosmo-religious universe is
accommodating of collaborative exercise of power. The dynamic and flexible
transcendence of God as the condition of possibility for the multitude of deities to freely
exercise their independent agencies in carrying out the tasks assigned them by God in
specific areas of human needs within the framework of divine economy precludes
conflict. In this connection, violent competition is structurally eliminated within divinity.
Nigerian Nobel laureate, Wole Soyinka, speaking of tolerance and respect for otherness
as the hallmarks of his Yoruba Orisa religion insists: “the religion of the orisa, abhors
such principles of coercion or exclusion, and recognizes all manifestation of spiritual
urgings as attributes of the complex disposition of godhead. Tolerance is synonymous
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with the spirituality of the black continent, intolerance anathema.”87 Soyinka is here
condemning the exclusivist monotheistic rhetoric of the two foreign religions that
intruded Africa, Islam and Christianity, with their penchant for intolerance and
totalization. God’s transcendence which, as articulated in the Etche world-view, entails
God’s gender-neutrality, no institutionalized cult/priesthood/devotees, no temple, and no
image represented in mbari figures, means that God is beyond instrumentalization and
appropriation. Every religion in and of itself has something good about it. Yet it can be
abused by its adherents for negative and violent purposes. The multiplicity of deities in
the West African religions can and have been instrumentalized by their specific devotees
for negative ends. While Enwerem and Soyinka are right, yet their position veers toward
romanticism. They tend to ignore the fact that some societies in Nigeria have war deities
whose services are enlisted to do violence during inter-ethnic and other forms of
conflicts. For example, the Etche (and Igbo) have Ekwensu88 and the Yoruba have Sango.
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It should be recalled, as we have established, that these deities enjoy operational liberty in
their responsibilities. But they can be instrumentalized for good or for ill. However, it
remains correct to insist that God in the Etche and the other world-views we have seen
does not inspire and could not be instrumentalized for violence thanks to his
transcendence.
2.4.1 God’s Transcendence and the Inter-Relational Agency of the Spirits
From the models of the West African world-views that have been described
above, one thing that appears to be suggestive is that the deities are the intermediaries or
agents of God as Metuh underlined. It is true that the Etche, for example, recognize
Chukwu as the Creator and who exercises supreme authority over all of creation. Yet
Amadioha and Ala who preside over justice and oversee morality are revered as the most
powerful deities. They are so close to and involved in the life and quotidian affairs of the
people that in certain parts of the Etche country, Amadioha has almost taken the place of
God as intimated above. According to Ndimele, the ancestors and one’s personal chi also
have a hand in the tide of a person’s life.89 In the Yoruba cosmology, Olodumare
entrusted the task of creating the world to Obatala who even introduced imperfection in
creation because he got drunk with palm-wine. Among the Ashanti, the deities (Abosom,
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water deities) are sometimes described as sons of God because they derive from him and,
therefore, share his spirit or nature. They are, not surprisingly, considered by the Ashanti
as intermediaries or delegated ministers of Nyame.90 They are also considered as
executioners for God since they enjoy the liberty of punishing offenders by sometimes
bringing death and destruction upon outlaws.91
But above all, in ritual situations (private or communal), the deities are offered
prayers following the same modality for praying to God. Arinze has drawn attention to an
example of morning prayer to Chukwu and the deities in the Igbo tradition: “Chineke
(Ezechitoke) ekene; Ani ekene, Igwe ekene…. Taani oji; Ogbuefi nnam…taa oji (God
greetings; Earth, greetings, Sky, greetings…. Take kola all; Ogbuefi my father [ancestor]
take kola.”92 These examples seem to give a suggestion of looking at the deities as selfsufficient entities. Do their seeming self-sufficiency rival with God’s? Are they in
competition with God? There is no easy solution to the question of the relationship
between the stress on One God and a multiplicity of divinities in ATR. Nonetheless, as
Kwesi Dickson cautiously suggests: “The most one can say is that God’s self-sufficiency
is never in doubt, even if other deities may be recognized and worshipful attitudes
adopted before them.”93 One may deduce from Dickson’s cautious insight that the
apparent autonomy and independence of the deities do not diminish God’s sovereignty
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and supreme authority. It is the case that in these West African world-views, the dynamic
and flexible transcendence of divine hierarchy creates the condition of the possibility of
the deities exercising their functions in their respective areas of competency with liberty
for the good of human beings in the world. Indeed, Kwame Gyekye clearly states:
“Although the deities were created by God, they are considered in Akan theology and
cosmology to have independent existence of some sort; they operate independently of
God and in accordance with their own desires and intentions.”94 All this goes to show an
inclusive relational rather than an exclusive absolutist divine hierarchy as the hallmark of
the Etche religious universe. While the supremacy of God is not diminished, the
multiplicity of deities, ancestors, and other mediums independently play specialized but
complementary roles in the different areas of human need assigned to them within the
framework of the divine economy. Having seen so far how dynamism, flexibility, and
multiplicity undergird the relational being in the Etche cosmo-religious universe, let me
proceed to treat in a more specific way how the multiplicity of relationships structure or
shape the realization of individual human destiny.
2.5 The

Relational Understanding of Person in the Etche World

From the sample models of West African world-views we have seen above, it is
obvious that the human person occupies the center of a universe (visible and invisible)
structured by a network of dynamic relationships. There does not exist any elaborate
myth of the creation of the human person in the Etche cosmology. However, it is believed
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that the human person comprises the following dimensions:95 ahu (the material body);
ume-ndu (breath or life or breath of life; the animating principle which ceases when the
person dies); obi (which could mean either heart or soul depending on usage. Understood
as soul, it is an undying part of the person which only departs from the person and returns
to God at death); mmuo (the human spirit; it is this part of the person that can leave the
body at night to wander about and engaging in certain activities while the person is
sleeping much like in the dream. Before the person wakes up, the spirit returns to the
body. If it is attacked by witches or other evil spirits or stopped from returning to the
sleeping body, then the person unable to wake up dies. It is also this spirit that goes to the
ancestral realm). Then there is chi (the personal deity, destiny or guardian spirit, the
bearer of fortunes, and the personal creator assigned by God to each person. Chi returns
to God at death. Through chi, God is ontologically linked to each person). Finally, there
is eke (ancestral guardian spirit manifested in the form of excellent virtues, character, or
physical resemblances as received from God).
Accordingly, God endows a unique creative agent called personal chi who creates
each person. One can, nevertheless, draw on the proverbs and beliefs of the Etche. A
significant Etche proverb says: “Chi abughu otu”96 meaning chi is not one. This maxim
can enable an insight into the people’s belief. As we have seen above in the analysis of
the word Chi, it is used here in this maxim in a cosmological rather than non-
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cosmological sense. Cosmologically, it may mean God, guardian spirit, or destiny.97
Since it has already been established that the Etche believe that God is One and Supreme,
then chi as used in the maxim does not apply to God. To say that chi is not one, therefore,
means that each person has a unique creator chi. Indeed, an Igbo proverb makes this point
clearer: “ofu nne n’amu ma ofu chi adi eke”98 meaning one mother may give birth (to
different children) but each child is created by a unique personal chi. Chi is thus
responsible for the individuality of each person because no two persons have the same
chi. It is chi that humanizes each person. Ndimele has remarked that in Etche, “The
personal deity is commonly called chi. The tide of a person’s life is ascribed to his [or
her] chi.”99 Chi not only individualizes and humanizes a person but is also dynamically
connected to personal self-actualization and achievement. Although the tide of a person’s
life may be controlled by his or her chi (à la Ndimele), it is also true as we have seen
earlier that the Etche abhor absolutism. That explains why absolute power concentrated
in one’s personal chi is abhorrent to the Etche, hence the proverb: “Onye kwe chi ya
ekwe” meaning if a person agrees, his or her chi also agrees. This supports the
characteristic dynamism, flexibility, and relationality that ground the republican ethos of
the Etche, the Igbo, and others as we have seen above.
According to the Etche anthropological assumption, each person is ontologically
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linked to God through his or her personal chi. Chi which is the spiritual dimension of the
self constitutes the intimate point of access into God. As a personal deity, chi, in the
traditional Etche world, has a cult in every mgbala (the woman’s hearth) and in ritual
situation is offered prayers and sacrifice.100 Because of the intimacy with one’s personal
chi and the desire to have one’s destiny realized, there is not infrequently the temptation
to accord more importance to the personal chi than to God or the deities. Ezekwugo
provides a sample morning prayer addressed to Chi which, albeit, is for him the true
name of the Igbo God represented by the ikenga symbol/cult (the male symbol of
achievement): “Ife-Jioku taa oji; Chi-m taa oji; Nnaa fa taa oji; Chi Okafor taa oji;
Chusasialanu-m ndi ajo muo (Ife Jioku, eat kola; My chi eat kola; My ancestrs eat kola;
the chi of Okafor, eat kola; Drive away from me the evil spirits).”101
Nevertheless, each person is equally loved and gifted by God. That is why another
Etche aphorism says: “Chi ana aka ibe ya” which means no one’s own chi is greater than
another’s. No person is more unique than another. Everyone has the same equal dignity
rooted in the presence of God in each person through his or her personal chi. Indeed, chi
is the imago Dei in each human being.102 Each person is therefore, considered to be of
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value. No individual is thus swallowed up in the “we.” This speaks to the irreplacibility
and irreducibility of every person. By extension, no one community is more unique than
another. Our gifts may be different but none is more unique than another. According to
Elochukwu Uzukwu, “Among the Igbo this spiritual element [chi] is the basis of the
creativity of the individual person in community.”103
In fact, the multiplicity of personal chi responsible for the multiplicity of
individuals as well as distinct gifts and destinies is the condition of possibility for human
interactivity and relationships in the community. Difference and multiplicity as seen
through the lens of destiny undergird human interaction for mutual enrichment. The
identity of a person is constructed and nourished within the framework of complex
relationships. Indeed, the self becomes a self at all only through living intercourse with
other selves and within networks of personal, social, cultural, and natural relations.104 Chi
opens a person up to go beyond the self toward others. In the light of this framework, any
claim to an individual self-sufficiency unto oneself wars against friendship and solidarity
of others. Charles Nyamiti’s observation is ad rem: “The deeper one’s communion is
with others, the more fully he or she will be a person. Since personality is nourished by
communication, the more we communicate to others, the more we deepen and discover

point or contact between humanity and God in communion of life and love. The dominance of spirit
experience in ATR is a valuable resource for rearticulating a trinitarian theology beginning with the Spirit
as the access to encountering the God of Jesus Christ.
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our personality.”105 To be sure, relationship is not simply an avenue toward selfrealization. Rather it is essentially a way of being person. Personhood is being as
communion.106 Individualism breaks down communication, participation, solidarity of
others, and consequently, institutes egoism, stasis, and eventual death. Chi abhors stasis
(in the Greek sense that views motion, dynamism, or flexibility as imperfection) and
engenders movement to self-beyondness. In this movement, creativity unleashes newness
and new possibilities.
Now let me further buttress the point made above with an investigation of another
West African (Akan) notion of person. The Akan anthropology clearly illustrates how
relationships constitute personhood. According to this anthropology, the human person is
composed of at least seven elements as summarized by Peter Sarpong.107 The first is
mogya (blood) which is inherited from the mother; the blood which makes the person a
biological being constitutes the material aspect of the person; it connects the person to to
the clan system thereby giving him or her status and membership within a lineage, and
obligations as a citizen in a matrilineal society; this part of the person dies. Then there is
okra or kra which is the soul (though not simply reducible to the soul); it is the individual
personality and it has a cult; it is the guardian spirit assigned to each person as well as the
the humanizing aspect of the person. It is the undying part of the person which he
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recieves from the Supreme Being.108 Okra or kra can be said to be the equivalent of the
Etche and Igbo chi. The kra “receives a destiny package from God on behalf of his ward
and sees to the realization of the content of this predestined lot which is believed to be
unalterable.”109 Another element is the sunsum (spirit) or a spiritual preexistent principle.
It is changeable and dynamic and, therefore, subject to either growth or diminution, being
strengthened or weakened. It can, however, be trained to be heavy instead of being light;
for to be lightweight is to easily fall prey to the activity of witches. It is the principle
which determines the character and individuality of the human person. Gyekye calls it the
activating principle in the person.110 There is the ntoro which is a spiritual element
received through the father which calls for the respect accorded one’s father. Postpuberty, the person becomes guided by his or her own ntoro. Accordingly, the sunsum,
ntoro, and kra make a spiritual being. Then there is the sasa, the avenging part of the
human person which urges wrongdoers to confess wrongs afflicted on others. And
finally, there is the saman, which is the form a person assumes after death; it is the form
in which the spirits of the ancestors exist.
Clearly, one can see from the Akan human type how the personal spirit that
undergirds West African anthropology is structured by a multiplicity of relationships. In
this connection, by virtue of the ntoro, the person belongs to his father’s kinship group;
through mogya, the person is linked to his matrilineal clan; through kra, the person is
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inextricably related to God. Truly, therefore, to exist, to be a person, is essentially to be
related. It is this interlinked complex of relationships that socially define a person. And
one can only continue to be a person only by nourishing and deepening these
relationships. As indicated above, these relationships not only bestow status but also
accrue obligations to the person which invite the person to go beyond the self in order to
move toward, to reach out to others. Thus, the West African human type abhors stasis
which is against motion, change, newness, and the possibility of alternative relationships.
Relationality lies at the core of sociality and society. Because each person is endowed
with a unique destiny, then each needs the experience, endowments, services, and
contributions of others for their comparative advantage111 since God did not give all
destinies to one person, but some to one person and some to others, so that all have need
of each other. Diversity, difference, and plurality thus invite relationality and sociality.
Personhood as a nexus of relationships is aptly expressed in the beautiful African
apothegm, “I am because we are and we are because I am.” To put it differently, a
person’s existence, worth, and identity are realizable only within the matrix of communal
and cosmic web of relationships that shape them. At the same time, the order, function,
and worth of community are only possible because of the personal contribution of its
individual members.
A crucial point worth stressing is the freedom of persons to creatively actualize
their destinies, albeit, always in collaboration with their individual personal chi
111
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(guardian-spirit). The need for destiny realization incites persons unto an ongoing
movement or process of auto-realization through creativity and diligence toward a life
that is fully lived. To attain such a fully lived life necessarily entails communion of life
with others. Francis Njoku lends credence to this vision as he writes:
Part of the affirmation of human dignity and auto-creation [in West Africa]
is in doing something in which the self shows itself as living. [This]…autocreation needs not be in manual or intellectual work but an expression of the
self in its authentic individuality where one communes and shares realistically
with others no matter how little. As an existent-subject, one contributes to the
world of humanization and affirmation.112
It is small wonder then that individuals in the Etche world are at least known or
recognized for something. It could be for their prowess, creativity, success, and
achievement. For example, a great or master wrestler is di-mgba (di could mean husband
or master in the sense of adept while mgba means to wrestle); a great yam farmer is eze-ji
(king of yam); a woman who uses her talents to increase the wealth of her family is
recognized as okpata-aku; a great peacemaker is “ome udo,” and so on. Everyone is
recognized by what he/she does best. The individual creativity is recognized and not
necessarily swallowed up in the “We.” An Etche peoverb that aptly captures this
perspective says: “Ekobebe ulo, ekota onye ogologo” meaning literally, “when hanging
the roof of a building, the need for a tall person becomes evident.” Put another way,
everyone has his or her own irreplaceable place. It can be said that it is the individual’s
achievements and actualization of destiny within the complex of relationships that
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enunciate and affirm him/her as a human person.113
What we have highlighted so far regarding the notion and place of the individual
person in West African anthropologies flies in the face, for instance, of Robert Schreiter’s
distinction between individualist and collectivist cultures within an intercultural
communicative matrix. Drawing on the views of certain sociologists, Schreiter holds that
in the individualist culture, a member feels affirmed since an intercultural communication
event that engenders openness and creativity would have displayed the novelty of an
uninhibited autonomous individual. Whereas within the collectivist position into which
Schreiter lumps Africans, he suggests that “members…would see ‘openness and
creativity’ as a potential deviation and a lack of group solidarity. Innovation of any type
needs to be seen as either rediscovery or a reaffirmation of the group’s knowledge, ethos,
and solidarity. Hence, collectivist cultures prize the enrichment of new information in a
way that is different from their individualist counterparts. New information is just a way
of saying something we already know.”114 Schreiter’s suggestion here appears to
insinuate that at the long run, there is no element of newness, new possibility, or surprise
113
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in the African cultural matrix since whatever an individual comes to know or create
would merely be a rediscovery, a reaffirmation, or a recollection (perhaps in the Platonic
sense of anamnesis)115 of “something we already know.”
This view of Schreiter is counterposed by the Etche (and Akan) anthropological
conception as has been exposed in the forgoing paragraphs. In these world-views, not
only does the community, its culture, and principles shape the individual’s values and
actions, but the community itself, its culture, and values are also shaped by the
individual’s rational creativity, imaginations, and ingenuity.116 Individual persons are
self-determined free participants and active collaborators in the pursuit of the
humanization and bonum commune of the community rather than anonymous, passive,
and conformist elements used by the community to carry out its own schemes. In this
context, moral obligation is seen in terms of the duty that persons consciously owe to
themselves and others in the mutually beneficial relationships that exist in the
community. Within this mutual and symbiotic relationship between the community and
the individual, the interests of the community and the individual are not mutually
exclusive. Rather, they are coextensive. In this light, African communal ethos is not the
same as collectivism. It is thus, instructive to note that there is a subtle distinction
between collectivism and African communal ethos which I have described elsewhere.117
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As has been made clear, the human person in West African socio-cultural
matrixes is conceived in terms of a multiplicity and plurality of relationships. A person
cannot be a person in isolation and as an abstract entity. While one’s individuality is
irreplaceable and irreducible, a person is always the product of a socio-cultural milieu.118
In the Etche anthropology under consideration, the human person is seen as divine, as
spiritual, and thus of having dignity and worth on account of being ontologically
connected to God through a personal chi (or kra for the Akan). It is this spiritual element
that is fundamentally determinative in the actualization of destinies and hence, in the
forging of relationships. The personal spirit enables a human subject’s openness to God
and as well the self-actualization of a person through creativity in openness to others,
community, and toward the harmony of the socio-cosmic process. Crucially, while one’s
destiny may not be altered, it is, however, susceptible to the malevolent influence of the
deities, witches, and sorcerers who use power for ill. Because they have the freedom to
employ power to act negatively, they can partially marr a good destiny and can even kill
out of jealousy. This explains the importance aattached to mediation in the Etche

sole source of meaning and value, it arrogates to itself power in order to be in control; since nothing in the
entire society matters except insofar as it contributes to the collective or carries out its programs,
collectivism is a menace to the individual because it totalizes and thematizes the individual. Rather than
self-determined participation (wherein lies moral responsibility), activity degenerates to response at the
behest of the collective; rather than personal initiative and creativity,what prevails is passivity and robotic
acceptance. Indeed, the collective renders its members, nay, its elements, if not similar, homogenized, and
passive, then anonymous and compliant. Rights are only those granted by the collective, so they offer no
defense of the individual with respect to it, especially since the code of law and the procedures of
adjudication that would secure rights are created by the collective on its own behalf and not necessarily
originating from the dignity of the individual as created by God and imbued with God’s Spirit (chi).
Consequently, collectivism always tends toward domination of persons, authoritarianism, or totalitarian
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religious universe. In what follows, I will examine the place and role of mediators and
spirit possession geared toward the amelioration of human destiny.
2.6 Mediation

in the Etche Cosmo-Religious Universe

In view of life as the greatest gift of God and the need to actualize one’s destiny,
the Etche take seriously the question of protection against the malevolent powers,
including their human agents. The need for mediation foregrounds the important role
played by diviners, medicine-men, and other mediums, who come under the influence or
guidance of the right spirits or deities. Uzukwu is right in pointing out that:
In African mystical experience the Supreme Being never mounts [that is to
say, never possesses] anybody; only His deputies who are emissaries mount
and give messages for the good of the community. In this way, God’s dynamic distance is maintained, and God’s spirit is encountered in inspired or
possessed emissaries (emphasis original).119
Guided by this insight, it immediately becomes clear that God’s dynamic transcendence
as seen previously is the condition of possibility for God’s emissaries to carry out the task
of possession particularly in their area of expertise. Spirit possession is a common
phenomenon in most of West African religions.120 In the Etche religion someone can be
possessed by Ekwensu (war-deity), Ala (Mother Earth), Agwushi (divination/medicinedeity)121 for the good of the community and the realization of human destiny. In the
phenomenon of possession the entrancing deities or spirits temporarily become manifest
in their chosen and communicate through them. But medicine (ogwu) which engenders
119
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cure and healing can also be used in pernicious and antisocial ways to cause harm and
misfortune to people through, for instance, nshi (poison).
Diviners (Babalawo in Yoruba, Dibia in Etche and Igbo, etc) and other mediums
can be possessed by the deities to equip them with not only power but also knowledge
and messages for the good of others. What is interesting to note is that this vocation is
not the prerogative of one sex or gender. Hence, men and as wall as women can be
possessed by the deities to serve as priests/priestesses, and to be practitioners of
medicine, or mediums.122 Also, both male and female deities play complementary roles in
the phenomenon of possession. For example, Ala (female deity), Idemili for the Igbo (the
deity of peace and daughter of Chukwu and Ala), can mount their elects as much as the
males deities can. For nothing is absolute. Twinness or multiplicity is also at work in
spirit possession.
Ideally, the purpose of spirit possession is for those entranced to help others and
restore especially the sick to holistic health and harmony in the community. Spirit
possession provides access to divine presence and power. Taylor rightly noted: “It is not
the doctor’s [or diviner’s] expertise as a herbalist or bone-setter which gives healing, but
the power of God and of the…[spirits] working through him. For a great part of his work
also consists of spiritual diagnosis, revealing the dividedness that makes patients
vulnerable or the undetected malice that works as witchcraft.”123 Taylor’s insight can be
said, among others, to point to the prophetic dimension of spirit possession that

122

See Parrinder, West African Religion, 37, 101; R. S. Rattray, Religion and Art in Ashanti (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1959), 39.
123

Taylor, The Primal Vision, 150-1.

137

empowers persons to engage in responsible praxis on behalf of the oppressed and
victimized.
In order to function effectively as a dibia or diviner, a person does not become
one overnight. Rather, in Etche religious landscape, for instance, a prospective dibia who
has discerned the signals of the vocation by Agwushi indispensably undergoes a long and
rigorous training or apprenticeship. Growing up in this culture, I have personally
witnessed the apprenticeship of dibias. During this training, the novice is familiarized
with certain rituals that would not only strengthen him but also facilitate his rendezvous
with and sensitization to the divinity. At the end of the rigorous training, he goes through
the complex initiatory rite of isa-anya which literally means the “cleansing of the eyes
with certain medicines” (empowerment for trances, for seeing and hearing the voice of
the spirit) which may last for a designated number of days. This ritual symbolizes the
death of the dibia to the old and a transformative resurrection into a new way or mold of
being. It transforms the personality of the dibia and activates his/her ability to begin to
see beyond the physical and the ordinary and to tap into the domain of the spirit’s
inaccessible to non-initiates. It equips him/her with special knowledge and wisdom
unavailable to the rest of the people. Worthy of pointing out is that, though, the
metamorphosis of the dibia grants her/him celestial access and the height of intimacy
with the spirits, s/he does not cease being a woman/man living under the human
condition on earth. Thus, the diviners play an agentive role in the fulfillment of the
greatest goal of ATR, to oblige “God to come down to earth, to renew his closeness to
man, to descend to him in order to divinize him,”124 and to bring about the realization of
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His (God’s) benevolent purpose for human well-being and wholeness. The phenomenon
of spirit possession, therefore, has an overriding social and relational orientation as the
diviners, the dibias, or priests, henceforth live their lives at the expense of the
worshippers and community.125
It is this traditional dimension of spirit experience that has, no doubt, been
appropriated and assimilated into West African Christianity today. Whether it is in
Pentecostalism (though it claims to reject all that has to do with ATR as devilish and
demonic) or in African Independent Churches (AICs), or in Charismatic Renewal
Movements, or among priest-healers, the dimension of spirit possession has been redimensioned, reformulated, and assimilated into the qualities of the all-powerful God and
the insurgent Universal Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit now possesses the prophet-diviner,
evangelist, charismatic and priest-healer figures in order to empower them for the
mission of liberating those under the clutches of the devil, witchcraft, and of healing the
sick.126 These rebranded diviners claim to be in the fullness of the Holy Spirit and to
possess spiritual powers to dislodge and undo the activities of evil spirits and of their
agents. They are successful in this prophetic praxis and resistance struggle against sinister
forces that diminish life because they take the sufferings, fears, and stories of their clients
seriously.127 The phenomenon of Spirit possession thus becomes an indomitable force

Martin and Lawrence M. Martin (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 17.
125

See Parrinder, West African Religion, 91.

126

Nathaniel I. Ndiokwere, Prophecy and Revolution: The Role of Prophets in the Independent African
Churches and in Biblical Tradition (London: SPCK, 1995), esp. chap. 7.
127

See Nathaniel I. Ndiokwere, Search For Security: Freedom From Sinister Forces that Threaten Life
in African Society, 2nd ed. (Onitsha, Nigeria: Effective Key Publishers, 1995), 58.

139

that empowers for resistance against evil that diminishes or destroys life in order to
engender human flourishing, abundant life, and freedom. We shall investigate the
importance of the AICs as far as the repackaging and rearticulation of the Christian
gospel in the light of ancestral religious assumptions are concerned in Chapter 5. There,
we shall also expand the insights of the AICs by reinterpreting the multiplicity of spirits
and deities in West African religious universe as refractions or manifestations of the
Universal Holy Spirit in the realization of Divine universal salvific purpose.
2.7 The

Pitfalls and Strengths of the Etche-African Relational
Framework
So far we have established that relationality, flexibility, and dynamism guide

relationships in the Etche religious world-view. God’s dynamic hierarchy allows for the
dispersal of power which enhances collaborative and participatory administration of
divine economy. While this may be its key strength, it at the same time creates room for
its woes.
Pitfalls: Perhaps I must point out that the dynamic, flexible, and relational
structures of the Etche (and likewise Akan, Yoruba, etc) anthropology are not without
their own pitfalls. [a] One such weakness is the tendency to parochialism, clannishness,
and ethnicism. While these must be guarded against, I insist that they do not, however,
detract from the excellence of relationality as a valuable contribution of the West African
matrix for negotiating difference in our world today. [b] Again, the importance and the
sometimes near-dominance accorded the cult of chi (kra for the Akan, ori for the Yoruba)
in a bid to achieve one’s destiny tend to occlude the place of the Supreme God or even
the deities. [c] Moreover, the framework of relationality which undergirds all
140

relationships in the Etche religious universe creates the condition of possibility for the
instrumentalization of the spirits and deities by their devotees and priests/priestesses for
anti-social purposes. [d] At the same time, the deities can also in turn take advantage of
their independence to turn malevolent. [e] It also enables agents of malevolent forces like
witches and sorcerers to tap into mystical power to be deployed for ill. Nevertheless,
these possible pitfalls should not eliminate from view the significance of relational
religious anthropology as providing an other paradigm for negotiating another discourse
on God and difference.
Strengths: [a] Relationality as an overriding criterion and core tenet of being in
the Etche religious universe guards against absolutism, despotism, and autarchic
unilateralism. In this way, it promotes and enhances collaborative and participatory
administration. [b] God’s dynamic transcendence is accommodating of plurality, and
tolerating of difference (male and female deities). This carries significant message and
implication for ecclesial and socio-political structures and organization. It is also relevant
for interreligious dialogue. [c] The dominance of the relational understaning of personal
spirit that undergirds West African anthropology invites a reinterpretation of Trinitarian
theology from an African perspective. There is no doubt that the question of God as the
Father of Jesus Christ was a radical novelty introduced to West Africans by missionary
Christianity.128 But it is clear from the discussion so far that the question of One God and
spirits was no stranger to the Etche and other West African religions prior to the advent
of Christianity. There is no question that the relational and dynamic understanding of
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God and the dominance of spirits was easily assimilated into the qualities of the Triune
God preached by Christian missionaries. This is evident today in the predominance of the
phenomenon of Spirit possessions and other Spirit-related phenomena that characterize
West African Christianity. West Africans rearticulated the Christianity they discovered
with their re-dimensioned traditional dimensions of spirit experience. The functions of
the multiplicity of spirits (for example, for healing, for protection from sinister forces, for
favors, and so on) have been creatively reconfigured and subjected to the Holy Spirit in
West African Christianity. West African relational religious anthropology invites a
revision of the Trinitarian taxis from the traditional God-Christ-Spirit to God-SpiritChrist which fosters pneumatology as the viable entrée into the Triune God. [d] West
African religious universe is fundamentally focused on the amelioration of human wellbeing. [e] The lack of conflict built into the structure of God’s dynamic hierarchy
precludes war and violence from being deployed in the name of God. This is a
contribution from which Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions can learn that violence is
not to be carried out in the nemae of God. These are some excellent values that West
African relational religious anthropology can contribute to enrich world Christinianity.
2.8 Conclusion
From what has been said so far with regard to the dimension of spirit experiences
in Etche-African cosmo-religious world-view, certain clear facts do emerge. Primarily,
relationality is the fundamental thread that is woven into the warp and woof of the said
weltanschauung. God’s dynamic and relational hierarchy allows for power-with rather
than power-over. The human person ontologically linked to God through a personal chi is
valued as sacred and as having an irreducible and irreplacible worth. The litmus test of all
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human and non-human behaviors and activities lies in determining whether they enhance
and promote life or diminish life thereby instituting disequilibrium in the socio-cosmic
process. In the face of anti-life forces, the spirit mounts persons in order to use them to
ameliorate health, destiny, and overall wholeness. This is a prophetic praxis against
oppression and domination. The beautiful values provided by the dimension of spirit
experiences from West African world-views may be the elixir for relearning hospitality,
friendship, and solidarity of others in our globalized world. The ambivalence inherent in
globalization, rather than abetting the clash of civilizations129 (as some are wont to
suggest) could become a kairos for the “dialogue of cultures and among civilizations”
according to the United Nation’s 2001 convention marking the Year of Dialogue, for a
more peaceful pluralistic world.
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Image Books Doubleday, 1992); Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (Indiana: University of
Indiana Press, 1964).
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Chapter 3
The Spirit as the Lord and the Giver of Life: Rearticulating
Relational Pneumatology
3.1 Introduction
The Niceno-Constantinopolitan creedal profession acclaims the Holy Spirit as the
Lord and the Giver of life. But the question of how the Spirit has been giving life both
within and out-side the church remains at issue. From what I have elaborated in the
previous chapters, it is clear that the Spirit has more often than not been domesticated.
Thus, structures that should be giving and promoting life have been and continued to be
used to spawn a spiral of violence and diminution of life. Where has the Spirit been
giving life? Whose life is it that the Spirit has been giving? Is this life limited to only
certain group of people or a particular religion? Is one life more important than another?
As Lord, does the Spirit exercise power to resist violence and anti-life forces and
structures and to work out liberation on behalf of the oppressed? Does the Spirit abhor
body and difference? There may be more questions than answers. But this range of
questions would prove helpful in mapping the contours of a theology that engages our
contemporary pluralistic age in a fashion that unleashes a redemptive and liberative
alternative.
In this chapter, I will first investigate certain biblical tropes which are helpful for
rearticulating the doctrine of the relational Spirit as the Lord and Giver of life. Mindful of
the elusiveness and mysterious nature of the Spirit, we recognize that metaphors are
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better tools than mere concepts to speak about the Spirit. The next section shall thus focus
briefly on the import of metaphors as well as certain metaphors or symbols of the Spirit.
This takes us to the question of Spirit and embodiment. Are they opposed or related?
Again, we shall examine the universal Spirit as Mediator of both the creative and
prophetic presence of God who has been giving life to the entire creation and
empowering humanity even before the incarnation of the Word. In doing this, particular
attention will be given to an understanding of the work of the biblical rûah. The role of
the Spirit in the life and ministry of the Messiah, in the church and the question of
pluralism will be looked into. Equally to be treated is the formulations of embodiment
within Christian tradition with regard to the Spirit and salvation. Here we shall focus on
Irenaeus of Lyons and Augustine of Hippo. On the basis of the fruit of these explorations,
I shall argue in the next section for the need to reclaim the dignity of difference. In the
final part, I contend that there is need for broadening our concept of sin in a way that
truly engenders genuine conversion that will promote justice and solidarity of the “other”
who is a neighbor. All this is inspired and made possible, as we shall conclude, by the
relational and life-giving Spirit.
3.2 The

Spirit as the Lord and the Giver of Life

As already pointed out in Chapter 1, the Spirit has been neglected in Roman
Catholic systematic theology for a number of reasons. Some of those reasons have been
clearly marshaled out. But among all the reasons, we noted that it was in order to
preserve God’s transcendence, and hence God’s freedom as articulated in classical theism
that the Spirit through whom divine relationality is concretely mediated in the world
paled into insignificance. Classical theism feared that recognizing relationality in God
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would detract from God’s utter otherness by predicating necessity and dependence to
God. But it is significant that from the evidence adduced in the preceding chapters, what
needs to be stressed is that relation and freedom in God, whether ad intra or ad extra, are
not contradictory. God in his absolute freedom and transcendence graces God’s other (all
creation) with God’s self-gift, presence, love, and care,not out of constraint but freely. In
other words, God’s transcendence and immanence are correlative rather than
contradictory. God is present throughout the whole world and indwells every human
being through the pervasive presence of the relational Spirit. Thus in neglecting the Spirit
in Latin systematic theology, what was actually eliminated from view is “the mystery of
God’s personal engagement with the world in its history of love and disaster…God’s
empowering presence…through-out history…calling forth the praxis of life and
freedom.”1 Indeed, what was neglected is the mystery of the Person and the activity of
the relational Spirit in the world. For the mystery of the absent-present God, God who is
ever-coming, ever drawing near, interrupting us, and passing by, God who comes in a
trace, is experienced as the energy and power of the Spirit. God is in the world and the
world is in God through the presence of the Spirit.
Again, as I noted in Chapter 1, from about the second half of the twentiethcentury, however, a new interest in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit emerged. Some have
described this new upsurge as a new advent of the Spirit. An interesting feature about this
new advent has been a spate and profusion of books on the Holy Spirit. Although a good
number of these books have shed light on the Holy Spirit, most still concern themselves,
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for instance, with the Spirit’s pro-cession in abstracto and the near-objectified Spirit as
vinculum amoris. That well taken, how-ever, much still remains to be done and made
clear with regard to the outreach of the divine Spirit to and in creation in general and
human beings in particular in their social and historical situatedness. This lacuna is the
location of my concerns in this section.
We may not speak adequately about the Spirit today especially in the light of our
pluralistic context without factoring in the notion of relationality. The universal pervasive
presence and cosmic breadth of activity of the Spirit penetrate every spectrum of life
engendering the interconnectivity and community of all life forces. Because the divine
Spirit―so-called because she is not estranged from life here but vivifies it―operates
universally in giving and affirming life, the Spirit could be recognized in everything that
ministers to life and resists its destruction, says Jürgen Moltmann.2 There has been a
tendency in traditional theology to limit the operation of the Spirit to indwelling the soul,
to faith, to church institutions and as having nothing to do with the so-called profane
domain. This spiritualization of the Spirit led to the separation of the Spirit from body
and embodiment, from nature, politics and economics, and indeed from all that is counted
to belong to the secular. Yet it is well to note that the Bible is replete with a certain notion
of the Spirit as the divine power and presence that inter-penetrates all nature and all
aspects of life. Before proceeding further to elucidate this fact, foremost, however, I
should like to clarify briefly how the term “Spirit” would be understood here. As also
mentioned in Chapter 1, to the understanding of the Spirit pursued here must be added
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both the impersonal and personal characters of the Spirit as they are complementary
rather than mutually exclusive.
3.2.1 Spirit: Terminological Clarification
Very often, the notion of spirit conjures up that which is immaterial, ghost-like,
discarnate, invisible, ethereal, vapid, and vacant. This construal might not be entirely
unconnected with the translation of the Holy Spirit in the King James Bible as Holy
Ghost. Indeed, the Spirit has been described as amorphous, faceless, shadowy,
anonymous, and so forth.3 It also gets more confusing when the same word spirit can
refer either to the Spirit of God, Holy Spirit, human spirit, or even to other spirits. All
such qualifications, no doubt, point to something about the elusiveness and dynamism of
the reality that the term spirit conveys. Not too infrequently, the notion of spirit has
played into the hierarchized dualism that plagues Western theological and philosophical
thought, implying a dichotomy and hierarchy between soul/body, spirit/matter,
mental/physical, human/nature, holy/profane, male/female, and so on. Peter Hodgson is
right in his judgment that, more often than not, the “hierarchy reflects a suspicion and
fear of the suppressed poles: nature, the body, the feminine.”4
These suppressed poles are often viewed to be outside the operation of the Spirit
understood as Holy. In a mistaken impression, the Spirit understood as Holy appears to
be opposed to the profane and the secular, to nature, body, and the feminine. That this
type of mentality has spun a spirituality of hostility―Gnostic and Neo-Platonist in
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character―toward the body and remoteness from nature and the world, and reinforcing
misogynist bias, is rather evident in the history of Western Catholic spirituality and
theology. At any rate, notwithstanding the elusive character of the Spirit, biblical texts
consistently figure the relational dynamism of the Spirit. Such relationality is concretized,
for instance, in the Spirit’s creative and sustaining activity; the Spirit is: “[the] life-form
who animates and sustains the natural world. The Spirit makes alive the natural systems
on which all life depends.”5 As a matter of fact, a cluster of biblical imageries that accrue
around the Spirit are all corporeal and vital for life. Be it breath, wind, water, fire, or even
the avian one (dove), each of these is vital for sustaining life and for living as we shall
see shortly.
Therefore, any attempt to make the Spirit antithetical to body, matter, nature, or
the secular is wrongly headed. Any such alternative would be false, narrow, and fails to
square with reality which appears as more holistic but dynamically interconnected. The
Spirit always seeks and rests on bodies; the Spirit always mediates God’s presence in and
to the world in embodied fashion. The relational dynamism of the Spirit, therefore,
requires a more radical affirmation of the Spirit as not simply ethereal, immaterial,
ghostly, vacant, but the very “Spirit of Life,” the “Divine Energy of Life” itself, and
indeed, the immanence of God in the whole world and in all things.6 This very
affirmation can only be eliminated from view to the detriment of the Christian faith and
theology. Elizabeth Johnson rightly accedes that this affirmation points “to the gracious,
furious mystery of God engaged in a dialectic of presence and absence throughout the
5
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world, creating, indwelling, sustaining, resisting, recreating, challenging, guiding,
liberating, completing.”7 All of these seemingly disparate activities of the Spirit, Johnson
affirms, “are in reality but aspects of the one engagement, the one economy of God with
the world.”8 Johnson’s fine insight here is a very significant one. There is only one
economy of God with the world and not two or three as the case may be. The one
economy spans from creation through redemption to consummation. Creation and
redemption do not constitute two separate economies. God creates in order to save. There
may not be such a thing as world history separate from a salvation history. For salvation
history entails the salvation of this whole created world. Redemption embraces not only
humanity but the entire cosmos since the Redeemer is at the same time the Creator and
reconciler of all things.9 To look at Christ who became incarnate and was resurrected in
the power of the Spirit is to see that redemption embraces all the dimensions of existence.
For in Christ all things hold together and through him (and his redemptive act), God
reconciles to himself all things, things in heaven and things on earth (see Col 1:16-20;
Eph 1:3-4). No aspect of reality is left out. Therefore, redemption enfolds all the
dimensions of being such that it includes not only liberation from the burdens of guilt
through forgiveness of sins and engendering hope for eternal life, but also from the
aftermath of sins manifested in sinister economic, political, and socio-cultural structures
that repress, alienate, and exploit men and women in history. All these aspects belong
together and to the one and the same history of God’s engagement with the whole
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world.10 It is the relational Spirit who is the agent of this holism. The elusiveness and
relational dynamism of the Spirit engenders the fruitful correlation between God’s
transcendence and God’s continuous coming into communion with all of reality. This
correlation is nowhere more evident than as it is captured in metaphorical language.
Having said this, let us now examine the significance of the use of metaphors in speaking
about the Spirit.
3.2.2 Metaphors/Symbols of the Spirit
In human speech, metaphors and/or symbols are used frequently to express
meanings in a way that concepts are incapable of doing. The use of metaphor entails the
transfer and application of a descriptive term or name or phrase to a person, an object, or
action to which it is imaginatively and symbolically (that is, really) but not literally
applicable. Symbols are imageries that “point beyond themselves and evoke awareness of
a dimension of human existence [and experience] that cannot be captured in nonsymbolic
expressions.”11 The revelation or the coming of God to humans is a unique experience of
interpersonal relationship that human concepts cannot capture adequately. The reason is
simple. God is a mystery and God is love. In his loving self-gift and communication to
humans God reveals God’s self as transcendent-immanent, as absent-present. God, albeit,
is the mysteriously wholly other and yet, God’s self revealing is always mediated in and
through particular concrete human experiences, situations, and persons. Symbol as a
particular structure of mediation makes real and present that which is signified without
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absolute identification. Symbols function like sacraments. Indeed, sacraments are
symbols or even icons. Religious symbols as rituals function to bridge and thus overcome
the distance between the transcendent mystery (vertical dimension) and to draw the past
(memory) into the present with an eye toward the future (horizontal dimension). In this
symbolic or sacramental operationalism, the power of human imagination (graced, of
course) creates an equilibrium of intimacy by converging both the vertical and horizontal
axes into a continuum that is real and efficacious hic et nunc. 12
In relation to speech about the Spirit, the use of metaphors or symbols is most ad
rem. In talking about the first Person of the Trinity, we are helped by such a familiar
concept as “Father.” With respect to the second Person, the idea of “Son” coupled with
his incarnation and hence his humanity, help matters. But with regard to the Spirit, we
encounter some difficulty because even the term “Holy Spirit” is not a proper noun.
Besides, the elusiveness of the Spirit makes it all the more difficult to grapple with the
mystery that is the Spirit. It is against this back-drop that we appreciate the series of
metaphorical ways in which the Old (or rather First) and New (or Second) Testaments
(hereafter, OT and NT) describe the operation and personhood of the Spirit. Among
others, we shall focus on the following metaphors: wind or breath, water or rain, fire or
light, oil or anointing, and dove. A crucial point worth noting is that all these metaphors
are natural and material elements, and therefore, corporeal rather than ethereal. This
unmistakably underscores the point that the Spirit is not antithetical to corporeality, rather
she intercompenetrates and suffuses it with life. Taking these metaphors one after the
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other, we shall see how they capture for us the proprium and role of the Spirit.
Wind or Breath: In the OT, experiences of God are often presented
metaphorically as the movement or rushing of the wind. Indeed, wind or breath is known
as rûah. In a later section, we shall explore a detailed understanding of rûah in the OT,
but for the moment, suffice it to say that rûah is the principle of life that births creation,
empowers individuals for specific tasks especially liberative ventures, and as breath,
gives life to humans and all living creatures. Wind is neither static nor rigid. Rather it is
always in motion, fluid, dynamic, unpredictable, uncontrollable, irrepressible, and allpervasive. We can then understand why Jesus in referring to the operation of the Spirit
says to Nicodemus: “The wind blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you
cannot tell where it comes from or where it is going” (Jn 3:8). Gregory Nazianzen
expands this saying of Jesus by rightly acceding that the Spirit not only blows where He
wills but also on whom He wills, and to what extent He wills.13 This is a very interesting
metaphor. The Spirit that blows everywhere is pervasively present in the entire creation
so that no one or group can monopolize, completely contain, or domesticate the Spirit.
The wind that is ceaselessly surging symbolizes the insurgent Spirit who resists all forms
of rigid formalization and routinization. Because the wind is constantly blowing and in
motion, it makes stagnant or foul air become fresh and full of vitality. It refreshes and
purifies, bringing about newness and new possibilities. Similarly, the ever blowing and
new winds of the Spirit move over lives that are contested, degraded, or even moribund,
groaning in them as in labor pain (see Rom 8:18-27). Since labor pains usually yield new
birth and new life, the Spirit’s groan augurs radical novelty, new possibilities, new
13
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creation, new beginnings, and a non-deceptive hope that shatters stagnation and
moribundity. It yields and sustains life. For a world without air will degenerate into
lifelessness. Wind is also a source of energy and power. No wonder rûah refers to the
power of God to accomplish and actualize divine projects. When the powerful effusion of
the great wind came upon the disciples on Pentecost, they were so possessed and filled
with power and courage that they broke loose from their fears and lethargy and set “on
the move towards unsuspected new things”14 that they would not otherwise do. The
power and energy of the Spirit empowers and mobilizes the agency of the degraded and
oppressed to resist and break the stranglehold of tyranny. Sometimes too, the irresistible
power of a very strong wind is destructive of whatever stands in its way. This is about the
Spirit as life-giver as well as the insurgent, transgressive, and resistant Spirit against all
controls of empire and all anti-life forces.
Water or Rain: In a number of instances in the Bible water is used as an apt
metaphor for the Spirit. As Jesus once put it, “If anyone is thirsty, let him come to me and
drink. Whoever believes in me, as the Scripture has said, streams of living water will
flow from within him. By this he meant the Spirit….” (Jn 7:37-39; cf 4:10). The symbol
of water tells us a great deal about the Holy Spirit. Water is necessary for the preservation
of life. A human being is said to compose of about sixty percent water. Hence, any acute
dehydration can lead to instant death. Other animals and plants need water to stay alive.
Without water or rain, the earth will neither be fruitful nor sustain any kind of life. In the
days of Elijah, for instance, when it did not rain for three and half years, all vegetation
died until Elijah prayed for it to rain again (see 1 Kgs 17:1; 18:41-45; cf Jas 5:17-18).
14
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Analogously, it is to say that the Holy Spirit is indispensable to the preservation and
sustenance of life. Water is equally necessary for cleansing our bodies and filthiness.
According to Gustavo Gutiérrez, “water also continually purifies us and smoothes away
any wrinkles in manner of being Christians, at the same time supplying the vital element
needed for making new ground fruitful.”15 When the Spirit is poured out upon us, she
births us anew, washes guilt away, refreshes and renews us (see Jn 3:5). And as Jesus
said to the Samaritan woman about the life-giving water which he shall give, “Everyone
who drinks this water will be thirsty again, but whoever drinks the water I give him will
never thirst. Indeed, the water I give will become in him a spring of living water welling
up to eternal life” (Jn 4:14). That is to say, when human beings receive the Spirit, she
becomes in them a life-giving wellspring from which others are supposed to drink.
Again, the immensity of water points to its power to drown or erode whatever tries to be
an obstacle on its path. We see the destructive power of water at work in the Flood during
Noah’s days (Gen 7) as well as the drowning of Pharaoh’s army in the Red Sea (Ex
14:28). Water is one of the greatest solvents and it can, with time, erode even the
strongest rock or stone on its path. It is also a source of power and energy. This is still
about the life-giving and saving but also resistant Spirit.
Fire or Light: Another popular metaphor of the Holy Spirit is fire. In the OT,
most theophanies of God occurred amidst fire. Fire in relation to God in the OT always
signified the presence of God. But since it is in and through the Spirit that God is present,
fire is another apt imagery for the Spirit. John the Baptist, when contrasting his own
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baptism with that to be administered by Jesus, spoke about Jesus as the one who will
baptize with the Holy Spirit and fire (Matt 3:11; Lk 3:16). The usage of the fire imagery
here by John the Baptist appears to follow from the prophecy of Malachi 3:2-3, about the
purificatory messianic fire that will refurbish and revamp everything, and foreshadowing
the new creation. Again, during the Pentecost event, amidst a rushing mighty wind that
filled the house where the disciples were hiding for fear of the Jews, “they saw what
seemed to be tongues of fire that separated and came to rest on each of them” (Acts 2:2,
3). Here, it is a source of power and enablement. Fire is indispensable for human life and
survival. It provides warmth and heat without which humans cannot survive certain cold
temperatures. Its combustive ability provides the energy needed for machine power of
different sorts. Heat energy can be converted to light energy and to other several uses.
Light dispels darkness. The heat and light from the sun are needed by plants for
photosynthesis and by us for natural vitamin D. Without plants, animals and humans will
lack food for sustenance. Moreover, fire consumes and burns. The burning capacity of
fire can be purificatory or destructive depending on the circumstance. The Spirit who
indwells us consumes sin in us. The fire of the Spirit is often called the fire or flame of
love according to the language of St. John of the Cross. Just as the disciples were lighted
up when the Spirit descended upon them at Pentecost and in place of fear, they became
emboldened and fired up with enthusiasm to witness to Christ, so too when the Spirit gets
hold of our hearts, she fills us with the fiery love for the Lord and with zeal for the
proclamation of the Gospel in word and deed. The consuming fire of the Spirit also
speaks to the resistance of the Spirit to whatever tries to impede her movement.
Oil or Anointing: The Spirit in both the Old and New Testaments is considerably
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associated with or rather symbolized by oil. The metaphor of oil has a lot to tell us about
the Spirit. As we shall see below, those who are assigned a specific task to carry out by
God are always empowered implicitly or explicitly by the Spirit of God. Anointed places
and persons become holy and by that very act, are set apart for God’s purposes. For
instance, God commanded Moses to consecrate the tabernacle of the congregation, the
ark of the testimony, the altar, and so on, by anointing them with oil (see Ex 30:25-29).
Moses also consecrated Aaron and his sons by anointing them and thus setting them apart
for the priestly office (see Ex 30:30). Others include David, anointed by Samuel for the
kingly and prophetic office (see 1 Sam 16:13). Most of the prophets received their
prophetic calling when Yahweh’s rûah came upon them and anointed them with power
and utterance. At baptism when we are reborn by the Spirit, we are anointed and
empowered to become priests, prophets, and kings (see 1 Pet 2:9). Again, it was oil that
sustained the light of the seven-branched candlestick (the Minora) in the tabernacle of
God. The tabernacle light that shined continually in the holy place symbolized the
constant presence of God amidst the people. Irenaeus comments that it is the Spirit which
gives light; he interprets the seven-branched candlestick which Moses received according
to the heavenly pattern as the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit which rested on the Son of
God in his coming as man.16 Indeed, identifying the Spirit with anointing, Irenaeus
pointedly avers: “The oil of anointing is the Spirit, wherewith He (the Son of God) has
been anointed.”17 When we are anointed by the Spirit, we also receive the sevenfold gifts
of the Spirit and become light which requires the unceasing supply of the oil that is also
16
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the Spirit if we must continue burning brightly in the world to radiate God’s presence and
love. Furthermore, oil serves as a lubricant to prevent wear and tear resulting from
friction between rubbing parts. In the same way, the relational Spirit, the Spirit of
communion lubricates the frictions, conflicts, dangers, risks, ambiguities that tend to
threaten human relationships emanating from the encounter of differences. The anointing
which abides with us is even personified as the teacher of truth and wisdom (see 1 Jn
2:20, 27). Oil is also necessary for the preservation of life not only as a necessary
ingredient for our nutritional needs but also for healing and soothing the sick. All this
symbolize the work of the Spirit as life-giver and preserver, as enabler and the principle
of communion.
Dove: This avian symbol is used to describe the Holy Spirit more precisely
during the baptism of Jesus in River Jordan. Accordingly, John the Baptist declaring that
Jesus was the Christ gave this testimony: ‘I saw the Spirit come down from heaven as a
dove and remain on him’” (Jn 1:32). St. Irenaeus speaks about the Spirit of God resting
on Christ as a mingling with his flesh.18 The dove is associated with the symbol of peace
and somewhat with the symbol of life. When the deluge receded during Noah’s days, he
released a dove from the ark to ascertain if the waters had abated and if peace and life had
returned to the earth. The dove came back to Noah in the evening carrying a fresh olive
branch in her beak indicating that peace had returned and that the earth was once more
habitable (see Gen 8:8-9, 10-11). This act of the dove is a ground of hope for a better and
more peaceful as well as the possibility of an alternative world. Such a hope does not
disappoint as God promises not to destroy the world again by flood. This hope for a
18
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world that has been reconciled and now at peace with God through Christ, is a hope that
does not disappoint “because the Holy Spirit has been given to us, pouring into our hearts
the love of God” (Rom 5:1, 6). The dove is also known as a pure and harmless creature as
well as a symbol of meekness and humility.19 This symbol interpellates our mentality in a
world where living like cat and dog often due to human hubris and corporate greed is the
vogue. In a fragmented world torn apart by endless violence, domination, and oppression,
the Spirit symbolized by the dove is a reminder that an alternative world where justice,
peace, love, and harmony reign is possible. The avian connection to hovering and
birthing of creation will be explored in a subsequent section.
It should now become obvious from the elaboration of these symbols/metaphors
of the Holy Spirit that the Spirit does not shy away from matter or body, and therefore,
from difference since matter is the principle of differentiation and individuation. Rather
the Spirit seeks and rests on bodies always. The Spirit animates and endues bodies with
life and power. In the circumstance where the life of the body is threatened, the Spirit
recreates, revivifies, liberates, renews, and resists such anti-life forces.
At this juncture we shall take a closer look at what it might mean to affirm that
the Spirit is the Lord and the Giver of Life. Of course, as already indicated, this
affirmation was part of the expansion during the Council of Constantinople (381) of the
third article of the Nicene Creed (325). The Council of Nicaea had articulated and
defended the faith of the Church in the face of Arianism which had denied the full
divinity of Christ. As opposed to the “pneumatomachoi” (opponents or fighters of the
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Spirit who claimed that the Spirit was a creature), the Second Ecumenical Council of
Constantinople affirmed the divinity of the Spirit as well as identified the Spirit with the
role of God as Creator and Giver of life. In order to properly elucidate and reinterpret this
affirmation of the Spirit as the Lord and Giver of life and its implications for Christian
life and practice today, I will be particularly dependent on the work of Moltmann,
especially The Spirit of Life.
3.2.3 The Spirit as the Lord and the Giver of Life: Explication
The third article of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed professes the Spirit as
dominum et vivificantem – the Lord and Giver of Life. In the Hebrew Bible, these two
metaphors implicate each other. The name “Lord” was never revealed to the patriarchs as
God himself acknowledged: “God also said to Moses, ‘I am the LORD.’ I appeared to
Abraham, to Isaac and to Jacob as God Almighty, but by my name the LORD I did not
make myself known to them” (Ex 6:2-3). The name was revealed for the first time to
Moses in the burning bush when God initiated the process of the liberation of Israel from
Egyptian slavery. The divine name that God revealed to Moses which he (Moses) in turn
was to convey to the people of Israel to whom God sent him is, “I am who am.” God, the
‘I am’ further said to Moses to tell the Israelites that “Yahweh” the God-of their
ancestors, the God-of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob had sent him to them and that this
would be God’s name forever and for all generations (See Ex 3: 14-15). Yahweh is the
glorious and awesome name of the God of Israel which the people were required to fear
and revere (See Deut 28: 58). The Septuagint translates the revealed divine name as “ho
On eimi ho On” and Yahweh as “Kurios.” Yahweh, therefore, refers to God who is Being
in an absolute sense and who is the Unoriginate source or origin of all created existences.
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God is and God causes to exist. The name Yahweh as Kurios – Lord, thus, takes on
significance against the backdrop of the experience of liberation and the new life which
God would work out on behalf of Israel. Hence for Israel, the unique experience of God
was the experience of God’s lordship as her liberator (see Ex 14:30-31).20 What becomes
obvious is that God reveals His presence in history always as a relational God; as the
God-of, the God-for. He is the God-of-the-Patriarchs and in the Exodus event he becomes
the God-of-a-people: “I will be your God and you shall be my people.” Thus particularly
relational, God reveals himself as a God-of, who wants to be in relation to a people
especially under the condition of oppression (both historical and spiritual). If this is the
case, then it is at least plausible to argue that this is a “vision” of God; it is the way God
wants to be seen or viewed. It is as a relational God, a God-of, that He listens and hears
the cry of the people in order to liberate them (that is, as the God-for) and make them his
people. Therefore, God’s very relational being and presence—as revealed and typified by
the divine name ‘Yahweh’—signifies God’s solicitude for the people in their concrete
experience of His liberating action on their behalf from oppression and suffering in an
unjust socio-cultural and religious situation.
Israel experienced God as Lord primarily within the context of liberation. It is in
this sense that Moltmann underscores the idea of freedom as that which lies behind the
name Lord.21 The experience of God as Lord and the experience of true freedom thus
belong together. So understood, the name Lord does not have any of the meanings that
have usually been associated with it in the course of history to express master – subject
20
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relationship. In that hierarchical understanding, the one lords it over the other; the one
represses and subjugates the other; the one is free but the other is not. The metaphor,
Lord, has too often been construed to entail imposition or domination requiring
peremptory submission and loyalty. This may not be unconnected with the Latin
connotation of the term Lord as “Dominus.” The word “domination” which could mean
to lord it over, to imperiously tyrannize, or to be domineering and autocratic, derives
from the Latin dominus. But God’s lordship is the power for compassion that liberates
rather than enslaves or dominates, the power that gives new life and the hope of a
brighter future rather than diminishes life and institutes the night. As Moltmann rightly
puts it, “the name ‘Lord’ has nothing to do with enslavement. Its context is liberation.
This can only be explained from the first commandment: it is the Exodus experience
which is Israel’s revelation of God.”22Israel indeed first experienced God as a liberator
before conceiving Him as a Creator. So the God who revealed himself as relational God
in the context of liberation from oppression and bondage and gave them free life, must
have created them in the first place in order to save them. Hence, the ‘I am,’ the God who
is and who creates what is, is truly the ‘Lord’ because of His capacity, inter alia, to
intervene and act in history, and to take as well an oppressed people’s side in order to
save and liberate them.
What emerges from the foregoing is clearly a picture of God whose predilection is
for the weak and oppressed. The entire setting for the revelation of the divine name to
Moses speaks of compassion: “I have seen the affliction of my people in Egypt and have
heard their cry of complaint against their slave drivers, so I know well what they are
22
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suffering. I have come down to rescue them” (Ex 3:7-8). God’s lordship is mobilized
when God ‘sees the affliction’ and ‘hears the groaning’ of the oppressed and dominated
of human history, God ‘remembers’23 his covenant with humanity and takes the initiative
to work out their liberation from the frigid clutches of death-dealing forces. Small wonder
the prophetic tradition, as we shall see in a later section, presents God as the defender of
the oppressed (for His reign is good news), unmasking sin, its oppressive evils, and
injustice as well as denouncing the perpetrators (for His reign is not only critical of the
bad and unjust religious and socio-historical present, but is also grace in order to
transform society). God as Lord is the God of freedom and life in the midst of yoke and
death (See Ex 6: 6-8).
A pertinent point that needs to be stressed is that this compassionate act of God is
completely gracious and gratuitous. The coming of God in history is always purely out of
His gratuitous love. God’s gratuitous love and predilection for the downtrodden and
exploited is a prophetic praxis. And it is within this theocentric matrix that every
commitment to and solidarity of the weak and oppressed of the world is grounded since
such divine gratuitousness is not opposed to human struggle and striving as a loving
human response to it. Indeed, the gratuitous gift of liberation and justice which God
accomplished on behalf of Israel became the condition of possibility for the task of
liberating praxis and struggle on behalf of the vulnerable and the poor (the strangers, the
anawin – widows, orphans, slaves, and all those who live under the crushing weight of a
burden) with which Israel was charged. Precisely because they have all received justice
from the Lord, justice is expected of every Israelite (See Ex 22:21; Deut 24:14; Lev
23
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19:1ff). The relational God will keep being the God-of-Israel and Israel his people as long
as, among other things, they keep defending the weak and the poor among them.
Therefore, these two dimensions of liberation, the unmerited love of God as grace in
history and the loving human response as a task, are, albeit, distinct but must not be
separated. Without circumlocution, John sums up this dynamic in his Epistle: “Since God
loved us so much, we also ought to love one another” (1 Jn 4:11).
What remains now to be articulated is the connection between the Spirit and Lord.
According to Moltmann, “when the Spirit is given the name Lord, Christian experience
of the Spirit is being set within Israel’s history with Yahweh.”24 That is to say, the
lordship of the Spirit is understood in Christian experience against the backdrop of the
idea of liberation and the giving of life. We find this idea clearly expressed in Pauline
theology where St. Paul says: “The Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is,
there is freedom” (2 Cor 3: 17). Paul, of course, has in mind the Spirit of the risen Christ
poured out to indwell believers, and who by so doing, frees “them from the compulsion
of sin and the power of death because it now already mediates to them eternal and
imperishable life,”25 writes Moltmann. Indeed, “the Spirit gives life” (2 Cor 3: 6), says
Paul. And Jesus himself affirms this: “It is the Spirit that gives life” (Jn 6: 63). It is to be
noted, however, that this very ascription of lordship is also true of Christ as was
confessed of him by the early church which understood him as sharing in the lordship of
God. Hence one of the earliest Christian creeds says: “If you confess with your lips that
Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be
24
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saved” (Rom 10: 9-10).26 Indeed, Paul describes the risen Christ, the new Adam, as “a
life-giving spirit” (I Cor 15: 45).27 For as the first-fruits from the dead, he becomes our
savior to liberate us from the slavery of sin to freedom and from the hopelessness of
death to eternal life.
The naming of the Spirit as the Lord and giver of life is thus set within the
compass of a messianic Exodus experience. Just as Israel’s experience of God as Yahweh
took form in the context of the Exodus experience of liberation from bondage and
impoverished life to freedom and new life, so is the Christian calling of the Spirit as Lord
set within the leitmotif of a new Exodus liberation experience. In accordance with
Moltmann, “the end-time outpouring of the Spirit at ‘Pentecost’ is understood as a
messianic Exodus experience.”28 In this Christian messianic understanding of the Exodus
experience, what seems to have taken place is the assimilation of the role of Israel’s Lord
into the Holy Spirit since as Moltmann notes, “‘the Old Testament’ is the testimony of
the history of the Spirit for the future of the kingdom of God,”29 and which kingdom, for
Christians, is already present hic et nunc.
New life within the matrix of that kingdom, according to the Christian
dispensation, requires new birth. Hence for John the evangelist, unless one is born again
or born anew of water and the Holy Spirit, one cannot enter the kingdom of God (see Jn
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3: 3-6). Moreover, for John, the Spirit is the Paraclete, the Comforter, who not only
creates the new life in Christ but also nurtures it and defends it just as an attorney defends
a client standing trial.30 It therefore becomes clear that the rebirth to life which the Spirit
engenders is redolent with the Exodus leitmotif. It is about liberation from slavery to sin
and from the evil manifestations of sin, and hence deliverance from death and freedom to
new life.
After the departure of Israel from Egypt at God’s initiative, and while God dwelt
in their midst all through the journey in the wilderness, the people were nevertheless, to
work out their destiny in collaboration with God their liberator. Face to face with the
difficulties that accompany the walk to freedom, Israel was frequently tempted to return
to Egypt, that symbolic place of oppression, exploitation, and death. Similarly, even after
the rebirth to new life by the Spirit, sin remains a temptation for us. It is in the light of
this tendency that Paul reproaches the Galatian Christians: “Formerly, you did not know
God, you were slaves to those who by nature are not gods. But now that you know
God―or rather are known by God―how is it that you are turning back to those weak and
miserable principles? Do you wish to be enslaved by them all over again?” (Gal 4:8-9). In
his solicitude for the Galatians, Paul exhorts them to hold unto the freedom Christ won
for them through the Spirit who gave them new birth and not to submit themselves again
to the yoke of slavery. Hence, “It is for freedom that Christ has set us free” (Gal 5:1).
Nothing could be further from the truth than to underline that the idea of freedom and the
new life wrought by the Spirit in the believer was of great importance to Paul that he
could not emphasize them enough. He goes further to say in his epistle to the Romans
30
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that through Christ Jesus the law of the Spirit of life has set us free from the law of sin
and death (see Rom 8:2). Paul, of course, uses the word ‘law’ in Romans in different
ways to refer to: God’s law (2:17-20; 9:31; 10:3-5); the Pentateuch (3:21b); the OT as a
whole (3:19); a principle (3:27); a controlling power (8:2). But Paul uses the law of the
Spirit of life here to mean the controlling power of the Holy Spirit who is life giving as
opposed to the controlling power of sin which ultimately produces death.31
From what has been elaborated, it is obvious that in the experience of the Spirit as
Lord, two key elements emerge: life and freedom. How these two elements correlate is
beautifully given expression by Moltmann: “Freedom without new life is empty. Life
without freedom is dead.”32 Those who are called to freedom and new life in Christ are
enjoined to eagerly await by faith through the Spirit, the righteousness for which we
hope. During this time of eschatological waiting, what matters according to Paul is, “faith
working through love” (Gal 5:6). During this time, those called to be free and led by the
Spirit of life are required to use their freedom to serve God and one another in love (see
Gal 5:13). It is not a time for indulgence. Faith working through love is a “vision,” a way
of being Christian, and a commitment to followership of Christ. To say that we have been
reborn to new life and freedom by the Spirit supposes that we are “now living in depth
our condition as disciples of him who said in so many words that he is the Way.”33 Love
is the way of living out in action our faith in Christ in the eschatological in-between. But
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this love, like the gratuitous love of God expressed in His liberative action is always a
preferential and prophetic predilection for the weak and those stripped of their humanity
by the forces of sin and death. Christian praxis of love is thus both a gift and a task to
work toward God’s reign of shalom, establishing justice and peace. All those who have
experienced the freedom and new life the Spirit offers have been swept into the economy
of divine dance of love to propagate it; to participate in the Spirit’s movement of
redemption. This is done, first of all, through overcoming sins in one’s own personal life
and then via a struggle against all inhuman situations of injustice, misery,
impoverishment, and exploitation wherever they are at work, thereby contributing to
bringing about a just society and signaling God’s kingdom “which is certainly as yet only
on the way to its fulfillment.”34 Indeed, in the words of Moltmann:
living freedom and free can endure only in justice and righteousness. In justice, human freedom ministers to life – the life shared by all living beings. In
justice, human life struggles for the freedom of everything that lives, and resists oppression. So justice brings the two key factors freedom and life down
to a common denominator…. Only justice puts life to rights, and defines the
content of liberty through ‘the covenant of life.’ It is only in justice that life
can endure.35
Moltmann here makes a salient move toward a more holistic pneumatological vision. The
life and freedom engendered by the Spirit are not merely limited to an individual’s soul
or to the life of the church alone. Rather Moltmann has in mind the universal activity of
the Spirit in gracing the whole creation with life and space for freedom. Thus human
freedom and life can only flourish in an atmosphere of justice. Genuine freedom finds its
fullness in its orientation toward God, others, and nature—that is, in taking responsibility
34
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for justice. This entails, among other things, openness to others, mutual respect and
reciprocal acceptance of others for who they are, community in solidarity, restoration of
rights and dignity to the deprived, conversion of the unjust, communion and
communication of life, as well as openness to creativity and possibilities of newness.
Unfortunately, in contemporary so-called secular rhetoric of liberty or freedom, this
aspect of responsibility or obligation has been occluded, reducing freedom to merely
issues of individualistic rights and entitlements.36 When the creative and prophetic Spirit
of life and freedom possesses us, then justice and lasting peace will reign. We shall now
look at the relationship between the Creator Spirit of life and the issue of embodiment.
3.2.4 The Spirit the Giver of Life and the Question of Embodiment
In the preceding section, it is made clear that Israel experienced God as Yahweh
or Lord in the context of the Exodus event of liberation. Thus God was first experienced
as a Liberator and by extrapolation backward, was then conceived as a Creator. In
liberating Israel from slavery and oppression, God graciously intends the good of Israel,
giving it freedom and new life, and for it to flourish in the Promised Land. Similarly, in
creating the whole world, God intends the good of all creatures, giving them life
(particularly human beings), sustaining them, and providing for their flourishing. The
point thus made is that the world with its goodness is neither the product of nor is it ruled
by “a pantheon of viciously warring gods―as in many of the mythic tales of the ancient
Near East―but by the One who is alone God, the LORD worshipped by Israel as

36

See Ian A. McFarland et al., ed., “Human Being,” in Constructive Theology: A Contemporary
Approach to Classical Themes, ed. Serene Jones and Paul Lakeland (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005),
77.

169

Redeemer and Creator.”37 God is thus ‘Lord’ over all, not in a tyrannical sense as was the
case with the vicious gods, but as a gracious Creator God “who intends to bring all of
creation to its proper end: the ‘rest’ of the Sabbath day.”38 As part of the essence of the
Sabbath rest, God intends humans and creation to be free from servitude and exploitation.
Having offered this brief preliminary nexus between Israel’s experience of the
Liberator God as the Creator God, we shall now look at the doctrine of creation and lifegiving from a pneumatological vantage point. It is worth noting that between the Greek
pneuma, the Latin spiritus, the Germanic Geist, and the English spirit, if there is one
thing that is common to them all, it is that they have always been construed in Western
conceptual scheme as anti-corporeal, immaterial, and hence antithetical to matter and
body. Moltmann calls for a recourse to the Hebrew rûah which does not permit the
Western cleavage between nature, body, and spirit, if we must come to a more holistic
appreciation of the Spirit’s activity in creation.39
3.2.5 The Nature of the Spirit as Rûah
A return to the primordial understanding of the nature and richness of the Hebrew
word rûah in talking about the Spirit is important and will meaningfully contribute to the
way we understand the nature of the world. Whereas rûah appears about 380 times, the
phrase rûah Yahweh occurs in about 27 passages in the Old Testament.40 The Hebrew
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rûah with a polysemic semantic range connotes something of the wind, storm, tempest,
air, breath, energy, and power; it is what is moving or in motion, fluid, event-like, vital,
living, active, rational, and conscious. Rûah is not static (as in the stasis of substance
ontology), not rigid or calcified. Rather, it is dynamic. When applied to God as Yahweh’s
rûah, the word refers to the creative, empowering, and life-giving power of God and even
sometimes to God’s killing wrath.41 It refers to the overarching divine presence in
creation, history, and in humans. Rûah at times also refers to its parallel, nephesh―the
soul―to mean the principle of life or vitality, the individual human consciousness. From
the outset, we have to remember that in the OT the Spirit had not yet acquired a distinct
hypostasis. However, throughout the OT both impersonal and personal attributes are
interchangeably predicated of rûah such as the Spirit speaking through the prophets.
Even in the few instances where reference to ‘Holy Spirit’ occurs, and, of course, only at
a relatively late period in the OT (see Ps 51: 13; Isa 63: 10, 11ff; Wis 1: 5; 9: 17),42 it
does not refer to the Spirit as a distinct hypostasis.
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3.2.6 The Work of Rûah as Creator Spirit
In the priestly account of the creation narrative in Genesis 1:2 the priestly redactor
inserted the action of rûah Elohim over the waters of the sea in the Exodus context into
the primeval chaos and waters in the deep at the beginning of creation. The same priestly
redactor recollects in the Song of Moses: “At a breath (rûah) of your anger the waters
piled up, the flowing waters stood like a mound, the flood waters congealed in the midst
of the sea…. When your wind (rûah) blew, the sea covered them; like lead they sank in
the mighty waters” (Ex 15: 8, 10).
Moreover, in the narrative of creation in Genesis 1: 2 the priestly author’s genius
lies in his adeptness in transposing creation as a complex reality emerging from rûah
Elohim’s action of moving upon or brooding over the primeval watery chaos (tohu
vabohu). He writes: “Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the
surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters” (NIV).
According to (KJV), “the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters;” (RSV), “the
Spirit of God was moving over the face of the waters;” whereas (NAB) says, “A mighty
wind swept over the surface of the waters;” and (NRSV), “a wind from God swept over
the face of the waters (mayim).” Now, two facts emerge from the quotation above: the
first is that rûah sometimes translates as wind and in some other cases as spirit. The
second is that the Hebrew phrase měrahepeth‘al which literally means “flap,” “shake,” or
“flutter” translates in the expression rûah Elohim…měrahepeth‘al as “the spirit of God
hovering over or brooding over….” Again, it also translates as “the wind of God…swept
over….” Interestingly, this word měrahepeth is used only once elsewhere throughout the
entire Bible, that is, in Deuteronomy 32: 11 where the NAB renders it thus: “As an eagle
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incites its nestlings forth by hovering (yěrahēp) over its brood…” As used here the word
retains some of the connotations of the Syriac rahep which literally means “to brood,”
“incubate,” “shake,” or “protect.” It refers to the action of moving oneself gently, “to fly
to and fro, to keep nest eggs warm, to brood.” The activity is thus similar to that of a bird
brooding over its young.43 Whereas on the one hand, the use of the notion of “wind” to
denote the Spirit in relation to creation retains something of the element of the
unpredictability, the uncontrollability, the mysterious and dynamic nature of the Spirit,
the avian imagery on the other hand, is a better fit with the idea of hovering and brooding
over, and suggests more of a caring, life-giving activity of a living reality such as the
Spirit of Elohim than that of wind.44 Thus, with the action of brooding over by rûah
Elohim, the chaos becomes “promise,” culminating with the birthing or bringing forth of
creation from chaos.45 The Spirit thus brings possibilities and hope into reality, 46 leading
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creatures to the realization of their destinies.
Towards the end of the priestly account precisely in Genesis 1:30, the author
mentions the entrustment of “everything that has the breath (nephesh- breathing creature)
of life” to humans to be cared for as well as for their sustenance. This breath of life is
further specified in the Yahwist text as also given to humanity. Thus in Genesis 2:7: “the
LORD God formed the man (ha-’adamah) from the dust of the ground and breathed
(naphash) into his nostrils the breath of life (neshamah hayyim) and the man became a
living being.” The word neshamah is used here instead of rûah to denote the breath of
life given to Adam. However, in Job 27:3: “as long as I have life within me, and the
breath of God (rûah eloah) in my nostrils,” the word rûah describes the breath or the
spirit of God and is used as a parallel to neshamah (see also Isaiah 42:5).47 From these
accounts, we notice a connection or an affinity between the breath of life given to all
living creatures generally and humans in particular in that rûah Elohim is the giver of all
life. Of particular interest is the fact that the rûah Yahweh who births and is the giver of
life to creation is the same breath of life which made Adam become a living being and
thus is here portrayed as a gift. The spirit as both the giver of life and the breath of life
(gift) is, therefore, as Gary Badcock contends, not something that creatures “possess by
permanent right”48 since according to the Psalmist, when God takes “away their breath,
they die and return to their dust” (Ps 104: 29 ). The breath of life given by God returns to

emanate necessarily from God. Rather God is absolutely free and creates and relates to the world out of
freedom in the power of the Spirit. See Dabney, “The Nature of the Spirit,” in The Work of the Spirit, 83.
47

See Montague, “The Fire in the Word,” in Advents of the Spirit, 36.

48

Gary D. Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids,
Michigan, and Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 1997), 9.

174

God at the death of creatures (see Ps 31: 6). This fact makes clear the ontological
transcendence of God who alone can give the Spirit to creation.
Basically, the creative and life-giving Spirit brings all of creation into being. St.
Irenaeus of Lyons in his famous imagery depicts the Word and the Spirit as the two hands
of God in the work of creation and salvation. Other church Fathers such as Athanasius
and Gregory of Nyssa hold that whereas the Trinity acts as one and the divine action of
creation is one, yet each Person’s role is performed in a distinctive pattern. Thus, the
unity of action of the three divine Persons does not necessarily eliminate from view the
proper role of each distinct Person. A pneumatological reading of Genesis 1-2,
nonetheless, suggests that the creative dābār Elohim is uttered in the power and within
the context of the primordial cosmic hovering over by the Spirit. Rûah Elohim is here
projected as already active in the work of creation. Thus according to the Psalmist, “By
the word of the LORD the heavens were made, and all their host by the breath of his
mouth” (Ps 33: 6; 147: 18).49 The Spirit not only births creation but sustains every living
creature in being by continually supplying it with the breath of life. This truism is
captured by Job 33: 4, “The Spirit of God has made me; the breath of the Almighty keeps
me alive.” For as the Psalmist says: “When you hide your face (pānîm), they vanish;
when you take away their breath, they die and return to dust. When you send forth your
spirit (rûah), they are created; and you renew the face of the earth” (Ps 104: 29-30).50
Montague draws attention to the fascinating relationship in this chiastically structured
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text between God’s face (pānîm) and God’s spirit (rûah) to score the theological point
that God is personally and actively engaged in creation51 as opposed to Deism.
Therefore, the Spirit does not simply create and then remains aloof from creation. Rather,
the Spirit creates, indwells all of creation, present to all of creation, indwells every living
creature individually, vivifying, sustaining, and knowing each one in the very depth of its
being. This wonderful dynamism of Yahweh’s rûah as ubiquitous divine presence finds
expression in the words of the Psalmist: “O LORD, you have searched me and you know
me. …you perceive my thoughts from afar…. Before a word is on my tongue you know it
completely, O LORD…. Where can I go from your Spirit? Where can I flee from your
presence?” (Ps 139: 1-2, 4, 7). Rûah as wind or breath not only pervades the entire
creation but also permeates every living creature in a radical way. Like the air we inhale
and exhale which permeates us in and out, and enfolds us, so it is that in the medium of
rûah, we are so interpenetrated that we live and move and have our being in God (See
Acts 17: 28). The Spirit who “searches everything, even the depths of God” (1 Cor 2:10)
truly knows our individual unique identities more than we know ourselves.
Additionally, another aspect of the work of rûah Elohim is not only the giving of
life and sustaining it but also the empowerment of every creature to live flourishingly.
This, the Spirit does in the very act of creating each being uniquely through the
“processes of division, distinction, differentiation, and particularization, beginning with
the separation of light from darkness and continuing with the separating out of species of
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plants and types of animals, each in its own or after its own kind.”52 In this very act of
differentiating, the Spirit, as Colin Gunton argues, “far from abolishing, rather maintains
and even strengthens particularity. It is not a spirit of merging or assimilation―of
homogenization―but of relation in otherness, relation which does not subvert but
establishes the other in its true reality.”53 By endowing all created reality with their
distinctness and particularity, the Spirit gives each being the space of freedom to
actualize its being and life. The creative and vivifying activity of the Spirit thus endorses
the essential goodness and reality of each created being in its distinctness and
particularity. God Himself rejoices in the goodness and beauty of creation that His rûah
has polychromatically designed and wonderfully executed in the progressional
affirmatory order from: “God saw that it was good” after each day of creating to the
climactic “God saw all that he had made, and it was very good” on the sixth and last day
of creating.
That all creatures are not morphed into sameness is the basis of relationality since
otherness implies not merely difference between things or persons, but also how they are
related. Following this logic, God is not creation’s ‘Other’ merely on the basis of
substantive difference, but also because of their relatedness. “Only that which is both
different and related is ‘other.’ That with which we are identical is not ‘other’; it is
simply a repetition of ourselves. That to which we have no relation, on the other hand, is
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likewise no ‘other’; it is, as far as we are concerned, simply ‘not.’”54 Otherness is that
which primarily characterizes reality. For it is only in transcending ourselves in the
encounter with the Other that we truly affirm ourselves, otherwise we remain trapped
within the circle of our autonomous consciousness and interests while experiencing only
narcissistic reflections, nay, mirage of ourselves. The indwelling rûah is that by which
persons “as individuals are transcended, engaged, oriented beyond…[themselves], and
related to God and neighbor from the very beginning.”55 Creation narrative viewed from
a pneumatological perspective, expands the notion of “neighbor” to include all creation
embraced by the cosmic breadth of rûah Elohim’s presence. It is in this light that Gunton
contends that the Spirit is the power of relationality. He writes: “That which is or has
spirit is able to be open to that which is other than itself, to move dynamically into
relation with the other. Spirit enables a form of perichoresis to take place, between mind
and world, world and God.”56 It is the presence of the divine Spirit in the world which
maintains the transcendence of God as well as God’s embodied presence in creation.
The differentiation in all things, the diversity, the particularity, and their unity
because they are differentiated, express the character of rûah Elohim as the creative,
dynamic, life-giving, and relational presence of God in the world and history.57 The Spirit
is God’s presence in the body of creation and in the particularity of differentiated bodies.
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While reaching beyond all “dichotomizing distinctions,” the Spirit is “the relationality
that holds things together even as it keeps them distinct,” writes Hodgson.58 This reality
speaks to a pneumatological aesthetics in creation which proclaims the glory of God. It is
such aesthetics that engenders the harmonious polyphony of all living creatures in
response to the injunction of their divine Maker and Sustainer: “Let everything that
breaths praise the LORD” (Ps 150: 6).
The Spirit as rûah is the power that engenders differentiation in all created things.
Created things are differentiated or rather individuated because they have body.
Corporeality is thus the symbol and vehicle of identity. As a symbol (that which gathers
together), the body converges in itself the identity of the self without being identical with
the self. In other words, there is something of the self that transcends the body. As a
symbol, the self is not reducible to the body. Neither does the self possess any identity
within space and time without reference to the body. All living bodies are as such
because they have the Spirit of life indwelling them, vivifying, and sustaining them in
being. At the same time, the Spirit is the principle of unity of all created things because
they are differentiated. The Spirit that indwells differentiated bodies in creation also
unites them with God without destroying their differences and otherness. This
unity―unlike the Spinozean Deus sive natura which conceives God as identical with
nature― does not tantamount to identicality. Put differently, divine presence in the world
does not collapse the difference between God and the world thereby making them one
and the same thing. Rather the unity constituted by the Spirit expresses God’s relatedness
and immanence in the world. Thus, rûah is not in any sense hostile or antithetical to
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‘body’ or ‘corporeality’ but is that which truly makes the corporeal a living being. 59 It can
then be argued that the presence of the divine Spirit constitutes the sacramentality of
embodiment as the site of God’s self manifestation. If that is well taken, then in as much
as God constitutes creation through the Creator Spirit, at the same time, God is
constituted by relating to the world precisely as manifested.60 For the God who is not
manifested in history remains unknown and cannot be believed in, and arguably, the God
who is unknown, perhaps does not exist, or may at best remain a fictio mentis. The
knowledge of the revelation of God presupposes and requires the existence of a historical
human subject as its condition of possibility. It presupposes a human person, a subject as
a pure potentiality and with an obediential but free capacity for hearing, understanding
God’s word, and making a free decision in relation to that word. Therefore, God’s history
lies in God’s coming to humans within the created order. As Eberhard Jüngel argues,
God’s historicity entails God’s being as it comes; it is “being-in-coming.”61 It is an eventlike coming, it is God who comes in the trace. This God who comes in the trace is the
God who is love. And because God is love, “this is then God’s being to be related
to….”62
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Conceiving creation as the embodiment of God enlivened by the Spirit makes a
demand on us with regard to our practices and outlook towards the created order. Henry
Lederle clearly laments the long provincialization of the Spirit to devotional piety:
For too long the Spirit and his work has been conceived of in too limited a
sense. There was a capitulation at the beginning of the modern era in which
faith became restricted to the private devotional life and the latter was then
described as ‘spiritual.’ The Spirit should not be limited to spiritual experiences and charisms…. The Spirit is at work in the world and should not be degraded to an ornament of piety.”63
Lederle’s lament is a reminder that the ubiquity and pervasiveness of the Creator Spirit
embodies God in every aspect of creation and human experience in history. Nothing is
further from the truth than to contend that God’s embodiment in creation provides the
basis for responsible social, economic, political and ecological engagement in a way that
preserves our world and resources, as well as contributes through industry and work to
building up and making the world a better and peaceable place for all.64 Interestingly,
Ivan Satyavrata makes a fascinating suggestion: “Although the work of creation is
complete in the sense that God has called it forth and it exists, it remains incomplete and
unfinished in that its goal has not been reached.”65 Only at the eschaton would this goal
be reached when creation would have become what it was meant to be. Meanwhile, the
Spirit present and active everywhere continually directs creation and history toward its
redemptive goal culminating in a renewed creation. Truly, the Creator Spirit not only
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gave life to, but also empowered adamah to become a co-creator. We find this
fascinatingly expressed in the charge given to Adam not only to name the other creatures
but also to subdue the earth (see Gen 1:28; 2:19-20).The charge to subdue the earth does
not in any sense connote domination or subjugation but rather the dignity of work
because the Creator in whose image humanity has been created is the quintessential
Worker Himself, “the universal Master Craftsman”66 as is evident in the beauty of the
work of creation. Hence the Spirit’s role in the act of creation as well as embodying
God’s presence in the created order “places significant obligations upon… [humanity] for
stewardship and witness.”67 Humanity is thus obliged not to distance itself from any
dimension of the Spirit’s activity since the Spirit is present and active everywhere in
creation.68 It demands openness and docility to the action of the Spirit.
What is of crucial importance to highlight, however, is that the movement of rûah
Elohim over the face of the watery chaos which birthed the body of creation into being
marks “the first, original beginning of God’s salvific self-giving, which is identified with
the mystery of creation itself.”69 Pope John Paul II rightly suggests, “This biblical
concept of creation includes not only the call to existence of the very being of the
cosmos, that is to say the giving of existence, but also the presence of the Spirit of God in
creation, that is to say the beginning of God's salvific self-communication to the things he
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creates.”70 Since God’s self-gift or self-donation in the mystery of creation is nothing but
love, then it is at least not implausible to contend that it is the Spirit of God who
introduces love into the world. God’s love in creation is expressed as self-gift. By nature
(not so much about the whatness or the quidditas as about who God is for us), God is
essentially a loving and hence a relational Being as biblical evidence bears witness. As
both inwardly and outwardly self-communicating, neither self-enclosed nor narcissistic,71
God freely and graciously loves creation into being as the fruit of that love. God’s selftranscendence in the very act of God’s loving self-gift lets God’s other (the world) to be
without collapsing the otherness of the world into God. In effect, this is so to speak,
God’s hospitality towards the world. This also implies that God is love ontologically.
God’s self-donation does not institute diminution in God since God freely gives of God’s
self to otherness “and yet in so doing remains one with himself.”72 Arguably, God’s
ekstasis is not incidental to who God is. Rather who God is―love―finds expression in
his ecstasy, his grace. In creation the Spirit gives the breath of God to creatures and in a
special way to humanity that it might share and participate in the nature and life of God.73
Humanity created in the image and likeness of God is thus made for love, to love, and for
community of love. Indeed, “God for us” (pro nobis) and “with us” (cum nobis), is ever
seeking to freely share his life and love with the world, a love from which not even guilt
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can separate us.74 Rather than a static, self-preoccupied thinking-thought, the God of the
Bible is a loving, relational, and ecstatic God. The Spirit’s universal presence makes
creation to be a sacrament of God’s ecstatic love and relationality.
At any rate, the Spirit truly gives life to bodies. But as the Spirit remains,
according to Johnson, “the creative and freeing power of God let loose in the world,”75
where the life and diversity of bodies become contested and diminished by anti-life
forces and empire, the freeing power of the Spirit is at work to challenge, resist, liberate,
recreate, renew, and empower. Put another way, the presence of the Spirit continues to
make efficacious God’s original salvific self-gift in creation expressed in divine loving
and compassionate engagement with the ruptured world. In what follows, we shall look at
the prophetic work of the Spirit on behalf of justice and wholeness in a fragmented world.
3.2.7 The Prophetic Work of the Liberating and Freeing Spirit
We have seen how Old Testament pneumatology linked the action of rûah Elohim
with the giving and sustaining of the life of created living creatures in their differentiated
bodily particularities. In articulating how the name “Lord” was assimilated to the Spirit
against the backdrop of the Exodus liberative motif, we recall that two key elements were
isolated: “life and freedom.” Having elaborated on how the Spirit gives life in the
preceding section, what will guide our exploration as well as the choice and interpretation
of texts here is the saving, freeing, resisting, renewing, and liberative gestalt of the
narrative of the Spirit’s action in the face of life-negating situations of human history. It
is about the compassionate engagement of the Spirit of God with creation and the human
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world in its experience of sin, the effects of massive sin as well as brokenness. If the
Spirit is, according to the affirmation of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, the Lord
and the Giver of life, then one of the upshots of such an affirmation is that, that life given
to creatures which makes them living beings and what happens to it, matter to the Spirit
who creates and gives the life ab initio. Therefore, the Spirit who saves, liberates, and
redeems is the same Spirit who first reveals God’s original salvific self-giving love in the
mystery of creation. As John Paul II notes,“When…God opens himself to man in the
Holy Spirit, this opening of God reveals and also gives to the human creature the fullness
of freedom.”76 The universal immanent presence of the Creator Spirit “is always and in
all circumstances the reality of God’s saving grace.”77
Now, after Adam and Eve were created and enlivened by the Spirit of life, they
alienated themselves from God through disobedience and hence, sin ruptured creation.
Creation became subjected to futility but not without hope, groaning for deliverance, and
waiting with eager longing to share in the glorious liberty of God’s children in the
language of St. Paul.78 This promise of liberation of God’s children which will embrace
all of creation is already hinted at in the protoevangelium of Genesis 3:15. Yet, such
cosmic liberation would be unintelligible apart from the original role of the Spirit in
creating and giving life. The Spirit’s protological role in creation and in directing creation
to its eschatological goal of completion or perfection thus becomes foundational for the
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Spirit’s role in the redemptive work of recreation. In broad terms, redemption here refers
to the renewing of creation. Redemption, as Clark Pinnock suggests, “does not leave the
world behind but lifts creation to a higher level.”79 Rather than its negation, redemption is
the restoration, nay, the renewal of creation. And the term perfection as used here should
not be understood in Aristotelian metaphysical static categories. Instead, it refers to “a
movement from imperfection to…the complete realization of the divine purpose”80 for a
renewed creation. For as long as the in-between times last, “the Spirit keeps creation
open”81 to the future until it attains its final and complete transformation into a new
creation. As such, the Creator Spirit is equally the Re-Creator Spirit. There is, to be sure,
an essential continuity between the creative and redemptive works of the Spirit.
3.2.8 The Spirit and Divine Enablement/Empowerment
One aspect of the redemptive and liberative action of the relational Spirit that
emerges from the OT is that of enablement and empowerment. The Spirit enables the
creativity of select individuals and empowers others in order to equip them for specific
tasks and services including various leadership roles, prophetic witnesses, and so on. The
specific tasks, in other words, are not necessarily limited to the sacred but cut across
every spectrum of life and human experience since all dimensions of the created order
belong to the Lord and are redeemable. In all cases, the Spirit comes upon or possesses
the select individual, instrumentalizing him/her for corporate purposes especially for the
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preservation and deliverance of the community in the face of sinister and destructive
forces. Through the Spirit, God is “present in everything, in the ordinary and the
extraordinary.”82Rûah’s enablement thus takes different forms and gestalt as the biblical
understanding of the nature of rûah unfolds and develops in a crescendo fashion toward a
clearer articulation of the Spirit’s role in messianic expectations. The Spirit comes upon
bodies to empower them for liberative purposes. Let us now look at certain empowered
biblical personages.
Joseph: In Genesis 41-43, the Spirit is at work in the tumultuous life of Joseph.
The Spirit is recognized to have endowed Joseph with practical wisdom and
extraordinary powers of interpreting dreams as well as the capacity to forgive his
brothers. On account of the Spirit upon him, Joseph was judged a “discerning and wise
man” and hence appointed by Pharaoh as chief administrator over all of Egypt to
responsibly manage and administer food supplies in order to save lives in the situation of
famine.
Moses: During his encounter with God at the burning bush, Moses was
empowered and enabled to go to Pharaoh to work out the freedom of the Israelites from
oppression and slavery in Egypt. Ordinarily, Moses would not have been able to
accomplish such a feat if not under the enablement of the Spirit of God. Although,
reference to the Spirit as the power behind all that Moses had to accomplish in Egypt is
not explicit, it nevertheless, remains a fair assumption that such a role could not be
played without the empowerment of the Spirit. That Moses actually had the endowment
of the Spirit all along is made explicit in Numbers 11:17-26. In the wilderness, burdened
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with the complaints of his contentious people, God instructs Moses to appoint seventy
elders and bring them to the tent of meeting to be equipped with the same Spirit that was
on Moses to assist him in bearing the burden of the people. To empower the elders, God
took of the Spirit that was on Moses with which He endued the seventy elders and
immediately they began to prophesy. Even two of the elders who were among the
appointed seventy but who could not make it to the tent of meeting with the others also
experienced the Spirit’s enablement and prophesied in the Camp to the envy of Joshua. In
this light Max Turner’s comment is apt that “the Spirit of the Lord was perceived as an
endowment on Moses…through which he liberated Israel at God’s direction.”83 Again, it
is worthwhile to note that, although, Moses had desired a spirit-filled community as he
expressed when Joshua demanded that he (Moses) stop the two elders from prophesying
(Num 11:29), “God’s spirit had been limited to the seventy elders” (Num 11:17, 25).84
Joshua: As the successor of Moses, Joshua was also endowed with the Spirit to
enable him complete the Exodus by preserving the life of the people in the face of
onslaughts from enemies on the way and eventually leading them into the Promised Land
after its conquest. At the time of his appointment, Joshua was described by God as “a
man in whom is the Spirit.”85 Interestingly, when he was commissioned to bring the
people into the Promised Land, his name was changed from Hoshea (salvation) to
Jehoshu‘a. The Hebrew Jehoshu‘a is a combination of Yahweh, Yah or Ya with hoshu‘a
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and means “Yahweh saves.” And after the death of Moses, Joshua was during his
succession perceived as a man “filled with the Spirit of wisdom.”86 It was under the
enablement of the Spirit that he did exploits to save the Israelites.
Judges: Between the conquest of the Promised Land by Joshua and its occupation
by the Israelites and the time the monarchy was instituted, about a century and half
interval, the Israelite tribes constituted only a loose federation. During that period, the
Spirit of the Lord rested upon certain charismatic leaders in the face of the critical
situations that the people found themselves. The Spirit empowered them to be liberators
and leaders of Israel’s tribes in those critical times. In these narratives of charismatic
endowments, rûah Elohim remains always the active and determining subject.
Charismatic endowments thanks to which these prophetic leaders and savior figures
emerged are so called because they “are spontaneous and temporarily limited gifts
conferred on individuals for (emphasis original) the whole people.”87 These Judges
include: Othniel, the first Judge in the wake of Joshua’s demise ruled Israel for 40 years
(Judg 3: 7-11). The Spirit of the Lord was upon him and enabled him to rout their
Mesopotamian oppressors. Deborah was another Judge, characterized as a prophetess,
and hence, under the enablement of the prophetic Spirit (although the Spirit is not
explicitly identified with her leadership, but is a fair assumption to make, since as we
have already seen in the case of Moses and the seventy elders, the nexus between the
Spirit and prophecy is obvious). In league with Barak, she delivered Israel from the 20
years of Canaanite oppression (Judg 4: 4). Gideon (Judg 6: 1-8: 35) under the
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empowerment of the Spirit delivered Israel from the Midianite aggression and judged
Israel for 40 years. Furthermore, when the Spirit of the Lord came upon Jephthah (Judg
10: 6-12: 7), he led Israel to victory against the Ammonites and, thereafter, ruled for 6
years. In the case of Samson (Judg 13: 1-16: 31) said to be the most notorious of Israel’s
judges and a Nazirite, quite early on in his life, “the Spirit of the Lord began to stir him.”
Then on three subsequent occasions, “the Spirit of the Lord came upon in power” and
gave him such extraordinary physical strength that he tore a lion asunder with his bare
hands, killed thirty men in a Philistine stronghold on the way to Ashkelon, and with a
donkey’s jawbone, he went on to smother a thousand Philistines. Samson judged Israel
for 20 years.
The activity of the Spirit in the form of charismatic endowments of liberators and
leaders during the time of the judges was always in response to the supplication of Israel
for deliverance. Recognizing that their collective crisis was often of their own making,88
in repentance the Israelites cried to God for help. God responded by raising up
charismatically inspired and empowered judges to save the people from their oppressors.
Monarchy: Saul was the last of the judges and with him the monarchy was
established as the first king of Israel. As with the time of the judges, the continuity of the
activity of the Spirit in relation to the era of human kingship is unmistakable. However,
there is a certain discontinuity. Whereas charismatic endowments in the time of the
judges were temporary, in the time of kingship, they became more permanent gifts given
to Israel’s kings to enable them govern the people. Nonetheless, after Samuel anointed
Saul king, Saul met with a band of prophets during which he was enmeshed in a religious
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frenzy and prophetic ecstasy and began to make prophetic utterance as the Spirit came
upon him. With the Spirit upon him, Saul was enabled to lead decisively and to zealously
deliver Israel.89 In this way, the authority of the king which comes from the Spirit is
linked with the prophetic office quite resonant with the experience of the seventy elders
in Numbers 11 as we saw earlier. Hence, we see the obvious nexus between the Spirit,
prophecy, and kingship. But Saul’s disobedience caused the Spirit to depart from him to
David, thus marking the decline of Saul’s kingship.
David: In David’s case (1 Sam 16: 12-17: 1ff), the endowment with the Spirit
came more directly through the ritual of anointing by Samuel. With David, God put a
messianic stamp on Israel’s monarchy as expressed in the prophecy of Nathan: “I will
establish the throne of his kingdom forever” (2 Sam 7: 13). David was a man after God’s
own heart and God promises that He will remain with David even as God will be a Father
to him and he will be a son to God (see 2 Sam 7: 14). At his anointing, the Spirit of the
Lord was upon David, remained with or rested on him. He was empowered to lead and
deliver Israel from her aggressors especially from the onslaught of the Philistine
aggression led by the giant, Goliath. The kingship of David, therefore, mirrored a pattern
of messianic leadership. Under the enablement of the Spirit, David ruled Israel for forty
years. But David sinned against God when, not only did he commit adultery with
Bathsheba but also plotted the murder of Uriah, her husband in battle. David was not
unaware of the nexus between the Spirit, kingship, and prophecy. Having seen how the
Spirit’s departure from Saul led to his fall, David would not want kingship devoid of the
Spirit with a possibility of losing the throne. Hence, in the Psalm (called the Miserere) of
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repentance and confession of sin attributed to David, he earnestly begs God: “Do not cast
me from your presence or take your Holy Spirit from me” (Ps 51: 11). Although, the OT
does not explicitly identify David with prophecy, the only allusion to the prophetic office
is found in 2 Sam 23: 1-7, where David uttered an oracle described as his last words by
the power of the Spirit. Curiously, if these last words of David were considered an oracle,
there is an implication that he may have uttered previous words that equally constituted
an oracle. Worthy of note, however, is that the New Testament explicitly links David to
the prophetic office in Acts 2: 30 which sees the prophecy encapsulated in Psalm 16 as
uttered by David. Be that as it may, as much as it was important, quite early on, for the
king to prophesy as evidence that the Spirit was truly upon him, it was even much more
important for the king to be subject to the demands of the prophetic word. This is
especially the case because in the early days of Saul’s reign and the time of David, Israel
had the ideal of kingship that was never to be duplicated either in the northern or southern
kingdom until the advent of the eschatological ideal prophetic king.
There is no question that the empowerment of Israel’s leaders by the Spirit
enabled them to deliver and preserve the people in times of crisis. It is well to note,
however, especially beginning from Joshua in the conquest of the Promised Land through
the judges to the kings, that the empowerment by the Spirit appears to be associated with
violence as though the Spirit is the Spirit of war and vengeance. What do we make of
such a difficult text as, for example, when the Spirit came upon Gideon, he sounded a
trumpet, led his army in a victorious campaign against the Midianites, and returned home
with their severed heads as trophies (see Judg 6:34-7:25). Another is the case of David in
his campaign against the Philistines during which he decapitated the Philistine giant,
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Goliath and took his head back to Jerusalem as a trophy (see 1 Sam 11:48-51, 54). Such
texts as these and more tend to leave the suggestion that God’s rûah in the OT has
something to do with violence. But according to the helpful suggestion of Michael
Welker, it is about “the action of God’s Spirit [in] situations of danger in which no escape
could be seen…. And they report wholly unexpected deliverance.”90 This sounds like the
ethical principle involved in self-defense where the defense of oneself from unjust
aggression may result in the collateral or incidental death of the aggressor. Even the
argument that God is always on the side of the oppressed raises the question as to
whether that transmutes God into a warrior as some OT texts seem to suggest. The fact,
however, remains that the sheer gruesomeness of those battles makes the terrifying and
violent aspects of the narratives keep raising more questions than answers.
The Prophets: Although all the prophets do not explicitly attribute their prophetic
utterances to the activity of the Spirit, one of the major works of the Spirit in the OT was
the inspiration of the prophetic word and visions.91 Indeed, the third article of the Creed
affirms that it is the Spirit “who has spoken through the prophets.”92 St. Irenaeus,
following Justin Martyr, grants that “the prophets were sent by God through the Holy
Spirit” and that it was through the Holy Spirit that they prophesied.93 At different times
throughout the history of Israel God sent prophets to speak to power the naked truth of
God’s justice in the face of flagrant abuse and oppression of the weak and defenseless.
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Not only to power, the prophets also addressed God’s truth to the entirety of the people
when they disobeyed God, calling them to repentance and fidelity to God’s
commandments. Equally in the face of national crises, the prophets rose to proclaim the
message of deliverance and hope.
The prophets may easily be categorized into two classes: the non-writing and the
writing prophets. Among the non-writing prophets were: Samuel who was sent to address
God’s judgment to Saul (1 Sam 15: 24-26); Nathan sent to speak to David on his sin and
power abuse (2 Sam 12: 1-15); others were Gad (2 Sam 24: 11-25), Ahijah (1 Kgs 11: 2939), Micaiah (1 Kgs 22: 8-28), Azariah (2 Chron 15: 1-7), and of interest to us is Elijah
sent to Ahab and Jezebel (1 Kgs 21: 17-24) to condemn their idolatry, injustice, and
oppression. Elijah was able to accomplish all did at his time when no other prophet was
around in Israel because of the Spirit powerfully upon him. That he was strongly
empowered by the Spirit is made obvious in the transmission of the Spirit to Elisha who
asked to receive a double portion of the Spirit that was upon Elijah (2 Kgs 2).
Among the writing prophets, of particular interest to us are Micah, Ezekiel, Isaiah,
and Joel, in that more than any other, they attributed their prophetic ministry to the overt
work of the Spirit. In Micah 3: 5-8, the eight-century pre-exilic prophet, Micah, links his
proclamation of the prophetic dābārYahweh (Word of the Lord) to his empowerment by
the Spirit. Basically, his prophetic message impelled by the Spirit was God’s
condemnation of the flagrant abuse, the pervasive moral corruption, and all sorts of social
injustice prevalent at the time in Israel. Micah spoke out in no uncertain terms, decrying
the exploitation of the peasants and the poor who were literally despoiled and stripped of
their human dignity by the few―the civil and religious leaders―who thrived by
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impoverishing the little people to enrich themselves. His was a clamant call addressed to
the perpetrators to metanoia and to liberate the downtrodden. However, for their
indifference to God’s love reflected in their oppression of the poor, exile to Babylon was
to be their fate, even though God might still redeem them.94
Isaiah: Isaiah had a lot to talk about the work of the Spirit during his prophetic
ministry. Because of its numerous allusions to the expected messianic king of Davidic
lineage, the prophecy of Isaiah is often called the “Fifth Gospel” or the “the Gospel of the
Old Testament.” Indeed, the term rûah occurs about 50 times throughout the entire
corpus. Like Micah, Isaiah was also an eight-century prophet particularly during the reign
of Ahaz and Hezekiah. Internally, Isaiah protested against all injustice prevalent in Israel
at the time: crimes, idolatry, and their trampling on the poor. Isaiah consequently issued
threats of God’s judgment against Israel because they added infidelity upon infidelity.95
In the face of external oppression, however, Isaiah spoke words of liberation and hope.
Indeed, in Proto-Isaiah, during the first plunder of Jerusalem by the Assyrians at the time
of Ahaz who refused to listen to the prophet, Isaiah announced the basis of a future hope
in the birth of Emmanuel in Isaiah 7: 10ff. At his birth, Emmanuel meaning “God-withus” will not simply bring God’s blessings and divine liberation. Rather, through him,
God’s presence would dwell among humankind and in him the promises of old would
come true. And to Hezekiah who listened to Isaiah, the prophet promised the survival of a
remnant of the people of Judah during Sennacherib’s Assyrian invasion and Hezekiah
resisted the enemy (see 36-37: 1-36).
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Again, in the midst of the Babylonian invasion still at the time of Hezekiah, Isaiah
started to envision the beginning of a new future world. He understood that future to be
beyond the present world characterized by violence and injustice. But the new world,
more or less, a new creation will be one in which justice and righteousness will prevail.
No longer can this new world be brought about by earthly kings. It would require the
advent of an ideal king of the line of Davidic kingship, a Messiah upon whom the Spirit
will rest and work with a mighty power in a unique and unprecedented way. Hence, out
of the tradition of the Davidic kingship and lineage as well grew the Messianic hope.96
Unlike the kings before him, the coming Messiah will be the true shepherd, will not rely
on violence or oppression, but he will be the Prince of Peace. His zeal for the Lord
Almighty will translate into his deployment of God’s power as power for compassion to
the point of self-giving love climaxing in suffering and death. He will reign on David’s
throne forever establishing justice and righteousness.97
Isaiah, thus, foresees the coming ideal king, the anointed one as the quintessential
pneumatophoros (bearer of the Spirit). Hence Isaiah 11: 2 says: “The Spirit of the Lord
will rest on him―the Spirit of Wisdom and of understanding, the Spirit of counsel and of
power, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord.” The reference to “power” in
relation to the regal figure who will be mightily endowed with the Spirit, as Max Turner
notes, “pertains to the power to ensure freedom from enemies and enforce righteous rule
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against opposition.”98 Thus Isaiah 11:3-4 goes further to describe the nature of the
Messiah’s rule, about how he will be compassionate, with justice will he judge the poor,
and with righteousness decide for the meek. This justice of compassion which the coming
Messiah will bring the poor because of his empowerment by the anointing of the Spirit is
taken up again in Trito-Isaiah (61: 1-2): “The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because
the Lord has anointed me to preach good news to the poor….” The identity of the ideal
king as Messiah, the anointed one, the liberator par excellence, will be constituted by the
Spirit. Messiah, Christ, simply means the one anointed with the Spirit. Somewhere else,
Isaiah also makes the point that the anointed one is sent by Yahweh and his Spirit: “and
now the Lord, even the Lord and his Spirit, hath sent me” {emphasis original (48:16)}.99
In the power of the Spirit, he will “initiate the rebirth of all the living for God’s new
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creation.”100 In many instances, Isaiah announces that the Messiah king who will come,
brings liberation, salvation, and will strengthen and restore his people (see 40: 10-13; 62:
11). Isaiah equally envisages that the salvation and justice which the anointed one will
bring will be seen by all the ends of the earth (see 52:10; 61:11). For the new heavens and
the new earth which God will create will be open to all peoples and nations of every
tongue (see 66: 18-19). Correlating the image of water and the Spirit, Isaiah illustrates
how the coming God will engender new life, deliverance, and the hope of a peaceful
time: “For I will pour water on the thirsty land and streams on the dry ground; I will pour
out my Spirit on your offspring, and my blessing on your descendants” (44: 3). Again,
when at last “the Spirit is poured upon us from on high and the desert becomes a fertile
field…Justice will dwell in the desert and righteousness live in the fertile field. The fruit
of righteousness will be peace” (32: 15-17). Just as water brings about life in the
wilderness, so the outpouring of the Spirit will create new life in those who have been
afflicted and desiccated by exploitation and oppression. What clearly emerges from the
foregoing Isaiah’s texts is that the rebirth of the Messianic people of the new creation will
be the work of the Spirit to be poured out.
Already in Isaiah, we begin to see that the future outpouring of the Spirit will no
longer be the prerogative of merely certain select individuals. The Jewish tradition, even
as we saw right from the time of Moses, had always limited the enduement of the Spirit
of God on persons with official status like judges, kings, prophets, and so forth, who are
given specific tasks to accomplish on behalf of the people. Rather, all the people will
experience the rebirth from the Spirit to be poured out. God’s Spirit will empower every
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member of the community of God’s people. It is this universal bestowal of the Spirit that
is taken up by Ezekiel and Joel.
Ezekiel: Ezekiel, a priest, was one of those deported to Babylonin exile. He
received his prophetic mission in the exilic period. More than any other, Ezekiel
explicitly acknowledged his prophetic oracles to have been engendered by the
enablement of the Spirit (Ezek 2-3: 1-27). The word rûah occurs about 46 times in
Ezekiel. Moved by the Spirit, the exilic prophet prophesied against the sins of Judah,
including those of the people, the leaders, and the false prophets (5-7; 11:1-12; 13:1-23;
22:1-31) as well as the purported stability of cult and peace that presumed the guarantee
of God’s protection of the Temple. Contrary to this view, Ezekiel, lifted up by the Spirit,
beheld the kābōd (glory) of God departing from the Temple and announced the certainty
of the exile (11: 23-24; 12:8-16). In all this, Ezekiel made thematic the explicit role of the
Spirit in his articulation of God’s dābār. The kābōd of God which departed from the
Temple was an indication that God’s presence was no longer to be seen to be confined to
the Temple building orchestrated by cult celebration under the control of the priestly
class.
With the vision of the departure of God’s glory from the Temple, Ezekiel became
more aware of the ever more ubiquitous presence of God to the people. Since God was no
longer limited to the Temple, then in the Spirit, God was present to the people even in
their place of exile. Likening the exile to some kind of wilderness or even death-like
situation, Ezekiel prophesied about the re-animation and re-vivification of their dead
bones by the Spirit to make them become living beings once more (Ezekiel 37: 1-14).
Ezekiel here projects the Spirit as the one who brings about a new creation and the giver
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of new life. The Spirit does not only re-create and re-vivify but also renews the people by
purifying and penetrating their hearts making them faithful to God’s covenant (36: 2428). Through the outpouring of the Spirit, “God will be the principle of faithful life and
holy life for Israel.”101 Not only that, when the Spirit is poured out on Israel, then truly,
never again will God hide his face (pānîm) from them (39:29) lest they return to their
dust. By pouring out the Spirit and putting the Spirit into them, the people will become
God’s dwelling place, God’s Temple, and God’s dwelling (Shekinah) will be among
them.
Joel: As mentioned earlier, even beginning in the time of Isaiah, the expectation
of the future Messianic age was already rife. The widespread outpouring and bestowal of
the Spirit became more closely tied to it. Thus in Joel, this widespread outpouring of the
Spirit became even more radically extended to embrace all peoples, indeed, all flesh.102 In
his vision of eschatological events, Joel declares: “And afterward, I will pour out my
Spirit on all people. Your sons and daughters will prophecy, your old men will dream
dreams, your young men will see visions. Even on my servants, both men and women, I
will pour out my Spirit in those days” (Joel 2: 28-29). What is radical and unusual in this
text is the mention of “servants” (both men and women, that men-servants and
handmaids). Except for their Sabbath rights protected by the sabbatical and Jubilee laws
of Sabbath rest and release (Ex 20:10; Deut 12:12, 18; 16:11, 14), these category of
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persons were excluded from the scheme of things in the community. Indeed, they were
simply not considered members of the community. Hence the radicality of Joel’s
prophecy means that “participation in God’s spirit implies equal (emphasis original)
status for each person in the community.”103 The Messianic expectations and the hope for
the universal outpouring of the Spirit are believed to have been fulfilled in the New
Testament. The Spirit that will be poured out on all flesh, the heart of flesh, indicates
once again that the Spirit is not antithetical to corporeality and history. Rather, the Spirit
seeks body, animates, recreates, renews, liberates, and redeems body by resisting and
subverting whatever life-negating forces that threaten the integrity and dignity of body.
The Spirit empowers all flesh from their powerlessness and weakness and liberates and
restores all who have been previously excluded and oppressed to the equal dignity of all
humanity. In the light of the biblical testimony we have been examining, there is,
accordingly, no room in the OT for what Welker describes as docetic pneumatology
which removes the Spirit and the work of the Spirit from the domain of corporeality and
history while relegating it to some form of ethereality.104 The Spirit is really active in
time and space with creation and humanity in flesh and blood.
Before proceeding to treat the role of the Spirit in the life of the Messiah and
subsequently in the church, it might well worth it to look briefly at the reading of the OT
by and as Christians. Previously, I mentioned that in the OT the Spirit had not yet
acquired a distinct personhood. Put another way, the Spirit in the OT was predominantly
viewed as an impersonal force or the power of God at work in creation and history. But to
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sustain the nexus between the OT and NT understanding of the Spirit, it is crucial to look
at how Jesus himself and the early Christians understood their continuity by how they
read the OT with regard to the Spirit.
3.2.8.1 Christian Reading of the Old Testament in Relation to the Spirit
Considering the pluriform semantic range of the Hebrew word rûah, some authors
have argued,on the one hand, that it is anachronistic and reductionist to equate rûah
simply with the Spirit of God and talk less with the Holy Spirit. According to this
position, to do so amounts to eisegeting (reading meaning) into the OT.105 Upholders of
this view thus call for minimalism. On the other hand, others view all the works
attributed to the OT rûah as evidence of the activity of the trinitarian third Person.106
Advocates of this position are viewed as maximalist in orientation.
While it is a truism that the OT has its own canonical integrity, the question
remains how the early Christians theologically interpreted the OT. No doubt, the veracity
of the Trinity and hence, the distinct personhood of the Holy Spirit are NT revelations.
Yet, Christian theological hermeneutics acknowledges the inspiration of both Testaments
as the work of the same Holy Spirit. Indeed, as Gerald O’Collins maintains, all the OT
personifications of the Spirit and Word paved the way for the eventual acknowledgment
of the Trinity.107
That the Holy Spirit was already active in the OT is attested to by Jesus himself.
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For instance, in Mark 12:35-36, “While Jesus was teaching in the temple courts, he
asked, ‘How is it that the teachers of the law say that the Christ is the son of David?
David himself, speaking by the Holy Spirit, declared’: ‘The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at
my right hand until I put all your enemies under your feet.’” In this case, Jesus was
alluding to the prophetic utterance attributed to David in Psalm 110:1. Jesus saw this
Davidic oracle as inspired by the Holy Spirit. Again, in Acts 1:15-16, “In those days
Peter stood up among the believers…and said, ‘Brothers, the Scripture had to be fulfilled
which the Holy Spirit spoke long ago through the mouth of David concerning Judas, who
served as guide for those who arrested Jesus…’” Here too, Peter read Psalms 69:25 and
109:8 as inspired by the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, in Acts 4:25, when Peter and John
rejoined the group of believers after their release by the Sanhedrin and reported all they
underwent in the hands of the chief priests and elders, the believers, among other things,
prayed thus: “Sovereign Lord…. You spoke by the Holy Spirit through the mouth of your
servant, our father David…” The believers’ prayer in this instance refers to Psalm 2:1-2.
Even Irenaeus follows this pattern and admits: “Wherefore the Holy Spirit says by David:
Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly” (emphasis
original).108 On the basis of this pattern of theological hermeneutics by Jesus himself, the
apostles, the early Christians, and the Fathers, it is arguable then that the OT references to
the Spirit of God are evidence to the distinct personhood of the Holy Spirit albeit
unnamed but already active in the OT.
Moreover, if Jesus could locate himself in the OT testimonies, for instance, when
he appeared after his resurrection to the two disciples on the road to Emmaus and
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eventually to the apostles in Jerusalem, he made them understand everything written
about him in the Scriptures starting from Moses through the prophets to the Psalms (see
Lk 24: 13-27, 44-47); and if the NT writers could also decipher Christ in the OT
witnesses, for example, Paul sees Christ as the Rock that provided Israel water in the
desert (see 1 Cor 10: 1-4), then following the same trend, it becomes plausibly arguable
that the Holy Spirit has also been actively at work in the OT. We shall now return to the
question of the Spirit and the messiah.
3.2.9 The Spirit and the Messiah
From both the Nicene creedal order and what appears to be the commonest
trinitarian taxis―Father, Son, and Spirit―the impression has too often been that the
Spirit comes only after Christ. To put it differently, the Spirit often tends to be viewed to
have arrived for the first time at Pentecost after being sent by the risen and ascended
Christ. But from our investigations so far, it is clear from the Hebrew Scriptures that the
Spirit has not only been actively at work in creation but even before the coming of the
Messiah, the Spirit as divine presence has always constituted part of the religious
experience of the people of God. We equally saw the dynamic, reciprocal relationship
between Spirit and Word in the OT as distinct but inseparable mediators of divine
presence. In addition, during the intertestamental period, wisdom (hokmah in Hebrew or
Sophia in Greek) was used in sapiential literature to designate the Spirit and became a
key category for speaking about divine presence.109 Pentecost, thus, is not the first
coming of the universal Spirit in history. Rather, it marks the apogee of the grandiose
outpouring and, indeed, a more perfect manifestation of the same Spirit who has been
109

See Wis 1:5-7; 7:7, 21-23; 8-9:1-17; Prov 8:1-36; Sir 1:1-10; 4:11-19; 15:1-10; 24:1-34.

204

ever-present from the very beginning.
It is worth noting, however, that the Spirit does not simply come after Christ but
has always accompanied the Word. Indeed, Mary conceived Jesus as the Son of God by
the Holy Spirit (Lk 1:35). The Holy Spirit who overshadowed Mary110 and engendered
the conception of Jesus of Nazareth reminisces the Spirit of God which in the very
beginning hovered over the primeval waters and birthed creation. Indeed, the Creator
Spirit created the humanity of Jesus in his incarnation. Before his conception, the angel
from heaven had given his name to Mary. The name Jesus is the same name as Jehoshu‘a
(the Lord saves). Thus, the name of Jesus reaches into the very mystery of God (as Savior
or Liberator) revealed to Moses at the burning bush. At his baptism, Jesus was anointed
and empowered by the Holy Spirit to carry out his prophetic ministry (Lk 3: 21-22) and
claimed by God as His Son.111 Fully endowed with the Holy Spirit, he was led by the
Spirit into the desert to be tempted and to overcome (Lk 4:1-2). And on his return to
Nazareth after baptism and overcoming temptation, Jesus read from the text of Isaiah
61:1-2; 58:6 (see Lk 4:18-19) in the synagogue on a Sabbath. In the end, Jesus
proclaimed the fulfillment of the text in him as the Messiah of OT expectation. Jesus
appropriated this Isaianic material to declare the nature of his mission under the
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empowerment of the relational Spirit. The identity of Jesus as the Son of God and as the
Messiah, the Savior, cannot, therefore, be understood apart from the endowment of the
Spirit in his life. As Gregory Nazianzen maintains, the Spirit both precedes Christ and
follows Christ. There is to be no subordination of any to the other or supersession of any
by the other.112
The prophetic Spirit anointed and empowered Jesus not only to overcome Satan,
temptation, and sin through obedience to the Father and counterviolence, but also by his
prophetic life-style and stance ―though non-partisan but definitely not apolitical―to
mount resistance against massive evil. Early on, St. Irenaeus of Lyons in his theory of
recapitulation, clearly recognized the redemptive significance of not only the passion and
death but also the incarnation and life of Christ.113 In the dominant Western soteriology,
however, much accent has been placed on the atoning and redemptive death of Christ (in
isolation) which saves from personal sin to the neglect of the redemptive significance of
the entire life of Christ expended in self-giving love (including his choice and defense of
the neglected and excluded, the vulnerable, the exploited, and his stance against systemic
evil such as injustice, and so on). We shall return to this issue in a later section. At any
rate, it is as one who is birthed by the Spirit, one on whom the Spirit descends and rests,
one who is first given the Spirit without measure (cf. Jn 3:34) that Jesus would be the
bestower of the Spirit from the Father on believers. Indeed, the Spirit is not just the gift of
Christ but also the giver of Christ as well.
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3.2.9.1 Jesus as Messiah and the Reign of God
Asked by the Pharisees when the kingdom of God was to come, Jesus answered
them by dismissing any construal that would comprehend the kingdom in terms of
geographical locatedness or physicality. Nevertheless, he affirmed, “For behold, the
kingdom of God is [already] among you” (Lk 17:20). Again, when it was insinuated by
the Pharisees that the source of Jesus’ power for performing exorcisms was from
Beelzebul, the prince of the devils, Jesus responded by pointing to the Spirit as the source
of his empowerment. Reproaching their deliberate attempts to ignore at best or obfuscate
at worst what was clearly the demonstration of God’s power, Jesus declared: “But if it is
by the Spirit of God that I drive out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon
you” (Mtt 12:28). In the ministry of Jesus, the Spirit inaugurates the basileia tou theou.
As Jesus proclaimed in his inaugural sermon in Nazareth noted previously, he was aware
up till the moment he gave up his spirit on the cross (Lk 24:46) that the relational Spirit
engendered liberation, forgiveness, deliverance, healing, restoration, and hope through
his ministry. The endowment of Jesus with the Spirit without measure marked the explicit
inauguration of God’s reign and the dawn of the new creation of all things. The Spirit,as
Moltmann puts it, “makes Jesus ‘the kingdom of God in person,’ for in the power of the
Spirit (emphasis original) he drives out demons and heals the sick; in the power of the
Spirit he receives sinners, and brings the kingdom of God to the poor. This…power of
God is given him not for himself but for others: for the sick, the poor, sinners, the
dying.”114 Thus, the subversions encapsulated in the inaugural sermon which Jesus
executed in his ministry and which the Pharisees tried to misrepresent, clearly show that
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the reign of God with its characteristic radical reversals has been inaugurated.
In the Roman empire of the time of Jesus as in every empire, the core principle
was domination. Imperial domination is often expressed in the deployment of the
instrument of control to subject all into the category of sameness. In this setting, those
who appear different are usually excluded. The reach of Empire is not merely
geographical and political. It also wields control over every domain of life―religion,
culture, economy, health, physiognomy and psychology, intellect and knowledge, wealth
distribution, power, and so on―with the consequence that those who appear to fall
outside the purported grid of the dominant normativity are perceived as deviant, as
different (in a degenerate sense), as “other,” and hence, marked out for oppression and
exclusion.115 Empire is thus characterized by the entrenchment of an imperialistic
monoculture whose operative mechanism runs on core-periphery and top-down
paradigm. Such totalitarian paradigm and unilateral run of power entails the subjugation
of the minorities, those at the margins, the weaker peoples, and smaller cultures by
empire.116 A crucial consequence of this monocultural imperialism is that its victims are
often forced into invisibility as subjects and persons with their own group distinctive and
specific expectations, experiences, perspectives, and desires. Jesus’ proclamation of the
reign of God, among other things, as Bruce Malina suggests, unfolded within the context
of the problem posed by imperialistic Roman political economy and culture as well as by
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local Israelite aristocracy, the fanatic, hierarchized, bureaucratic, and pharisaic
religiosity.117
Contrary to the operative mechanism of empire rooted in the politics of
domination, violence, and control, Jesus demonstrated the power of God’s reign in terms
of “struggle” (power in weakness) expressed in the politics of compassion and self-giving
love as an alternative. The Gospels are replete with many instances of such display of
compassion by Jesus. For example, Jesus reached out and touched a leper (at a time when
lepers were regarded as among the worst sinners by the religious establishment and
ostracized from the society of normal people) in order to heal him (Mtt 8:2-3). He
welcomed the touch of the hopeless and frustrated woman with issue of blood considered
as unclean and healed her (Mtt 9:20-22), forgave the paralytic (Mtt 9:1-2), criticized his
own generation and the Pharisees and Sadducees (Mtt 12:38-45; 16:1-4), preached the
Good News to and fed the drifting and hapless crowd (Mtt 14:13-21), renounced power
as domination (Mtt 23:8-12; Mk 10:41-45), spoke truth fearlessly to power (Mtt 23:1339), welcomed children (Mk 10:14), mingled with the despised (Lk 7:36-50; 19:1-10),
and so on. In these different circumstances Jesus enacted his politics of compassion as a
demonstration of the reign of God that has come. Compassion and solidarity entail siding,
identifying, and bearing the suffering of others with them to the extent of doing
something practically to relieve their misery even at the risk of one’s own life (see Isa
42:3; 50: 6; 53:4-5). Since there can be no such thing as true love or compassion without
solidarity, solidarity thus entails some form of incarnation or identification with. In the
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words of the Spanish-born Jesuit theologian, Jon Sobrino, “Solidarity that was not
prepared to share the lot of those with whom it wanted to show solidarity would be
paternalism, to put it mildly, or would lead to despotism. Solidarity in a world of victims
[and the silenced] that was not prepared to become a victim would in the end not be
solidarity.”118
Jesus’ Spirit empowered politics of compassion and prophetic stance would bring
him into a seething and searing controversy with the establishment (the political and
religious authorities). His politics of compassion subverted the politics of domination,
greed, and exploitation at his time. No doubt, his life-style, his ministry of self-giving
love, compassion, and his prophetic stance challenged the violence119 and life-negating
structures of the religious, economic, and socio-political power relations in his universe.
Consequently, those who benefitted from the status quo conspired and forged a
pernicious alliance to eliminate him. In fact, Jesus posed a threat to the empire and its
socio-political and religious status quo by offering a distinct and opposite alternative.120
His unmasking of oppression which was sublimated and justified in the name of God and
religion; his denunciations of the oppressors and forms of power that structure oppression
in society at his time especially as represented and exercised by certain classes and
groups (such as the Pharisees and scribes, the chief priests and the rich, the rulers and the
aristocrats), as well as his defense of the oppressed formed part of Jesus’ prophetic
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praxis. Jesus, of course, situated himself within Israel’s classic prophetic tradition and as
such, knew that the fate of the prophets would be his lot as well (see Lk 13:32-33).
Nevertheless, his prophetic praxis aimed, inter alia, at summoning whole groups and
collectivities (and not merely individual sinners) whose power structure perpetrates
systemic evil and oppression sublimated in God’s name, to conversion for the purpose of
the transformation of society. This does not mean to reduce the ministry of Jesus to
merely social activism and ideological exercise. It rather means to say that Jesus took the
whole life of society seriously especially its structural dimensions that produced innocent
victims in order to transform it through offering alternative values. As a divine figure but
incarnated in history, his prophetic praxis and entire life could not but be meaningful in
the light of the spatio-temporal conditions of his time including the religious, social,
economic, political, ideological, cultural, and so forth. Thus, Jesus not only proclaimed
the kingdom of life but also denounced the anti-kingdom, unmasking its different deathdealing aspects: religious, social, economic, etc.
The Spirit empowered ministry of Jesus had to necessarily unmask and confront
sin and evil in its different guises and manifestations―personal and social (which
essentially has economic and political ramifications)―thereby making his ministry
ineluctably assume a public character. Non-partisan, albeit he was, that does not mean
that Jesus’ Spirit-inspired ministry and history was apolitical or had no social and
economic implications. He was definitely on the side of the oppressed, the hapless and
downtrodden, the voiceless, the marginalized, the violated, the excluded, and, indeed,
those on the underside in order to bring them the justice and compassion of God. His
ministry and indeed his entire history was not simply all about preserving peace and
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harmony as in pure pacifism (understood in the sense of absence of conflict).121 Rather,
Jesus’ Spirit-enabled ministry was also subversive, however, not in the Zealots’
revolutionary sense.122 In proclaiming the kingdom of God for the poor, Jesus proffered
an alternative way of establishing it different from the religious nationalisms and violent
political theocratic model— friend-enemy—espoused by the Zealots. By contrast to
Zealotism, the kingdom Jesus proclaims and expresses in his life, words, and deeds, was
to be established through such humanizing values as truth, justice, compassion, love, and
above all, by grace. He boldly and radically challenged the establishment to selfcriticism, denounced the alienation and inhumanity of their oppressive deeds, called them
to metanoia, and to end the cycle of violence, while offering them liberation and hope.
Because his Spirit-inspired insurgence against injustice and evil made the comfortable
and powerful uncomfortable, when arraigned before Pilate the chief priests and the elders
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of the people accused him of being a political subversive (Lk 23:2, 13-14; Jn 19:12-15).
They murdered him out of colossal hatred, envy, and brutal injustice. But even at that,
Jesus was not a passive victim in his suffering and death. It was not his victimizers,
neither was it death itself that were the determining agents in his death. There is little
doubt that Jesus was fully aware of what was going to be his fate in the conflict with the
death-dealing forces and gods of the anti-kingdom. He knew that the fate of the prophets
who went long before him awaited him (see Lk 13:31-33). Rather, in the power of the
Spirit he freely and actively laid down his life for the sake of his friends. Nor was his
death simply a pacification of God’s anger against humanity going by traditional
atonement theory. It was fundamentally engineered as a result of State hatred and
scapegoatism123 to which Jesus, however, actively surrendered as a sign of his credible
solidarity and irrevocable love for his friends. As Sobrino succinctly puts it, “And where
his own fate was concerned, Jesus—hard and verbally aggressive to the point of insult
when defending the poor and oppressed—offered himself without resistance to his
persecutors.”124 By so doing, Jesus proved that nothing, absolutely nothing, not even
death could constitute an obstacle to God’s irrevocable saving love for his friends in the
throes of life-negating anti-kingdom. Be that as it may, through his self-giving love even
in death, the compassionate and “gracious God of Jesus enters into solidarity with all
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those who suffer and are lost.”125 It is this God’s definitive love that saves. And because
God’s love saves, we know him as truly God-with-us and God-for-us. What is most
consoling, nonetheless, is that the power of the Creator Spirit who is also the Recreator
Spirit transcends death. Thus in the power of the Spirit the giver of life, God raises Jesus
“in new, unimaginable life as pledge of a future for all the violated and the dead…. and
the whole cosmos itself.”126 This brings us back to the point that the relational, Creator
Spirit remains unpredictable, uncontrollable, unrestrainable, and undomesticable. The
ubiquity of the Spirit who gives life holds sway even beyond death. After his death and
resurrection, Jesus sends the promised Spirit from the Father to the disciples.
3.2.9.2 The Spirit and the Church
The Spirit, the giver of life in whose power Jesus is raised from the dead to new
life is the same Spirit who has been poured out on the disciples on Pentecost. In the midst
of the enveloping mighty wind and in hovering over and resting on each one of the
disciples in the form of tongues of fire, the Spirit birthed the church (Acts 2:2-3). The
early Christian community was clearly convinced that the outpouring of the Spirit on
Pentecost after the ascension of Christ―in accordance with Luke’s chronology (Lk
24:51; Acts 1:9)―was the fulfillment of the OT promise of a universal and inclusive
bestowal of the Spirit in Joel as noted previously. The Spirit empowers the circle of
disciples with a variety of gifts and different callings to witness to the saving power of
Christ and to be a sign of the reign of God in the midst of the brokenness of this world. In
this new community, the presence of the resurrected Christ will continue to be present to
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the church and to the world in the Spirit. The Pentecost event of the outpouring of the
Spirit on “all flesh” in fulfillment of Joel’s prophecy is important for our purpose in
furthering our claim that the relational Spirit seeks and rests on body, gives life,
engenders plurality and equality, and resists anti-life forces.
3.2.9.3 The Spirit and Pluralism
The Spirit who is being bestowed on all flesh for their empowerment relativizes
the imperial monoculture, monolingualism, and unilateral flow of power in empire. By
broadening the reach of the Spirit’s inspiration and empowerment not only to a privileged
few, the Spirit resists all that empire stands for―domination and control. The enablement
of all flesh means, as Welker suggests, that “a specific group of people, a specific
stratum, a specific tradition, or a specific culture can no longer claim for itself alone
God’s presence, the reception of the Spirit, prophetic testimony, and true definitions of
reality.”127 The Spirit is bestowed on all irrespective of differences: old and young, male
and female, master and servant, privileged and disadvantaged. By empowering all,
typical differences not withstanding, the Spirit fosters unity and equality in the midst of
differences. This fostering of pluralism and heterogeneity which shatters the core of
imperialistic monoculturalism―a particular perspective or culture of the dominant or
privileged group paraded as universal―further finds expression in the bestowal of the
gift of polyglossia by the Spirit during the Pentecost event. When the Spirit descended on
the Galilean disciples, as Paul writes, “they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began
to speak in different tongues, as the Spirit enabled them to proclaim” (Acts 2:4). The
unpredictability and uncontrollability of the power of the Spirit which cannot be merely
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contained within the familiar and the comfortable blossoms forth in the profusion of
speech to the utter bewilderment and astonishment of all those gathered from every nook
and cranny of the globe. What at first appears to be a confusion of languages as in Babel
is quite dissimilar to Babel, in that in the Pentecost event, each of those gathered heard in
his or her own native language and idiom. Those gathered included Parthians, Medes,
Elamites, Mesopotamians, Judeans, Cappadocians, Asians, Phrygians, Pamphylians,
Egyptians, Libyans, Cyreneans, Romans, Arabs, Cretans, and others (cf Acts 2:5-12).
The gift of polyglossia means that no one single language can express fully the
mysterious immensity of the Spirit. The outpouring of the Spirit inherently requires a
pluriversality of languages and narratives, and different peoples to give it expression.
With the Pentecost experience which dismantles the stranglehold of monoculturalism,
unilateralism, and uniformism, there is no more place for any one particular culture,
tradition, group, or dominant voice to claim monopoly of the true definition of reality
which becomes universalized or even absolutized. In this connection, it is difficult not to
agree with Hodgson’s suggestion that: “There is neither a singular, monolithic truth nor a
plurality of truths but rather a truth that is itself inherently pluralistic, reflecting the
pluralism of universal reality.”128
The Spirit of Pentecost, indeed, sustains plurality, difference, and heterogeneity.
In the church, the Spirit sustains the life of the body of Christ by indwelling human
bodies and providing them with different gifts. Variously, Paul frequently describes the
Spirit as indwelling human bodies: “You are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells
in you” (Rom 8:9). Again, “If the Spirit of the one who raised Jesus from the dead dwells
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in you, the one who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also,
through his Spirit that dwells in you” (Rom 8:11; cf. 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19). By being poured
out on all flesh, the Spirit subverts the unsalutary differences created by empire which
makes a certain class the dominators and others on the underside the subjugated. The
Spirit resists these power differentials by creating an alternative pluralism in which all are
empowered and not simply some or the merely privileged. In this way, the Spirit creates a
certain egalitarianism among the empowered. While fostering pluralism and encouraging
an affirmation of differences, it is not all differences that should be reinforced. As Welker
writes, all “unrighteous differences”129 should be done away with. That is, differences
that are life threatening, death-dealing, oppressive, or life-negating, are to be discouraged
and resisted. While those that cultivate and flourish life should be sustained. It is positive
difference that the Spirit promotes. The Spirit that is poured out on all people means, as
Moltmann notes, “that the traditional privileges come to an end―the privileges of men
compared with women, of lords compared with servants, of adults compared with
children.”130
A crucial point to grasp is that the Spirit does not simply empower those who
previously had no power and perhaps merely raise them to the same level with those who
wielded power before. In other words, the insurgent Spirit does not simply accomplish a
formal equality (which in this sense is equal to sameness). For such notion of formal
equality would make it extremely difficult if not impossible to unmask and name how
difference has often been maneuvered to continue to structure privilege and advantage
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versus oppression and disadvantage. Equality is not the same as sameness or
homogeneity. For there can be no genuine equality unless distinct groups, their specific
culture, specific perspectives on reality, distinct experiences which form a crucial
dimension of social existence in a particular contextual situation are recognized and
affirmed. Blindness to difference when it is assimilated, under the guise of formal
equality, into sameness often oppresses minority groups whose difference is delineated
by the dominant groups as deviant on the basis of their (the dominant’s) own purported
neutral unsituated humanity. Therefore, whereas the Spirit strengthens those who are
powerless, at the same time, the Spirit interpellates, resists, and restricts the powers and
privileges that have been pernicious and death-dealing. It is in this sense that we can say
that the life giving and liberating Spirit is on the side of the oppressed while restricting
harmful powers and summoning their agents to metanoia and to the challenge of justice.
God, undoubtedly, loves equally. At the same time, however, God’s love is not neutral.
God’s love in the Spirit, as abundant biblical testimony affirms, is always a preferential
option, a predilection for the powerless and defenseless, the voiceless, the weak, the
vulnerable, the oppressed, the exploited, and the poor. He is the God of the poor and
oppressed (see Ex 22:21-27; Ps 9:10; 68:6; 140:13; 146:7-9). In this way the relational
Spirit creates relations that are life-giving rather than life-diminishing. And in this way,
the relational Spirit engenders equality that at the same time affirms positive differences
while fostering the inclusion and participation of all in the community of the empowered.
Another consequence of the Pentecost outpouring of the Spirit on all people is
that those who are now empowered by the indwelling of the life-giving, resistant, and
liberating Spirit, are to embody and propagate the same activities of the Spirit by
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promoting justice and the flourishing of life for all in a fragmented and violent world.
The community birthed by the resistant Spirit is a community of memory. It is a
community of the dangerous memory of Jesus,131 as Johann B. Metz suggests, even as he
placed himself in the prophetic tradition. It is a community of memory because it shapes
and nourishes its identity by reliving the narratives of Jesus and the early Christian
community, a community of resistance, reconciliation, possibilities, and hope. What we
have been discussing in this section is that the Spirit poured out on all flesh does not
obliterate difference. Rather, the Spirit promotes positive difference and plurality while at
once relativizing and resisting harmful difference that structures privilege and oppression.
We shall take a closer look at the construction of difference later on in order to figure out
ways to engage the ambiguities inherent in the term.In the meantime, let us examine
certain patristic positions on the significance of the relational Spirit and body in relation
to identity and difference as well as to its relevance or otherwise for who we are with
regard to God’s salvific act.
3.3 Christian

Tradition and Embodiment

From what we have discussed so far, the witness of the Bible depicts the Holy
Spirit to not be opposed to corporeality. Nature, bodies (and hence plurality, diversity,
and difference), and the interconnectedness of reality are no strangers to the Spirit. It is
by now clear that the Spirit births and sustains the life of the world. Since our bodies are
symbols, they bear the mark of our different traditions as well as cultural differences. In
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our bodies too we are differentiated and individuated in the sense that no two persons are
identical, even the identicality of so-called identical twins still does not render collapsible
their identity, individuality, or particularity. As a bearer and not merely the constitution
of difference, how we approach the question of body speaks much about our perspectives
with regard to the issue of difference. If the Creator and relational Spirit instilled
diversity and plurality in creation, promoted and elevated them at Pentecost without
morphing all into sameness, are our differences relevant to God? Does the body matter to
God and so with its embodiedness to be redeemed or is it merely a temporary expedient
to be dispensed with and transcended at the long run in the resurrection? Ambiguity
plagues the church’s account of the Spirit’s relation to body which has significantly
impacted certain church practices with regard to certain bodies. This conflicted history
notwithstanding, the Spirit continues to seek and rest on bodies, and continues to liberate
and renew bodies. In this section we shall take a look at how the concept of embodiment
was formulated in Christian tradition by the Church Fathers. Of particular interest to us
here are the perspectives of St. Irenaeus of Lyons and St. Augustine of Hippo with regard
to the place of body and hence, difference, in the divine economy.
3.3.1 St. Irenaeus of Lyons
St. Irenaeus from Smyrna (ca. 135–ca. 200) studied at Rome and later became the
bishop of Lyons. His theology is said to bridge the gap between Eastern and Western
churches. His teaching on the Spirit is understandable, among other things, within the
framework of his refutation of certain tenets of the Gnostic phantasmagoric complexity as
he outlined in the greatest of his works whose significance and purpose is indicated by
the title: The Refutation and Overthrow of the “Knowledge” Falsely So-Called
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(popularly called Adversus haereses—Against Heresies). Embracing the exaggeration of
oriental Platonism, the Gnostics taught that matter was intrinsically evil. Since for them
the good God could not be closely associated or come into direct contact with matter
which is evil, then material creation as presented in the OT could not have been the
handiwork of the same good God of the NT. Rather, matter emanated from “spirit,” a
displaced Eon – Demiurge, the Craftsman of the material world. Consequently, the idea
that Christ, for instance, or even a human being who is thought to compose of spiritual or
divine aspect, should possess a real, material body was repugnant to the Gnostics. Thus,
they separated the Savior, Christ from the Jewish messiah Jesus and held that Christ only
appeared to be human while his body was merely illusory.132 Again, consonant with their
repugnance and contempt for matter, the Gnostics maintained that human body precisely
as material cannot be saved anchoring their position on a misapprehended Pauline
teaching that “Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (1 Cor 15:50). It is in
the light of these basic Gnostic beliefs that Irenaeus’ theory of recapitulation133 and
atonement, and the sharing of the human body in the fruits of the redemption through the
communication of the Spirit become comprehensible.
Basically, Irenaeus teaches that Adam and Eve in the prelapsarian state were
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created by God like children (in the sense of spiritual childhood and immaturity).134
Although they were created immortal, God nevertheless, set them certain limitations, so
that should they keep God’s commandments, they were to remain immortal and destined
for perfection which they had to actualize through divine pedagogic and incremental
stages within time and space.135 Irenaeus makes a subtle distinction between the image
and likeness of God in humans. He holds that the body of Adam created from the ground
and infused with a soul was fashioned in the image of God. It, however, requires the
spirit from God in order to be in the likeness of God. Thus the communication of the
Spirit of God to humans makes them complete. When Adam sinned, all humanity sinned
underlining the solidarity of the human race with Adam as its head. In order to redeem
human beings from the bondage and death caused by Adam’s disobedience, every
dimension of Adam’s humanity has to be taken and summed up completely in the new
Adam, Christ (recapitulation)136 in his incarnation to restore the solidarity of the human
race with its new head.137 Adam’s disobedience estranged humanity from God. The Fall
caused the loss of the Spirit for both Adam and his progeny. For restoration and renewal
toward perfection, Irenaeus believes, Adam, and indeed, creation, needed the hospitality
of God to open up such possibilities. Christ, thus, restored humanity to God by becoming

134

Ibid., III. 22; Dem., 12.

135

Dem., 15; Her., V. 23, 1-2. For Irenaeus, human beings were created immortal in the prelapsarian
situation and death was not part of that state until the disobedience to God through the deception of the
Apostate, Satan (see Dem., 16). Irenaeus, thus, rejects the idea that the creational limitations set Adam by
God imply mortality and violence as a way of counteracting Gnostic repugnance and abhorrence of time
and matter.
136

Her., V. 1, 2.

137

Ibid., V. 14, 2.

222

the same Adamic flesh. But unlike Adam who lost the Spirit, Christ the new Adam
possesses the Spirit in full measure by which he permeates, vivifies, and sanctifies the
whole human race, and communicating the same Spirit to humans through his obedience
to the point of death.138 Irenaeus thus insists strongly on the true and full humanity of
Christ the Redeemer as opposed to the docetic stance of the Gnostics.139 It is through the
communication of the Spirit that humans become spiritual and thus empowered to share
in the life of God and to achieve communion with God through the exercise of free will.
The Spirit hence gives life to bodies that are destined for communion and relationship
with God. Thus, the God of redemption is one and the same as the God of creation
Irenaeus emphasizes human freedom and insists that the mark of human equality
is the gift of free will that makes humans responsible for their ultimate destiny. Indeed,
he identifies the image of God in humans with the freedom of the will.140 This idea of
freedom Irenaeus contrasts with the more fatalistic tenet of the Gnostics who divided
humans into three categories or grades: the spiritual, the psychic, and the material.
According to this deterministic approach, only the spiritual have hope of salvation; the
psychic are salvageable but in a diminished form; the material are doomed to perdition.
Hence, Irenaeus contends that St. Paul’s “spiritual” people in his letters refer to those
who freely accept Christ, receive the Spirit, and thus become spiritual and have life
because they allow themselves to be led by the Spirit. For “where the Spirit of the Father
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is, there is a living man,”141 Irenaeus argues. While those who choose to live without
Christ are carnal because, destitute of the Spirit of God, they are dead and not having life,
cannot possess the kingdom of God.142 It is those given to carnal lusts,143 Irenaeus notes,
which the Gnostics failed to understand as the flesh and blood that will not share in the
kingdom of God, according to St. Paul. However, those who are spiritual do not dispose
of their body; the communication of the Spirit does not vaporize their body.144 It is the
entire person; body, soul, and spirit that is spiritual. Accordingly, it is those who are
spiritual, those who have received the Spirit that are made for salvation, since “without
the Spirit of God, we cannot be saved.”145 Therefore, salvation involves the whole
person. For the perfect man is not merely a part of man but “the comingling and union of
all the constituent parts, that is, body, soul, and spirit.146 According to the famous
Irenaean Imagery, the Spirit is one of the two hands147 with which God fashioned us in
creation and wrought our redemption. If the body would not be saved, then it would not
have been created in the first place and the Word of God would not have become flesh.148
God creates in order to save and that includes the body.
Again, Irenaeus argues, “If the flesh is not capable of salvation, man is not
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redeemed, because flesh is an essential constituent of his nature.”149 While arguing for
the immortality of the soul, Irenaeus, however, appears to hint at a subtle relative
corporeity of the soul. This hint is captured in his description of the soul as having “the
figure of a man” (hominis figuram). The soul possesses this figuram of the body fitted to
it just as water to a vessel.150 Consequent upon this figuram and as opposed to the
Gnostic theory of transmigration following Plato, the soul, Irenaeus teaches, utilizing the
parable of Dives and Lazarus, continues to exist without passing from body to body; it
retains the same bodily figuram in which it was originally fashioned, so that they (both
soul and body) are able to know and recognize each other in the next world “and to
remember the things which are here.”151 Importantly, nevertheless, Irenaeus distinguishes
that the soul is immortal by nature while the body receives immortality only as an
extrinsic and gratuitous gift after its dissolution or transformation from corruptibility to
incorruptibility.152
Besides, Christ’s resurrection and the seal of the Spirit constitute the guarantee of
the resurrection of our own bodies. Counteracting the separation by the Gnostics of the
man Jesus who is capable of suffering from the Christ who cannot suffer, Irenaeus argues
for the unity of the Savior who recapitulates in himself the whole humanity. Anchoring
on Paul, Irenaeus contends that if the Spirit of him who raised Christ from the dead
dwells in us, he who raised Christ will give life to our mortal bodies (cf. Rom 8:11). The
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Gnostics appeared to be so preoccupied with the frailty and corruptibility of the flesh that
they eliminated from view the power of God made manifest in weakness as Irenaeus
suggests. For if God, Irenaeus contends, “does not vivify what is mortal, and does not
bring back the corruptible to incorruption, He is not a God of power.”153 The flesh, like
the grain of wheat which when sown in the earth decomposes before it increases, is sown
in weakness in death but made alive in power. Rising through the instrumentality of the
Spirit, the flesh becomes a spiritual body, so that by the Spirit it possesses perpetual
life.154 With this imagery of the wheat, Irenaeus puts the idea of the resurrection and
salvation of the body in close relation with the Eucharist.155 The wheat which is the fruit
of the earth becomes, through the Word of God, the Eucharist, the body and blood of
Christ. When we partake of the body and blood of Christ, it is preposterous that we would
not, like Christ’s own body itself, be raised to immortal life.156 Furthermore, Irenaeus
hinges on the Pauline imagery of temple to argue that our bodies as temples of the Holy
Spirit and members of Christ, are destined for salvation and resurrection.157 As our bodies
are the members of Christ, we will then naturally share in all that belongs to Christ
including the resurrection of the body.
Moreover, another significant aspect of Irenaeus’ doctrine of recapitulation is the
idea that he gleans from Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians 1:10 on the recapitulation and

153

Ibid., V. 3, 2.

154

Ibid., V. 7, 2.

155

Ibid., V. 2, 3.

156

Ibid., IV.18, 5.

157

Ibid., V. 6, 2; cf. 1 Cor 3:16-17; 6:15.

226

reconciliation of all things in heaven and on earth in Christ. Irenaeus suggests that
whereas the things which are in heaven are incorporeal, the things on earth are corporeal
and find their synthesis in the human being. Christ therefore, recapitulates in himself all
things “by uniting man to the Spirit, and causing the Spirit to dwell in man.”158 Christ
who created all things and is inherent in all creation was in the last times made flesh and
hung upon the tree that he might sum up all things in him-self.159 Clearly, Irenaeus’
theory of recapitulation which stresses the decisive importance of embodiment and the
salvation of the flesh has a more robust cosmic ramification as this salvation includes the
renewal of the whole creation. Thus, Irenaeus’ understanding of salvation as
accomplished through the Spirit’s instrumentality holds great significance for ecology
since all creation is interconnected and interrelated via corporeality. This affirmation of
the goodness of the body and the material world as destined for salvation constitutes
Irenaeus’ holism. All in all, the goal of Irenaeus has been to establish that the essence of
the incarnation, life, passion, death, and resurrection of the Savior was the reconciliation
and union of humans with God through the communication and restoration of the
relational Spirit lost by Adam’s disobedience to human beings. This is because, without
the Spirit, humans have no life since the Spirit is itself the life of those who receive it.160
And humans who are perfectly alive because they possess the Spirit are the glory of God;
hence the import of the timeless Irenaean mellifluous dictum: Gloria Dei, vivens homo
which means “the glory of God is the human being fully alive.” The relational Spirit is
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truly the Giver and Sustainer of abundant life.
Irenaeus’ theory of recapitulation which entails the summing up of the whole
human nature, the restoration of the Spirit of communion, and the reconciliation of all
things in Christ with its cosmic ramifications is well taken. Nevertheless, I take an
exception to Irenaeus’ stance that those who are not members of the body of Christ’s
Church have no share in the Spirit. Irenaeus is, undoubtedly, pushed to this position
because of his limiting the Spirit to the Church which for him appears to be the only
means through which the Spirit as the pledge of immortality is communicated:
For where the Church is, there is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of
God is, there is the Church and every kind of grace…. Those, therefore, who
do not partake of Him, are neither nourished into life from the mother’s breasts, nor do they enjoy that most limpid fountain which issues from the body
of Christ; but they dog for themselves broken cisterns out of earthly trenches,
and drink putrid water out of the mire….161
The Irenaean axiom, ubi Spiritus Dei, illic ecclesia, et omnis gratia, seems troubling. If
the Spirit of God blows wherever she wills as Irenaeus concurs, then it appears to be
somewhat contradictory to at the same time limit the operations of the Spirit to the
boundaries of the Church as Irenaeus seems to suggest. If the pervasive and
uncontrollable Spirit makes possible the ever presence of God passing by, God always
coming in a trace and drawing near especially in the most unexpected of places and
persons, then the uncontrollable Spirit makes grace (understood simply as God’s free and
gracious self-gift, self-donation, or self-communication) available to all human beings
even outside the boundaries of the church. In the words of John Paul II, the “mysterious
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working of the Spirit who, blowing where he wills…comes to and involves every person
living in this world.”162As Johnson rightly suggests:
Every personal encounter of God with human beings occurs in the Spirit,
and it is in the Spirit that people make their response. This presence of the
Spirit is a power and a joy, an outpouring and a gift. It is not controllable by
any institution or community but is effective beyond the confines of the church, bringing forth fruits of holiness in people who do not partake of Christian
word and sacrament.163
Irenaeus’ position is tenable but to the extent that the understanding of church is more
expansive (beyond institution) and drastically revised along the lines of a robust
pneumatological perspective. The Spirit is no property of the church and the living God is
not simply the Christian God; He is also the God of all humankind and even of those
whose way of life, cultures, customs, and perceptions of the good and true are unlike
those of Christians’. There is no one community or person that enjoys a monopoly of the
Spirit, and no institution can lay claim to an exhaustive possession and control of the
pervasive and uncontrollable Spirit since she blows where she pleases. Indeed, the
mystery of the living God cannot be limited to the Christian God. This overabundance of
God made available by the pervasive and uncontrollable Spirit which is experienced in
other distinct settings and religions should be allowed to create a leeway for a more
expansive understanding of church and new catholicity.
3.3.2 St. Augustine of Hippo
If Irenaeus’ theological endeavor with regard to the Spirit, body, and salvation,
inter alia, significantly influenced and paved the way for later Eastern theological
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currents especially those of the Cappadocians, Augustine’s did the same in the West. No
doubt, the perspectives of St. Augustine (354–430), bishop of the North African city of
Hippo, proved most influential in the formulation of Western theological trends with
regard to the Spirit within the overarching framework of Trinitarianism. Since
Augustine’s views on corporeality and the Spirit are interspersed within his vast literary
lexicon, we shall here adopt, as a helpful criterion, to plumb his perspectives in what may
be understood as the early and later Augustine.
Early on in his career, the reading of Cicero’s Hortentius inspired Augustine with
the love of philosophy.164 By happenstance, he followed the Manichean dualistic beliefs
which, among other things, conceived of a cosmic conflict between good and evil
principles165 and that all material reality is evil and the handiwork of an evil god. For the
Manichees, the true and good God has nothing to do with the material universe which is
evil but rather presides over a spiritual realm. Manicheans equally held that the real self is
the inner self which is spiritual waiting to be liberated from the entrapment of the body at
death. Disappointed at some point, however, with the Manichees, Augustine reverted to
Neo-Platonism166 which would influence his philosophical and theological perspectives
after his conversion to Christianity in 386. After he became a Christian, the early
Augustine rejected the Manichean belief that matter was evil and rather affirmed the
goodness of the material world including human bodies brought into existence by the one
and true God. Refuting the Manichean dualistic account of evil, Augustine conceives evil
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as having no being, as a privation167 since whatever has being is good and originates from
the true God who is not only good but is Goodness par excellence.168 Augustine argues,
therefore, that evil issues from that empty and aberrant human desire (libido or lust)169
and will in its sinful choice to turn away from God the immutable and ultimate Good and
to turn toward temporal and lesser goods—intermediate goods—in Augustine’s pointed
terminology.
Unlike Gregory of Nyssa, who held that our sexually differentiated human bodies
were a temporary expedient which will become unnecessary in the resurrection,
Augustine affirmed the goodness of bodily difference to be preserved even in the
hereafter.170 According to Gregory, our sexual difference became expedient as a result of
humanity being created in the image of God which entails freedom (as in Irenaeus) and
hence, mutability as well as the possibility of the abuse of freedom through disobedience
to God’s commandments. Since the consequence of sin would be death, in order to
preserve humanity from extinction, God in his foreknowledge created male and female as
a biological reproductive mechanism to preserve the human race as long as the condition
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of sin lasts. Gregory’s position, in other words, is that there would have been no need for
sexual difference, were there to be no sin, and therefore, there will be no need for it after
the resurrection.171 Augustine diametrically differed with Gregory.
Augustine’s encounter with Pelagianism, however, caused a shift of emphasis in
his apprehension of human free will as the index of being created in the image of God.
The British ascetic, Pelagius, had stressed moral optimism in the role of human effort
through obedience to achieve salvation. Contra Pelagius, Augustine rather stressed the
radical depravity and vicious corruption of the human free will (originally capable of
avoiding sin—posse non pecare) emanating from the sin of Adam and Eve “after which
neither they nor their posterity could avoid sinning (non posse non pecare).”172 In other
words, the human will in the wake of the Fall no longer possesses any effective volitional
power of its own to will the good via its own unaided natural capacity since the
irresistibility of sin surpasses and wrecks the power of the will. For Augustine, therefore,
Pelagianism undermines the fact that salvation cannot be achieved by human effort and
autonomous free will under the condition of sin but can only be received as the free gift
of God’s grace. To argue otherwise is, according to Augustine, to maintain “that human
beings saved themselves.”173 But the good news, for Augustine, remains that “the
graciousness of God’s redeeming grace depended on its being absolutely unconditional
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on human work or merit.”174 In this way, the later Augustine modified his earlier
understanding of the natural power of the free will to which he had attributed the capacity
for both good and evil.
Having rejected one of the tenets of Manichean religion that God was a bodily
substance and so somehow extended, and therefore, corruptible (a belief that he wrestled
with for a long time), Augustine came to acknowledge that God is a spirit, thus
immaterial and incorruptible.175 Since God is Spirit, communion with God must be a
spiritual rather than a physical reality. Consequently, Augustine identifies the image of
God in human beings with the soul,176 without discounting the goodness of the created
order in general and the human body in particular.
After having identified the image of God in human beings with the soul or mind,
Augustine in a further effort to articulate what communion with God entails, relates it to
the rational faculties of the soul: memory, understanding, and will. The memory, as
Augustine notes, in remembering its object, not only understands and knows itself, but by
the same token also loves the object of its knowledge and becomes one with it. Augustine
uses this psychological imagery to illustrate the presence of the Trinity in the soul.
Memory stands for the Father; understanding for the Son, and will for the Spirit. The
Father knows the Son He begets and the Son knows the Father who begets him and their
reciprocal love (or gift) which they give to each other is the Spirit.177 Conceiving the
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Spirit as both the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son, Augustine surmised that
the Spirit is their unity or communion. Hence, the Spirit comes to be known as the
vinculum amoris (bond of love) between the Father and the Son.178 The Spirit is thus the
principle of communion and relationality. This Augustinian position was pressed to
service in medieval Catholicism to emphasize the procession of the Spirit from both the
Father and the Son which culminated in the addition of the Filioque clause (“and the
Son”) unilaterally by the West to the Creed.179 At any rate, the life of the Spirit and
communion with God for Augustine is not merely a life of the flesh but an interior life
cultivated in a journey toward God.
In the light of this journey toward God, what has come to be known as the “ascent
motif” in the later Augustine assumed prominence. Consequently, the “life of the mind
rather than the life of bodies together [that is, the full human being as a complex unity]
became the chief analogy for God’s life, and as a result the body often seemed distant
from Spirit’s life.”180 Indeed, in accounting for human journey toward God within the
confines of history, the pertinent metaphor Augustine employs is peregrinatio which
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entails living out one’s time in the world like a stranger without attachment to it. While
not necessarily shunning the goodness of the created order, bodiliness, and other worldly
concerns such as order, power, civilization, and so on, the life of the Spirit, for
Augustine, reorients them to God as the Good that truly satisfies. As Peter Brown puts it,
those who belong to the city of God, for Augustine, “are set apart by a holy yearning for
the heavenly Jerusalem.”181 The life of the Spirit in this yearning for the heavenly
Jerusalem is to draw humanity into the eternal dance and fellowship of the Trinity.
Augustine’s concern for the spiritual clearly overshadows every other consideration.
Augustine’s thought as elaborated above is well taken. Nevertheless, his apparent
construal of history as merely a place of marking or living out one’s allotted time in
peregrinatio runs the risk of promoting an attitude of stoical endurance of the evils and
sufferings of this life including, perhaps, those emanating from injustice, be they
ecological, economical, political, socio-cultural, religious, and so forth, rather than to
resist and confront them. This objection is strengthened all the more when it is realized
that Augustine’s androcentric projection of the normativity of male nature has proved
very influential in promoting patriarchalism and the diminishment and exclusion of
women in the Roman Catholic Church.182 Moreover, Augustine, to be sure, subtly grants
that human freedom and responsibility are not annihilated by grace. However, his view
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that salvation is received by sheer grace still risks rendering inconsequential and vacuous
the role of human decision within the matrix of space and time in shaping ultimate human
destiny.
Without pretending that the two Patristic figures we have considered in any way
exhaust early Christian reflections on difference, it is sufficient that they represent
significant influences in both the East and the West. It is clear that our bodies as symbols
and bearers of our differences matter to God. As indwelt by the relational Spirit, what
happens to these bodies of ours touches God since God has also taken body through the
incarnation of Jesus Christ. In what follows then, a rethinking of the dignity of difference
seems pertinent.
3.4 Rethinking

the Dignity of Difference

Certain people especially among oppressed groups have been wary of any attempt
at reclaiming difference for fear that such will continue to re-inscribe the assimilationist
description of “otherness” by the so-called privileged group. Such fearis, indeed,
reasonable and well taken since the assimilationist construal of difference has continually
been used as a ploy to legitimate cultural imperialism as well as the oppression and
exclusion of those marked out as “different.” Nevertheless, it does not stop us from still
probing the question of difference which remains a social and historical given that we
cannot simply shy away from. In this section, I attempt to sketch a certain understanding
of difference that will help us reclaim the dignity of difference. But before we go further,
let us revisit how difference has been overtly and somewhat continues to be covertly
constructed.
As I suggested in Chapter 1, the kind of rationality espoused by the eighteenth236

century European Enlightenment up to the nineteenth- through the early twentiethcentury modernity with its purported claim to universality and neutrality inevitably led to
the exclusion and devaluation of some groups as savage and degenerate. Descartes had
bequeathed to modernity a philosophy founded on the canon of mathematical style
axiomata and scientificity. The intrinsic rationality of this modern science and
philosophy is that whatever cannot be clear and distinct under the gaze of the cogito as
the rational knowing subject is said to lack epistemic status. This Cartesian cogito, this
rational subject as knower, is projected “as a self-present origin standing outside of and
opposed to objects of knowledge―autonomous, neutral, abstract, and purified of
particularity,”183 as Iris Young writes. Thus, the Cartesian modern scientific and
philosophical heritage constructs a discourse of “modern subjectivity by fleeing from
material reality, from the body’s sensuous continuity with flowing, living things, to create
a purified abstract idea of formal reason, disembodied and transcendent.”184 According to
the Cartesian distinction between mind and body, it is only the mind that can be the
matrix of clear and distinct knowledge since it lacks extension and hence fallibility which
characterizes bodily senses and all material stuff. Distrustful of the fallibility of the
senses, it is only with the eye of the rational mind, for Descartes, that one can see clearly.
And “only what is seen clearly is real, and to see it clearly makes it real.”185 Hence, the
subjectivity of the rational subject alone becomes the privileged authority that decides
what is to be taken as truth and knowledge.
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Beginning with Descartes, therefore, reason assumed a new signification in
Western epistemological and scientific discourse different from what it used to be in
ancient philosophy. Reason no longer includes practical and praxic rationality; intuitive
and emotive faculties pale into oblivion. Rather, in modernity, reason has come to mean
exclusively calculative thinking, instrumental reason, or technical rationality. This
appears like the coming true of what Martin Heidegger’s fear once was when he said that:
“calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only
(emphasis original) way of thinking.”186 What I aim at here is not a rejection of the
positive aspects, insights, and achievements of the Enlightenment and modernity. Neither
is it an attempt to turn the clock back to pre-Enlightenment days. It is rather a critique
that aims at eliciting the inherent reductionism of modern reason and its implications for
the construction of difference.
Characteristic of the gaze of the cogito―the subject of modern calculative and
scientific reason―is its normalizing propensity. The rational knowing subject who claims
to be gazing from a transcendent, abstract, and neutral height, views every other reality
including other humans merely as objects outside of itself. So viewed, they are to be
measured, calibrated, and evaluated on the basis of the norm set by the subjectivity of the
knowing subject. In this way, everything is subjected to the arbitration of subjectivity. 187
Thus the calculative thinker decides on the basis of his own norm―which becomes
universalized―what is real and what is tenable.
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Having articulated the lineaments and attributes of the Cartesian modern
calculative rational subject, in what appears to be a crucial move, whiteness, masculinity,
and class closely came to be associated with reason purified from the fallibility of matter
and the senses as was espoused by later Western philosophers, anthropologists,
sociologists, medical scientists, theologians, and so forth. By the same token, blackness,
brownness, redness, femininity, and others, were identified with body, lacking in
rationality and intelligence. Rationality was conceived to issue forth from body type and
physiognomy. White European bodies and facial features became the norm, “the
perfection of human form, in relation to which other body types were either degenerate or
less developed.”188 Because black bodies, according to the normalizing gaze, for instance,
lacked rationality they were construed as ugly, deviant, degenerate, loathsome, violent,
etc. Moreover, viewed as naturalized bodies bereft of rationality, black bodies were
disproportionately eroticized, construed as having unbridled sexual licentiousness,
immoral, childlike in mental simplicity, physically frail and diseased, lacking in selfcontrol, and, indeed, abnormal.189 It is in this way, as Young puts it, that “the dominant
culture defines some groups as different, as the Other…. Dominant discourse defines
them in terms of bodily characteristics, and constructs those bodies as ugly, dirty, defiled,
impure, contaminated, or sick.”190 Clearly, we can see how nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century modern scientific and calculative rationality came to construct a
discourse that lapsed into a medicalization and epidermalization of difference. Difference
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came to be viewed simply from the standpoint of physiognomy, biology, as physical
appearance became indicative as to whether a person was a superior or inferior human
being. There is no doubt that group oppression based on groups marked out as different
has been and continues in some ways to be perpetrated in accordance with the
normalizing gaze we have been considering. It is also this consideration that largely
explains cultural imperialism; that is, how “culturally imperialist groups project their own
values, experience, and perspective as normative and universal.”191 When the dominant
cultures and privileged groups ascribe normality and universality to their perspectives,
they presume to lose and transcend their own particularity and situatedness. Because
members of the privileged group put themselves in the position of the modern scientific,
detached, and neutral rational subject, they came to view their humanity and rationality as
the authentic while others who are different were viewed as sub-human. There is no
question that this modern philosophic and scientific way of constructing the discourse of
difference “has come to have enormous influence and repercussions in modern Western
culture”192 with regard to how it relates with those construed as Other contingent upon its
normalizing gaze. The normalizing gaze of the purported detached rational subject which
thematizes, objectifies, and totalizes the Other has profound and enduring consequences
insofar as the infrastructure of its discourse continues to condition the ideology and
psychology that support privilege, power, and domination.
What is crucial to note is that in contemporary culture, albeit the dominant
discourse that structures privilege and oppression may have been outlawed in public
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policy, it has, nonetheless, assumed a subtler, more evasive, and delicate character. The
construction of the ugly bodies of those considered as Other may no longer be a matter of
conscious public discourse, it has, nevertheless, “gone underground, dwelling in everyday
habits and cultural meanings of which people are for the most part unaware.”193 Even
though people are now unaware in terms of discursive consciousness, yet such
construction continues to find expression in the unconscious fears fueled by bias (in
Lonergan’s sense of the term), the habits of avoidance, and aversions for the despised
groups as well as an apparently unconcerned attitude rooted in a routinized habitus
toward the unjust structures that cause their oppression.194 The sin of omission is a worse
kind of sin.
As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, many people especially among
the disadvantaged and oppressed groups fear to affirm that they are different from the
dominant groups since such admission would simply be buying into the rhetoric and
legitimation of exclusion of the Other. Put another way, they fear that any admission of
difference would amount to a reinscription of subordination and oppression. While such
fear and the danger are real, the fact of difference still remains a reality. It cannot simply
be wished away. What is rather needed is a way of accounting for difference that does not
lead to the exclusion and subjugation of the Other. Fundamentally, it is a truism that
every human being irrespective of color, race, sex, class, religion, and ability, belong to
the same taxonomy of common and full humanity with one human nature. Theologically,
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this one human nature, according to Christian confession and, indeed, biblical witness, is
anchored on the fact that all human beings are created in the imago Dei. No human being
is more human or less human than another. All human beings are rational and equal.
Equality here should not, however, be understood to mean sameness in the sense that
everybody has to be Caucasian, for instance, in order to be human. But then, the one issue
that is often glossed over is that as created beings, every human being exists within a
spatio-temporal milieu, and thus, within history. In the words of Heidegger, a human
being as a Dasein (being-there, situated or located being), who we are, and not
necessarily what (quidditas) we are, our experiences and perspectives, are shaped by our
distinct social milieu, memory, temporality, and historicity. Again, language is the home
of being. There is no such thing as universal language. One thing we cannot do, as
Jonathan Sacks rightly suggests, “is place ourselves outside the particularities of language
to arrive at a truth, a way of understanding and responding to the world that applies to
everyone at all times.”195 Language dwells in meaning. It is merely naïve and
reductionist to equate a person’s physiognomical and biological features with the nature
or essence of the person. Any such equation is tantamount to essentialism.
The trouble with warped discourse of difference is that on the basis of the
essentialist or deterministic logic of identity, a dominant group arrogates to itself “the
position of a norm, against which all others are measured.”196 By positioning itself as a
norm, the so-called dominant group fails to recognize the particularity, situatedness, and
contextualized status of its own perspectives which it tries to universalize. This has been
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one of the key Western assumptions that progress achieved through the workings of
technical rationality, would homogenize societies, neutralize differences (which would
come to be called “tribalism”), and create one monoculture, the culture of the West. In
this, what fails to be recognized is that there can be no such thing as the “unsituated self
divorced from constitutive attachments to family, friends, community and history.”197 In
other words, it is impossible to speak of any human being or social group who is contextfree. Young is right to suggest that, “contextualized understandings of difference
undermine essentialist assumptions.”198
By trying to morph all into sameness, the dominant category renders those who
are different invisible and hence easy objects of oppression and exclusion. But it is only
because subjugated groups are able to stand up and positively affirm their group
difference through, for example, protest and liberation movements, civil rights
movements, and so on, that oppression and exclusionary policies together with the
institutions that nurture them are counteracted. Essentializing the logic of identity also
neglects the fluid character of identity. It forgets that even one person as a member of a
particular group can inhabit multiple identities all at the same time. Indeed, both
individual and group differences always cut across every social group. And so it is not
about hard core dualistic and hierarchized opposition—white/ black, rationality/body,
male/female, universal/particular, and so forth. There are always gray and overlapping
domains when it comes to the question of identity and difference. Sacks captures this
complexity very succinctly: “We are particular and universal, the same and different,
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human beings as such, but also members of this family, that community, this history, that
heritage. Our particularity is our window unto universality (emphases original)”199 To
ignore the reality of difference from a positive perspective is to deny the reality of who
we are as persons. In a very fascinating fashion, Sacks writes: “Our very dignity as
persons is rooted in the fact that none of us—not even genetically identical twins—is
exactly like any other. Therefore, none of us is replaceable, substitutable, a mere instance
of a type. That is what makes us persons, not merely organisms or machines.”200 “If our
commonalities,” Sacks continues, “are all that ultimately matter, then our differences are
distractions to be overcome.”201
To be sure, however, our differences are neither distractions nor exclusive
oppositions to be overcome. An alternative to understanding difference simply in an
essentializing and stereotypical way is to construe it in terms of relationality. Reality is
not merely constituted by dualism in terms of dialectic of opposition. Rather, the really
real is constituted by relationality; it is a complex of interconnected relationships. As I
have made clear in the previous chapters, it has been part of the burden of this work to
demonstrate that relationality is the overarching characteristic of reality. When
understood from a relational perspective, the fecundity of difference enriches parties
engaged in an encounter in the spirit of openness and unbiasness. This idea of openness
in the encounter with the Other is crucial since there is something of a mystery in every
human being and every social group. No one social group enjoys a monopoly of truth and
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knowledge. There is rather plurality in reality. To disregard this fact amounts to human
hubris. Besides, it is also an attempt to keep nourishing the fear that renders impermeable
the frontier between sameness and Otherness in order to sustain and continually defend
privilege and domination. Perhaps this underlines Heidegger’s summons to all to
releasement and openness to the mystery.202 The term releasement derives from the
German word, “Gelassenheit” which connotes a certain sense of composure, calmness, or
unconcern. The word also has to do with the idea of letting the Other be, letting the world
go and giving oneself to God. Thus releasement, when understood within the context of
relationality, entails recognizing and respecting the otherness of the Other, letting the
Other be, and the opening of oneself to the Other in self-transcendence and reciprocity.
Indeed, releasement and the need for openness of oneself to the mystery that the Other is,
belong together. This is not to be delusional about the fear, risk, danger, and ambiguity
that come with the interpersonal encounter between the self and the Other. But in order to
be fully human with the Other, openness, embrace, and solidarity require the self to have
the courage to deal with those ambiguities that difference yields. A relational
understanding of difference is thus an other way of relativizing previously held universal
and purported neutral objective positions of dominant global designs which are but
particular, situated epistemologies and, therefore, for overcoming the exclusion and
exclusiveness. In this way, domination and alienation would be jettisoned in favor of
releasement.
Pneumatologically, as we argued in the foregoing section, the relational Spirit
poured out on all flesh at Pentecost empowers all the inspirited to embrace a
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transformation of imagination. Taking the challenge of relationality—embracing
equality-in-difference in openness and solidarity—seriously would require a rethinking of
attitudes toward those often excluded by us as Other. It would require revisiting and
retrieving memory that keeps informing, most times surreptitiously, our histories,
legacies, actions, aversions, and engaging it in truth telling in order to ascertain if and
how such memory and imaginary may have been freeing some people while hurting those
viewed as Other. Such memory and imagination need to be transformed in order to
become more life-affirming. The liberating Spirit who resists and overcomes all lifenegating structures ushers us into the pluriversality of the body of Christ for mutual
enrichment and for witnessing to the reign of God. In the community of the inspirited,
everyone, irrespective of social status, place of origin, language, sex, ability, culture, and
so on, is recognized, respected, and has a place in the community. In that community, the
Spirit empowers the powerless, makes the silenced native tongues of the margins to be
heard, and sets them free from their suffocating situations to develop their own capacities
and actualize their own destinies. It is this kind of Spirit enabled community that should
be a sign of the reign of God to the world. When we say that we have been indwelt and
inspirited by the outpouring of the Spirit, such a statement is fecundated with a profound
theological import that has significant implications for ecclesial and social praxes.
Through the outpouring of the Spirit, we become the body of Christ “and individually
members of it” (1 Cor 12:27). Through the agency of the indwelling Spirit, Christ raises a
body “for himself within humanity…through which the domain of Jesus’ body is
extended.”203 If in the double epiclesis at the Eucharist we invoke the Spirit to transform
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not only the bread from the earth but also us into the body of Christ, then the calibration
and evaluation of bodies that lead to “the domination and reduction of human bodies”204
become theologically problematic. As Shawn Copeland aptly puts it, such constitutes “an
insult to Eucharist.”205 Theologically, the inspirited human body becomes a site of divine
revelation. The human being fully alive because enlivened and vivified by the life-giving
Spirit becomes, in the language of St. Irenaeus, the glory of God. Again, in the words of
Jesus in Matthew 25:40, whatsoever you do to these little ones who are my brothers and
sisters, you do it to me. I am sure that it is because of words of Jesus like this one from
Matthew’s text that Marianne Sawicki wryly and pointedly comments: “Jesus turns up in
bodies other than his own.”206 Any refusal or exclusion of the Others because they are
regarded as different by any group renders the Eucharistic koinonia an empty ritual.
Emphasizing the importance of difference, Vladimir Lossky suggests that “the face of the
Spirit is the assembly (koinonia) of redeemed human faces in their infinite diversity.
Human persons grown to the fullness of their particular identities, but sharing in the
common divine gift of reconciled life…are the Spirit’s manifestation.”207 Christianity is
not innocent when it comes to the question of the denigration and desecration of bodies
since it once supported and clearly crafted theological justifications to legitimate the
enslavement of black and other bodies. This complicity of Christianity truly subverted the
204
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koinonia, the communion, and relationality through which the Spirit binds the members
of the ekklesia to the Trinity and to the body of believers, and indeed, to all of creation.
This instance and similar others illustrate a denial of the Eucharist. The liberating,
reconciling, renewing power, and grace of the Spirit challenge and also help all who are
used to oppressive proclivities to unlearn such, convert, transform their memory and
imagination, and begin to embrace praxes that are life-giving and life-affirming.
This challenge is no more clamant than in contemporary times when what used to
find expression in oppressive and exclusionary public conscious discourse has
metamorphosed into hidden but practical unconscious habits, feelings, behaviors, cultural
vocabularies, generalized media culture, and aversions for the degraded Other that simply
appear to be normal because taken for granted. In other words, such practices are not a
matter of the choices or actions of a few isolated individuals who are out to denigrate the
Other; they have simply become, for that matter, unconsciously institutionalized. More so
because such new guises subtlely evade the reach of law and public policy, it requires a
socio-historical and critical analysis and description like the kind we have been pursuing
in this section in order to get to the root of the matter. That such transmuted practical
discourse exercises significant influence with far-reaching effects on the denigrated Other
today cannot be overstressed. On the other hand, it is often the case that those who have
been oppressed and so devalued for such a long time tend to come to internalize and
introject their devaluation and unconsciously understand themselves through such
prism.208 Such imagination also needs transformation that will engender the revaluation
and revalorization of the dignity and agency of the denigrated bodies. It is such
208
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imaginations and collective negative social memories that need to be interpellated,
unmasked, named, and transformed so that difference will no longer be construed for
exclusionary but for mutual enriching purposes. Considering the need for proper
transformation and senatio in radice of the said imaginations, we shall, in the next
section, take a look at a broader understanding of the concept of sin and evil.
3.4.1 Broadening the Concept of Sin
Through the centuries, the dominant trend with regard to the understanding of sin
in Christian thought has focused on the individual as the sinner. This particular
understanding of sin is not unconnected with the idea of the traditional elements that
come into play in order for sin to occur. They include, among others, intention,
knowledge, and free choice. There is also little doubt that the Adamic account of sin (see
Gen 3:1ff) would have contributed immensely to the development of a juridical and
privatized notion of sin. Sin becomes a transgression or disobedience against God’s law
in relation to its concomitant punishment. Moreover, it is easier to ascertain at the
individual level the constituent elements that go into the making of sin in order to impute
culpability. Hence, sin has most frequently been conceived solely as a matter of evil and
morally questionable choices located within the will of an individual who, consequently,
stands guilty before the judgment of God. Going by this construal, the experience of evil
has most often been viewed as the punishment for sin. It is in this light that the whole
idea of the practice of penitence and penance—to heal the wounds and undo the
punishment due sin—which overly concentrates on the individual in much of Roman
Catholic tradition becomes understandable. It is not my intention here to undervalue, still
less deny the reality of the individual sinner as the locus of responsibility for sin and evil
249

since fundamentally it is the individual who, by and large, makes morally sinful choices.
For without such recognition, it becomes even more difficult to apprehend the possibility
of receiving grace, conversion, and acceptance of God’s mercy. Rather, it is my judgment
that the overemphasis and preoccupation with individualized understanding of sin
(though it preserves personal responsibility) eliminates from view other significant
aspects of sin especially the tragic dimensions of the horrendous injustice that the selfish
and unregulated greed and choices of certain groups cause to others on our planet. In
individualized view of sin, those sinned-against as victims and the massive evil caused to
them do not often enter the picture. More often than not, the very fact of victimhood is
not actually and truly acknowledged. It is not hard to understand the reason. Since the
perpetrators of massive evil do not suffer what their victims, the sinned-against, suffer,
they cannot imagine the anguish involved. Thus, only the victimized is qualified to speak
about what it feels like to be sinned-against. Truth here is rooted in practical reason and
in the verifiability of the historical praxic experience of suffering bodies in unjust
situations. It is this truth that reductionistic instrumental reason always tends to jettison as
irrational. Part of the call to conversion on the side of perpetrators, is thus to be open to
listen to the victims in order to learn the concrete truth of what it means to suffer.
Individualized or privatized notion of sin and evil is, therefore, to my mind,
narrow and perhaps has, for that matter, caused a neglect of the question of the impact of
massive evil, the undeserved suffering, anguish, and massive destitution brought upon the
sinned-against. It is true that everybody is a sinner, that is, no one is sinless. But that does
not negate the fact that everybody has not sinned equally and that some groups of people
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are simply innocent victims of evil “forces largely beyond their control.”209 The
distinction between perpetrators and victims is crystal clear. Sin basically as an offence
against God is an offence that at the same time is inseparable from an offence against
neighbor. However, certain sins are primarily against neighbor. The sin and evil of
insatiable and unregulated greed which drives the engine of market capitalism which of
necessity creates inequalities, for instance, results in sin against love of neighbor and not
primarily an issue “of personal or professional morality in direct relation to God.”210
Sin may be personal but it is never individualistic. It is also social and structural
or systemic. The social dimension of sin, according to Bernard Häring, entails some “sort
of solidarity in corruption.”211 In his 1984 Post-Synodal Exhortation Reconciliatio et
Paenitentia, Reconciliation and Penance (hereafter, RP), Pope John Paul II painstakingly
labors to explain the distinction between personal sin and social sin. While admitting the
reality of social sin, John Paul II suggests that ultimately, such cases of social sin are
nothing but simply “the result of accumulation and concentration of many personal
sins.”212 Put another way, social sin is merely an aggregate of many personal sins. For
him, then, social sin is nothing but:
a case of the very personal sins of those who cause or support evil or who
exploit it; of those who are in a position to avoid, eliminate or at least limit
certain social evils but who fail to do so out of laziness, fear or the conspiracy of silence, throughsecret complicity or indifference; of those who take re209
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fuge in the supposed impossibility of changing the world and also of those
who sidestep the effort and sacrifice required producing specious reasons of
higher order. The real responsibility, then, lies with individuals.213
Understandably, part of his reason for this position is to avoid the possibility of
attributing responsibility to an anonymous or generalized system or structure. Another
factor is because of his conviction that sin “is always a personal act, since it is an act of
freedom on the part of an individual person and not properly of a group or
community.”214 Even though John Paul II concurs that both external and internal
conditioning factors and influences “may attenuate, to a greater or lesser degree, the
person’s freedom and therefore, responsibility and guilt,”215 he, nonetheless, insists that
the individual remains free. He fears that any disregard of this fact in order to blame
external factors like structures, systems, communities, for individuals’ sins, detracts from
the freedom and hence the dignity of the person. To crown it all, he argues that an
institution, a structure, or a society cannot be the subject of moral acts. Consequently, an
institution, a structure, or a situation cannot in itself be good or bad. That is to say they
are morally neutral. While John Paul II’s fears are genuine and his position well taken,
there still remains something troubling about such position. To ascribe neutrality to
certain institutions for fear of diminishing personal freedom and responsibility is to gloss
over the evil inherent in such institutions by their very nature. Let us take, for an
example, the institution of slavery with its structures which caused unprecedented
suffering including the uprooting and dislocation of African slaves in Europe and the
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Americas. Such an institution and other social structures like colonialism (and neocolonialism by their very nature cannot be said to be neutral, neither morally good nor
evil. Without any circumlocution, I dare to say that such institutions by their very nature
were and remain a crime against humanity wherever and whenever they existed or still
exist. Dehumanizing by their very nature, they are essentially evil. Such institutions
qualify as structural evil as they were even legitimated by law and given theological,
religious, and ecclesiastical sanction as well as philosophical justification.216 They were
not merely the result of the accumulation or aggregate of many personal sins but an
institutionalized violence that incarnated as normalization at the time. Any disregard of
the massive evil caused by such horrendous institutions to their innocent victims
jeopardizes the prophetic task of unambiguously calling evil by its real name and for
what it is and more so, of naming who is creating it. In this case, it is about denouncing,
for example, the institution of black enslavement as evil and unmasking the perpetrators
as Europeans and Americans because all Europeans and Americans whether personally
guilty or not benefitted from the said evil institution. The same logic applies to global
neoliberal imperialistic capitalism. All in the global North who benefit from it whether
knowingly or unknowingly, directly or remotely, including the churches, are implicated
in the massive poverty that is unleashed on the two-thirds world, especially, Africa. The
216
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relational, liberative, and resistant Spirit challenges both society and church of the North
to listen to and learn from beyond its borders.
John Paul II seems to understand this fact. For, somehow, he veers toward this
direction without actually going there. I said this because in underscoring the unfailing
holiness of the church, John Paul II recognizes that for the church to be an authentic
witness and agent of reconciliation, it has to be mindful of its own failings and the
constant need of purification, penance, and renewal.217 As he clearly puts it: “for, by
reason of her sins, sometimes "the radiance of the church's face shines less brightly" in
the eyes of those who behold her.”218What is meant by this statement: “by reason of her
(the church’s) sins?” Does this refer to the personal sins of the church’s individual
members? Or is it about the corporate sins of the church as a corporate entity? Or is it
about both? While this statement might be riddled with confusion and unclarity, it is not
difficult,at any rate, to know where John Paul II stands on this. With regard to social sin
in relation to the church, his position would definitely be that the sins of the church are
nothing but the aggregate of the personal sins of its individual members. For he strongly
avers: “Whenever the church speaks … or… condemns as social sins certain situations or
the collective behavior of certain social groups, big or small…she knows and she
proclaims that such cases of social sin are the result of the… concentration of many
personal sins.”219 John Paul II also grants that “social sin can be committed either by the
217
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individual against the community or by the community against the individual.”220What is
unclear in all this is how a social group as an entity may engage or participate in massive
evil and sin. The sins of the church may, therefore, not simply be limited to the personal
sins of its individual members or, for that matter, to the concentration or accumulation of
the personal sins of members but also to the work and whole life of the church as an
institution including the decisions and actions endorsed by the official church and carried
out in its name.
By the way, it had to take over half a millennium, precisely in 1992, during his
papal visit to Senegal (to one of the ports from where slaves were shipped out of Africa)
for John Paul II to confess on behalf of the church and to ask Africans, to forgive the
church for its collusion and participation in the enslavement of Africans. The church is
not merely a collection of individuals who compose it. It is also an organization, a body
with a life of its own which is not merely an agglomeration of atomized disparate
individuals. It is an organism, a body in which members exist through a spiritual and
mystical relatedness and bonding such that it is described as a koinonia or communion.
Because it exists as a body through relatedness, whatever happens to one part has an
impact on the rest. Thus, it is as an organic entity that the church can participate in sin
through its practices, policies, and even translations (which might be ideological and so
sometimes create situations of injustice, exclusion, oppression, and suppression through
the wielding of the coloniality of power).221 In December 1999, the International
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Theological Commission issued the document, Memory and Reconciliation: The Church
and the Faults of the Past (hereafter, MR). MR aimed at providing a theological
foundation for the “purification of memory” as one of the signs that may help people to
live the exceptional grace of the celebration of the Jubilee Year 2000 with regard to
resentments stemming from the legacy of past faults of the church.222 What is worth
noting, however, is how the central focus and tenor of this document lean heavily toward
reconciliation with God and hence the glorification of God. No doubt, the document
makes reference to reconciliation with other humans (referring to Matt 5:23-24 where
Jesus asked the offender to go first and be reconciled with his brother before bringing his
offering to the altar), particularly those victimized by past injustices.223 Yet the treatment
of such reconciliation in MR is consistently underemphasized and subordinated as a byproduct of reconciliation with God. To be sure, only God can absolutely forgive.
However, numerous biblical passages press home the point that reconciliation with God
is achieved by seeking reconciliation with one’s fellow humans first. The prophet Isaiah,
for instance, clearly insists that the worship pleasing to God is predicated upon the
outreach to victims of socio-political, cultural and religious injustices (see Isa 58:1-12).
Similarly, according to John, whoever claims to love God but hates his brother or sister is
a liar, “since no one can love God whom he cannot see if he does not love his neighbor
whom he can see” (1 Jn 4:20). Therefore, reconciliation with fellow human beings whom
we have hurt and victimized is a necessary condition for reconciliation with God.

222

International Theological Commission, Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of
the Past (December 1999), “Introduction.”
223

Ibid., § 2.2.

256

A common link between MR and RP is its emphasis on social sin as always “the
result of the accumulation and concentration of many personal sins.”224 MR goes on to
say that “Sin is therefore always personal, even though it wounds the entire Church,
which, represented by the priest as minister of Penance, is the sacramental mediatrix of
the grace which reconciles with God.”225 Again, while maintaining that one can only
speak of social sin by way of analogy, MR deduces that “It emerges from this that the
imputability of a fault cannot properly be extended beyond the group of persons who had
consented to it voluntarily, by means of acts or omissions, or through negligence.”226 The
fundamentum of this position is still the idea of personal sin which entails knowing and
willing consent. But this position remains really disturbing. What if those group of
persons who had consented voluntarily did so not in their own names but in the name of
an institution (sociologically understood, like the church), is it not the church that bears
the blame? Moreover, the argument that the imputability of a fault cannot be extended
beyond the group of persons who consented to it does not really seem to hold water since
the church as an institution outlives individuals and groups of persons who act on its
behalf. Individuals and groups come and go but the church remains and whatever wrongs
committed in its name remains associated with the church. The church is to be held
accountable for those wrongs committed in its name whether or not the group of persons
who consented to them are still around or not. By this, I do not mean personal sins of
individual members of the church of which they go to con-fess to the priest. I am talking
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about wrongs or evils officially sanctioned and legitimated by the church and backed up
with official theology. Is this just the accumulation of the sins of individuals? For such
wrongs against whoever may be the victims, the church as an institution takes
responsibility and imputability regardless of whether or not the specific actors in the
name of the church are still there. As if this is not yet enough, the document intriguingly
states that, “only when there is moral certainty that what was done in contradiction to the
Gospel in the name of the Church by certain of her sons and daughters could have been
understood by them as such and avoided, can it have significance for the church of today
to make amends for faults of the past (emphasis mine).”227 But it is arguable that the
church of today does not emerge from the vacuum. Its contours are shaped and informed
by the traditions and legacies of the church of past generations which it has inherited
including the good and the ugly, and of whose story it has be-come a part (by way of
common memory). The church of the present continues the legacy of the coloniality of
power of the church of the past. There may be no purification of memory without
acceptance of responsibility. If memory is the faculty that brings the past into the present,
then we accept that that past is a part and parcel of our story whether the actors in the past
are still around or not. In a certain sense, the church of the past is still the same church of
the present. There is continuity. If the church of the present does not accept that memory,
then what are we purifying? We can be held responsible without necessarily being
culpable. As a matter of fact, the real problem we have to deal with in our world today is,
perhaps, not so much about what has been done by people who knew they were doing
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wrong as about what has been done by people who were convinced they were right.228
The worst crimes, massive evils, and egregious injustices committed against humanity
have all probably been executed by people who were convinced they were doing the right
thing. Nazism, colonialism, slavery, the Spanish Inquisition, and the burning of heretics
at the stakes are a few examples. Sadly enough, in all this talk about personal sin and
imputability, the innocent victims of the effects of other’s sins are left out of the equation
that seems to be more interested in ascertaining moral certainty. Sin is not just sin; it
attacks and ruptures relationships. It undermines the relationality that characterizes
reality. It is of utmost importance to acknowledge the experience of the victims, affirm
the harm done to them irrespective of whether the specific actors in the name of the
church are still extant or not, and then look into the structures and attitudes that supported
and perhaps continue to perpetuate the harm and change them, and make amends to
restore the sense of dignity and equality of the victims.229 Real healing is inseparable
from justice. The call for the healing or purification of memory and reconciliation cannot
be a calling of victimized peoples, groups, persons, religions, nations, and so on, simply
“to conform to the pattern of the…dominant group doing the calling [and defining what
that purification means]. There is no way to heal from violence…brokenness,
[exploitation] if the injustice that caused the…[harm] is not also addressed.”230 There is
need to go to the root of the matter without cosmetizing and rationalizing over moral
228
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certainty when in the meantime, those mistreated are still carrying the burden and wound
of the wrongs done to them.
Another point that is often eliminated from view when sin is limited to
individualized sins is what I have already hinted at above. It is about the normalization
and powerful sedimentation of ways, attitudes, behaviors, cultural vocabularies and
idioms which not too infrequently prove influential in the formulation of policies which
ultimately end up denigrating and insidiously making victims of some social groups
regarded as “Other.” Such practices, as noted in the preceding section, are not simply a
matter of the choices or actions of disparate individuals. Neither are they about the
concentration or accumulation of disparate personal choices or actions. These have
simply become institutionalized and normalized ways of causing violence and oppression
to others. Such social structures, even as they grant the enjoyment of unprecedented
privilege and power to those who live within them, they have become “so subtle and
complex, so intertwined with commonly held assumptions about human nature and the
good life, as to be nearly invisible”231 to those who participate in them. That explains
why, among other things, it is crucial that structural evil requires cultural healing; a
healing of the collective imagination and social memory bank, and calls for corporate acts
of metanoia, not only of individuals but also of social groups whose ways of living
(inordinate consumerism, for instance), policies, ideologies (be they economic, political,
or religious) make victims of others through oppression, suppression, domination,
deprivation, financial slavery, or even death. All, albeit, are sinners, but all do not sin
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equally. Those who have privilege and advantage thrust upon them by the unjust socioeconomic systems and the coloniality of power in which they are embedded; and who
enjoy the fruits of global neoliberal market capitalism, for instance, which at the same
time brings untold suffering and destitution to the vast majority of the globe; are on all
counts greater sinners than those who only suffer the experience of its horrendous
injustice. This kind of sin is not directly against God but the neighbor. What needs to be
stressed is that God’s solicitude is not merely directed toward the one who sinned directly
against God but more so to innocent victims, the poor, the oppressed, because they suffer
the evil of the sins of perpetrators and oppressors. Genuine conversion, metanoia, and
purification of memory, therefore, requires that we pay an intense and profound attention
to the effects of our sins on those sinned-against in order to change our ways. The
irrepressible and resistant Spirit confronts all unrighteous power relations and challenges
all in power—civil or ecclesiastical—to self-criticism and to learn from the victims. As
the Johannine Epistle makes clear, anyone who claims to know and love God but is
lacking in neighborly love is a liar (see 1 Jn 2:4; 3:15; 4:20; cf. Jn 8:54; Jas 1:27); for
such people suppress the truth and only cling to the image of God of their own
fabrication, which is idolatrous. Indeed, the witness of Scriptural evidence abundantly
attests to the fact that it is neighborly love that proves our love for God.
What strikingly emerges from the foregoing is that it is pertinent to unmask,
assess, and name evil in its personal, social, and structural dimensions in order to engage
it. It is an effort to put into relief the difference between oppressors and the oppressed.
This task involves what Gayatri Spivak calls “strategic essentialization.”232 As an
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approach, strategic essentialization allows one to name evil in a definitive way especially
within specific social and political contexts in order to strategically mobilize the agency
of the oppressed and those cut of from power equation to engage and resist such specific
tyranny. One of the goals of strategic essentialization is to stress the need of recognizing
that some people are actually and truly oppressed and hence are innocent victims. This
recognition should lead to a move to end the cycle of violence and victimhood which
have more often than not been eliminated from perspective in individualized or privatized
view of sin and evil. Such recognition will, no doubt, help victims—who most often
introject and place the blame for their victimization on themselves—in their healing
process. Be-sides, such acknowledgment would cushion victims and enable them to
overcome the dangerous temptation to revenge and/or replicating the sin and evil that has
been visited upon them.
This task also calls for the healing and transformation of memories and
imagination (I shall deal with this issue later). Since social structures are always mediated
through private lives, social change will always go hand in hand with personal metanoia.
As a matter of fact, structural transformation is an index and verification of authentic,
profound, and abiding personal conversion. The fact that institutions and ideologies that
perpetrate massive evil are human creations, the argument of inevitability is neither
sustainable nor defensible. They can always be transformed. Things can change and an
alternative world is always possible. Genuine and deep conversion, therefore, calls for
human solidarity, solicitude, and responsibility for the neighbor. The neighbor is not
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necessarily the one who is like us as the parable of the Good Samaritan reveals. No
doubt, through the Creator, life-giving, and relational Spirit, God has made every person
in His image. The life of every human being indwelt by the living Spirit of God is equally
important to God especially the plight of the defenseless poor and oppressed. Yet, in that
same image, each of us is different. The challenge to our social and religious imagination
then is how “to see God’s image in one who is not in our image”233 and still love him or
her. It certainly calls for openness to the Spirit who effects a change of heart (see Jer
31:31). Nowhere is this challenge more evident in human intersubjectivity than in the
question of hospitality to the stranger, the one who is different, not quite like us. In the
next chapter, I shall deal with the framework of hospitality as a model for negotiating the
boundaries of difference and of living out in concrete terms the communion and
relationality inspired and made possible by the life-giving, liberative, andrelational Spirit.
3.5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated in this chapter that the Lord and the Giver of life is truly
the relational Spirit. This fact has been illustrated with evidence from biblical, Patristic,
conciliar, magisterial, and other contemporary theological resources. The lordship of the
life-giving relational Spirit is comprehensible within the matrix of creation and liberation
leitmotif. Thus, the Spirit not only gives life and provides for its flourishing, but also
interpellates all life-negating forces by being on the side and in solidarity of the
marginalized, oppressed, and exploited. In a world of differences, the relational Spirit
challenges all perpetrators of massive evil who make victims of others to self-criticism
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and conversion to the love of neighbor which is inseparable from the love of God. It is
the life-giving and liberative Spirit who makes communion and relationality necessary
for building an alternative world possible.
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Chapter 4
The Relational Spirit and Hospitality/Friendship:
Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference
4.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter we articulated the need for acknowledging the dignity of
difference (which itself is a gift of the relational and Creator Spirit). What remains to be
worked out is a framework that would allow us to negotiate differences in a way that is at
the same time transformative and enriching. This chapter investigates the model of
hospitality/friendship as a suitable framework for negotiating the boundaries of difference
in a mutually enriching way; and as a way of living out the imperative of the Spirit who
enables the overflow of God’s abundant hospitality to the world.
I will first and foremost clarify the meaning of the term hospitality, the reason for
its choice as a preferable model, and the key elements that constitute it. The next section
will focus on the deformations of hospitality and friendship. Here, I shall expose certain
notions that appear as hospitality but in actual fact, are not. We shall do this particularly
in conversation with Aristotle. In what follows, the question of hospitality will be
investigated in conversation with two key postmodern philosophers, Emmanuel Levinas
and particularly Jacque Derrida’s take on the impossibility of hospitality. We shall then
use the insights of decolonial thinking especially, of Walter Mignolo, to problematize the
Eurocentric bent of deconstructionism. This leads us to an examination of the ritual of
welcome among the Etche as one instance of the enactment of hospitality in a historically
concrete situation that allows for the emergence of the voice of the excluded outsider.
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Furthermore, this takes us to the treatment of hospitality as a liberative imperative of the
Spirit. As the one anointed by the Spirit, Jesus embodies and enacts the liberative
hospitality of God by bringing release to the oppressed and suppressed. The climax of his
hospitality is in the complete gift of himself in the Eucharist which, in turn, becomes a
gift and a task for the church. Finally, our awareness of the eschatological tension in
which we abide helps us to understand that unlimited hospitality especially as
accomplished in the Eucharist, remains an eschatological ideal and a lure toward which
Christians strive proleptically in hope of its fulfillment while working now for justice and
peace in the power of the Spirit. The model of hospitality, we will conclude, remains a
preferable framework for articulating an African theology that will usher in the social
transformation of Africa in an age of globalization.
4.2 Hospitality/Friendship:

Preliminary Clarifications

Taken in a broad sense, the word hospitality expresses a set of relationships and
encounters between hosts and guests. The guest could be known, invited, and
expected/unexpected or a totally uninvited and unexpected stranger who simply arrives.
My interest here lies in understanding hospitality as a religious concern for the stranger.
From the outset, hospitality to the stranger should be understood as a model for
negotiating the complexities, ambiguities, and the sometimes difficult eddies surrounding
difference and identity as well as one way (not the only way) to respond to the challenges
posed by difference. As amply demonstrated in the preceding chapters contemporary
understandings of relationality underscore that identity is discovered in difference. In
keeping with such understandings, it becomes clear that as human beings, we are able to
delineate our identity by our ability “to distinguish what is other to ourselves, what is
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irreducible to our own needs and wishes.”1 On this note, Edward Farley is right when he
writes, “If we cannot get outside the circle of our [own] autonomous [narcissistic]
interests and desires, we will experience only reflections of ourselves.”2 This is very
important considering that our local context (Nigeria) is a space that is inhabited by
multiple religious and ethnic identities, as well as other configurations that call for what
decolonial thought describes as border thinking and pluriversal existing (I will explain
this later).
Let me now talk a little bit about who a stranger is in order to focus our discussion
of hospitality and friendship. A stranger is someone considered not an insider but an
outsider defined by his/her difference which, in any case, does not make the person less
equal. A stranger is that person who is not like us and so viewed as not one of us. S/he is
regarded as a foreigner, an alien. Precisely as an alien, a stranger is that person who does
not share the cultural patterns, traditions, narratives, religion, and history of an unfamiliar
world that is being approached or encountered. The unfamiliar space approached is one
where the stranger is without a home. Found in the uncanny and the unhomely with no
supporting networks,3 the stranger is one who approaches an unfamiliar turf where s/he
may or may not be welcomed.
Ordinarily, the world of home can be said to be the space where the host inhabits
a settled existence. The import of hospitality to the stranger may not be clearly
1
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understood without an appreciation of the significance of home. Lucien Richard
fascinatingly employs a cluster of qualifications or markers to elucidate this significance.
According to him, “Home is a safe place; it is an affective place. It is a community in
which communion should exist; it is habitable.”4 The home, Richard goes on,
“describes…the place where I belong, where I have rights and obligations. …Less simply
a space than a place of intensity, of emotional energy, ‘home is where the heart is.’”5
Furthermore, “to be ‘at home’ implies familiarity, mutuality, respect, security. It means
that communication with one another and understanding of the other can follow
established patterns. In the home reality is predictable; the ‘other’ is not an abstraction.”6
Just as the notion of the stranger implies the idea of an outsider/insider, so also the notion
of home is laden with the idea of an inside and an outside. This understanding of home
brings to the fore the category of boundary which makes possible the distinction between
inside and outside. As Richard suggests, “Within our boundaries there can be domestic
peace; outside, life can be dangerous and hostile. At the same time that the inside offers
comfort, it also offers a chance to communicate with ‘neighbors’ and their living spaces.
Boundaries of human living need not be exclusive.”7 An ideal home which necessarily
incorporates the idea of a house is one which not only has windows through which its
inhabitants can only look outside but also a door (or doors) through which they can go
out and let others come in as well.

4

Richard, Living the Hospitality of God, 7.

5

Ibid.,7, 8.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid., 8-9.

268

Richard’s description of the notion of home as more or less a stable entity, a safe
and affective place within whose boundaries domestic peace is guaranteed but beyond
which there can be insecurity, precariousness, conflict, and hostility, is well taken.
Understandably, Richard seeks to affirm and accentuate the positive and humane aspects
of the notion of home inside of which is “the space of a pure domesticity, if there is such
a thing.”8 Albeit, he grants that boundaries need not be exclusive, his description,
however, eliminates from view the sometimes internal dynamics of ambivalence,
ambiguity, and conflict which take place even within the interior borders of the home
itself. It is here that postcolonial theoretical approach becomes germane. To state the
matter differently, the home space is not merely a stable and ordered space of pure
domesticity and solidity, a space where reality is always predictable, and a place where
interface with others always follows established patterns and orderliness with emotional
and communal securities guaranteed. That the home space is characterized by such
ambivalence finds expression in Michael Nausner’s recognition of the fact that “it was in
the familiar surroundings of his home town Nazareth that Jesus met his first real death
threat (Luke 4:21-30).”9 For the purity of the home traditions and assumptions, even
insiders who dare to be different may sometimes be oppressed and treated like outsiders.
With regard to friendship, while it is part of human nature to engage in friendship,
it is not always the case that people are friendly. To forge the bond of friendship takes
time and testing through various circumstances. Friendship entails a “willingness to place
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our life and needs in the hands of another.”10 This means that the process of getting to
know someone in prospect of opening authentic friendship requires vigilant efforts
(translating, interpreting and reinterpreting each other’s actions and attitudes over a
period of time) in order for mutual trust to come about. Friends never enter into a
relationship from a presuppositionless position. Friendship does not dissolve the
individual differences of those in a relationship. Rather, when authentic friendship has
been established, friends learn to transcend their individual selves to seek what
transcends them in the relationship: the truth that none possesses in its fullness. Hence,
authentic friends are not afraid to engage their distinct histories and experiences through
conversation in order to enrich themselves with the truth which is personal and without
one party imposing on the other, his or her own epistemic stance as some neutral,
abstract, universal, and unlocalized phenomenon. This also implies the possibility of
disagreement on issues without stopping them from being friends. Where authentic
friendship with openness to mutual trust exists, the parties involved would realize that
there is something deeper in relationship (which is not self-serving) that goes beyond
their individual desires; something that calls for self-dissipation for one’s friend. Such a
realization would be helpful to friends in devising a paradigm or mechanism for
sustaining a relationship even when they disagree. By extrapolation, this means that we
can also be friends to those who do not agree with us and who may not necessarily be our
friends. We can live together, coexist and inhabit the same space even if we do not agree.
Friendship, undoubtedly, has its own temptations. Friends, for instance, might
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become too familiar with each other that it becomes “increasingly difficult to speak the
truth, as and when we see it, to someone with whom our life is intertwined…. Yet the
demand to do so…never ceases. We can never claim to ‘have the truth,’ to fully know
another, since our articulations of what we think to be the case are always up for revision
(emphasis mine).”11 Truth is not merely an assertion with a claim to universal rational
validity imposed by one party on another. Alasdair MacIntyre has rightly reminded us
that no one thinks and operates outside a certain given tradition or perspective. Therefore,
“those who pretend to operate outside any tradition by claiming the ground of rational
discourse are themselves guided by the tradition called ‘liberalism.’”12 Indeed, it is
legitimate to say that every thinking and every inquiry is always grounded and proceeds
from some implicit and underground perspective held by the one doing the thinking or
quest. Authentic friendship requires that each party be honest and be him/herself. Where
honesty exists, even when out of human frailty a friction occurs in the relationship,
friends with understanding would be able to seek avenues for reconciliation.
In friendship, genuine friends do not enter into a relationship from a position of
self-sufficiency. Seneca, for instance, espoused the position that self-sufficiency is the
condition of possibility for friendship.13 His view was formulated as a critique against the
perspective that sees friendship as rooted in the need to compliment a lack in one’s life.
Thus, for him, friendship is only possible between two people who have already attained
11
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the abundance of virtues and are self-sufficient. In this way, they do not have any lack to
fill out by each other; they are invulnerable and unaffected in the relationship since
friendship simply becomes a leisure affair. Friendship so conceived does not allow for
any mutual enrichment; there is no expectancy since each of the parties does not stand to
learn anything from one another because each is already self-sufficient. That this type of
mindscape (self-sufficiency) continues to guide the Catholic church’s relation to other
religions today even with all the hullabaloo about interreligious dialogue is obvious, as
we shall see in the next chapter.
The fact that we can still be friends even to those who disagree with us or are
unlike us links friendship to hospitality which is extended to those outside the inside of
the borders of the home turf. This brings us to a subtle and tenuous distinction between a
frontier and a border. Hispanic theologian, Roberto Goizueta, has beautifully silhouetted
the contours of “the Frontier myth” which is rooted in the desire to “construct” an
“other.” Tracing the myth back to its British colonial antecedence, Goizueta locates its
most explicit articulation in American history as synthesized by the American historian,
Frederick Jackson Turner in what today is known as the frontier thesis:
American social development has been continually beginning over again on
the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion…with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of
primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character. In this
advance, the frontier is the outer edge of the wave – the meeting point between savagery and civilization….14
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Clearly, a crucial characteristic of the frontier is to extend, to expand, to dominate, to
seek new opportunities, to conquer, especially the purported region of savagery that lies
outside the frontier. The frontier today intrumentalizes neoliberal capitalist economic and
market forces (globalization), as well as political and not infrequently, military might to
achieve its goal. The frontier characteristically constantly moves outward and strongly
resists every movement from without into it viewed as tantamount to uncivilization.
Construed as the meeting point between savagery and civilization, Goizueta rightly
interprets the frontier as “an idol, and that, like all idols, it generates victims”15 always to
justify its own innocence much in tune with René Girard’s mimetic and scapegoat
theory.16 By generating victims and passing the bulk as a way to maintain its own willful
innocence, the frontier then does not have to bother to deal with the egregious evils and
injustices that are embedded at the core of its own social order and power. The interior
frontier of modernity with its myth of progress and expansion of civilizing mission
couched in hubristic logocentric global designs; its claims to offer to the so-called
savages on its exterior boundaries the ideal of history, rationality, and of being human,
amounted to the dislocation of the subalterns. Colonialism is often justified as something
nobler rather than pure exploitation, oppression, repression, subjugation, and the
silencing of the epistemological potential of the “outside.” What emerges from this is that
colonial discourse and modernity’s instrumental rationality (which, by the way, is only a
local rationality/epistemology) became universalized as the norm from which to gauge
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other rationalities or irrationalities. But to be sure, what truly lies hidden beneath the
surface of this so-called myth of progress of modernity is the irrational myth of violence
and barbarism of the hegemony of Western episteme. This type of discourse serves power
as it is used to support the hegemonic reach of modern rationality, knowledge, and
epistemology which at the same time suppresses or silences every other epistemic
perspective at the margins. But if God who is transcendent also in his freedom
gratuitously and radically reveals himself in the most unexpected of places, in Jesus from
Nazareth, that place where nothing good comes from, then frontier by its very nature is
preclusive of the possibility of a divine irruption, a revelation that impinges upon it from
the “other side.” As Jesus declares in Matt 25: 34-40, the hungry, the stranger, the poor,
the weak and vulnerable, indeed, the one from the “other side” constitutes the privileged
locus of revelation. In this sense, it is clear that hospitality and friendship to the stranger,
the vulnerable, and indeed to the subaltern, thus take on a cardinal theological
significance.
In keeping with the above understanding, a frontier differs from a border.
Accordingly, “A border is the place at which two realities, two worldviews, two
cultures…[or plurality of cultures/worldviews], meet and interact…. At the border
growth takes place by encounter, by mutual enrichment. A true border, a true place of
encounter, is by nature permeable.”17The border, like the threshold of a home, is not
inside, it is the “in-between,” the limit space between inside and outside. Precisely as the
“in-between,” it is the space of transition, the space where hospitality is extended to the
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stranger who arrives. It is always from the border as from the threshold that doors are
opened and arms are opened or extended to embrace and welcome. As the “in-between”
and the place of transition, the border becomes, in the language of Walter Mignolo, the
space of the “colonial difference” from where emerges “border thinking” which aims to
unsubjugate and foreground silenced subaltern perspectives through intellectual
decolonization.18 I will elaborate more on this and its significance for border inhabitation
in a later section. A border becomes a frontier when it becomes impregnable or
exclusionary and implacably harsh with only a totalizing agenda. What is needed is not a
frontier that moves outward only in order to dominate, conquer, totalize, and subjugate
the potential epistemic status of the “outside” because it lacks openness of being toward
mutual relationship with others. Rather than a frontier that grows only by mere expansion
outward, what is needed is a border, a meeting point where growth and/or enrichment is
predicated upon genuine cross-epistemological interaction respectful of equality-indifference. The boundaries of the home turf should be characterized as a border, a
threshold where authentic hospitality is at the service of difference rather than a frontier
which excludes and silences.
Before we proceed, there is need to attend to a further clarification on the reason
for our choice of the model of hospitality/friendship rather than covenant in our effort at
developing an African theology that is contemporarily relevant for the social
transformation of Africa. Such clarification has become necessary in view of certain
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objections raised especially by Nigerian philosopher-theologian, Francis Njoku, against
the use of hospitality model for grounding a relevant African Theology.
4.2.1 Hospitality Versus Covenant
In his essay, “Missiology Today: The African Situation,” Elochukwu Uzukwu had
argued for the endurance of African hospitality in defiance of all cultural fragmentation
emanating from colonial infiltration, technology, and modernity. Building on this
observation, Uzukwu submits that hospitality, to the extent that it has abided, “it could be
described as a way of being an African”19 and as the minimum a person expects from
family and community. For Uzukwu, the hospitable attitude of Africans toward the
stranger proves a fertile ground for preaching and receiving the Gospel. It is against this
backdrop that he proposes hospitality as a model of inculturation. What must be carefully
noted in this observation is that Uzukwu avoids essentialism by stating in no uncertain
terms that hospitality is “a” way (not simply the way) of being African. This assertion
should be understood to mean that hospitality constitutes an important aspect of African
inhabitation; albeit, a unique characteristic of Africans, it is not exclusive to Africans as it
is also uniquely shared by the rest of the world in their own unique ways. The reality of
African hospitality should not, however, be dismissed or even trivialized on the grounds
that it is after all a commonplace among peoples of all cultures as Njoku seems to
suggest.20 This commonality of hospitality should not eliminate from view the distinct
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symbolic universes that ground, shape, and inform its practice in different regions and
traditions. To be sure, as Njoku further notes, “there are records of brutality or hostility
emitted to people outside of one’s clan…. The present state of affairs in the [African]
continent could be all but hospitable to its citizens or strangers!”21 Yet it is arguable at the
same time that hostility is not peculiar to Africans and to the African continent. Just like
hospitality, inhospitality is also widespread across different regions of the world. You
only need to read the newspapers or listen to daily news to confirm this fact. Njoku
further opines that viewed through a critical lens, the so-called African hospitality may
well be merely “a personal feeling of some good hearted individuals who are found in the
various degrees in every culture amid the general attitude of suspicion shown towards
strangers. So it (hospitality) may not be presented as a specifically or solely African
cultural attitude or value.”22
Njoku tends to ignore the fact that hospitality could be well practiced both on the
individual and communal levels. In the case of the latter especially, certain distinct
cultural and symbolic rituals guide its practice. Such distinct cultural symbols associated
with the practice of hospitality must not be treated with levity. This is because every
region is a historico-cultural and linguistic entity; and when a symbol is taken outside its
original contextual universe and social location, its signification is either obscured and
hence rendered unintelligible or completely obliterated. The seriousness of this matter in
our time of increased linguistic, historico-cultural, and pluriversal consciousness can
scarcely be overemphasized. This recognition must be taken seriously in order to avoid a
21
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naïve simplification and/or conflation of the practices of hospitality in different regions
by collapsing them under one common denominator. A people’s contextual approach to
hospitality with its undergirding symbols must be respected insofar as such symbols
function not to dominate or prejudicially exclude but to welcome the stranger who
arrives. Reality is never unmediated; nor unsituated. Indeed, nothing is unmediated. By
the same token, hospitality as an aspect of reality, its commonplacenessnotwithstanding,
is never unmediated since it needs a particular historical place/space in order to be carried
out. It is, therefore, needful to humbly and sincerely recognize the fact that all actual
expressions of the enactment of hospitality are historically and culturally contingent and
variable. Thus, the presence of hostility does not necessarily present a sufficient reason
for reducing hospitality to the merely personal feeling at best or for peremptorily
dismissing its reality at worst. After all, even individuals can also be hostile rather than
hospitable to others. And quite unlike hospitality which has conventional rituals to shape
its practice of welcoming the other, hostility does not have such recognized rituals. Thus
while hospitality can be seen as a way of “being,” hostility is not, even though it might
irrupt intermittently due, partly, to the “structural situation of the created order—its
materiality and temporality—“23which implies that sometimes, there could be weaknesses
and pitfalls in our relation to the other and in our ability to extend hospitality. Whereas as
beings created in the image of God, as I have earlier on established in the previous
chapters, we not only have the capacity for love, compassion, and empathy
(misericordia) in our relationships with others but do actually practice and live these
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virtues as well. Yet as creatures inhabiting the postlapserian dispensation, albeit,
redeemed, we are still prone to finitude and fallibility.
Another area where Njoku takes issue with Uzukwu is in the latter’s observation
that although, the presence of a guest ordinarily portends a good omen but he/she could,
depending on the circumstance, equally constitute “both threat and luck.”24 By this
Uzukwu could be understood to mean that in the encounter between the stranger and the
host mutual respect is expected. Should the stranger try to impose his/her message on the
host with no due regard for the traditions and, may be, protocols of the host, then there is
every likelihood that the stranger may face opposition, criticism, and possible rejection of
his/her message. The idea of threat or opposition or rejection does not seem to augur well
with Njoku. For him, hospitality is either an intrinsically “positive value”25 or it is not. It
cannot incorporate simultaneously both terms of “threat and luck” as expressed by
Uzukwu. Njoku seems to understand the idea of opposition or threat as suggested by
Uzukwu as an element of aggressiveness introduced into the metaphor of hospitality. For
Njoku then, this amounts to a diminution of the notion of hospitality. At any rate, Njoku’s
fears and apprehensions are frankly understandable especially in view of his purely
rationalistic and logical modality which sees hospitality to the guest as portending both
threat and luck to be not only dualistic but also contradictory. But clearly, it is also true
that life is larger than logic. It must be affirmed that Uzukwu’s observation is realistic
rather than merely idealistic. On this side of the eschaton, when the stranger abuses the
hospitality of the host by disrespecting his (the host’s) traditions or by regardlessly
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imposing his perspective on the host, the likelihood of encountering opposition, criticism,
or even rejection is a real one. This does not, however, take away or detract from
hospitality which must not be abused. It must be kept in mind that the practice of
authentic hospitality is not an effort in passivity. There is no question that authentic
hospitality eschews totalization be it either on the part of the host or the guest. As Hans
Boersma rightly affirms, “Hospitality rejects the violence of a totalizing imposition of
oneself on the other, the violence that forces the other to be shaped into one’s own
image.”26 Therefore, in a number of ways, hospitality as an active attribute can also be an
activity of interpellation of the proclivity of the host to thematize, homogenize, dominate,
and totalize the stranger; it could as well be an imperative summons to the host to be
open to responsibility and justice as “the essential precondition for gaining the truth.”27
Yet authentic hospitality ordinarily demands that the guest respects and not dominate or
impose his will on the host.
The fluidity inherent in the metaphor of hospitality warrants that one could be
hospitable yet at the same time critical of the status quo. As Gerald Boodoo in a
fascinating rhetorical move puts it: “Isn’t this one of the messages of the parable of the
good Samaritan? The very act of kindness and hospitality by the Samaritan was a
scathing condemnation of the religious and social context of the time. Hospitality then
allows for welcome and participation as well as meaningful resistance and opportunities
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for change.”28 Hospitality must not be bastardized to take advantage of either the host by
the stranger or vice versa. And because reality is never unmediated, therefore, neither the
host nor the stranger has complete possession of the truth to be imposed on the one by the
other or vice versa. This should not be seen as a form of endorsement of relativism. It
should be noted that “Enlightenment presuppositions about truth and reason gave…[the
very specter of relativism] its stature as a threat. For they presume a normative set of
rational criteria available to all, against which any claim to other sets of criteria is utterly
unsettling. That is what we mean by ‘relativism.’”29 Rather, hospitality entails a way of
saying that truth can only benefit from an atmosphere of respectful encounter with
another30 (which is not merely an intellectual debate in which there is a winner and a
loser but rather an honest and humble “cross-epistemological conversation” à la
Mignolo). This also means that when it comes to the question of hospitality, there may be
no claims to any hard and fast boundaries characterized by solidity. Rather, where
genuine hospitality is given, it renders boundaries pliant, permeable, and penetrable.
Hospitality thus includes an element of uncertainty which has to be carefully navigated
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via dialogue and deference. Hospitality helps us to understand that all human inquiry and
thinking happen within a tradition. Hence, any claim to faith grounded in “pure reason”
or abstract universal, is, at best, an illusion, and at worst, violence. What is required is for
us to develop, through hospitality, the skills needed to navigate among the distinct
traditions without totalizing any. The element of uncertainty in hospitality is, therefore,
profitable to theology, and for that matter, African theology which remains faith
constantly questing to understand as it seeks to penetrate the depth of Africans’ particular
experience and confrontation with divinity in their own historical and social space. This
questing of faith by its nature, progresses asymptotically.
In hospitality, the boundary is neither shunned nor simply transcended but rather
transformed into a border, a space of negotiation, translation, and interpretation in the
light of the stranger who approaches as an other center of epistemic enunciation. In
hospitality, border is not erased. Rather it assumes a certain malleability, permeability,
plasticity, and instability.31 The permeability of the border allows for its opening to
enable subaltern perspectives to emerge. This kind of understanding is redolent with
Homi Bhabha’s point that the place called boundary or borderline “puts us in the position
of translating differences into a kind of solidarity.”32 The border is not a place for
destroying but rather for affirming differences while at the same time allowing for a
movement across differences through mutual encounter and interaction leading to
growth, enrichment, and transformation in solidarity of others. Thus to be a boundary
dweller entails an interstitial inhabitation of the “in-between” where identity is actually
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shaped by a multiplicity of factors and not necessarily in an essentialist fashion that gives
the impression of a more solidity of identity than what is actually the case. On account of
the numerous external influences that have always infiltrated and ultimately invented
Africa as a forced reality particularly the experience of colonialism, it is plausible to
submit that Africans are characterized by a border or an “in-between” inhabitation or
dwelling. In this way, Africans, like other subalterns in the modern/colonial world
system, inhabit multiple identities. However, it is only in keeping with such an
atmosphere that the Gospel which is both transcultural and countercultural can effectively
impact culture by interpellating and transforming those elements that are counter-Gospel.
At the same time, the Gospel in turn is itself enriched and its dimensions expanded
through rereading, translation, and reinterpreting in the light of such encounter with local
cultures/epistemologies and situations of lived experiences.
By and large, in view of the objections raised, Njoku proposes the model of
covenant in place of hospitality. He sees the idea of covenant as not the only feasible
model but for now remains, nevertheless, the best for constructing an African theology of
inculturation. To make his point, Njoku adopts G. E. Mendehall’s definition of covenant
as a “solemn promise made binding by oath, which may be either verbal formula or a
symbolic action. Such an action or formula is recognized by the parties as the formal act
which binds the actor to fulfill his promise.”33 Njoku briefly rehearses some of the
biblical accounts of covenants ranging from simple ones between men to those between
God and men, the people of Israel, and climaxing in the Eucharist. In all this, Njoku’s
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interest seems to focus on the idea of “oath” or “promise” which is binding on the parties
involved in the pact to avoid occurrence of a breach. The oath makes the parties to be
respectful and faithful to each other. Indeed, he sees the idea of the Hebrew berith which
has the English equivalent of oath as analogous to the Igbo (African) idea of Igba-ndu
which means mating or communion of life.34 Through Igba-ndu which may involve the
ritual process of blood drinking taking from and by both parties, “communion in the same
life and meaning”35 comes to be effectuated. In this way, Njoku underscores that the idea
of humans as covenanted or existing in communal union is no stranger to the African
experience. Indeed, Njoku minces no words in affirming that covenant making
characterizes African mode of being. He goes on to aver that through such covenants,
“even strangers come to see themselves as ‘blood relatives,’ thereby assuring the
sacredness of all in a common paternity/maternity and brotherhood.”36 For Njoku, this
covenant model overcomes the prejudices and fears, and perhaps, the uncertainties
surrounding the ethic of encounter which, accordingly, can only be nourished by life of
communion and friendship.37 Quite frankly, Njoku grants that even the covenant situation
is not perfect or absolute since there abounds an infinite possibility for breaching it. But
his conviction is that in the event of a breach, parties involved can “avail themselves of
the infinite possibility of renewals, re-enactments and re-commitment to their initial
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cause….”38 To my mind, this observation of Njoku with regard to human limitations that
frequently endanager relationships is key to understanding the import of igba-ndu. Igbandu (meaning binding life together) seems to be more meaningful when understood as the
ritual renewal of already existing relationships but which have been broken or
endangered by betrayal, neglect, or failure.
Njoku’s position is undoubtedly fascinating. There are many appealing features in
his analysis of covenant. Yet it contains some troubling subtle nuances which need
further critical exposition. But before proceeding, it is, however, pertinent to point out
that every model always encapsulates reality from a particular perspective. Since no
model or imagery pretends to be exhaustive, all models limp. At any rate, some models
would be more significant than others in the sense that they are more illuminative of the
issue at stake and more unifying of its multifaceted aspects into a holistic vision.
Moreover, a model may be more relevant in a particular time and context than in another
particularly in view of the signs of the times.39 In an age of pluriversality and
globalization, with the shrinking of the world into a smaller village and coupled with the
ambivalence of interconnectedness and fragmentation which has heightened awareness of
differences, I contend that the metaphor of hospitality remains a preference. This is so
because, among others, hospitality is capable of transforming boundaries into an “inbetween” space for negotiating difference and fostering solidarity with the stranger
regarded as other in our contemporary time and context.
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While there is little doubt as Njoku establishes that covenant is not only a biblical
but also African motif (such as Igba-ndu), it is equally pertinent to argue that hospitality,
in the first place, is the condition and possibility for covenant. Hospitality always
precedes covenant. Before any talk of covenant, before alliance or agreement, a welcome,
a recognition of the other, a hand is held out or spread out to embrace40 the other, the
stranger. Even in the case of the Sinaitic covenant, before making a covenant with Israel,
God had to first of all show the people of Israel hospitality while they were strangers in
Egypt. As strangers in Egypt, the people of Israel were the “other,” the subaltern, those at
the margins and hence, the voiceless, and the silenced, and worst still, the oppressed and
enslaved. Israel, of course, fared well initially in Egypt until a new Pharaoh breached the
bond of friendship and subjected it to subaltern position. It was from such situation that
the hospitable God liberated Israel before ever entering into a covenant with the people
(cf Ex 2:23-25; 3:7-10). Before covenant, God first welcomed Israel as strangers. Indeed,
God’s hospitality to the people of Israel which was a condemnation of the unjust social
structures that pushed them to the exteriority of Egyptian frontier, preceded and paved the
way for the Sinaitic covenant. It was there on the margins, in that subaltern location that
God revealed his power to lift up the silenced and oppressed. Subalternity is also a place
of speaking; it is also a place with epistemic potential, and indeed, a site of revelation.
God’s hospitality and concomitant election is thus the foundation of his covenant with
Israel.41 Actually, in accordance with the common ancient Near Eastern practice of
40
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making treaties or alliances (especially suzerainty pacts), a brief chronicle or rehearsal of
historical antecedents which serves as a prologue usually precedes the making of
covenant commitments.42 It includes especially the deeds of benevolence and hospitality
performed by the suzerain on behalf of the vassal. This is to inspire faithfulness on the
part of both parties. Besides, whereas in covenant, everything seems to be more
controlled and predictable, in hospitality what appear to be more prominent are the
elements of surprise, expectancy, and fluidity which are more congenial to the revelatory
nature of hospitality. God who comes in the stranger, the subaltern is one who arrives and
presences in the most unexpected and unpredictable places. It is little wonder that
Pharaoh fails to notice God speaking through Moses and Aaron, the representatives of the
stranger (Israel) before him. God actually restored the silenced voice and demands that it
be given a hearing. This is the work of hospitality; and authentic hospitality requires that
the stranger, the subaltern, the outsider, not be silenced.
Indeed, the Greek noun for hospitality, xenos not only embodies a potential for
fluidity but equally denotes simultaneously a guest, a host, or a stranger.” The verb,
xenizo or xenizein means not only “to receive or entertain as a guest” but also “to
surprise.” The fluidity characteristic of hospitality makes the exchange or reversal of
roles between hosts and guestspossible. Put another way, the stranger is the bearer of the
culture, tradition, the world of meaning and values, and indeed the context s/he brings
with him/her to an unfamiliar world where s/he depends on the hospitality of the host
who is at home. In a certain sense then, the host as the homeowner becomes the guest of
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the stranger who assumes the status of a host since the homeowner could always learn
something from the stranger for their mutual transformation. Again, it is arguable that
quite unlike some covenants, whenever and wherever genuine hospitality takes place, it
always tends to a greater inclusiveness43 by making boundary as border malleable,
perforated, and unstable while recognizing and welcoming differences.
Clearly, covenants have a greater tendency to ossify or rigidify boundaries and to
exclude those who do not identify with the initiated as covenant members. In capturing
how the Hebrew people despised and excluded the Gentiles as uncircumcised pagans
before Christ, for instance, Paul has this to say: “At that time you were without Christ,
you did not belong to the community of Israel; the covenants of God and his promises
were not for you” (Eph 2:12). In the same vein, the ritual of Igba-ndu which establishes a
covenantal relationship can also be exclusive. Whereas those who have taken part in
Igba-ndu now see themselves as sharing in one communion of life, as more or less “blood
relatives,” those who have not taken part in the ritual may be viewed as “non-bloodrelatives,” and hence, excluded. In order words, whereas covenants tend to exclude noncovenant members by hardening the distinction between outsiders and insiders,
hospitality rather tends to expand and transform the frontier by welcoming the stranger
who is not considered a “blood relative” but rather a foreigner who is a non-covenant
member in the “conviction that God’s redeeming work always discloses itself…[in the
subaltern] as well.”44 In a covenant, the parties involved no longer see themselves as
strangers to each other; they are like blood relatives with no more prejudices and fears
43
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surrounding their relationship. Arguably, however, even before such rapprochement is
achieved, it is fundamentally through hospitality that the tension between those who
perceive themselves as insiders and as outsiders precipitated by the element of
strangeness can be doused and defused. The interpellatory nature of hospitality functions
to overcome the tension and transform the foreigner into a guest, and when welcomed,
into a friend. On the basis of these clarifications, it is still my heartfelt contention that the
model of hospitality remains a preferable metaphor for dealing with and for negotiating
the boundaries of difference. It is a helpful model for a creative epistemology of an
African theology that would be relevant in an era of World Christianity, of pluriversality,
and globalization. At this juncture, before we move on to further tease out the notion of
hospitality, I think it might be useful to review certain articulations of hospitality that in
our estimation might rather be deemed deformations of hospitality.
4.3 Deformations

of Hospitality/Friendship

In some ways, a number of philosophers (Western) have construed hospitality not
only as a political practice but also as an exercise in virtue. Among such philosophers, we
would focus on Aristotle, the disciple and student of Plato, since his sway continually
underwrites much of the later traditions of Western ontological and epistemological
constellations. To be treated here is Aristotle’s take on magnanimity and charity as
pathways to self-actualization as well as his understanding of friendship.
4.3.1 Aristotle’s Notion of Self-Actualization and Hospitality/Friendship
In silhouetting the contours of interpersonal moral virtues necessary for political
life, Aristotle derives their status basically from the vantage point of the self’s (agent’s)
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own flourishing, eudaimonia, which, for him, is the telos of moral virtue and agency.
There is no doubt that Aristotle is well aware that human beings are social by nature, for
he states, “…no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since
man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others.”45Consequently,
humans as embedded within the complex web of relationships acquire virtues and live
them out in relationality. But for Aristotle, the agent is not only the point of departure of
all love, magnanimity, and hospitality but also the terminus ad quem of all such
relationships since they are necessarily geared toward the perfecting of the self (agent) in
virtue. It comes as no surprise that in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle introduces his
thought thus: “relations with one’s neighbors, and the marks by which friendships are
defined, seem to have proceeded from a man’s relations to himself.”46 For Aristotle, the
good man is a lover of self who “wishes for himself what is good…and does so for his
own sake.”47 This is the core characteristic of Aristotle’s magnanimous man. It is only
from this standpoint of agent-centeredness that any ethical relationship with the other is
possible within the Aristotelian framework. In loving another, the self actually loves itself
with the other merely playing an instrumental function. It is against this backdrop that
Aristotle opines that “loving is better than being loved”48 not because such act of loving
is disinterested but because it is freighted with the investment of conducing to the
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actualization of the potentialities of the self that would not otherwise be possible. To
demonstrate this point, Aristotle employs the metaphor of the “producer – product”
relationship to capture the operative dynamics between the hospitable, so-called
magnanimous man and the beneficiary of his magnanimity or hospitality. Thus in loving
the beneficiary, the hospitable benefactor stands to his beneficiary as to another self (that
is, himself since the other simply becomes an extension of the self) because “the
handiwork [who is here taken to be the beneficiary] is in a sense, the producer [who is the
benefactor] in activity; he loves his handiwork …for what he is in potentiality, his
handiwork manifests in activity.”49 Aristotle goes on to press home the point: “For a
person regards what come from him as his own, as the owner regards his tooth or hair or
anything….”50 From the foregoing exposition, it becomes clear that in the ethical
encounter or relationship between the self and the other, what is of cardinal importance
for Aristotle is the self-actualization of the self, the good of the self while the other is
merely the instrument for such a project.
This same matrix of self-actualization also shapes the contours of friendship in
Aristotle. Friendship is possible only between two adults who are good in themselves (in
the sense of lacking imperfection): “a good friend is by nature desirable for a good
man.”51 Because the motivating factor in friendship is for whatever contributes to selfactualization, it is only a good friend who is perfect in virtue that can be desirable for the
good man. This implies, therefore, that a friend in pain, for instance, cannot be desirable
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for the good (magnanimous) man since he cannot understand how we could possibly “ask
friends to share in our bad fortune, for that would bring them pain.”52 For Aristotle then,
friendship between the good, shuns any kind of vulnerability or imperfection since that
would not conduce to enhancing self-actualization but rather diminish or deter such
prospect. Accordingly, a benevolent or magnanimous action for the sake of a friend is,
after all said and done, a refined self-love in Aristotle.
This Aristotelian framework whose ghost has, no doubt, continually haunted
Western epistemological systems is problematic and disturbing for a number of reasons
some of which we would like to bring to limelight. First of all, for Aristotle, the essence
of hospitality or beneficence is for the self to acquire virtue and become a
hospitable/beneficent person. In this way, the self actualizes itself. On the contrary, when
the self fails to be hospitable, that is, fails to attain virtue but rather relapses into vice by
becoming, for instance, cruel, hostile, and tyrannical, then the only thing regrettable,
going by the Aristotelian parameters, is the failure of the self to actualize itself and thus,
stunting both its growth in virtue and its capacity to attain eudaimonia. Going by this
frame of thought, cruelty is evil primarily because it is preclusive of the self’s flourishing.
This position eliminates from view the fact that cruelty is first and foremost wrong
because it is intrinsically evil and because of the violence it inflicts on the other who is
made a victim and not necessarily because it does not contribute to the flourishing of the
agent. As a matter of fact, way back in his Politica (treatise on Politics),Aristotle
condemns tyranny only for its effects on the happiness (eudaimonia), virtue, and
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longevity of the tyrant.53In other words, Aristotle’s particular interest is not on the
violence of the tyranny visited on the subjects of the tyrant but rather on the fact that
tyranny precludes the eudaimonia and self-realization of the tyrant. Secondly, in this
Aristotelian design, the beneficiary appears condemned to the receiving end as long as his
existence makes it possible, in the first place, for the benefactor to realize his potential for
beneficence. Since the benefactor needs a long time to cultivate this virtue, because
virtues are acquired over a long span of time through practice, then the beneficiary
necessarily needs to remain in his status as long as whatever time it takes the benefactor
to become self-actualized. From this purview, it does not seem there is room for making
the beneficiary to become independent. The recipient is condemned to a dependent status.
And one insidious implication of this is that once the benefactor believes he has
sufficiently acquired the virtue of beneficence (which is self-actualization/selfsufficiency), a tendency is for him to flaunt himself as being moral enough as though one
can actually become moral enough leaving no more room for further striving and
improvement. Thirdly, the Aristotelian magnanimous man confers gifts on the
beneficiary without any expectation of material reciprocity from the latter. The gifts
conferred only enable the giver to mature in virtue and thus serve to reinforce his sense of
superiority and self-sufficiency as the benefactor. Gift giving and hospitality for the
magnanimous man only serve to underline his superior status which accrues to him
respect, honor, and prestige as a virtuous man. Lastly, this idea of gift giving and
hospitality as a way of reinforcing the superiority of the giver necessarily creates a
53
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polarity at whose opposite end is located the inferior recipient so-called precisely as
unable to actualize him/herself since, according to Aristotle, it is better to love/give than
to be loved/given. This approach leads to deformation when hospitality, as Letty Russell
writes, “is practiced as a way of caring for so called ‘inferior people’ by those who are
more advantaged and able to prove their superiority by being ‘generous,’ rather
than…[being] a model of partnership.”54
We must not simply use others as objects of our charity in order to make us feel
satisfied as generous people. Worst still, when we dictate for the recipients of our socalled charity on how they may or may not use such charity. Russell suggests that:
We must strive to meet others as they are [that is, to see them the way they
see themselves, not as we want to see them through the prism of our own
eyes], not as objects of our charity, but as persons in their own right, capable
of making choices about their destiny. If we insist they dress as we do and
follow the same manners, we are not exercising hospitality but ‘reforming’
others to match our expectations.55
Therefore, hospitality goes beyond mere charity. We cannot give others what they are
undeserving (charity) unless and until we first of all give them what they are truly
deserving (their just right to be respected for who they are, to equality, to human dignity,
to life, to cultural and religious freedom, to actualize their own epistemic potential and
destiny, and indeed to justice). We cannot give a person charity without at the same time
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removing imposed universal structures and institutions that continue to silence and
inferiorize them and make them victims of massive evil. There can be no true charity
without justice. Thus, beyond mere charity, hospitality requires deeds of genuine
solidarity with those who are pushed into the border of subalternity rather than totalizing
and letting them be trapped in the web of dependency and indebtedness.56 But in this
whole Aristotelian framework, it is glaringly obvious that the status of the recipient as a
subject in his own right is left out of the picture. With too much of attention focused on
the self (agent), that is, the benefactor and his self-actualization and prideful display of
generosity, one wonders if this type of approach is not in any way contributive to the
unjust structures that encourage dependency syndrome, control, manipulation, and as a
ploy to support the structures of power discourse that remains operative through the
process of globalization today.
Granted, Aristotle considers relationships anchored on utility or pleasure as
inferior and egoistic. Yet the principal evil of such egoism expressed as greed, avarice,
selfishness—which make victims—is not so much that it harms others as it harms the
egoist, because by so doing, the egoist has dwarfed his own capacity for selfactualization. In the face of the scandalous poverty, flagrant destitution, and death from
starvation, for instance, that have engulfed the Two-Thirds World largely due to
neoliberal capitalism that feeds the greed, avarice, individualism, and inordinate
consumerism of the One-Third World, Aristotle’s approach in this case condemns not the
injustice involved but only the failure of the consumerists to attain self-actualization in
virtue. Additionally, this Aristotelian perspective comes to a head in his metaphysical
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theory of “act and potency” where he contends that existence, precisely as actuality, is the
chief good. Transposing this idea to the notion of his ethical subject, Aristotle maintains
that the chief good of the self is to actualize and maintain itself in being. And because
existence or being is good, the self has to persevere in being by doing that which
contributes to its flourishing. Therefore, besides delighting in the activity of being itself,
the self also delights in the activity of being with itself.57 The significance of this
Aristotelian standpoint is found in the enormous influence it has wielded throughout the
entire trajectory of Western philosophical and theological thoughts from Parmanides
through Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Sartre, Husserl, even Heidegger, and
several others. It is about the notion of “persevering or persisting-in-being,” “being-foritself” and “with-itself” which is finely captured by the Spinozean succinct terminology:
conatus essendi. All in all, we maintain that, albeit, Aristotle articulated his idea of
magnanimous and hospitable ethical relationship between the self and the other in the
context of relationality, such relationship is deformed precisely because it centrally
focuses on the self persevering in its own being, being-for-itself rather than being-for-theother. Despite talk of beneficence to the other, it remains unclear whether at all the other
has any “moral significance for the self except insofar as he or she is a function of that
self’s own thrust toward self-actualization.”58 Authentic hospitality is rather about
allowing space for the stranger, the subaltern, the silenced and dependent to emerge and
assume his or her own place as well actualize his or her own destiny. As Thomas
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Ogletree writes, “It involves a recognition in the other of a center of meaning and value
which cannot legitimately be reduced in significance to our own drives for selfactualization.”59 But before we can bring this argument full circle, it would be useful to
attend to yet another philosophical issue which borders on the possibility and/or
impossibility of hospitality.
4.4 The

Thesis of the Impossibility of Hospitality

A fascinating phenomenon in so-called postmodernity is the increasingly renewed
interest among postmodern philosophers in the question of human hospitality. This is
particularly pertinent in the light of massive movements of people today through
immigration and migration especially from the South to the North as well as the tensions
stemming from the encounter with people, religions, cultures, and traditions which are
different and so challenge one’s identity and primordial assumptions. In this section, I
will be drawing on two postmodern philosophers, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques
Derrida with particular reference to their reflections on hospitality.
4.4.1 Emmanuel Levinas and Hospitality
Levinas, a Lithuanian Jew, “moved to France in 1923, studied under Husserl and
Heidegger in Germany between 1928 and 1929 with robust enthusiasm for German
phenomenology. In 1930 he published his first book on Husserl, The Theory of Intuition
in the Phenomenology of Husserl which was actually his dissertation. However,
beginning from the mid-thirties, his suspicion and dissatisfaction with the preponderance
of ontology in Western thought reached a climax when later he shockingly learned that
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his former teacher, Heidegger was involved with Nazism which for him was a political
embarrassment. Coupled with his own (Levinas’) five-year imprisonment and the murder
of his parents and brothers by the Nazi regime, Levinas eventually came to reevaluate
and interpret Heidegger’s ontology as a splendid renewal of the Western tradition – the
ontology of the Same. Levinas’ philosophical enterprise can be said to be undergirded by
one overarching concern: that Western thought is embedded in structures that do violence
to the integrity of the “other.” Consequent upon its violent tendencies and consistent
suppression of the “other,” Western philosophical thought suffers an inability to respect
the “other.”60 On the way to exposing this proclivity, Levinas traces the penchant of
Western tradition for an imperialistic “ontology of the Same” all the way back to
Parmenides.61 His goal, as already noted in Chapter 1, is partly to liberate the “other”
from the tyranny and totalizing objectification by the same or the self. He makes it a
point of duty to question and to break with the consistent preoccupation of Western
thought with “perseverance-in-being” as we saw figured above in Aristotle and others.
This preoccupation with essendi upon which, by the way, Western culture is founded
according to Levinas, expresses itself by imposing rational categories (claimed to be
universal) on reality, on the world including the human other. In this way, reality, and
particularly the human person is conceived merely as an epistemic other—an object of
intentionality—whose epistemic status is real only in the consciousness of the self. The
other is scrutinized, measured, evaluated, judged, and known from the standpoint of the
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self. The other is not regarded in his/her own terms. Indeed, the other is constructed and
ontologized either as an object or area of study by what Mignolo calls the “coloniality of
power.” This particular trend which runs across the entire gamut of Western thought
constitutes an ontological violence as it undermines the alterity of the other who is
another center of consciousness, value, and meaning. This ontological violence which
involves an attempt to construct the other in the image and likeness of the self has the
implication of refusal to accept the other as other. Thus Western cultures including their
politics and economics which are undergirded by a totalizing, assimilating, and
imperializing metaphysics as well as purported universal epistemological categories
naturally lead to violence, domination, oppression, and suppression because they scarcely
leave room for difference, for the irruption of the other. At any rate, the other for Levinas
remains irreducible to the “same.” In his alterity, the other, unlike other phenomena,
remains an enigma that defies a definition in phenomenological terms, because the other
is never given or comprehended in consciousness.62
Levinas’ starting point on the way to upend and break with this Western
metaphysical tradition is not the self’s unyielding quest for self-actualization,
centeredness, or self-integration through persisting in being. Rather he starts with the
notion of the “face” of the other. To be sure, the face, one of the key terms in Levinas, is,
according to Colin Davis, “problematic because it both does and does not refer to real
human faces. The face is that part of the body of other people which is most readily (or
most often) visible; it is also the most expressive part of the body, and the notion of the
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face as expression (emphasis mine) plays an important part in Levinas’ think-ing.”63 The
face in Levinas is primarily not a thing seen or intended. Hence writes Levinas, “The face
is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is,
encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched – for in visual or tactile sensation the identity
of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content.”64 It is as
expression, speech, discourse that the face reveals itself. The face does not reveal itself to
be seen, but rather to be heard. The face of the Other speaks to me.
The speech of the face is simultaneously an imperative and an appeal. As an
imperative, it questions and repudiates the self for its egoistic and murderous tendencies
to suppress and assimilate the other. At the same time it is an appeal to the self to accept,
respect, recognize, and welcome the discourse of the face even in its destitution in
manifestation. The speech of the face is thus an invitation to welcome and openness to
plurality and difference. Levinas uses such adjectives as higher and lower to describe the
mode of the approach of the other who addresses the self in the other’s face.65 The other
comes as higher not in the sense of dominating the self since his resistance, precisely as
ethical, is preeminently nonviolent and nonethnocidal.66 Rather higher is understood in
the sense that the imperative nature of his speech and call challenges, interpellates, judges
the arbitrariness of the self’s proclivity to homogenization and absorption of whatever
lies outside it into the hegemony of its empire. The face of the Other in its speech thus
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traumatizes, shocks, and shakes the self’s powers of totalizing, dominating, and
appropriating the other, questioning the self’s propensity to persist in being and satisfying
only itself. The face thus shocks the thematizing self with the truth about itself and thus
marks the self’s limits. At the same time, the other is lower because he approaches the
self not with coercive power but in destitution and defenselessness, with an appeal to be
welcomed while calling the self to ethical responsibility.
Levinas presses home the idea of the irreducibility of the other whose alterity is
non-adequate to any perception in intentionality by contending that the other speaking in
the face approaches the self in a “dimension of height.”67 The other speaking to me in the
face is my master and my teacher. More to the point, Levinas means to say by this that:
the…encounter with the other opens up a new world of meaning to which I
otherwise have no access. I do not possess that world within my own orientation to meaning, not even latently. Thus, I cannot presume that the other is
like me or that I can understand the other on the analogy of my own experience—perhaps through a process of identification and projection. If I am to
approach the other’s world of meaning, I must let him teach me about it, open
its contours and nuances to me.68
This is a very important caveat from Levinas. We cannot gain access to the system of
meaning and value constituted by the world of inhabitation of the other by imposing our
own particular categories, projecting our own perceptions and understandings upon him
under the assumption or pretext that they have universal validity for all. That kind of
universal rationality silences the voice of the other who should be heard as an epistemic
center of its own. To comprehend the other solely according to our own system of
67
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meaning and value amounts to an ontological and epistemological violence. We cannot
master or know the other in advance since his alterity resists such mastery and
determination. It is only in the context of discourse, the speech of the face that the infinity
or mystery of the being of the other and his world is revealed to the self. Ethical
responsibility in Levinasian perspective, therefore, entails the readiness and openness to
allow the other to come to audibility and not to silence him. This responsibility to
welcome and not to thematize the other who approaches, to hear the speech in the other’s
face, to learn from the other, is what hospitality is about in Levinas.
According to Levinas, this ethical responsibility is infinite. On this side of the
eschaton, we can never become moral enough; enough can never be enough. We are
never done with the neighbor who always concerns us,69 with being responsible toward
others, especially toward the weak, the widow, the poor, and the stranger. Again,
according to Levinas, this responsibility toward the other is not only infinite, but also
non-symmetrical. Unlike Buber who sees the I-Thou relationship as one of symmetrical
reciprocity, for Levinas, it is decisively asymmetrical because it does not wait for
reciprocity which tends to subject hospitality to calculations of deficits and
compensations in cost accounting.70 My responsibility and obligation toward the other is
not conditioned on what I stand to get out of it or on the other’s reciprocal obligatory
indebtedness to me. In this way, Levinas rejects the traditional vocation of being as
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being-for-itself, the interestedness and perseverance of being-in-itself and for-itself,
which he considers, to be at the root of all the crises of civilizations, the wars, and the
massive atrocities of the twentieth century. Although the word, hospitality, features rarely
in Levinas’ works, Jacques Derrida, however, affirms that “Totality and Infinity
bequeaths to us an immense treatise of hospitality (emphasis original).”71
All in all, Levinas has posited that the practice of hospitality is necessary
particularly in the light of pluralism and difference. His perspective proffers a fascinating
corrective to the structures of the universal epistemology of the coloniality of power that
continues to hold sway in our globalized world. Hospitality and friendship should serve
as central elements of our relational activity as members of the comity of one common
humanity. Such perspective recognizes our equality-in-difference in a way that is
enriching rather than destructive of each other. Albeit, his account of the encounter
between the I and the other is not an event that is located within synchronic and historical
real time because the other rather approaches from a diachronic, pre-originary, and
immemorial past, it, nevertheless, has real time analogue and relevance. The Levinasian
“face” which speaks must be seen and heard in the faces of all those who are oppressed,
subjugated, and silenced by the coloniality of power of the modern/colonial world
system’s imaginary. Indeed, along these lines, his account provides “a structural
possibility that precedes and makes possible all subsequent [real time historical]
experience.”72 Let us now turn to Derrida.
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4.4.2 Jacques Derrida and the Impossibility of Hospitality
The ethical concern expressed by Levinas particularly with respect to the
obligation to respond with hospitality toward the epiphany of the other who approaches
the self has been appropriated and expanded by Derrida (1930-2004), the philosopher of
deconstruction. During the last few years of his life, Derrida wrote two books on the
theme of hospitality. The first is entitled Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas in which he not
only analyzes the idea of hospitality in the oeuvre of Levinas but also builds on it. The
second is entitled simply Of Hospitality. Besides Levinas, Derrida’s reflection on the
theme of hospitality equally developed in conversation with the philosophical strands in
Søren Kierkegaard, Husserl, and especially Kant.73
Immanuel Kant, the philosopher from Königsberg reflected on the theme of
hospitality in the context of his discussion on the conditions for peace between states. In
his essay on Perpetual Peace (1795) Kant describes what seems to be a universal
hospitality as the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the
land of another. The stranger may arrive in another’s country with a claim to a universal
right to hospitality, to be welcomed, on the grounds that “all men are entitled to present
themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal possession of the
earth’s surface.”74 This stems from Kant’s universal conception inspired by his Judeo-
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Christian heritage that “originally, no one had more right than another to a particular part
of the earth.”75 However, this universal hospitality is one that is conditioned. The stranger
must behave peaceably in another’s country. And he only has the right of resort and not
the right of guest. With the right of resort, the stranger has only a right of temporary visit
and not the right of permanent stay which would be the right of guest.76
Derrida rejects this conditioned hospitality as articulated by Kant because, for
him, it is plagued by determinacy and involves a horizon of expectation. Because it is in
the nature of this conditional hospitality of reciprocity to spawn a vicious circle of
indebtedness which is characteristic of the logic of the economy of exchange, Derrida is
led to enunciate the impossibility of hospitality. Insofar as we remain entangled in the
web of the economy of exchange, pure and true hospitality not already tainted by the
reciprocal logic of debts and obligations remains an impossibility. Derrida thus
distinguishes between this conditional hospitality continually threatened by the logic of
indebtedness and absolute hospitality that is freely given. Such unconditional and
absolute hospitality requires that before welcoming the stranger who approaches, we
forego all profiling, all judging, all analyzing, and evaluating of the other. The whole
point of identification is to engender knowledge, vision, and prejudice which eventually
lead to thematization and control. Pure hospitality then requires that we desist from
continuing the violence that tries to construct the other by shaping him into our own
image. Derrida rather suggests that pure hospitality requires a radical and absolute
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openness to the advent of the wholly other without any prefiguration.77 This wholly other
refers not only to God but also to every human person. The other as the wholly other
transcends all determinacy, possibility, presence, and possibility. For Derrida, violence is
intricately interwoven within the structures of conditional hospitality as understood along
Kantian lines of totalization. In the light of this violence, Derrida rejects it in favor of
unconditional and absolute hospitality.
In making the case for radical and absolute openness to the advent of the
newcomer, Derrida rejects all manner of messianism. Put another way, he is wary of any
claim to any definitive arrival of the kingdom in any particular messianic figure. For such
a claim would be preclusive of the radical openness to the future of the ceaseless advent
of the other, a future removed from the violence and regime of presence, the presentable,
and the programmable. Hence Derrida argues for a messianicity without messianism, a
revelation without vision, a religion without religion, without truth, without knowledge
since the wholly other cannot be identified with any determinable faith or a determinable
messiah.78 Derrida wants to overcome the determinacy of religion and messianism which
generate determinable faiths that brew pernicious absolutism, universalism, and
triumphalism engendering exclusion and exclusiveness. For Derrida, the freedom of the
wholly other prohibits its containment within the determinate dogmatic content of any
particular historical religion, institution, or program. To do so amounts to reducing the
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wholly other to the regime of sameness. For that reason, Derrida emphatically insists on
“the infinite respect of the singularity and infinite alterity of the other.”79 The notion of
messianicity has the character of an absolute openness to an indeterminate future that can
never be fully realized. It is a messianicity whose future hope and promise ceaselessly
remain to come (à venir) and absolutely undetermined. Accordingly then, pure hospitality
implies messianicity. Derrida’s search for an indeterminate messianicity is undoubtedly
informed by his fear of the violence often associated with particular messianisms,
whether it is of Judaism (Zionism), Christianity, or of Islam. For the moment that
messianic future is claimed to be realized, then hospitality becomes thrust into the
horizon of determinacy, and hence, leads to the impossibility of the avoidance of
violence.
However, despite this quest for unconditional hospitality with indeterminate
messianicity, Derrida realizes that within the limits of time and space, hospitality is
always caught up within the aporia of indeterminacy and determinacy, unconditionality
and conditionality. This aporia is the dilemma—which Derrida describes as the double
bind—of hospitality. While, on the one hand, pure hospitality entails unconditional
welcome extended to the stranger, on the other, Derrida realizes that the stranger must be
welcomed in a particular way, by means of particular protocols and conventions, and
within a particular symbolic universe and language.80 In other words, the conditionality
of hospitality entails that it have a specific context. Therefore, for the welcome to be real
and effective, the stranger must somehow be identified, called out or be greeted by name.
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Yet, Derrida is not unmindful of the slippery slope which stealthily lurks at the
background. For in the context of the particularities and conditionalities of hospitality,
there is often the tendency that the process of “identification always risks negating the
hospitality that is extended; for in inviting, recognizing, or identifying the stranger, in
subjecting him or her to our suppositions or our knowledge if not our prejudices, the
stranger always risks becoming a relative nonstranger …who look[s], sound[s], and
smell[s] like us…who share[s] our tastes.”81 The real danger is how within the fabric of
conditionality, the posing of a question which quite frankly should be a welcoming
gesture to the stranger who approaches could easily be transcoded into a tool for
thematization, control, and the shaping of the stranger into our own image, to become one
who is like us in order to be welcomed.
As a way to get around this aporetic double bind, Derrida first of all comes to the
concession that both ends of the hospitality spectrum—the unconditional or unlimited
and the conditional—are necessary. Real hospitality consists in unconditionally
welcoming the unexpected guest into a particular symbolically and linguistically
conditioned context. Derrida’s concession is not based on the fact that we are incapable
of pure and unconditional hospitality perhaps due “to our finitude…our limited capacities
and resources, or…simply…[due] to political expediency.”82 It is rather the recognition
that real hospitality is always about welcoming particular guests and not indiscriminate or
indeterminate “wholly other.” Because the welcoming question is threatened always by
the danger of turning into an inquisition and thematization, Derrida suggests that
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deconstruction is necessary. Deconstruction thus becomes a thoroughgoing critique of the
consistent propensity to insist on the solidity and purity of being and of trying to shape
the other into our image. At any rate, because for Derrida, real hospitality has to consist
in the welcoming of a particular guest in a particular context, then pure hospitality is
always impure, it is always compromised insofar as it is enacted, realized, and made
effective in real time. Therefore, for Derrida, unconditional hospitality is and should
remain an impossibility.
Moreover, Derrida addresses himself to the question of “gift.” Utilizing the same
trend of thought, he maintains that a pure gift is unpresentable and absolutely
undetermined. He opines that there is never pure altruism in gift-giving.83 Gift giving is
always betrayed or even cancelled by at least the hidden desire for affirmation. Even if
this affirmation does not come from the recipient of the gift, the giver of the gift
somehow repeats it to himself by way of confirming the gift he has given. This is what
Derrida calls iterability. It is this idea of repetition inherent in the word, gift, or promise
that betrays it by changing the context and meaning of the original to the horizon of
economy, knowledge, determination, and so on, because the repetition brings it into
presence. Derrida thus insists on the impossibility of the gift. For the gift cannot be
brought into presence while still remaining a gift either on the side of the donor or the
recipient; it is impossible for pure gift to be present. The gift as such is entirely foreign to
the horizon of theoretical determination and analytic knowledge, economy, ontology, and
conceptual definition. The gift as such, like hospitality, cannot be legitimately presented
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in reality, for the moment it is achieved, it ceases to be a gift. Ultimate messianic justice
and the dreams of realizing absolute hospitality as conceived by Derrida remain an
eschatological reality that awaits us, that is to come (à venir).
4.4.2.1 A Critical Evaluation of Derrida’s Deconstructionism
Derrida’s brilliant insights are well taken. There is no doubt that he and other
postmodern deconstructionists are trying to subvert the specter of Western
epistemological traditions with their entrenched totalities which thematize and oppress.
This has always been a central problem more especially since the time of the history of
the modern/colonial world system which classified alterity on the basis of the normativity
of Western global designs that created the regions of subalternity. However, it must be
said that Derrida’s conceptualities are still troubling. Although, Derrida has a project of
dismantling totalities, he appears to end up merely in deconstruction for the sake of it.
The radicality of his deconstruction which negates everything determinate as the horizon
of totality and economic exchange leads him to take flight into the realm of absolutes that
defy mediation in history. Because such absolutes are never mediated, Derrida ends up
critiquing the imperfections of determinate historical practices rather than providing
solutions on how to improve on them. He criticizes religions and other determinate
entities merely for what they cannot achieve in terms of pure and perfect realization of,
say, hospitality or the gift, within history, than in encouraging them to bear a better and
more effective witness in showing hospitality in the best possible way they can.84 By
emphasizing the absolutes, he is unknowingly reconstituting the old dualisms (much like
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“same” versus “other” that he is trying to overcome) that have always plagued Western
thought. For to speak of unconditional, indeterminate, pure, is to at the same time imply
their opposites, conditional, determinate, and impure. Because his absolute
conceptualities allow no place for mediation for fear of the regime of sameness, he has
difficulty finding a middle ground as a way to get around the opposite ends of his
conceptual spectrum. But the truth remains that reality is never unmediated.
Moreover, Derrida tends to be blind to the reality that one can never simply think,
inquire, and know in a vacuum or from a delocalized “zero point”85 that constitutes an
indubitably neutral objective foundation outside a tradition. Although his goal, as for
other postmodernists, is to subvert that tradition, nevertheless, the presuppositions of that
same tradition are still implicit in his thought. Basically, Derrida simply re-inscribes
Enlightenment rationalism (pure reason that is merely logocentric and ahistorical
abstraction). Indeed, it is legitimate to say that Derrida thinks in supraessentialist terms
and “otherization.” Hence, Derrida’s religion without religion, his messianicity without
messianism can only continue to remain pure and absolute as long as they lack
incarnation and mediation in history. From the Christian tradition, the absolute,
transcendent, and incomprehensible God is the same God incarnated in Jesus from
Nazareth (that subaltern region). And because Derrida gets lost in ahistorical abstraction
and logocentrism, his perspective fails to be fully attentive to the reality of the situated
and particular historical living experiences of the subalterns. The reality of such subaltern
historical experiences and knowledges is completely foreign to Derrida even though he
may have a notional idea of it; but it is not the same as being a subaltern. Hence, it is only
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the subalterns who can give expression to their own historical experiences which equally
enjoys an epistemic status. As a matter of fact, Derrida is thinking from a position of
power (coloniality of power) and has no knowledge of the reality of colonial difference
from the subaltern perspective. He can only learn it from the subalterns themselves. If
hospitality cannot be incarnated or mediated, how can the margins emerge from that
constructed subalternity of inaudibility where nothing good comes from according to the
coloniality of power, but where, nonetheless, divine revelation irrupts? Precisely as
caught up in ahistorical abstraction, Derrida’s deconstruction is, at the long run, still
totalizing. No doubt, Derrida indulges in negative theology in order to save transcendence
from being encapsulated in a determinable way. But by claiming that the best that can be
said about transcendence is the radicality of the unconditioned, then Derrida presupposes
or implies that he already knows in advance all about transcendence. This, in itself, is
thematization. Thus, Derrida plunges back head on into what he is trying to escape from.
The issue is that Derrida’s thinking is still rooted in Western metaphysical tradition
which only thinks in terms of “First Cause” or “Absolute Foundation.” In line with this
understanding, that which “never arrives,” “always without limit,” that which “continues
to become,” is for metaphysics beyond thought and defies its logic, since the only logic
possible for it is that of absolute foundation, the logic of sameness, or finished-product
(object). But God’s gift is a non-object, it is grace.
Besides, Derrida’s emphasis on the infinite and absolute singularity of the
individual out of fear of reducing or “fusing” the individual into the horizon of the “We”
or perhaps to avoid subscribing to schizophrenic personality, rather isolates the individual
absolutely with an absolute responsibility. Any claim to absolute obligation or absolute
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responsibility, realistically speaking, amounts to an assumption that is false. We always
exist as integrated relational beings and we need relationality and the solidarity of others
to achieve what, as individuals, we cannot achieve alone all by ourselves. Add to that,
Derrida’s emphasis on absolute singularity loses sight of the reality of multiple identities,
that an individual can inhabit multiple identities at the same time largely because of
dichotomous experiences which are never had in isolation. Such dichotomous
experiences find expression, for instance, in Homi Bhabha’s “in-between” or “border
dwelling,” W. E. B. Du Bois’ “double consciousness,” Abdelkebir Khatibi’s “double
critique,” Luke Mbefo’s “two-fold heritage,” and so on. That is why we need an other
perspective, an other paradigm or logic of thinking which is relational because it is not
ethnocidal but rather accommodating of a diversity and pluriversality of local narratives
simultaneously since even the tradition or memory which Derrida’s thinking presupposes
is also itself a local history or local epistemic center. In any case, Derrida’s take on
absolute hospitality and pure gift as impossibilities helps us to appreciate all the more a
pneumatological foundation of hospitality and the gift. The very impossibility that
Derrida highlights is precisely what is made present in the superabundance or rather the
excess of God’s gift of divine hospitality made available through Jesus Christ in the
Spirit. But before we treat this, let us in the following section explore Mignolo’s notion
of “border thinking” as an other paradigm that is accommodating of differences not in an
oppressive way but à la equality-in-difference.
4.5 Walter

Mignolo and Border Thinking

In order to put a finger on his notion of “border thinking,” Argentinian
semiotician and decolonial thinker, Walter Mignolo, tries in his book, Local
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Histories/Global Designs, to, first of all, theorize what he describes as the “colonial
difference” in the formation and transformation of the “modern/colonial world system.”86
Drawing on and expanding the insights of Immanuel Wallerstein and others, Mignolo
underscores that colonial experiences in their variety of shapes and forms started all the
way back from the 1500s with the emergence of the Americas to the second half of the
twentieth century in the emergence of global colonialism. By coupling
“modern/colonial,” Mignolo and other decolonial thinkers want to insist that coloniality
and the “coloniality of power” do not simply end with early forms of active colonization
of peoples and lands forcefully appropriated and occupied. Rather, the colonial project
still perdures and is inextricably linked with “the modern world since it is part and parcel
of modernity…not a later addition to the modern project. The modern project and the
colonial project go hand in hand. As long as we exist in the modern world (as we are
especially in a modern world system such as neo-liberal capitalism) we are existing in
contexts that exhibit structures of coloniality and the coloniality of power.”87 Again, the
coupling of modernity/coloniality allows Mignolo to highlight “the spatial dimension
imbedded in the modern world system that is lacking in the linear conception [(such as
early modern, modern, and late modern)] of modern Western history.”88 With the
emergence of global colonialism and the enduring coloniality of power, the spatial
dimension of the system shows that the colonial difference is no longer restricted to the
external borders or peripheries (where it is still present) away from the metropolitan
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centers but is today, perhaps thanks to migration and communication, all over, in the
peripheries and in the centers as well. Let me now throw more light on some of the key
terminologies used here.
Coloniality: Decolonial thinkers make a distinction between colonialism and
coloniality. As already noted above, whereas colonialism entails the formal subjugation
of peoples, the occupation of their lands, and exploitation of their resources, coloniality
has to do with a complex, pervasive, and expansive reach of hegemonic power
throughout the planet. Indeed, coloniality is the matrix out of which colonialism emerges,
such that even in the wake of colonialism, coloniality—which maintains structures of
power discourse that classify and subjugate people on the basis of race, class, gender,
production of knowledge, and so on—far from being history, is still alive and well today
especially “in its new guise of global coloniality.”89
Coloniality of Power: A term which Mignolo adopted from Anibal Quijano
identifies it with capitalism and its consolidation in Europe from the 15th to the 18th
centuries. Accordingly, it refers to the way by which the entire planet with its continents
was classificatorily articulated and legitimated on the basis of an epistemological
perspective that utilizes certain institutional structures as channels of production of
knowledge. Those channels which function to articulate, control, and manage such
classifications (in which task the concept of culture becomes crucial) include (state,
university, church, and so on).90 Mignolo contends that “Eurocentrism becomes,
therefore, a metaphor to describe the coloniality of power from the perspective of
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subalternity. From the epistemological perspective, European local knowledge and
histories have been projected to global designs….”91 Global designs are, therefore,
always local histories created in the metropolitan centers and then exported,
implemented, and enacted as universal for all in various particular places. Coloniality of
power is thus a “conflict of knowledges and structures of power.”92
Within the modern project, coloniality of power, through its classificatory agenda,
creates the “inside” and the “outside” of modernity. The regions, cultures, and those on
the outside are considered of interest only as areas and objects of study and knowable
only through the prism of Western epistemology. In this way, the outside of modernity
became a place of inferiorization and subalternization, a place of subjugated and silenced
epistemic potential. Worst still, those on the outside of modernity were repeatedly and
forcefully taught to reject and despise all knowledges, histories, and traditional forms of
thought native to the subalterns. By so doing, such subjugated knowledges (viewed as
inadequate, naïve, unscientific, and thus, disqualified) became buried under the guise of
functionalist systematized knowledge and all “in the name of disciplinarity and
scientificity in the production of knowledge.”93 The coloniality of power thus subjected
the subalterns to Eurocentric epistemological hegemony as the only nomothetic and
scientific way of knowing and thereby creating a spiral of dependency and imitative
tradition. Hence, diversity and plurality were sacrificed on the murky stable of
Eurocentrism. This is what has been described by decolonial thinkers as the dark side of
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modernity.94 Those who wield the coloniality of power from inside modernity and who,
therefore, benefit from it, are easily blinded to the devastating negative impact of
modernity on the vast majority who are outside. An Etche aphorism says: “shi onye nyuru
anaghi eshi ya ishi” which literally means “one’s own excrement does not smell foul to
the person; it is rather more off-putting and repugnant to others.” This is a way of saying
how easily a person can be blind, unperceiving, and insensitive to the negative and
repulsive effects of his or her action on others. It is this space of negative impact created
by the coloniality of power outside modernity that is described as the “colonial
difference” in decolonial thought (that is, the difference between the inside and outside of
modernity). It is the space where local histories (emanating from inside modernity)
inventing and implementing global designs intersect or conflict with subaltern local
histories (outside modernity). Fascinatingly, Mignolo not only sees the “colonial
difference” as the space where the coloniality of power through global designs is enacted
but also where the restitution of subaltern knowledges and histories is taking place.95 This
point of intersection between subaltern local histories and global designs is where “border
thinking” takes place.
Border Thinking: Border thinking is still within the imaginary of the
modern/colonial world system but truly takes place in the space of colonial difference
and subalternity (the space of repressed and silenced local knowledges and histories by
the coloniality of power through global designs). Mignolo contends that border thinking,
properly speaking, can only work and “be such from a subaltern perspective and never
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from a territorial (e.g. inside modernity) one. Border thinking from a territorial
perspective becomes a machine of appropriation of the colonial differe/a/nces; the
colonial difference as an object of study rather than as an epistemological potential.
Border thinking from the perspective of subalternity is a machine for intellectual
decolonization.”96 Border thinking as a form of decolonial construction which emerges as
a response to the wound of the colonial difference is less a discourse of resistance than a
discourse of unsubjugating and legitimizing local histories and epistemic loci that were
subalternized and repressed during the long process of the colonization of the planet.97
It is, therefore, not so much a new idea as a new way of thinking, an other
paradigm or logic of thinking not anchored on universal reason and global designs.
Border thinking which emerges in the moments of cracks in the imaginary of the
modern/colonial world system implies “a new opportunity of breaking open closed
gates”98 for subalternized and silenced perspectives to become foregrounded. In
restituting subalternized and silenced local histories to the foreground, border thinking,
by the same token, reveals the particularity and “the local histories from which global
designs emerge in their universal drive.”99 In this sense, border thinking aims at
intellectual “decolonization, and transformations of the rigidity of epistemic and
territorial frontiers established and controlled by the coloniality of power…(emphasis
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original).”100 This also means that subaltern knowledges and histories can no longer be
viewed only as objects of study; subalterns must be viewed as subjects and no longer as
objects of study according to the canon of Western social sciences. Subalternity produces
not simply cultures and objects to be studied but also intellectuals who are producing a
body of knowledge and generating theories as they reflect on their own cultures and local
histories. This body of knowledge is also scientific in its own rights and must not be
silenced any longer by the coloniality of power but recognized and respected especially
in academia. This calls to mind Valentin Mudimbe’s observation: “Since the 1960s
African theorists…ideologues [philosophers, theologians, and so on], rather than
confiding in and depending on…[Western episteme], have tended to use critical analysis
as a means for establishing themselves as ‘subjects’ of their own destiny, taking
responsibility for the ‘invention’ of their past as well as of the conditions for modernizing
their societies.”101 As a matter of fact, Mudimbe underscores that since the end of World
War II, it has meant the possibility of new open gates for “new theories in the African
field”102 in the light of contextual determination. To Mignolo’s point then, border
thinking as “an other paradigm”—and as an alternative to global designs, abstract
universal, and neutrally objective knowledge—is not a return to another essentialist
“otherization” (à la Boodoo), but a recognition that every knowledge, every history is
situated. As an other paradigm, the logic of border thinking is, therefore, “a logic of the
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plural”103 and requires that no tradition projects itself as an abstract neutral universal to
be imposed on all.
Border thinking as “an other thinking” is not murderous because it does not
thematize or totalize. Its aim is not conquest but intellectual decolonization, the
unsubjugation, and foregrounding of forced, dislocated, and silenced subaltern local
histories/knowledges. It is, according to Mignolo, “a way of thinking that is not inspired
in its own limitations and is not intended to dominate and to humiliate; a way of thinking
that is universally marginal, fragmentary, and unachieved; and as such, a way of thinking
that, because universally marginal and fragmentary, is not ethnocidal.”104 And because
border thinking can only be such from a subaltern perspective and never from the inside
of modernity, it is border thinking that can actually not only interpellate modernity’s
global designs but also dismantle them through intellectual decolonization.
Decolonization is a form of deconstruction but from a subaltern perspective on the
exteriority of modernity. Decolonial thinking, thus problematizes intra-modern discourses
and Eurocentric critiques of modernity (e.g., postmodernism and Eurocentric
deconstruction). That is why Derrida, as we have seen above, can only do Eurocentric
deconstruction but not decolonizing deconstruction because he criticizes modernity’s
totalizing and thematizing propensity from the inside, from the perspective of modernity
itself. He cannot do decolonization because of his blindness to the colonial difference.
Perhaps that is why, at the long run, Derrida relapses into the same absolutizing and
totalizing categories that he is trying to displace in the first place. This is because he is
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seeking alternatives inside the same modernity that grounds his thinking and utilizing
categories that have the same origin in the logocentric hubris of Western episteme.
Clearly, Derrida seems to not be able to think outside “absolutes.” He is not able to think
the colonial difference but limits himself only to the colonial structure of every culture
which he absolutizes: “All culture is originally colonial (emphasis mine).”105 Derrida’s
phobia for determinacy and particularity makes him think that any talk about the
particularity of a socio-historical culture, religion, or knowledge automatically leads to a
kind of sovereignty, a kind of law coming from elsewhere, and so to domination. Hence,
all culture is colonial. Consequently, the only way he thinks for him to get around this
aporia of domination of any determinate entity, is to dwell in the “absolutes” leading to
“religion without religion,” “politics without politics,” “culture without culture;” with no
mediation or incarnation in determinate particularities. Thus, Derrida is still caught up in
the abstract and remains in custody of the universal proclivity of modernity’s concept of
“pure reason.”
But border thinking which emerges out of the colonial difference understands
what it means “to be or feel in between,” to have “a double consciousness,” and to have
multiple identities. Border dwelling or the “in-between” where border thinking takes
place is a space for negotiating differences, and especially a locus for letting the silenced
voice of the stranger, the subaltern, be enunciated. Border thinking, in this way, aims at
the “multiplication of epistemic energies in diverse local histories”106 and at remapping
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colonial differences toward a future world characterized by an ethics and a politics of
pluriversality (a combination of plural and universality).
Pluriversality stands to dethrone the monolingual, totalizing neutral reason or
global designs invented, exported, implemented, and enacted in the name of universality.
To be sure, “pluriversality is an attempt to make visible and viable a multiplicity of
knowledges, forms of being, and visions of the world. Pluriversality is equality-indifference, the possibility that many worlds can fit in one world. It is the future
alternative to modernity/coloniality.”107 This notion of pluriversality resonates with the
Igbo African aphorism: “egbe bere ugo bere; nke si ibe ya ebele, nku kwa ya” which
means “let the eagle perch and let the kite perch; may the one that denies the other the
right to perch have its wings dislocated.” It is a call to us that in spite of our differences,
we can all coexist in one world without the one oppressing the other. Pluriversality is,
therefore, open to what Mignolo calls macronarratives.
The notion of macronarratives is not a reinscription of metanarratives. Rather, it is
aimed at dethroning the hegemony of abstract universalism of modernity’s global
designs. Mignolo conceives macronarratives “as a network of [multiple diversity of] local
histories and multiple local…[epistemologies]”108 engendering the possibility of
“dialogical thinking”109—which is a thinking with (as subjects) rather than a thinking for
or a thinking about other people and their history (as objects of study)—and “‘double
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translation’ allowing for an intersection between incommensurable (from the perspective
of modernity) forms of knowledge.”110 Within the matrix of pluriversality, every local
history/narrative will have to survive in diversity; it will have to recover itself, structure
itself, and preserve itself, while changing and absorbing.111 Pluriversality, conceived from
the standpoint of border thinking, thus, calls for hospitality and friendship in relating to
others beyond the frontiers established by a totality, a monolingualism, and a
universalism that is falsely universal. This is all the more reason in the context of
globalization that has brought differences to inhabit the same space in a more
interconnected way.
It should be clear by now that identity is found always in relationality and
difference. And since we always exist as relational and integrated beings inhabiting
multiple identities, Mignolo envisions that local identities/histories would be modified by
one another through cross-epistemological conversation requiring a pluritopic rather than
a monotopic hermeneutics. A monotopic hermeneutics—that is, a perspective of a
homogeneous knowing subject located in a purportedly universal, delocalized, and
unsituated no-man’s-land—enshrines the distinction/dichotomy between the knower and
the known, the subject and the object studied, the borderland (as the known) and a pure
disciplinary subject (the knower) uncontaminated by the border matters s/he describes.112
Pluriversality rather underlines that the space of our existing understood in terms of
epistemic locations, is characterized by “their disruption of dichotomies through being
110

Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, 85.

111

Ibid., 246.

112

Ibid., 18.

323

themselves a dichotomy. This, in other words, is [for Mignolo], the key configuration of
border thinking: thinking from dichotomous concepts rather than ordering the world in
dichotomies (emphasis original). Border thinking, in other words, is logically, a
dichotomous locus of enunciation….”113 Border thinking as thinking from dichotomous
concepts which yields macronarratives requires a reconfiguration and transformation of
disciplinary scientificity to become trans-disciplinary/cultural, inter-disciplinary/cultural,
and multi-disciplinary/cultural. No doubt, intellectuals generating and producing
knowledge from subaltern perspectives, have embraced this approach. By and large,
border thinking can be said to be a way out of the labyrinth of the clash of civilizations.
The significance of Mignolo’s insight for negotiating the boundaries of difference
in our interconnected and globalized world cannot be overemphasized. It has relevance
for intercultural, ecumenical, interreligious, feminist, and liberation hermeneutics, as well
as for communion ecclesiology, among others. It also resonates to a very large extent
with my own thesis of relationality from an African perspective. My Nigerian context as
an epistemic space, for instance, is a forced invention of the coloniality of power as a
conglomerate of diverse peoples, cultures, languages, histories, epistemologies, and
religions, constructed without the consultation or participation of the people. If being
Etche-Nigerian is understood, for instance, in terms of epistemic locations, this suggests
that the hyphenated Nigerian is more than simply being an Etche or where the Etches are.
Rather, it entails the relationships and engagements Etches have with the diversity in the
Nigerian space—a conglomerate of diverse cultures, religious faiths, histories, and so
forth, which we could also call epistemic centers—at the intersections of encounters with
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them. In keeping with this understanding, then Etche-Nigerian space is at the same time
Yoruba-, Hausa-, Tiv-, Ogoni-; Catholic-, Muslim-, Protestant-,ATR-space. So to be an
Etche-Catholic, for instance, is, by this configuration, to be in such relations as CatholicMuslim, Catholic-Anglican, Catholic-ATR, and so on. This is what decolonial thought
refers to as the dichotomous nature of pluriversal epistemic locations which disrupts
dichotomies through being themselves a dichotomy.
The dichotomous nature of border thinking and pluriversality creates a condition
of possibility for border thinking in terms of cultural and religious diversity. In terms of
interreligious encounter, it creates a possibility for mutual enrichment of faiths rather
than trying to conflate or resolve these dichotomous categories into monolingual and
homogenous narratives, which, of course, merely renders invisible the coloniality of
power still alive and well today. After all, this is not strange to the nature of Christianity.
As an organized religion, Christianity is modified by its deep roots in Judaic cosmology,
epistemology, history, ethics, and so on. It is also shaped in the formulation of its
doctrines by Greco-Roman traditions and philosophies while in turn, the Christian gospel
also modified and transformed the aforementioned traditions. It is all these traditions
interwoven and cross-fertilized with Christianity that have equally become our own
Christian heritage. But this is a process that remains ongoing if Christianity must be
relevant for every epistemic location which may not simply be a passive but active
recipient of the faith. Hence, these dichotomous forms are constitutive of who we are as
Christians. Undoubtedly, it is in relation to such continual and dynamic engagement of
Christianity with diverse religious traditions, local histories/ epistemologies, and the
situated dichotomous lived experiences of peoples, which invites constant double
325

translations, pluriversal readings and reinterpretations, that strengthens and clarifies the
uniqueness of our faith. Border thinking and pluriversality require that silenced voices
and subjugated epistemologies/histories be heard and foregrounded as they contribute to
the continual shaping of the Christian tradition (which is supposed to be living and
dynamic, not fossilized) through their reasoned reflection on their faith experiences of the
divine. Boodoo is on the mark when he says: “If what we call faith cannot/will not
generate nor be informed by a production of knowledge that breaks the coloniality of
totalizing systems, of idolatry, then that faith is no faith at all, that is ideology.”114 It is
difficult not to agree with Boodoo as he further submits: “Our faith must serve and be
served by the epistemological perspectives that are generated out of the colonial
difference, the dichotomous experiences of our situations, the border thinking that comes
from our forced and dislocated spaces.”115 This is the only way to overcome the tyranny
of the coloniality of power that, unfortunately, is still alive and well today. In what
follows, I will explore an aspect of Etche (African) hospitality which highlights the
revelatory nature of hospitality as a locus of epistemic enunciation and, thus, as a site for
theological reflection.
4.6 The

Etche-African Ritual of Hospitality

Among the Etche, one significant symbolic ritual is the benediction invoked on a
family member who is about to embark on a long journey especially to a far away place. I
have personally had this experience. Those who preside over this ritual are usually the
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parents and grandparents. The ritual, among other things, involves the taking of a pinch
of sand from the ground and imposing them on the right and left big toes of the person
about to travel. In the process, there is invocation of God’s blessings, peace, safety, and
security; the protection of the ancestors as well as a passionate supplication to the
person’s chi to help him/her actualize his/her destiny by bringing the journey to a
successful end and at last to bring the person back home safely. During the process of this
ritual, God is often invoked by such names as the following: Chinedu-ije (God who
directs a person’s journey), Chizoba (God who saves and protects), Chisom (God who
accompanies a person), Chinonso (God who is near), Chinonyere (God with a person),
Chidube (God who leads), Chikwado (God who fructifies and brings plans to their
fulfillment), Chibuzo (God is the way), and so forth. The significance of this ritual is to
underscore that God is with the prospective traveler and will be with him/her even in the
strange place. In other words, the traveler becomes an embodiment of the divine, and
indeed, an icon or sacrament of the divine. Besides, as I pointed out in a previous chapter,
in Etche anthropological assumption, the human person is not just ordinary but has a
unique relation to God because of the presence of chi (spirit) in every human being.116
This particular anthropological assumption also underwrites how the Etche view
people from other cultures and places who they encounter. They tend to view such
persons as equally accompanied by God and by their chi or rather as bearers of the
divine. Hence, hospitality among the Etche assumes the nature of a religious concern for
the other, especially the stranger who is considered sacred and who, as such, is deemed
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revelatory of the divine.117 Hospitality for the Etche is thus not only an ethical practice
but also a religious enactment because it is believed to involve a triadic dynamics of
host←stranger←God. God passes by in the stranger encountered by the host. God comes
to us in the stranger. Therefore, hospitality so understood is not primarily geared either
toward the self-actualization of the host or toward what the host stands to gain out of the
encounter with the other via reciprocity. Rather a divine and transcendent orientation is
the warrant for our human ethical and hospitable responsibility toward the other. For the
Etche, the encounter between the host and the guest is considered to always take place in
the presence and mediation of the Spirit. God and the Spirit meet us in the guise of
strangers who interpellate and challenge our thematizing presuppositions.
This practice of impartation of divine benediction on the prospective traveler as
well as the belief in and recognition of the trace or presence of the divine which passes
through the stranger or visitor is one that is widespread in most of West Africa. Among
the Wum of Cameroon, for example, when a family member is about to travel to a far
country, the parents and grand-parents sit down while the person stands before them. The
parents and the grandparents then bring the two hands of the person together, forming a
cup-like shape and exhaling into the person’s palms while pronouncing blessings and
good wishes upon him/her. Interestingly, the exhalation resonates with the biblical
impartation of the Spirit, the breath of life. God is beseeched to accompany, guide, guard,
and to see the traveler to his/her journey’s end. In a similar way, the Chribo of Liberia
practice exactly the same thing that the Wum people do. With regard to recognizing the
divine in the stranger, the Fang of Gabon believe that an ancestral spirit passes by a
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stranger who consequently should be given hospitality.118 The same is also true of the
Bulsa who believe that ancestral spirits visit them in the form of strangers, orphans,
beggars, the sick, and so on, and therefore, they should be treated with kindness.119
In Etche cosmo-religious tradition, hospitality may be said to be given to different
categories of persons who are distinguished by different designations. Some of this is
based on personal experience. Among different categories of guests, our interest here
focuses on the welcome usually given to two kinds: “obhia,” and “oghaghaa.” An
“obhia” generally could be an invited, known, and expected guest. Such an obhia could
be said to be an invested guest. An obhia could also be unknown but expected. Upon
arrival, an obhia is usually given a good treat by the host. To begin with, obhia is offered
oji (kola nut) which is often accompanied with ose-oji (alligator pepper), garden egg, and
ngwo (palm wine) or another kind of drink in the absence of palm wine as a symbol of
welcome and acceptance by the host.120 An Etche adage says: “eme obhia oji y’ekwuo
hhe okwhoro bia” which means when the guest is first offered kola nut, that is, welcomed
and accepted, then and only then will s/he be able to unpack his message to the host by
unveiling the purpose of his mission. What is important to note here is that the enactment
of hospitality creates an atmosphere of openness that allows the voice of the stranger or
guest to heard rather than silenced. Of course, apart from the initial offer of kola nuts, the
host family cooks delicacies with their best cuisine to entertain an obhia and usually in
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the company and gathering of family and community members.121
The second category of guests is the “oghaghaa.” In Etche conceptual scheme,
the concept of oghaghaa designates a guest who is a total stranger, unknown, uninvited,
and unexpected. The oghaghaa is the wayfaring stranger who simply arrives but whom
society owes justice and kindness. The concept of oghaghaa points to a helpless stranger
who has been pushed to a situation of marginality by forces beyond his or her control, but
who, nevertheless, deserves to be given a hearing and shown solidarity. To be sure, it is
to an oghaghaa that true hospitality is given. Etches see in the oghaghaa something
sacred and will do their best possible to accommodate him/her.122 An oghaghaa could be
someone seeking refuge from oppression, repression, or persecution in his own town or
village; a victim of stigmatism and ostracism, famine, or loss of land; a dislocated and
displaced person, and so on. Etches are blessed with an abundance of arable land. There
have been several cases of those considered oghaghaa who have come into the
community and have been warmly welcomed by host families and the entire
community.123 Such strangers, after telling their stories, have been known to be
incorporated into the community where they usually stay for the long haul in terms of
undetermined period of time. They have been known to be given a piece of land to
cultivate and a house to live in. Again, the men especially have also been known to have
married (if they were unmarried before they came) and raised their own children while
living in the host community. All of these, especially gifts of land and a house to live in
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are given free of charge to an oghaghaa (the stranger). He does not have to pay for the
land or give any kind of compensation to either the host family or the community.
As time progresses, the oghaghaa gradually comes to some understanding of the
ways, the culture, language, traditions, and other aspects of the host community without
necessarily losing his alterity even though as an “in-between” dweller, his identity
becomes reconfigured. As pointed out above, hospitality entails a certain dynamic
fluidity which makes possible the reversibility of roles between host and guest. It is from
this standpoint that the presence of the oghaghaa who represents a distinct epistemic
center contributes in the modification of the host community’s culture/traditions since his
perspective is often given a hearing on issues in the community. The stranger can help to
point out to us areas in the culture that are less humanizing which are not infrequently
taken for granted but nonetheless, need to be addressed.124 At any rate, the stranger who
has come to live in the community comes to be taken more or less as a member of the
community. Eventually, after several years some of them (the oghaghaaswho choose to)
do leave and return to their own home land. What is really our point of interest here is
how the oghaghaa (who is already the suppressed and silenced) is not doubly silenced
again in his host community of refuge. As pointed out above, one of the reasons for this
hospitality shown to the oghaghaa is the belief that the stranger embodies the divine and,
therefore, carries a promise. Hence, the stress it is only through the active role of the host
families and community in receiving, accepting, and welcoming the stranger without
subjugating or silencing him or her, that the promise embodied by the oghaghaa would
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come to pass. To be sure, Etche hospitality is about how we relate to the stranger who is
understood to be revelatory of the divine; it is about openness to welcome difference
without the violence of trying to shape him or her into our own image or subjugating and
silencing his voice.
In the light of the Etche anthropological assumption with regard to the presence of
chi (spirit) in every person including the stranger, we can better appreciate the
significance of their hospitable concern for the oghaghaa. The recognition of the
presence of the spirit in the oghaghaa who approaches serves to awaken in the Etche a
sense of responsibility for accepting and sharing the gift of themselves, their land, and
home with the stranger. For the Etche, hospitality to the oghaghaa is, therefore, not done
on the basis of the pedigree, profile, surname, or where s/he comes from, but rather in
view of what the stranger represents for them—God or the spirit who comes in the
stranger. Hospitality is thus one other way of how the Etche experience the Spirit. Where
authentic hospitality is enacted, there the Spirit, nay, the Triune God, is found. For the
Etche, hospitality to the stranger becomes a pathway to God and God’s pathway to them.
Etch hospitality to the oghaghaa is thus one excellent way of negotiating the boundaries
of difference. Significantly, the model of hospitality pushes relationality beyond the
limits of kinship, tribal, and ethnic settings to build solidarity of others who are not of the
same ethnic group with us, those who do not share the same blood with us or in the same
blood covenant with us. The cardinal imperative for a new, virile, dynamic, and viable
model of building relationships beyond the boundaries of ethnicity in Africa today, may
be met through the metaphor of hospitality. What has been said here so far does not
assume that this manner of hospitality simply comes easy or is achieved instinctively
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without taking cognizance of a usual disorientation that encounters with strangers tend to
foment in us. The Etche, like all humans, do also have their own fair share of human
weaknesses including the tendency to dislike what is the unlike and exclude others who
are not like us from the radius of our religious and ethical concern. The truth of the
matter, however, remains that their understanding of the divine transcendent orientation
of hospitality as the impetus helps invaluably in majority of cases to direct its practice
along the right course; to recognize the stranger (oghaghaa) as the one whose presence
awakens in us a sense of ethical responsibility to accept and share ourselves, our land, our
gifts, and community with him or her without, at the same time subjugating or repressing
him or her.
Contrary to Derrida, who, for fear of determinacy with its tendency to thematize
or degenerate into economic exchange, is more interested in taking flight into vague
abstractions and the “absolute,” the Etche hospitality is historically and concretely
mediated in the situation of the stranger in need of welcome and recognition. Etche
hospitality may not be a perfect one, but it is still better than simply indulging in the near
obsessive stress on absolute unconditioned and the radical discontinuity of determinable
hospitality à la Derrida. We are always historical and situated beings. And historicity is
not the same as or simply reducible to totality. Nor does it necessarily amount to an
automatic totalitarian reduction of the other to the regime of sameness. Hospitality, to be
realistic, necessarily has to be incarnated and mediated as typified in the Etche brand.
Derrida’s position is likened to the skeptic, who driven by an obsessive fear of falling
into error, refuses to believe anything including error itself, and thus, risks finding the
truth. Therefore, Derrida’s negative theology conflates everything into the absolute while
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seemingly turning a blind eye on the need for a concrete constructive hermeneutics of
engagement with ambiguity and pluralism that characterize our historically conditioned
and situated living and experiences. What is worth noting, however, is that in the two
categories of Etche hospitality as we have seen above, the stranger is welcomed as a
bearer of the divine. On account of the stranger’s revelatory character, s/he is welcomed,
recognized, and not silenced in spite of her or his subalternity. Against the backdrop of
the whole idea of the divine passing through the stranger—who embodies a promise and
thus, an epistemic potential—as the foundation of hospitality, we now take a look at
hospitality as an imperative of relational pneumatology.
4.7 Liberative

Hospitality as an Imperative of the Relational Spirit

Hospitality from a Scriptural perspective could be said to be always empowered
by the Spirit of the hospitable God. In the person of Jesus from Nazareth, the unlimited
hospitality of God is incarnated and mediated. It is the Spirit who not only makes
possible but also renders present the hospitality of God mediated through the life, works,
and paschal mysteries of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. As Brendan Byrne suggests, “The
whole mission of Jesus…can be summed up in the phrase ‘the hospitality of God.’”125
Jesus as the one anointed by the relational Spirit concretizes the hospitality and good
news of God in the life of those dislocated and subalternized by the social structures that
oppress, subjugate, and silence them. Because the hospitality of God does not remain an
absolute unconditioned but is always mediated historically reaching its climax in Jesus,
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John Koenig is right in insisting that a deep link always “exists between the verbal
content of God’s good news and its historical embodiment in boundary situations.”126
As we noted previously, the Spirit who descended on Jesus at his baptism and
rested on him marked his anointing and hence, his empowerment for his messianic role as
the one who inaugurates and ushers into the present the eschatological liberative
hospitality of God. As one empowered by the Spirit, wherever Jesus exercised his
messianic ministry, the hospitality of God was made manifest. This is in conjunction with
his inaugural announcement in the synagogue at Nazareth: “The Spirit of the Lord is on
me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to
proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind, to release the
oppressed, to proclaim the year of the Lord’s favor” (Lk 4:18-19). Without succumbing
to the traditional tendency of over-spiritualizing this text and depriving it of its critical
bite and subversive potential, it is clear that this announcement encapsulates a wider
program of social justice and God’s tender hospitality toward the poor, the oppressed, the
subalternized, and the silenced. This understanding comes to a sharper focus when we
come to appreciate the import of the concept of aphesis meaning “release” in Luke’s
Gospel. The significance of this concept, in the words of Byrne, “implies that the
ministry of Jesus will fulfill the program of social justice that, according to Isa 58:5-7,
God required of Israel.”127 The release meant here is not merely spiritualized but actually
embraces a practical historical liberative dimension to it as is already powerfully reflected
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in Mary’s Magnificat: “He has put down the mighty from their thrones and lifted up the
downtrodden” (see Lk 1:46-55); and as enshrined in the Beatitudes (Lk 6:17-26; see Matt
5:1-12). It was a practical interpretive device employed by Jesus not only as a religious
instrument but also as a social one deployed to disturb and challenge the powerful and to
restore hope to the powerless and voiceless. In her own case, Mary recognized that she
has actually been lifted up and released from her situation of invisibility and inaudibility
(which was her lot as a woman under the penumbra shadow of the patriarchal Israelite
society of her time) when she asked the heavenly angel Gabriel in the event of the
Annunciation: “How can this be?” By posing this all important question, the voice of a
woman, a subaltern, for the first time, was given vocality and hearing in the synoptic
Gospels.128 This is more significant when we realize that Mary’s question was posed to a
sovereign, a heavenly authority figure, to whom a woman of her lowly status could not
ordinarily ask such a question (except through the man, her husband) at the time. Besides,
Mary’s question is less a suggestion of doubt than it is of her wanting to be clarified on
her role and contribution toward the concrete embodiment of Jesus in the flesh. This is a
typical example of the cracking of coloniality and the unsubjugation and foregrounding
of a silenced epistemic potential of a subaltern. The irruption of the angel became a
moment of crack in the system of repression which allowed for the enunciation of Mary’s
epistemic potential and destiny. Therefore, the good news which Jesus preaches to the
most isolated and ignored does not remain mere words but actually effects a change by
lifting the oppressed and repressed from a situation of marginality and marginalization to
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reclaim their dignity and equality-in-difference. Thus, as the bearer of God’s liberative
hospitality, Jesus dismantles and dethrones all the mighty structures that dominate and
repress the underdogs, and in turn lifts up the downtrodden, the subaltern, and the
silenced, from the frontiers of the shadows of invisibility and inaudibility to foreground
and legitimize their epistemic potential. The subaltern, like Mary, also has a contribution
to make in bringing to the world and in the shaping of our dynamic faith tradition.
As a background to our understanding of the import of Jesus’ hospitality toward
the margins, it may be helpful to briefly investigate the import of hospitality in the First
Testament (OT). The OT repeatedly returns to the motif: “You shall not oppress the
stranger, for you know the heart of the stranger—you yourselves were strangers in the
land of Egypt” (Ex 23:9). Again, “When a stranger lives with you in your land, do not illtreat him” (Lev 19:33). Hospitality was also understood to be revelatory of the divine.
Abraham and Sarah upon welcoming the three strangers did not know they were showing
hospitality to God (Gen 18:1-15; cf. Heb 13:2). This valorizes the theological
significance of the stranger as an epistemic center and a site of revelation. Indeed, this
Abrahamic role as an ideal host who welcomed the irruption of the divine in the strangers
became archetypal in ancient Judaism.129
However, as time progressed, “a number of forces—socioeconomic, political, and
religious—worked to…[diminish or preclude the practice of hospitality]. In diverse ways
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Palestinian Judaism prior to 70 C. E. suffered from tendencies toward exclusivism.”130For
example, many of the purity ritual laws (cf. Lev12-19 ) came to be translated and
interpreted in such ways as to regulate and set limits to the encounter and interaction with
those considered unclean. Those who were considered ritually unclean, the likes of
lepers, hemorrhaging women, and Gentiles or pagans, were to have nothing to do with
the community of the people in the name of purity of tradition.131 At some point, these
purity ritual laws became ideological, and were instrumentalized by the powerful
religious authorities to oppress and repress, to exclude and denigrate certain categories of
people in the Israelite community. Among other things, it is this anomaly that the
hospitality of Jesus serves as a scathing condemnation and aims to dismantle.
Equipped for his messianic mission with the power of the Spirit, Jesus would
engage the powerful entrenched forces that seek to oppress, silence, and deprive all those
excluded and marginalized, of their God-given human dignity.132 On various occasions,
therefore, through his actions and words, Jesus challenged and condemned the oppressive
religious, political, and socio-economic structures of his day. In keeping with such a
stance, Jesus went out of his way to challenge “exclusivism wherever it was officially
sanctioned or accepted as normal. Above all, the challenge is dramatized in stories about
Jesus’ association at table with the marginal people known as tax collectors and
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sinners.”133
In many cases, Jesus would be both a guest of, and a host to those regarded by the
religious tradition as “sinners”—tax collectors, publicans, and prostitutes (cf. Matt 9:913; Mk 2:13-17; Lk 5:27-32; 7:36-50). Jesus touched and healed lepers who were
declared untouchable and quarantined outside the community, silenced and not allowed
to communicate with any body for the sake of not contaminating ritual purity (cf. Mk
1:40-45). What is interesting to note here, especially in the case of Zaccheus, the tax
collector (Lk 19;1-10), and the leper, after Jesus had released them from their repressed
situations, for the first time in the Bible,their voices are heard. For the first time, we hear
the silenced voice of Zaccheus: “But Zaccheus stood up and said to the Lord, ‘Look
Lord! Here and now I give half of my possessions to the poor.” In the case of the leper,
although Jesus had asked him not to tell anyone about his healing except the priest;
“However, as soon as the man went out, he began spreading the news everywhere.” From
their individual experiences of the Lord in their own unique situations, they have a story
to narrate which must not be silenced. This is what the relational and liberative
hospitality of God is about. Joachim Jeremias writes, “The inclusion of sinners in the
community of salvation, achieved in table-fellowship, is the most meaningful expression
of the message of the redeeming love of God.”134 This redeeming or liberative love of
God expressed through the hospitality of Jesus aims at the restitution of such excluded,
silenced groups and persons who deserved to be recognized and heard. In this way, the
inclusive hospitality of Jesus is subversive and condemnatory of the structures of
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oppression and repression.
Furthermore, it is the same point that is underscored in the parable of the great
banquet organized by a king for his son. In this parable, Jesus aims to dismantle the social
structures that perpetuate the ignoring of those who are already marginalized and
subalternized by society. Hence, the poor, the crippled, the lame, the blind who were
among the oppressed and marginalized in the world of ancient Judaism were all brought
in to partake of the meal (cf. Lk 14:15-24; Matt 22:1-14). In this parable, Jesus relativizes
all classificatory structures that denigrate, ignore, and stifle the epistemic potentials of the
repressed and excluded. The margins are at last given the chance to become visible to
reclaim their equality-in-difference in the kingdom fellowship. Jesus’ hospitality here
entails a dethroning of the system of domination. In all these instances, Jesus
demonstrates by his actions and words that the hospitality of God does not exclude
anyone; that the margins constitute a privileged place of divine irruption that should be
recognized and heard.
This point is further orchestrated in Jesus’ encounter with the Samaritan woman at
the well. The Hebrew people treated the Samaritans as despised aliens who do not
possess the God of Israel. Plus, she was also a woman (who had no place in the scheme
of things in the society). But Jesus as the one empowered by the relational Spirit
dismantled the barriers of both ethnic and male chauvinism and reached out to the
Samaritan and extended God’s hospitality to her (Jn 4:1-42). After her experience of
Jesus in her situation, for the first time, her voice was given vocality and hearing as she
told the whole town the gospel about Jesus. Jesus unsubjugated and lifted her from
marginality to the foreground. Again, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus
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projected the Samaritan as the one who acted as a true neighbor to the stranger robbed,
beaten, and left half dead. The story of the kindness and hospitality of the Good
Samaritan by Jesus is aimed at condemning the social and religious structures and
institutions that perpetuated exclusion and repression. For the sake of purity of tradition
and ritual cleanness, the priest and Levite ignored an act of kindness to a half-dead man
when he most needed assistance and support. For the sake of purity of tradition, those
viewed as outsiders are often ignored and excluded. At worst, they are thematized and
totalized by being reduced into the regime of sameness. Indeed, purity of tradition, if
there is such a thing, is an illusion of ideological and totalitarian systems. Is it any
surprise that in the name of pure Christian tradition, authentic canon, translation, and
interpretation, the epistemic potentials and voices of the already silenced subalterns have
continued to be silenced today? Goodness, kindness, excellent cultural values and
treasures, can also be learned from the subaltern, the outsider as typified by the Good
Samaritan. No one person, group, or tradition has a monopoly of goodness and truth.
God’s grace and gift of holiness is not limited to any one particular group of people or
tradition. This invites pluriversality and a plurality of traditions that allows for the voices
of the silenced, the values of subjugated and subalternized epistemic locations, to be
foregrounded, legitimized, and heard. Therefore, God’s hospitality as embodied by
Jesus—the one anointed and empowered by the Spirit—is inclusive, subversive, and
prophetic. Its inclusion of those denigrated, marginalized, and oppressed by the
entrenched forces that seek to impoverish their dignity means that true hospitality is lifegiving and life-affirming. Its prophetic stance seeks to subvert, to challenge, to
overthrow, and to transform whatever structures that generate oppression, exclusion, and
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thwart human dignity. In this sense, hospitality is also liberative and redemptive.
It is in the light of scenes as the ones just pointed out that Jesus would begin to get
into conflicts with the domination system. The increasing conflict between Jesus—on
account of his inclusive, interpellatory, and prophetic hospitality—and the entrenched
powerful forces that ruled his world climaxed in the crucifixion. He was murdered for
daring to be in solidarity of subalterns and for speaking from the wound of colonial
difference and subalternity, when he should be silent. He was killed for not preserving the
oppressive and suppressive religious practices of the system of purity and holiness.135
Indeed, the cross is the height of Jesus’ hospitality to and solidarity of the margins where
he gave the superabundant and supreme gift of himself for their sake. On the cross, Jesus
ends the circle of economy of exchange and indebtedness. On the cross he ultimately
dissipated himself completely for others to the point of giving his own life in their place.
But before he suffered, Jesus dramatized and sacramentalized this immeasurable self-gift
as a testimony of his credible love and friendship in the Eucharist. Let me now talk a little
bit on the Eucharist in relation to hospitality.
4.7.1 The Eucharist and Hospitality
In the Eucharist and on the cross, Jesus proved, contra Derrida, that unconditional
and unlimited gift giving and hospitality is an impossible possibility since God makes the
impossible possible. In a sense, the Eucharist as the sacrament of Jesus’ gratuitous total
self-gift for the salvation of the community is the highest form of hospitality and
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friendship. Greater love has no one than to give his life for his friends (cf. Jn 15:13). The
Derridean standpoint with regard to the impossibility of the gift and hospitality because
they are unpresentable and unrealizable within the parameters of historico-temporal
determinacy is precisely what is made present in the Eucharist. The Eucharist is the
sacrament of Jesus’ love, hospitality, and friendship. Both as sacramentalized in the
Eucharist and as enacted on the cross, the hospitality and friendship of Jesus are not left
as abstract absolutes but are actually mediated and made concrete in history without
diminution or reduction to the regime of economy. The notion of gift with regard to the
divine is one with a profound theological import. Theologically, divine gift is another
name for grace. And by nature, grace is that which is a “non-value,” a “non-worth,” a
“non-object,” or that which is unquantifiable, incalculable, immeasurable, ungraspable,
and always excess. That is why grace is said to be constituted by gratuitousness and
graciousness. It is gratuitous because given free of charge and gracious because
unlimited. God’s self-gift as grace (non-object) means that the transcendent-immanent,
the absent-present God, is nothing of what is. It is precisely because God is nothing of
what is, that God must “become.” God continues to become but never arrives, never
reducible to a finished-product which would amount to objectification. Because God
continues to become, he becomes through a symbolic or iconic body in which to presence
himself without being identical with the icon. The icon becomes only a translucent mirror
through which God presences by gradually saturating it without being consigned to the
measure of our gaze on the icon as in the case of an idol.136 The historical Jesus from
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Nazareth is thus the Ursakrament (original or primordial sacrament) who iconizes God
and through whom God becomes body. In the Eucharist God continues to become but
never finishes coming. Through the Eucharistic double epiclesis, the bread (gift of the
earth and work of human hands) and the assembled community, become the body of
Christ. In the Eucharist, God continues to become both cosmic and human body. The
God who is distant and absent is the one who is near and presences in the Eucharist.
Since it is the Spirit who edifies the church, the sacraments of the church including the
Eucharist, are both gift and grace of the Holy Spirit.137
Again, as the Messiah, Jesus’ relationship to others is not about conquest and
domination as it is about liberation, subversion, and transformation of unjust social and
religious structures that diminish life. During the Last Supper, when Jesus instituted the
Eucharist in the power of the Spirit, after washing the feet of the disciples, in a long
discourse, Jesus spoke his final words to them concerning his impending death, the
coming of the Spirit, and how they are to live and relate to one another. In a very moving
way, Jesus calls his followers, “friends” especially because of the openness in his
relationship with them. He did not hide from them anything he has learned from the
Father. Relationality, hospitality, and friendship, require that openness and honesty exist
between parties engaged in a relationship in the recognition of their equality-indifference. In genuine friendship, self-sacrifice for the sake of one’s friend rather than
totalization is key to lasting relationships. Because he regards his followers as his friends,
Jesus could say “Greater love has no one than this, that he lay down his life for his
137

See the document of the Joint Commission for the Theological Dialogue Between the Roman
Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church, Faith, Sacraments, and the Unity of the Church (June 1987), §
15.

344

friends” (Jn 15:13). Jesus chose the disciples and also elevated them to the level of
friends. What friends do for each other is self-emptying for the sake of the other. This is
what Jesus commands his friends to do: “‘You are my friends if you do what I
command.’ ‘My command is this: Love each other as I have loved you’” (Jn 15:14,12).
He loved by his willingness to lay down his life for their sake. Thus, the friendship that
Jesus recommends for his followers is one that is self-sacrificial and non-totalizing.
Jesus’ example is, therefore, meant to teach the disciples the radicality of God’s relational
engagement with humanity as one of friendship. This is the pattern and vision the
followers of Jesus are to imitate in their relations to others. They are to relate and engage
others who also are God’s friends especially those at the margins, including nonChristians on the model of friendship and hospitality. Jesus’ hospitality and friendship
constitute the model and the condition of possibility for Christian hospitality and
friendship.
The reality of the Eucharist thus grounds our hope and is a spur for our striving
toward the achieving of unconditional gift and hospitality. Jesus’ self-gift in the Eucharist
symbolized by material bread and wine is a sign that God’s hospitality cares about and
takes seriously what happens to the human person (who is a composite of body, soul, and
spirit with intellectual, intuitional, emotive, psychological, and other dimensions). Jesus
gave his life that the community may be saved. But then, God’s gracious self-gift in
Christ, is both a gratuity and a task. It challenges and calls us to express God’s hospitality
not only toward others (by flourishing the life of all and eliminating all unjust and deathdealing institutions) but also toward all of God’s creation and our environment.138 In the
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gift of the Eucharist, we also become the “flesh of Christ” in order to share intimately in
the situations and struggles of those who are being oppressed, silenced, and subalternized
by social structures and to bring them release (aphesis) as Jesus did.
To carry out this task of hospitality, the church is totally dependent on the Spirit.
As Thomas Hughson writes, “Invoking the Spirit expresses and enacts a constitutive and
constant dependence of the eucharistic community and presider on the Spirit for the
transformation of the gifts, no less than the institution narrative expresses and manifests
continuity with Christ’s words and acts at the Last Supper.”139 The Eucharistic epiclesis
thus displays the nature of the church as one which is constitutively and constantly
dependent on the Spirit in ever-new fidelity to Christ. Hence, the Spirit empowers the
members of the Eucharistic community as the body of Christ with gifts to bear witness to
the hospitality of God embodied in the Eucharist. The gifts of the Spirit are for creativity,
for service to others, and for building up the community. Since all have been gifted,
hospitality requires that these gifts (whether of individuals, groups, or local traditions,
etc.) be recognized and not subjugated and silenced. This means that the Spirit is not a
possession of the church as a piece of property. Nor is the Spirit merely at the disposal of
the church as its divine assistant, albeit, the church “can and may ask for the coming of
the Holy Spirit and can be certain that this plea will be heard.”140 But always, the church
“exists and acts in all aspects and dimensions in radical dependence on the somewhat
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unpredictable action of the Spirit…”141
The Eucharist is reconciliatory by nature. It reconciles us to one another as
members of the one body and to God. As Paul puts it, “But now in Christ Jesus, you who
once were far away have been brought near through the blood of Christ. For he himself is
our peace, who…has destroyed the barrier, the dividing wall of hostility [which separated
us]” (Eph 2:13-15). Furthermore, “He destroyed hatred and reconciled us…to God
through the cross, making…[us] one body” (Eph 2:16). With all this in mind, Paul then
underscores an all important point: “consequently, you are no longer foreigners and
aliens, but fellow citizens with God’s people and members of God’s household” (Eph
2:19). In the power of the Spirit, Eucharistic hospitality builds relationships across
differences making it possible for all to feel welcomed in God’s household. The Spirit
who accomplishes the Eucharist is thus the power “of fluidity that permeates or
circumnavigates the barricades of impossibility we erect.”142 In the Eucharist we are built
into a community, a fruitful communion that honors equality-in-difference. As a
community built out of equality-in-difference, it requires that no person’s charisms or
group cultural values and local epistemologies be subjugated and subalternized by a
regime of the coloniality of power. The relational Universal Spirit who blows where she
wills and bestows gifts freely is also present and actively at work in the region of colonial
difference where border thinking takes place.
It is the relational Spirit who makes it possible for us to crisscross the boundaries
of our differences and engenders understanding across differences. This is exactly the gift
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that the Spirit bestowed on the church on the day of Pentecost. The Spirit’s gift of
polyglossia at Pentecost shattered the imperialistic and totalizing monolingualism of
Babel and restored the beauty of pluriversality to its rightful place (Acts 2:1-18). With the
gift of polyglossiaat Pentecost, the Spirit empowers the church to welcome pluriversality
by creating space for macronarratives and fostering equality-in-difference. Indeed, it was
this marvel of plurilanguagism by the Spirit at Pentecost that jolted the church into
mission ad gentes. The challenges and opportunities which difference presents become
for the church through the power of the Spirit always an occasion for coming to a new
understanding through constant rereading of the Bible, translation, and reinterpretation.
Any claim to a static authentic interpretation with a universal application irrespective of
distinct local histories and situated lived experiences becomes not only ideological but
reinscribes and supports the totalizing discourse of the coloniality of power. The tongues
of fire of the Pentecostal Holy Spirit are many and pluriversal. When the tongues of fire
rested on each of the disciples, filled with the Holy Spirit, they began to speak other
languages as the Spirit enabled them to speak. Everyone in the crowd consisting of
diverse groups from the different parts of the world who heard them were excited because
each heard them speaking and proclaiming in their own native language, what God, the
Savior does. A hermeneutic of hospitality as an imperative of the relational Spirit’s
economy of abundance (a plurality of gifts for many and different Christian practices and
services for the good of others and the world) thus upends the spiral of the economy of
exchange and indebtedness. As members of the body of Christ and as those who become
the Eucharistic body of Christ through the epiclesis of the Spirit, we, and the church,
continue to be gifted by the relational Spirit for hospitality and friendship.
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4.8 Hospitality

and Eschatology

Already we have established that Christian hospitality which entails a
transformative encounter with the stranger is an imperative of the relational Spirit. The
same Spirit who anointed and empowered Jesus to be the embodiment of God’s abundant
and inclusive hospitality also empowered the church at Pentecost to participate in and
embody divine hospitality in its relations to others. Through the life, death, resurrection,
and ascension of Jesus, the reign of God has already been inaugurated while awaiting its
eschatological fulfillment. The relational Spirit poured out on Pentecost makes
participation in God’s hospitality possible. The church bears witness to this possibility
through its hospitable practices toward those usually considered outsiders by working out
their release from what oppresses and silences them.143
The imperative of the Spirit to bear witness to God’s hospitality reminds the
church of the need to be open to pluriversality of macronarratives and to the dignity of
equality-in-difference in a World Christianity today. The church can still carry out its
mission without necessarily reducing everyone to the regime of the same through the
coloniality of power (which would involve doing violence to subaltern local histories and
epistemologies through totalization). As we noted earlier, the impossibility of absolute
and pure hospitality is what has been made possible in Jesus and in his gift of the
Eucharist. For the church, however, hospitality as embodied in the Eucharist remains an
eschatological ideal and a lure as the church continually and anticipatorily strives toward
the eschaton in its historical situatedness and particularity. While presently inhabiting the
“in-between” of the eschatological tension, the church and the members of the body of
143
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Christ are challenged to ceaselessly and unflinchingly witness to the eschatological but
liberative hospitality of God concretized in the work of peace, justice, and righteousness
in a globalized but fragmented world of violence and conflicts. As those who have been
loved and made friends of God, we are called to join in the divine mutual ecstatic dance
of love (perichoresis) and propagate divine hospitality in the world. It is in the nature of
dance to alluring and contagious. An Igbo aphorism puts it succintly: “onye amaghi agba,
y’ekwewe n’isi” meaning “even if one does not know the dance step, the lure of the dance
makes one join by nodding one’s head. The relational Spirit ushers us into a divine milieu
of mutual dance of love in order that we might embody the dance and transform the
world into the kingdom. By joining in the divine dance, we embody it and continue to
open it out to the world. Socio-cosmic disharmony results when human beings who are
not only destined for the Triune dance but who have actually been swept into the dance
refuse to gyrate according to the rhythm, and instead introduce a counter-rhythm through
unjust relationships, exploitation, oppression, and repression. Hospitality as a model
holds enormous promise that is relevant for constructing an African theology that takes
Africans’ situated lived experiences and histories seriously.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the importance of the model of hospitality as a
practical framework for negotiating the boundaries of difference. We investigated the
nuances which distinguish true and genuine hospitality/friendship from covenant and a
relationship driven by the desire and quest for self-actualization. From the vantage point
of its revelatory, interpellatory, and fluid character, hospitality is best enacted in the “inbetween,” in the border or the space of colonial difference where border thinking takes
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place to unsubjugate subalternized voices and local histories/epistemologies through the
coloniality of power. It is this understanding that we find behind the practice of
hospitality by Jesus which climaxed in the complete gift of himself for the salvation of
others and sacramentalized in the Eucharist. For the church, hospitality is thus both a gift
and a task. The model of hospitality still holds enormous potential for the transformation
of imagination that would usher in social transformation especially as it concerns Africa.
At any rate, hospitality remains an eschatological ideal to which the church strives while
presently coursing through the tensive eschatological ‘in-between.”
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Chapter 5
Toward an African Christian Relational Pneumatology:
Significance for Being Church Today
5.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I have tried to establish from both biblical and Christian
traditions how the Holy Spirit is the Lord and the Giver of life. It has also been our task
to seek a reinterpretation and a rearticulation of this confession in a way that allows for
new understandings of the Holy Spirit in order to elicit its relevance for being church in
present day Africa in the context of the ambiguities of globalization. In this chapter, we
will look at the Universal Holy Spirit in the light of the multiplicity of spirits in West
African world-views in order to gain new understandings about the Spirit. We shall
examine the mission of the Spirit as distinct from that of Christ in order to focus our
discussion. Toward constructing an African relational pneumatology, we shall be drawing
and building on the insights of African Initiated Churches (AICs). The implications of
this pneumatology for being church in postcolonial Nigeria and Africa today would be
explored. And finally, we shall investigate a way forward for African theology.
5.2 The

Holy Spirit and Other spirits in the World

As the Giver of life, the Spirit of God is the Creator and sustainer of all life forms
including human life in the world. Not only this, the work of the Spirit in the world also
entails resisting all life-negating forces that try to diminish and impoverish life. Thus, as
Lord, the Spirit is the resistant and prophetic power of God for liberation and salvation
not only from sin but also from all manifestations of the destructive effects of sin
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particularly as they affect the poor, the marginalized, the oppressed, and the exploited.
All this is a way of showing how the Spirit of God is involved in and with the world.
Notwithstanding the fact of her own hypostatic entitative reality, the Holy Spirit is,
clearly, a way of referring to God’s universal presence and active working in the world.
As pointed out previously, God is immanent in all things through the Spirit. The Spirit
who anointed and empowered Jesus for his redemptive work is one and the same as the
life-giving rûah Elohim who birthed creation into being. Indeed, Jacques Dupuis is right
when he writes: “The immanent presence of the Holy Spirit is always and in all
circumstances the reality of God’s saving grace.”1As I had already made clear, we shall
be using both the personal and impersonal properties in talking about the Personhood of
the Holy Spirit since the Bible allows for both ways of expression.
If the Universal Holy Spirit has been pervasively present in the whole world
before the incarnation of the divine Logos, how do we make a sense of the awareness of
the existence of “other spirits” predominant in the spirit-world of other cosmo-religious
world-views and traditions in the world? Do these “other spirits” have anything to do
with the Universal Holy Spirit and if so, could they shed a different light on biblical data
and perhaps challenge the traditional paradigm with regard to our understanding of the
Spirit’s activity in religions, cultures, and history in general? Or are they mutually
exclusive and opposed to each other? How can talk about the Holy Spirit become
meaningful within the context of other “distinctive cultural understandings of ‘spirit’”2 or
1
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“spirits” as the case may be? In what follows, I shall re-examine some materials from the
Bible and Patristic tradition as well as certain scholarly endeavors that would help us to
broach an other understanding of the relationship between the Holy Spirit and “other
spirits.” The goal here is to establish that there exists a precedence in the Bible and early
tradition with regard to how to construe the relationship between the Holy Spirit and
other spirits. This approach will be helpful toward an understanding of how it is that the
Universal Holy Spirit has been actively present and at work in cultures, religions, and
world-views outside the boundaries of Christianity. It should also be kept in mind that the
“other spirits” in question here are not to be understood according to the Christian
conception of “demons” in the sense of spirits opposed to God. Rather, we have in mind
spirits that are conceived as compatible with (and in some cases as the modalities of) the
dynamic hierarchy of the Supreme God.
In the first place, there is no doubt, according to the Christian confession, that
Jesus is the definitive revelation of God. However, it is legitimately arguable that Jesus is
not the exclusive revelation of God. As Gavin D’Costa suggests, “Jesus is called totus
Deus, never totum Dei; wholly God, but never the whole of God.”3 While Jesus is wholly
God, he is neither the Father nor the Spirit. Nor is he the entire Trinity personified. God is
more than the person of Jesus because the Triune God also includes the Persons of the
Father and the Spirit. Jesus as the definitive revealer of the Father—whom no one has
ever seen—is the Way and the one who leads us to the Father in the Spirit: “Whoever
sees me sees the Father” (Jn 14:9). But such revelation “is never completely exhausted in
3
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history.”4 As Jesus says to his disciples, “I still have many things to tell you, but you
cannot bear them now. When he, the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into the
whole truth” (Jn 16:12). Again, as I indicated in Chapter 2, albeit Jesus is the definitive
revelation of God insofar as the incarnation is concerned (in that there would not be a
second incarnation), but precisely as the eikon of God, this revelation cannot be
exhausted in history by the church at any time. Therefore, in spite of the definitive selfdisclosure of God in Jesus, the complexity of such revelation invites the awareness that
God still maintains his mysterious and hidden quality as well as his distance and
otherness from humans even in the person of Jesus Christ. Besides, it is also legitimate to
say that the particularity and historicity of the humanity of Jesus from Nazareth in all its
Jewishness could not have exhausted all about the divine pre-Incarnate Logos.
Consequently, no single or particular group of traditions, neither Jewish, Greco-Roman,
nor African can completely appropriate the holy mystery that God is. It is through the
universality and pervasive presence of the Spirit, blowing where she wills (Jn 3:8), that
she “constantly and in surprising ways calls us into deeper understanding of God in
Christ.”5 The Spirit plays this role, albeit, without focusing attention on herself. The
Spirit is rather the light in which we see light. It is in the Spirit that we see, know, and
have access to Christ and through him (Christ) to the Father. The Spirit is indeed our true
access to the Triune God. Thus, as the Lord and Giver of Life, it is the relational Spirit
who creates, empowers, and relates to each creature, “bringing each [and all creation]
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into communion with the Trinity.”6 In order to gain some helpful understanding about the
relationship between the Holy Spirit and “other spirits” particularly in Etche -West
African cosmo-religious universe, let us first examine the church’s emergent
understanding with regard to the presence and operation of the Universal Holy Spirit in
the world and in non-Christian religions.
5.2.1 Vatican II and Beyond: The Church’s Emergent Understanding

of the Universal Spirit
When, in his December 25, 1961 apostolic constitution, Humanae salutis (Of
Human Salvation), pope John XXIII set out to convoke Vatican II, he set the tone and
tenor of the council within the horizon of “a new Pentecost.” In the prayer dedicated to
the opening of the council, the pope made a plea to the Holy Spirit: “Renew your
wonders in our time, as though for a new Pentecost.”7 With this plea, the entire
proceedings and outcomes of the council were placed under the horizon and influence of
the Spirit with an abiding trust that the Holy Spirit would not fail to direct the
deliberations and orientations of the general councils. This plea appears to be grounded in
the enduring belief that the Spirit unceasingly brings about newness. Hence, the prayer
for a new Pentecost was not merely a plea for a repetition of the original event but
stemmed from a conviction that Pentecost is ongoing. Therefore, John XXIII had in
mind, unlike previous councils, a council whose preoccupation would not simply be
definition of dogmas and clarification of disciplines. This approach, to be sure, did not
6
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emanate from any disdain for dogma, doctrine, or church discipline. Rather, taking their
validity for granted, the pope envisioned a pastoral council for the renewal/reform
(aggiornamento) in the self-understanding of the church and its relations to its otherness
in the light of new conditions and “signs of the times” in the modern world that is both
historical and natural. Through the invocation for a new Pentecost, the pope placed this
vision of aggiornamento under the domain of the Spirit’s sway and leadership with the
realization that the Spirit is the protagonist and agent of newness and renewal.
But in spite of the preponderant attention given to the Spirit in the beginning and
all through the council, precisely as not a dogmatic council, there was not a dogmatic and
systematic treatment of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Although, references to the Holy
Spirit appear at least 258 times in the entire gamut of the council documents, such sheer
enumeration does not, in and of itself, according Yves Congar, yield a conciliar
Pneumatology.8 Out of the 16 conciliar documents, Congar, however, goes on to identify
six of what he calls “elements of true pneumatology that were present at the Second
Vatican Council.”9 They include: (1) the Christological reference to the Spirit as the
Spirit of Christ; (2) the communal structure of the church serves Christ’s Spirit; (3) a
trinitarian view of the economy of creation and grace; (4) the Spirit as source of charisms,
renewal, and coinstitutive of the church; (5) the Spirit as the principle of the communion
of local churches; and (6) a certain recognition of the Spirit already active in history
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before the recapitulation in Christ.10
Of particular interest to us is the last element mentioned by Congar. In several
places in different documents, the council speaks, for instance, of the Spirit of the Lord
“who fills the whole earth;”11 “who directs the unfolding of time and renews the face of
the earth, and who is not absent from this development;”12 who “was at work in the world
before Christ was glorified;”13 and “who works on man and turns him toward God.”14
Additionally, the council developed some positive view of other religions and cultures as
containing “elements of truth and grace,” and hence can be salvific.15 In keeping with this
positive attitude, the church vouches to reject “nothing of what is true and holy in these
religions;”16 and exhorts Christians that, “while witnessing to their own faith and way of
life, [they should] acknowledge, preserve and encourage the spiritual and moral truths
found among non-Christians, also their social life and culture.”17But one thing, however,
remains important to be noted. In spite of this positive outlook and recognition of the
presence of grace and truth in the beliefs, rituals, religious sense, human values, virtuous
10
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practices, treasures of wisdom, hospitable and moral living of other religions which guide
their adherents to God, the council still views them as merely partial, temporary, and,
therefore, defective. For the council, regardless of all of these fruits and values which can
only be attributed to the active presence of the Universal Spirit, the other religions, as
preparations for the Gospel, are only straining and reaching toward their true completion
and fulfillment in Christianity and more precisely, in the one church (Roman Catholic) of
Christ. In other words, according to this fulfillment model which provided the gestalt for
the council’s thinking, unknown to these religions and their adherents, is the assumption
that the presence of elements of truth and grace in them ultimately comes from Christ and
orient them toward the one church of Christ. This reservation on the part of the church
comes to expression in one of the conciliar documents on the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World: “For since Christ died for all people, and since the ultimate
vocation of the human race is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe that the Holy
Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to every person [including non-Christians]
the possibility of being associated with this paschal mystery.”18 This positive
acknowledgement on the part of the church that “the Holy Spirit [who] in a manner
known only to God,” invisibly but actively offers grace in all peoples and religions,
points, at least implicitly to the possibility of salvation for people outside the boundaries
of the church’s word, sacrament, and apostolic ministry. This is also in connection with
the universal salvific will of God. But after all is said and done, the council’s thinking
shaped by the fulfillment model still maintains that the presence of saving mystery and
grace to all peoples (and far less explicit, to all religions) remains the saving mystery of
18
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Christ requiring the necessity of the church (Catholic) as the ordinary means of salvation.
What this comes down to, according to this theory, is that the elements of truth and grace
present in the “others” and their religio-cultural traditions are already found in
Christianity and superabundantly in the Catholic Church. Put another way, there is
nothing fundamentally different or new in these “others” that is not already found in
superabundance in the church. This appears to be the much that the council could
cautiously say with regard to the Universal Spirit of God who fills the whole world and is
thus, present and active in non-Christian religions. Postconciliar theology, nonetheless,
developed a greater sensitivity toward the “others” and their religio-cultural traditions.
Along this line, Karl Rahner’s influence which contains a seminal insight, among others,
remains pivotal though not without its own pitfalls. The shape of Rahner’s argument
looks like this:
Given that human beings are not pure individual spirits but embodied spirits
-in-the-world with a social nature, all their relationships are mediated through the structures present in their society at any historical moment. The same
holds true for relationship with God. It is quite unthinkable that salvation
could be achieved as a private, interior reality outside of the religious bodies
in the environment in which people live. Since experience of the divine is
embodied in the creeds, rituals, and moral codes of religious traditions, these
concrete religions necessarily become the mediation of salvation in various
cultures.19
This Rahnerian approach, on all counts, expresses a deeper sensitivity toward the
“others” and their traditions. It amounts to a seminal but significant and real
acknowledgement of the reality of religious pluralism. However, it is not as innocent as it
seems. For what forms the infrastructure with regard to Rahner’s edifice is the “inclusive
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presence of Christ” model. Thus, in spite of his remarkable insight and apparent openness
to the otherness of other religions, Rahner could not disentangle himself from what has
come down as the requirement of the invested central affirmation of the Christian faith.
This key affirmation is conceived as the mystery of the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as the
universal Savior of all humankind. For Rahner, this mystery is already operative in all
religions such that members of other religions are saved in Christ, albeit, not despite but
through their own religious practice and belief. Precisely as the epitome of embodied
spirit par excellence via the incarnation, the movement of God toward humanity and of
human transcendentality toward God finds its climatic expression in Jesus Christ who is
mysteriously present in every religion. Because this human transcendentality toward God,
according to Rahner’s transcendental theological anthropology, is an existential condition
in which it is created, all human persons are caught up in a “supernatural existential”
transcendence toward union with God. This movement toward union with God is not the
result of a natural desire or search, or for that matter, a yearning for God. Rather, it is
created by God freely and graciously in the human person and destined for God.
Consequently, Rahner opines that all human beings—who may not become Christians
through the gospel, sacrament, and apostolic ministry—are saved by Christ the universal
Savior, even if it is unknown to them. They are already “anonymous Christians” since all
other religions are “anonymous Christianity” because of the grace of the inclusive
presence of Christ that is universally operative in them.20 Consequently, Rahner’s
20
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position becomes susceptible to the charge of inclusivism.
However, along this line of profounder sensitivity as found in Postconciliar
theology, the singular contribution of Pope John Paul II remains outstanding. More than
any other pope before him, John Paul II—in what appears as an unprecedented
endorsement as well as a real and important advance—emphatically “affirms the
operative presence of the [Universal] Spirit of God in the religious life of non-Christians
and the religious traditions to which they belong.”21 Following the path of the
achievements and insights of his two predecessors (John XXIII mediately and Paul VI
immediately), John Paul II, in his first encyclical, Redemptoris Hominis,set for his
pontificate, inter alia, the goal of unity and dialogue among Christians and with nonChristians. With regard to the latter (non-Christians), the pope acknowledges in no
uncertain terms the operative presence of the Spirit of truth in the “firm belief” of the
other religions when he asks:
Does it not sometimes happen that the firm belief of the followers of the
non—Christian religions—a belief that is also an effect of the Spirit of
truth operating outside the visible confines of the Mystical Body—can
make Christians ashamed at being often themselves so disposed to doubt
concerning the truths revealed by God and proclaimed by the Church and
so prone to relax moral principles and open the way to ethical permissive-

temporary, and so defective blind human yearning and search for God which only finds fulfillment in
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ness?22
This affirmation of the operative presence of the Spirit of truth in the “firm belief” of the
other religions became recurrent in John Paul’s numerous speeches, writings, and even
prayers. Appropriating the texts of John 3:8 which speaks about the Spirit who “blows
where he wills;” and Romans 8:26 where Paul speaks about the Holy Spirit who prays in
us, respectively, the Pope underlines that every authentic prayer both of Christians and
non-Christians is inspired by the same Spirit of the same living God even when, for
some, this God is the great Unknown. According to him, “We trust that wherever the
human spirit opens itself in prayer [even] to this Unknown God, an echo will be heard of
the same Spirit who, knowing the limits and weakness of the human person, himself
prays in us and on our behalf, ‘expressing our plea in a way that could never be put into
words’ (Rom 8:26).”23 Again, in his address to the members of the Roman curia on
December 22, 1986, in the wake of the October 17, 1986 World Day of Prayer for Peace
held at Assisi, the pope alluded to the mystery of unity of all of humankind grounded in
creation and redemption. Accordingly, that unity which cuts across differences and
divisions was palpably manifested during the Day and in the atmosphere of authentic
Prayer. For the pope then, every authentic prayer always takes place under the influence
and within the horizon of the Spirit. He thus submits: “We can indeed maintain that every
authentic prayer is called forth by the Holy Spirit, who is mysteriously present in the
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heart of every person.”24 But the pope did not simply stop at this. Perhaps working under
the assumption that what appears to be new doctrinal statements or teachings do not
necessarily revoke their antecedents, John Paul II’s deeper sensitivity to the presence and
operation of the Universal Holy Spirit of God is still seen to be undergirded by the
fulfillment matrix, nevertheless. Hence he maintains, “The intercession of the Spirit of
God who prays in us and for us is the fruit of the mystery of the redemption of Christ, in
which the all-embracing love of the Father has been shown to the world.”25 There is,
however, a certain pay off in all this. From the new growing positive attitude, a clearer
teaching is beginning to emerge in which the church understands and recognizes, at least
to a certain extent, that the Holy Spirit is not only universally present in the world and
actively at work in every human being, and, therefore, in members of other religions, but
also “in the other religious traditions themselves.”26
This emerging understanding is given its clearest and most explicit articulation in
the encyclical of John Paul II on the Holy Spirit, Dominum et Vivificantem (given May
18, 1986). Here, the pope most explicitly refers to the universal dispensation of the Holy
Spirit which is not limited to the two thousand plus years since the birth of Christ. Rather,
it embraces “the whole action of the Holy Spirit even before Christ—from the beginning,
throughout the world….”27Accordingly, this prevenient action of the Holy Spirit “has

24

See more detail in Pontifical Commission “Justitia et Pax,” Assise: Journée mondiale de prière pour
la paix (October 27, 1986).
25

Ibid.

26

Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions, 69.

27

John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Dominum et Vivificantem, On the Holy Spirit in the Life of the
Church and the World (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1986), § 53.

364

been exercised, in every place and at every time, indeed in every individual.”28 The wind
which blows where it wills, “reminds us of the Holy Spirit’s activity also ‘outside the
visible body of the church.’”29 And once more, the leitmotif of the presence and activity
of the Universal Spirit is referred to in the encyclical, Redemptoris Missio {henceforth
RM (given December 7, 1990)}. Here again, with crystal clarity, the pope speaks of the
special manifestation of the Spirit in the church and its members but whose presence and
operation is not limited to the visible boundaries of the church. Rather, the Spirit’s
“presence and activity are universal, limited neither by space nor time…. The Spirit…is
at the very source of the human person’s existential and religious questioning which is
occasioned not only by contingent situations but by the very structure of its being. The
Spirit’s presence and activity affect not only individuals but also society and history,
peoples, cultures and religions.”30 And even more explicitly, through the Universal Spirit,
the pope says God “does not fail to make himself present in many ways, not only to
individuals, but also to entire peoples through their spiritual riches, of which their
religions are the main and essential expression.”31
It remains to be said that despite this emerging, and indeed what appears as a
blossoming understanding concerning the affirmation of the universal presence and
activity of the Holy Spirit not simply in the members of non-Christian religions but also
in the religious traditions themselves, the guiding frame of thought remains the
28
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fulfillment model. In fact, this framework is even made most explicit in John Paul II’s
apostolic letter, Tertio Millennio Adveniente (henceforth TMA), in which he
unmistakably states: “Christ is thus the fulfillment of the yearning of all the world’s
religions and, as such, he is their sole and definitive completion.”32 This same framework
is also the organizing principle in the document jointly issued by the Pontifical Council
for Interreligious Dialogue and the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples,
captioned “Dialogue and Proclamation: Reflections and Orientations on Interreligious
Dialogue and the Proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ” (May 19, 1991). More still,
the paradigm is even acutely discernible in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith’s declaration, Dominus Iesus (2000), which among other things, maintains the
unicity of Christ as the only universal Savior; that the Holy Spirit does not work
salvifically in the other religions apart from Christ; and emphasizes all the more the
gravely deficient situation of non-Christian religions objectively speaking.
After all is said and done, the question remains: “why the other religions in the
first place?” The answer may not simply be a facile recourse to the Barthian musing that
they are merely “beliefs” because of the incommensurable human search for God as
opposed to “faith” which is the obedient response to God’s free self-revelation in Christ.
Is it possible to also recognize in the other religious traditions something of divine
initiative toward human beings without necessarily subsuming it under the central
affirmation of the Christian “way” as the only way of salvation and union with God? Can
God not freely draw all kinds of different people to himself by all sorts of different routes
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apart from the Christian way? We may be overconfident that we already have the secured
roadmap to the divine, but what if, and rightly so, the subalternized and the space of
subalternity (the religions and religious others) also constitute a site of divine revelation?
And if so, how do we measure how much of divine presence is there and from whose
norm? Whose perspective? By the way, if the Spirit is at the very source of all human
persons’ existential and religious questioning (search), as John Paul II accedes in RM,
how could it be said at the same time that such search and questioning is a blind human
search for God (that is, merely human effort and initiative) as the pope seems to underline
in TMA?33 This is not only illogical and inconsistent, but a contradictio in terminus:
something cannot be and not be at the same time. Again, if there are elements of truth and
grace, as well as spiritual riches understood as fruits of the Universal Spirit through
which God, in many ways, makes himself present in other religions, does not the verdict
that they are gravely deficient amount to contempt for God who freely chooses to make
himself present in those manifold ways? There is no gainsaying that there are not two
economies, one of Christ, and another, of the Spirit, but one single economy of
redemption. Yet in that one economy of redemption initiated by the Father, there is
manifest and operative real difference and not only unity between the mission of Christ
and the mission of the Spirit. An exploration of this pneumatological real difference
perhaps may be useful to theologically account for God’s activity in other religious
traditions without necessarily subsuming it under the horizon of Christianity as the
paradigms of both “anonymous Christianity” and “fulfillment” are wont to suggest.
Perhaps it is pertinent to stress that the view represented by the above two theories savor
33
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“too much of religiocultural imperialism in claiming for Christianity all that is good in
other religions.”34 In any case, a significant development that is right on the mark, at
least, is the emergent recognition by the church of the universal presence and activity of
the Spirit of God outside the boundaries of the church and not only in individuals but also
in non-Christian religious traditions, in their firm beliefs, and cultures. Let me now, in the
following section, talk a little bit moreabout the explicit proprium and mission of the
Spirit as distinct from that of Christ.
5.3 The

Pneumatological Difference in the Mission of the Spirit

There is no question that in the aftermath of such historical experiences with
Montanism, Joachim of Fiore, and Reformation, the Catholic Church has always been
apprehensive of any attempts to emphasize the distinctness between the missions of
Christ and Spirit. As the church views such emphasis as a potential source of division and
proliferation in the one body of Christ, consequently, the economic and ecclesial unity of
the two missions rather than how they are distinct has been the rule in ecclesial
statements more so than an exception. In any case, it remains important to stress that
there are no two economies but a single economy of the salvific will of God. Yet within
this one economy initiated by the Father, there operates two missions with real and
internal difference between that of Christ and of the Spirit. Whereas there is inseparable
communion and complementarity in the Trinity, there is also real distinction and
otherness which is not a mere mental convention. Thus, the Father is neither the Son nor
the Spirit; neither is the Spirit the Son. The mission of the Spirit with its temporal effect
34

John Parratt, Reinventing Christianity: African Theology Today (Grand Rapids, Michigan and
Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans; Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1995), 208.

368

is different from the mission of the Son with its temporal effect,35 albeit the Spirit
proceeds from the Father through the Son. To minimize the difference between these two
missions is to do violence to the Trinitarian mystery as the customary insistence on
economic unity and complementarity of missions not infrequently tend to be easily
conflated and misunderstood as one divine mission with two aspects.36
Not only is the Spirit a distinct person from the Son by virtue of origin but there is
also a difference between the temporal effect of the mission of the Spirit from the
temporal effect of the mission of the Son. The mission of the Son is in content and shape
inextricably linked not only to his manner of origin (generation or being begotten of the
Father) but also to the temporal effect as expressed in the assumed human nature
(incarnation), and in the whole of Christ’s life, words, deeds, ministry, passion, death,
resurrection, and ascension into glory at the Father’s right hand. As the definitive and
explicit climax of revelation in “the salvific economy willed by the One and Triune
God,”37 the Son’s mission and entry into human life and history in the particularity of
Jesus of Nazareth is once-and-for-all, unrepeatable, and in that sense, permanent and
finished. So understood, there can be neither new incarnation nor new paschal mystery.
But not so with the mission of the Spirit. Whereas the mission of the Spirit in content and
shape is strongly connected to procession from the Father through the Son, its temporal
effect is other than incarnation (in the sense of assuming any created reality in the form of
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a hypostatic union) but expressed in “self-giving presence and personal influence of the
Spirit in creation and history (emphasis mine).”38 In this sense, the mission of the Spirit
and its temporal effect remains unfinished, still occurring anew, and not confined or
physically located in a definitive place since the Spirit keeps blowing wherever she wills.
This “pneumatological difference underlies and makes possible continual newness
precisely in and through the temporal effect in the mission of the Spirit—new gifts,
inspiration of the Scriptures [or its new interpretations], surprising personal inspirations,
unforeseen communal movements, organized local initiatives in service of neighbors.”39
Thus, this temporal effect in the mission of the Spirit is so diffused that it is spread out
and directed to all human persons and not merely to Christians alone (even though it is
directed most fully to Christians in their communion with Christ and the Father), but to
the whole creation since the Spirit is universally active at work. Not resting any where,
not limited or restricted to any definitive place, yet the Spirit acts everywhere through all
times in all nations, peoples, religions, and cultures. Until the eschaton, the temporal
effect in the mission of the Spirit is still underway, unfinished, remaining always new and
renewing.40 As part of her role, the Spirit opens up the church to its eschatological future
bringing about always, the possibility of newness, renewal, and reformation. It is because
of the ever renewing work of the relational Spirit who leads the church to selftranscendence and self-criticism that the church can be said to be “ecclesia semper
reformanda.” It can be argued, therefore, that Jesus and the Spirit do work in diverse and
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manifold ways within the framework of the unity of the single salvific economy initiated
by the Father. The Spirit operates salvifically beyond the incarnate Christ before, during,
and after the hypostatic union. The work of the Spirit in both Christianity and nonChristian religions may thus be different from, albeit not contradictory, to what Christ did
or said. There is, therefore, a nonidentity in the missions of Christ and the Spirit, though
they are complementary.
Besides, granted that the Word incarnate is the definitive and most explicit
revelation of God, yet it is conceivable to hold that the divine Word (Logos) cannot be
exhaustively identified with what has been revealed through the particularity of the
historical humanity of Jesus from Nazareth. Through the hypostatic union, the humanity
of Christ serves the divine Word as an instrument. It is possible then to conceive that the
Universal Spirit who is not only the Spirit of Christ but also the Spirit of the Father may
be actualizing different aspects of the one salvific economy initiated by the Father in nonChristian religions.41 Such salvific operation of the Spirit in other religions does not
contradict what Christ had accomplished. Rather, Christ remains the once-and-for-all
climax of revelation and the unique and universal Savior of humankind in accordance
with the Christian faith claim, which, nonetheless, is a valid claim. But it must be pointed
out that the Universal Spirit has been bestowing gifts, empowerment, and impulses, for
example, on the likes of Moses, Joshua, David, the prophets; inspiration of Scripture,
grace and truth in other religions, and so forth, before the incarnation and the paschal
mystery of Christ. The Spirit did not start bestowing these gifts only after she was sent by
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Christ post-Ascension to impart the fruits of Christ’s paschal mystery. Indeed, it can be
said that all God’s salvific activity in the world which is climaxed in the paschal mystery
of Christ is made possible only in the power of the Holy Spirit. A robust pneumatological
horizon, therefore, invites respectful and discerning dialogue and solidarity of others as a
better way for Christianity and the church to bear witness to the gospel of Jesus Christ
and to the reign of God for the liberating redemption of the world. Let me now elaborate
more on the unique mission of the Spirit.
5.3.1 The Spirit as Communion and as the Agent of Communion
As already established in previous chapters, the Spirit is not only the communion,
the vinculum amoris in the Trinity but also binds the Triune God to creation and to the
church, as well as the principle of communion and unity among the members (in spite of
their differences) of Christ’s Body. Also as seen above, the relational Spirit is the
principle of “beyondness.” As the creator and constructor of personality, the Spirit draws
human persons beyond themselves in order to give of themselves to others. Jeffrey Vogel
is right when he writes: “As the agent of communion, the Spirit’s role is…to draw those
whom he indwells out of their self-enclosure towards others and, ultimately, towards
God. The Spirit is the source of outgoing motion in them, or the movement itself,
directing them to God and neighbor.”42 In the past, a lot of emphasis has been placed on
the hiddenness, the holding back, and the self-effacement of the Spirit to the point of
forgetfulness of the Spirit as the coequal third hypostasis of the Blessed Trinity. A
construal of particularly the text in John’s Gospel that the Spirit does not draw attention
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to herself (cf. Jn 16:12-14) has not too infrequently led to a diminution or limitation of
the personhood and proprium of the Spirit. In the New Testament, a verb that is often
used to speak about the movement of the Spirit is ’εκχέω which may mean “out-going,”
“gushing forth” or “pouring out” onto others (cf. Acts 2:17, 33; 10:45; Tit 3:6). This verb
depicts the very opposite of self-effacement or holding back. Rather, the Spirit pours
herself out onto those she indwells, empowering and jolting them into motion oriented
outward toward others. The gushing-forthness of the Spirit is always other-directed.
Relationality and movement in an other-directedness is what is enabled by the outpouring
of the Spirit. According to an interesting and illuminating insight of Kallistos Ware, the
Spirit is “not so much hidden as transparent.”43 No one can say Jesus is Lord except in
the Spirit. In the illumination and transparency of the Spirit, Christians experience Christ
as Lord and recognize others in their full humanity alongside their distinct treasures and
epistemic potentials. In the transparent light of the Spirit, persons become sensitive and
attentive to their vision or seeing of others in whom the Spirit brings God into presence.
In the transparency of the Spirit human beings are oriented toward their fellow humans
and become attentive to the neighbor in whom God is iconically revealed.
Attentiveness or sensitiveness to God which of necessity becomes sensitiveness
and attentiveness to one’s fellows is what is enabled by the outpouring of the relational
Spirit. Such sensitiveness engendered by the Spirit enables those she indwells to see God
in others and others in God. It is the outpouring of the relational Spirit who anointed and
rested on Christ that enabled him to give himself away completely and to dissipate
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himself for others even to the point of death. This is what it means to “walk according to
the Spirit” or to be “in the Spirit” rather than be “in the flesh” in accordance with the
language of the Apostle Paul (cf. Rom 8:4).
Paul often correlates flesh and Spirit as two principles of activity and
manifestations that interlap in the life of a believer. To walk according to the flesh (kata
sarka) or to be in the flesh (en sarki) does not simply mean to live a corporeal or bodily
existence (for even Christ himself did this and took care of people’s bodily needs).
Rather, it means to focus or limit one’s gaze only on all that flesh means which is a
domain that is resistant to or rejects God, and by the same token, hostile to all that God
loves especially fellow human beings. Such fleshly gaze continually and voraciously
annexes the other to itself by appropriating and objectifying the other. Flesh captures the
very materiality and historicity of the human condition which inevitably entails
vulnerability, sinfulness, fallenness, suffering, division, conflict, and mortality.
Consequently, the flesh leads to death and its works are death-dealing. Among the works
of the flesh are: idolatry (which is incidentally associated with death and the spilling of
the blood of innocent victims unjustly), enmity, jealousy, dissension, selfishness, envy,
and so on (cf. Rom 8: 6, 12-13; Gal 5:19-21). To the mammon and idol of neoliberal
capitalism is sacrificed the blood of many human victims in the Two-Thirds World
spilled through unjust and avaricious economic structures, and through other forms
oppression and subjugation of the poor. By contrast, to walk according to the Spirit or to
be in the Spirit is to be in filiation or to be united with the Lord. And this filiation, of
necessity, finds expression in human solidarity and koinonia. Thus, the outpouring and
indwelling of the Spirit leads to love of and friendship with God as well as with
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neighbor.To walk according to the Spirit ultimately means life insofar as the Spirit is life
and as the source of life, gives life (cf. Rom 8:9). As Gustavo Gutiérrez lucidly puts it:
“To walk according to the Spirit is to reject death (selfishness, contempt for others,
covetousness, idolatry) and choose life (love, peace, justice). To renounce the flesh and
live according to the Spirit is to be at the service of God and others.”44 It is to be in an
abiding state of “vigilant insomnia,”45 to use the language of Emmanuel Levinas, for the
speech of the face of the neighbor. Therefore, it is in the power of the relational and
transparent indwelling Spirit that we are able to go beyond ourselves and the proclivities
of the flesh to not dominate and suppress the subalterns. The Spirit is thus truly the
principle of communion and reconciliation.
Going by the Pauline construal of “the flesh,” we cannot but let our curiosity be
aroused momentarily with regard to what it means to affirm: “the Word became flesh.” If
flesh captures that which is fragile, fallen and prone to sin, subject to mortality, and
resistant to God and to the reconciling activity of the Holy Spirit, how then can we
continue to affirm that the Word, of all things, became flesh? It must be insisted that this
affirmation is necessary if the redemptive work of Christ must preserve its significance.
Such an affirmation points to the self-emptying of the Son of God in becoming flesh and
thereby identifying completely with and sharing most deeply in the frailties and foibles of
the human condition.46 It is from within rather than from without that he redeemed that
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fallen condition. The church as the sacrament of Christ is reminded and challenged to be
the “Flesh of Christ.” That is, the “Word became flesh” invites the church to empty itself
and prophetically and intimately share in the human condition in the world in all its pain,
misery, brokenness, sinfulness, conflicts, alienation, and in its subjection to mortality.
This is even more urgent now because the Spirit has been poured out on all flesh,
identifying with all humanity in all its differences, defects, poverty, and so forth, in order
to recreate, liberate, renew, and reconcile it and all of creation with the Triune God.
Though the Word became flesh without sinning, but the church as the “Flesh of Christ” is
reminded of its non-hypostatic union with Christ and hence, of its susceptibility to lust,
weakness, and sin;47 and therefore, the need for its continual dependence on the renewing
power of the Holy Spirit without basking in the euphoria of triumphalism and elitism.
The church as the “Flesh of Christ Crucified” is a reminder that the church must not be
aloof but be in sympathetic solidarity with, deeply involved and sharing intimately in the
agonies of the weak and the beaten in their struggles for justice and liberation from sin
and all its manifestations. This is the mission and witness to which the relational and
resistant Spirit has empowered the church to embrace.
It is as the relational principle of communion that on the day of Pentecost, the
Spirit mobilized the church for mission. Quite frequently, the Mystical Body theology
tends to view the church as a fully-fledged structured reality, though having nascent
operations, which Jesus simply turned over to the autonomous leadership of the apostles
under the guidance of his memory. The account of Pentecost in Acts 2, however, presents
Conversation, The Annual Publication of the College Theology Society, vol. 56, ed. Laurie Cassidy and
Maureen H. O’Connell (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2010), 97.
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us with the opposite of such a stance. The church, according to Thomas Hughson,
“became church only on Pentecost and in this became assistant to, instrument for, and
acting in dependence on the Spirit.”48 Although certain essential elements were
potentially present, but before Pentecost the church as such did not yet exist. From
Pentecost henceforward, however, the church existed and only acted under the power and
as an instrument for the Spirit. Perhaps I must also not fail to stress that the church and,
for that matter, Christianity, functions as an instrument for the Spirit only when it serves
the Holy Spirit rather than silencing the Spirit. This is because it is a historical fact that
the church, nay, Christianity has sometimes sided with power or through the coloniality
of power imposed purportedly authentic interpretations on all with total disregard for
local histories/epistemologies and situated lived experiences. It has also been lamentably
complicit in intolerance, slavery, colonialism, inquisition, racism, sexism, and other
sinful acts. On the African turf, the Rwandan genocide is a case in point. Christianity was
also used to legitimate and defend the heinous, dehumanizing, and segregationist regime
of apartheid in South Africa. On such sinful occasions, the Christian church (Catholic,
Protestant, and so forth) cannot be said to be the instrument for the Spirit. When the
church indulges in these kinds of iniquitous practices, then it defies the paradigm which
the Holy Spirit reveals in Christ. Beginning with the Incarnation, Christ’s prophetic and
liberative ministry, the Cross, the Eucharist, and so on, the paradigm is consistent: that
divine power is expressed in solidarity of the oppressed and suppressed rather than for
conquest and totalization. It is power for compassion, for love, for healing the wounded
and broken, for releasing (in the sense of aphesis) the oppressed and lifting up the
48
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suppressed, for overcoming sin and its varied manifestations, for prophetically siding
with and liberating the poor, and not for domination. Obedience to the Spirit in order to
be instrument for the Spirit requires openness and vulnerability on the part of the church.
This, among others, is what Christian witness to the divine, hidden in the vulnerable
humanity of Christ, requires.
As already mentioned above, with regard to the institutional structures put in
place by Christ, he did so in the Spirit in whose power he was conceived and who
anointed him and empowered his ministry from the beginning to the end. Hence, Christ
coinstituted those institutional structures with the Spirit. But then, it was only from
Pentecost onward that:
the institutional structures Christ and the Spirit coinstituted existed and functioned in dependence on and in service of the Holy Spirit. That dependence
resulted, of course, in a strengthened christological focus since now they (the
disciples) adhered to Christ-as-sent-and-sending.49
In one final crucial statement, Hughson submits:
Pentecost and the ensuing mission revealed the whole church in its social,
communal reality, including the successors to the apostles and visible ministry, as deriving not only from the once-and-for-all life, ministry, teaching,
death, and resurrection of Jesus but also in complete, constant dependence in
unexpected ways on the mission of the Spirit who acts to provide ever new
guidance in service of Christ’s mission.50
This means that the church as a community, in all its activities, both institutional and
charismatic, is totally dependent on the Holy Spirit. What is required of a church that is
totally dependent on the Spirit is to always, through careful discernment, recognize where
49
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the Spirit is moving or working and join in rather than stifle the stirrings of the Spirit
through the coloniality of power. Once more, this brings to the fore the significance of
the epicletic nature of the church as one that confidently invokes the Spirit in order to be
always faithful in all things.
Clearly, Acts 2 portrays a church that from Pentecost onwards, is dependent on
the mobility of the Spirit for witness and mission. The Spirit opens the church up for
mission through solidarity and dialogue. On the day of Pentecost, the outpouring of the
Spirit, without destroying the gift of difference and pluriversality caused everyone to
rather hear in his or her own native language. This common experience of everybody
understanding the preaching of the apostles in his or her own native language fostered,
more than anything else, solidarity among those gathered. Such solidarity made it
possible for everyone assembled—strangers, natives, and others—to coexist and
communicate within such a pluralistic and multicultural context as the Pentecost. Thus,
we can see from Acts 2 that the Spirit engenders mission and witness in ways that are not
destructive but respectful of genuine equality-in-difference and pluriversality which in
turn enrich the Gospel of Christ quite in contrast with the monolingualism of the tower of
Babel. This is more so because the Universal Spirit is also actively at work in those
different and diverse cultural and linguistic contexts. As a matter of fact, mission and
witness entail “finding out where the Holy Spirit is at work and joining in.”51 The
relational Spirit continues to invite solidarity today as essential in the struggle for justice,
liberation from dehumanizing oppressions, peaceful and hospitable coexistence, and for
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witness and mission that is respectful of equality-in-difference in an increasingly
pluralistic and multicultural but interdependent globalizing world. A fortiori, this need for
solidarity calls for transformation of imagination in which the other has been constructed,
objectified, and inferiorized. This call for transformation of imagination is a call to
conversion, to metanoia by the relational Spirit who calls us to self-transcendence and
drawing us beyond ourselves to solidarity of others. It is a call to break our
connivances—whether by commission and especially by omission—with the social and
religious structures that continue to dehumanize others and sustain unjust situations, and
to become committed to a resistant and liberating common action that overcomes the
oppressive status quo, while ensuring that all human persons actualize their destinies and
all subalternized local histories with their epistemic potentials foregrounded and
legitimized. Now that we have established the unique mission of the Spirit and her
Universal Spirit presence and operation in other religious traditions including their firm
belief and spiritual riches, I shall, at this point, elaborate more on the question of the
relationship between the Universal Holy Spirit and “other spirits” with particular
reference to West African spirit-universe and mystical experience.
5.4 The

Universal Holy Spirit and the “other spirits” in
West African Mystical Experience
The question of the relationship between God/Holy Spirit and the multiplicity of

spirits in Etche and other West African weltanschauungen must be refocused. While the
definitive revelation of God in Jesus must not be compromised, nevertheless, the God of
the Bible whose name is translated by the vernacular names of God (with all their cultural
baggage) in West African Christianity suggests that God can manifest himself through
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several modalities in different religions. As a matter of fact, what must be kept in mind at
all times in approaching people of other religions is the fact that God, through the
Universal Spirit, has never left himself without being present in all nations at any time.
As M. A. C. Warren notes: “Our first task in approaching another people, another culture,
another religion, is to take off our shoes, for the place we are standing is holy. Else we
may find ourselves treading on men’s dreams. More serious still, we may forget that God
was here before our arrival.”52 Warren further writes that “When we approach the man of
another faith than our own it will be in the spirit of expectancy to find how God has been
speaking to him and what new understandings of the grace and love of God we may
discover in this encounter.”53 Indeed, God, in ATR, is the relational dynamic center
around whom all the other elements of African religions revolve.
Not surprisingly, Lamin Sanneh maintains that the adoption of African names for
God in Christianity carries implications for social and cultural transformation since such
names not only regulate indigenous naming rules, ethics, but also historical
consciousness. Accordingly, “the name of God contained ideas of personhood, economic
life, and social/cultural identity; the name of God represented the indigenous theological
advantage vis-à-vis missionary initiative.”54 Consequently, Sanneh argues that the fact
that Christian expansion or its resurgence was limited to those societies that preserved the
indigenous name for God “suggests that theologically God had preceded the missionary
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in Africa, a fact that Bible translation clinched with decisive authority.”55 This means that
the relational and flexible qualities of God in ATR makes him open to universality as
attested to by the adoption of his vernacular names in translating the God of the Bible.
This also means that the vernacular names used to designate the God of the Bible must
not be uprooted from their cultural contexts with all their accompanying cultural baggage
since this is what it means for God to be truly universal in a way relevant to every
context. Therefore, the diverse vernacular names used to designate God in different
religions as a supreme, creator, ultimate, and personal deity may not facilely be reduced
to a common signification without considering their meanings and significance in their
originating contexts.
To elucidate this point, Sanneh beams light on the signification of the term
“Olugbala” which, for the Yoruba of Nigeria, means “savior.” It is this name Olugbala,
together with all its natural signification in the Yoruba idiom, that is used to translate
savior in the Bible thereby generating new understandings of Jesus Christ. In this
endeavor of translating Olugbala into savior, the name could not have been completely
excised from its connection with the rich heritage of Ifa divination from which it draws
its import. Therefore, “The name for savior, Olugbala, for instance, is preloaded with
older Yoruba theological notions of divine power, solicitude, and redemptive suffering.
Olugbala accedes to the Jesus of Scripture without dumping the old cargo.”56 This is the
kind of reworking and rearticulation that is going on in African Christianity today.
Accordingly, since God’s dynamic hierarchy in ATR is not incompatible with the
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existence of a multiplicity of spirits who participate in divine devolved power, they (the
spirits) do not preclude but rather become instrumentalized in the realization of divine
economy for the well-being of human beings and the achievement of their destiny in the
world. Therefore, the multiplicity of spirits and divinities with regard to West African
religions in relation to God-talk and the Holy Spirit speaks to the multiplicity of religions
as the manifold ways and modalities through which the intended benevolent purpose of
God’s economy may be fulfilled and experienced. This is a way of affirming that insofar
as other religions (non-Christian, including ATR) contain elements of truth and grace as
already affirmed by the church, it is legitimate to say that they function as ways of
salvation for their adherents since the Universal Spirit of the Mysterious God also
operates salvifically in them. This means that ATR (with its values) and for that matter,
other non-Christian religions, may not be seen merely as a kind of praeparatio
evangelica57 or merely as destined to find their fulfillment in Christianity. Rather, since
the Universal Spirit has been and is salvifically operative in them, they enjoy some form
of autonomy of their own and function as ways of salvation, at least, for their adherents.58
In other words, “non-Christian religions may be seen as part of the plan of divine
providence and endowed with a particular role in the history of salvation.”59 In this
connection, the final statement of the Dar-es-Salaam conference of Third World
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theologians submits: “We recognize also as part of the reality of the Third World the
influence of religions and cultures and the need for Christianity to enter in humility into a
dialogue with them. We believe that these religions and cultures have a place in God’s
universal plan and the Holy Spirit is actively at work in them.”60
Let there be no doubt that the said autonomy and role of non-Christian religions
subtracts nothing from the Christian claim that Jesus is the unique and universal savior or
that the Church is a sacrament of Christ’s salvation. Rather, granted that the Christian
faith affirms Jesus as the mediator of “God’s gift of salvation to humanity in an overt,
explicit, and fully visible way, which is now continued in Christianity,”61 it does not
cancel or revoke God’s past covenants (Adamic, Noahic, Sinaitic, and so forth) and
neither does it nullify the salvific operation (both past and present) of the Universal Spirit
at work in other religions. But because Christ is the culminating point, the explicit and
definitive revelation of God’s gift of salvation—which has been operative in other
religions before this climax—he (Christ) and “the non-Christian religions are related to
one another.”62 For the same reason, the non-Christian religions are also related to
Christianity but cannot simply be reduced to or said to be fulfilled in Christianity, albeit,
they can be open to Christianity. This faith stance calls for a dialogic encounter between
non-Christian religions and Christianity in order for each to benefit from one another in
constructing their identities and attaining their full potential. It is by respecting and
recognizing the wholesome values of other religions that Christianity can modify them
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and they in turn modify and enrich Christianity. It is not merely about inserting the
Gospel into the non-Christian religious and cultural other; for such a strategy appears
imperialistic and reconstitutes the coloniality of power.
Thus, in West African religious frameworks, religion is fundamentally about the
divinization of human beings on earth through contact and closeness with the
Transcendent and the realization of both individual and communal divine destinies. The
fundamental issue and concern in West African cosmo-religious framework is less about
preoccupation with exclusive belief-systems, creedal formulations, and bedrock of
certitudes (however important they may be) than it is about the viewing of religion “as
the matrix in which men and women experience and respond to the sacred in their human
existence….”63 It is, therefore, not so much about how much truth of the pre-Incarnate
Logos (asarkos) is contained and operative in extra-biblical traditions, according to Justin
Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and others, as about the truth of the religious and
spiritual dimension of people’s situated lived experiences and their responses to the
action of the divine within their traditions and human existence. Properly speaking, then,
it is the Universal Spirit blowing where she wills who engenders such experiences and
responses to divine action and grace.
In Etche and West African ancestral religions, the multiplicity of spirits
corresponds to the maximization of the agentive competency of the divinities, spirits,
ancestors, other human mediators. Such agency is enacted through their participation in
God’s dynamic hierarchy and devolved power toward the realization of the goal of
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religion in West African conceptual schemes. This goal is nothing more than the
realization of humanity’s divine destined course under the human condition in this life
which ultimately culminates in the divinization of human beings for their wellbeing. It
has been affirmed that West African primal religious world-views are acutely thisworldly. The idea of this-worldliness should not be understood as a relegation of
transcendence or lack of eschatological orientation, or for that matter, purely in a
materialistic sense. Rather, the notion of “this-worldliness encompasses God and man in
an abiding relationship with God, in other words, the divine destiny of humankind, and
the purpose and goal of the universe (emphasis original).”64 In these world-views, heaven
is already wedded to earth, the supernatural forms a continuum with the natural, and
grace—God’s presence mediated by the spirits, divinities, who are instrumentalized by
the Holy Spirit—already provides the adherents with the salvific means they need to
achieve the destiny intended for them by their divine author within the same historical
process.
In these Weltanschauungen, the universe is understood as a holistic universe with
no sharp separation, dualism, or conflict between the physical and the spiritual, the
mundane and the sacred, the profane and the religious. We have amply illustrated this
point previously in chapter 2 above.65 Accordingly, the physical and the mundane act as a
vehicle for, as a reflection, and indeed, as a sacrament of the divine. The unceasing
commerce between the celestial and the terrestrial weld them into a complementary and
unified organic system. In this conception, the divine or the transcendent, albeit distinct,
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is neither separate from nor disengaged with the realm of human affairs, since humans
themselves are constantly involved in the continual traffic and encounter with the divine
especially through different ritual processes and in self-transcendence toward others
(such as the Oghaghaa). Within this sacramental imagination, God is seen in all things,
according to St. Ignatius of Loyola: that is to say, God is sacramentalized in “other
people, communities, movements, events, places, objects, the environment, the world at
large, the whole cosmos. The visible, the tangible, the finite, the historical—all these are
actual or potential carriers of the divine presence.”66 Moreover, I must also say that the
fact that these world-views do not conceive of any sharp separation between the sacred
and the mundane does not mean to say that the Etche/West African religions are sacralist.
Being sacralist means to be “so preoccupied with the sacred as to prejudice the material
well-being of the community and to impede man’s control over his environment.”67
Rather, the sacred and the mundane are not seen as alternatives or irreconcilable
polarities but as complementary dimensions of reality. Over and against the constant
tendency in Western traditions (especially neo-Scholastic ontotheology) to
transcendentalize the divine absolutely, sacramentality and sacramental operationism
radically connect the mundane material aspect of a sacrament to the divine signified
reality, and subversively resists any unwholesome theological construct that renders the
divine as merely abstract. Consequently, the affirmation is right on target that “at the
heart of the universe and of religion [of West African world-views] is a divine-human
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relationship for the fulfillment of humanity’s divine destiny.”68
Put another way, this conception discloses the truism that God seen through the
prism of West African ancestral religions is keenly involved in a dynamic and relational
engagement with human beings in this world in a way that is intended for their good and
wellbeing. Indeed, Dominique Zahan has also aptly drawn attention to the thisworldliness of African mysticism and spirituality when he wrote: “man [African] aspires
to become God; certain rites even lead him there. However, he never leaves his human
condition; he does not rise to the sky in order to peacefully bask in the beatific vision.
Rather, he obliges God to come to earth, to renew his closeness to man, to descend to him
in order to divinize him. Thus, the favored place for the African beatific vision remains
the earth.”69 Thus the world, the universe remains a sacramental site for divine-human
encounter for the good and salvation of humanity and creation. The material world in this
African perspective, therefore, “is not only not evil, but shares in the same destiny of
goodness as the human race itself. The salvation of humanity also entails the re-creation
of the material world—a new heaven and a new earth…”70 which is the work of the lifegiving and Creator Spirit. It is a frequent tendency in Christianity for Christians to be so
preoccupied with the life of the world to come and beatific vision that they sometimes
seem not to know how to live this life in this world by cultivating positive human
solidarity, friendship, compassion, and concern for the alterity of others. It makes
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absolutely no sense to fret so much about the life to come in the next world when a
majority of the people (of the Two-Thirds World ravaged by poverty, for instance) have
not even started living this present life with dignity. Consequently, in connection with
human well-being and the realization of their divine destined life, the numerous spirits
and ancestors as mediums and intermediaries, are instrumentalized to mediate the
manifold aspects of the divine economy. According to Caleb Oladipo, they guarantee the
solidarity, stability, and progress of the human community in the world insofar as this
role will engender the achieving of the expected destined course of the life of the
members of the community.71 In his attempt to construct a relevant African
pneumatology, Oladipo limited himself to utilizing the functionality of the ancestors only
in accounting for the operation of the Holy Spirit in Yoruba African indigenous
Christianity.72 He purposefully or otherwise failed to integrate the place of the divinities
(Orisas) in his analysis and articulation. The divinities are not merely deified beings but
fundamentally spiritual or divine entities and may not be neglected in any talk about
African pneumatology.
Furthermore, the spirits who mount certain human beings like the diviner-doctors,
prophets, healers, dibias, and so on, empower them to dislodge evil forces, to bring
therapeutic healing to the ill, and succor to victims of witchcraft. They mount people in
order to dispose such persons to not just affirm themselves through realization of their
own destined course in life but also to give themselves away for others. This is very
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redolent with the Spirit mounting/resting on/anointing Jesus for his ministry during which
he would give himself completely away for others to the point of death. It is about
relationality, hospitality, and friendship. It is these excellent relational qualities of the
spirits as well as the plurality and flexibility assumed in God’s dynamic sovereignty that
have been reworked and appropriated into West African Christianity particularly in
relation to the Holy Spirit. West African Christianity necessarily presupposes the
assumptions of ATR and what Kwame Bediako calls “primal imagination.”73 The
relational, pluralist, and dynamic assumptions inherent in ATR makes it open to the
universality of the Gospel. This allows for the possibility of the modification of
indigenous knowledges and traditions by the Gospel as well as the modification and
expansion of dimensions of the Gospel by the indigenous traditions through translation,
rereading of the Bible, and reinterpretation giving rise to new understandings of Jesus
Christ in the light of situated lived experiences and local histories.
This explains why, in the process of the Gospel proclamation, there can never
be—contrary to the colonial missionary ideological style of transplanting Western culture
as the purported civilizing aspect of evangelization—any active senders and passive
receivers. This has been the Catholic way from the very beginning even though this
approach was abandoned at some point in its history when it became the dominant
religion. It cannot be gainsaid that any one or group in the over one millennium history of
the Christian church has completely abandoned their “cultural and religious heritage in
order to become Christians.”74 There is not, and there has never existed anything such as
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some pure form of universal acultural Christianity. The universality of the Gospel means
that there is no such thing as a universal Christianity that is not at the same time a
Christianity with a Jewish background, a Greco-Roman background, and rightly so,
cannot equally be without an African background. Faith is always “the faith of a
historical community. Christianity…was born in the matrix of Judaism and in Semitic
context.”75 It is only within the particularity of its cross-fertilization with diverse and
different religious and cultural contexts that the Christian faith derives its universal
appeal. While conversion to Christianity necessarily brings about radical change in the
lives of converts, Christianity, however, cannot exist at the expense of the authentic
values of indigenous religions. Whereas Christianity may transform or correct some
aspects of those traditions when necessary, they also in turn actually enrich Christian
faith as they become the modes through which it finds concrete expression and selfrealization. Hence, on the need for Christianity to don an African face, for instance,
James Johnson has this to say:
Christianity is a religion…suitable for every race on the face of the globe.
Acceptance of it was never intended by its founder to denationalize any
people, and it is indeed the glory that every race and people may profess
and practice it and imprint upon it its own natural characteristics, giving it
a peculiar type among themselves without losing any of its virtue. And why
should there not be an African Christianity as there has been a European
and Asiatic Christianity?76
A people, therefore, need not and must not desert their cultural and religious heritage and
traditional values in order to become or upon becoming Christian. Subaltern local
histories and epistemic potentials must not be silenced by the coloniality of power.
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There is no gainsaying that God’s salvific love and faithfulness is for all
humankind. In the light of this, Sanneh affirms that plurality “is a prerequisite for
authentic Christian living, since translation assumes cross-cultural encounter where the
notion of multiple living cultures makes it necessary to exchange one form of
communication for another. In both its Protestant and Catholic forms, Christianity has
affirmed with the Gentile breakthrough the shibboleth of God’s faithfulness toward all
peoples.”77 West African ancestral religion with its pluralist propensity has, no doubt,
helped its traditions to be broadened and deepened by the impact of its contact with the
two religions of Islam and Christianity, irrespective of their enormous negative
dimensions with regard to the fragmentation of Africa. By the same token, African
religious values have also modified and expanded the dimensions the gospel. The
pluralist and flexible proclivity of ATR makes it possible for it to be open to crossfertilization with other faiths. In point of fact, as Ghanaian evangelical theologian,
Kwame Bediako rightly underscores: “Long before pluralism, religious as well as
cultural, became a subject of serious discussion in the Western world, many Christian
communities in Africa had been living, witnessing and learning to survive and grow in
the context of religious pluralism.”78 Elsewhere, Bediako indicates that ATR,
Christianity, and Islam, have often lived side by side and contributed to the various
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African societies.79 Openness and welcome to other religions have thus been a hallmark
of ATR. It is this dynamism, this flexibility, and this opennessand ability for creative
interdependency that has enabled the primal imagination of ATR to survive, albeit not
unaffected, but not completely wiped out in its contacts with the other faiths. In African
Christianity, there is, therefore, both continuity in relation to the authentic values of
ancestral religions and discontinuity as well.
In the realm of continuity between Christianity and the West African ancestral
religions, there is a question that needs to be answered. It is about the issue of how the
‘primal imagination’ brought its own peculiar gifts of relationality, plurality, multiplicity,
dynamism, and so on, to bear on “the shaping of Christian affirmation [and tradition].”80
In order to answer this question, we must turn to the insights of African Initiated
Churches (AICs)—also called Spiritual Churches because of their emphasis on the Holy
Spirit and her works—in order to see what they have done with the primal imagination
and African religious heritage. More than the mainstream missionary churches, the AICs
remain the best site so far for ascertaining how African indigenous values (particularly
“spirit qualities”) have been reworked and appropriated into the Holy Spirit in
Christianity. They also remain the best place to find Christianity “brewed in an African
pot.”81 But before investigating this, let us first establish that such reformulation and
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reworking taking place in African Christianity today is not unprecedented. It has been
native to Christianity.
5.5 Biblical

and Patristic Antecedents

Certain biblical data provide us with evidentiary materials for understanding the
usage of the term “spirits” or group of spirits and their creative assimilation into the Holy
Spirit. Already in the Old Testament, there is a precedent in the prophetic and priestly
traditions which creatively reworked, reinterpreted, and assimilated Canaanite and other
Semitic divinities into angelic host in the service of Yahweh in divine council. Equally,
the names of Semitic divinities were assimilated into the name of Yahweh of Israel.82
Having said that, I shall focus here on the book of Revelation with its several references
to a group of “seven spirits” and how this has been reworked by certain church Fathers
and contemporary biblical commentators in relation to the Holy Spirit. The book of
Revelation severally refers to a group of “seven spirits” (Rev 1:4; 3:1; 4:5; 5:6). Of
crucial importance to note is the fact that the first mention of the “seven spirits” is set
within the context of the initial greeting and doxology. Thus in Rev 1:4-5, “grace and
peace” are presented by John as coming “from him (God) who is, who was and who is to
come, and from the seven spirits of God which are before the throne, and from Jesus
Christ, the faithful witness, the firstborn of the dead, the ruler of the kings of the earth”
(emphasis mine). A close reading of the use of the preposition χαί (from) in the above
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passage seems to suggest that the “seven spirits” are included in the divine power to
bestow grace and peace so much like God the Father and Jesus Christ. Since such a
capacity to bless with grace and peace indicates something of a divine origin, it is
possible to infer that the “seven spirits” participate in the same divinity as the Father and
the Son. In other words, the seven spirits here appear to be on the same level as God the
Father and Jesus the Son. Indeed, Paul makes this explicit when he writes, “The grace of
the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit, be
with you all” (2 Cor 13:14). From this occurrence of the “seven spirits” in Rev 1:4 as
sharing in the same divinity as the Father and the Son, it is not hard to see how the early
church would rework and re-dimension it into what would generally designate “Holy
Spirit.” This is further coupled with the fact that in accordance with biblical numerology,
the number “seven” symbolizes fullness or completeness. Seen in this perspective then,
the “seven spirits” would “represent the Spirit of God in its fullness and
completeness.”83Considering the metaphorical and apocalyptic density of Revelation,
Edmondo Lupieri is cautiously inclined to think that “John is developing some kind of
(pre-) Trinitarian thinking.”84
It is clear from the other passages in Revelation that the “seven spirits”—albeit,
often expressing angelic traits—are not the same as the seven angels. For instance, the
seven stars held by the Son of Man are said to represent the angels of the seven churches
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and the seven lampstands are the seven churches (1:16, 20; 2:1). Certain passages,
however, seem to give the impression of a subordination of the seven spirits. For
example, Revelation mentions “he who holds the seven spirits of God and the seven
stars” (3:1); “Seven flaming torches burn before the throne; these are the seven spirits of
God” (4:5); “I saw him with seven horns and seven eyes, which are the seven spirits of
God sent out to all the earth” (5:6). From all this, there emerges not only an apparent
subordination of the seven spirits but also a conflation of their personal and impersonal
characters. How is it that the seven spirits participate in divinity as evidenced by their
capacity to bless with “grace and peace,” and yet, are presented as flaming torches before
the throne, held by Christ, the seven horns, and the seven eyes of the Lamb? To my mind,
there does not seem to be any contradiction here. It is not unusual for impersonal
metaphors to be employed to describe the divine in the Bible. As has already been
pointed out in Chapter 3, the Bible is full of impersonal metaphors or images used to
describe the Spirit and her activities, such as, wind, fire, light, oil, water, power, energy,
and so on. The impersonal images thus describe the activities of a personal being who is a
divine person. Both aspects of the Spirit’s character are complementary rather than
contradictory. What sometimes may appear as a seeming subordination of the Spirit may
rather well be an aspect of the self-effacement of the Spirit in bringing into presence the
other Persons. It is in the Spirit that the other Persons are made present. For the Spirit is
the communion of the Father and the Son as well as the principle of communion between
the Trinity and humanity, and all of creation. In keeping with this line of understanding,
then, the seven eyes projected as the seven spirits of God sent out to all the earth, for
instance, would designate an all pervasive presence and immanence of God in the whole
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world through the Universal Spirit. The Spirit is both “the Spirit of the Father and the
Spirit of Christ the Lamb”85 not because she is lesser than them but rather because they
are always manifested or revealed in the Spirit.
In a very illuminating article, Romanian biblical scholar, Bogdan Bucur explores
the Wirkungsgeschichte (reception history) of the Book of Revelation. He unveils how
both patristic and contemporary commentators have been wrestling with the construal of
the passages under consideration. Bucur’s agenda, undoubtedly, is to overcome a certain
exegetical impasse between the alternatives of either viewing the occurrence of “spirits”
in the texts as actually referring to spirits or to angels. Utilizing available evidence
constructively, Bucur sketches the contours of an angelomorphic pneumatology as a way
to hybridize the two alternatives. Nevertheless, he points out, among others, how, in
referring to the seven spirits, the seven eyes, and the seven lamps, which, of course, may
be found in Zechariah 3:9 and 4:2,6-7,10, the Book of Revelation connects them with the
rest/tabernacling of the seven spiritual gifts on the messianic stump of Jesse (Isa 11:2; cf.
Prov 8:12-16).86 Drawing on the fragments from patristic commentaries provided by
Albin Škrinjar and others, Bucur highlights a particular patristic reworking and
reformulating, especially, of Revelation 5:6. Here Bucur reaches back to Oecumenius and
Andrew of Caesarea who seem to construe 5:6 as referring to the seven gifts of the
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Spirit.87 Bucur corroborates this standpoint by citing Karl Schlütz who “has shown that a
connection between Isa 11:2 (the seven gifts of the Spirit) and Zech 4:10 (the seven
lamps) was an established topos in patristic exegesis.”88 Furthermore, Bucur grants that
both “Ancient and modern exegetes agree that Rev 1:4 is intended as a reference to the
seven spirits/eyes/lamps of the Lord in Zech 3:9; 4:10”89 which is also connected to Isa
11:2. The question of identifying the Spirit as impersonal spiritual gifts shares resonances
with the biblical tradition of identifying the Spirit with impersonal metaphors such as
wind, energy, water, and so forth, as a way of describing the manifold activity of the
dynamic Spirit of God who resists any arbitrary or rigid formalization and routinization.
It is in keeping with such tradition, it seems, that Jesus could say, “If anyone is thirsty, let
him come to me and drink. Whoever believes in me, as the Scripture has said, streams of
living water will flow from within him. By this [water] he meant the Spirit….” (Jn 7:3739; cf 4:10).
In a very excellent and fascinating move, Irenaeus of Lyons, in his The
Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, conceptualizes, with a remarkable clarity, the
seven spirits as the manifold ways the Spirit indwells us to equip us for numerous
services and destinies. Thus he asserts:
Wherefore also the Spirit of God is manifold in (His) indwelling, and in
seven forms of service is he reckoned by the prophet Isaiah, as resting on
87
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the Son of God, that is the Word, in His coming as man. The Spirit of God,
he says, shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom and of understanding,
theSpirit of counsel and of might, (the Spirit of knowledge) and of godliness; the Spirit of the fearof God shall fill him (emphasis original).90
For Irenaeus, therefore, the “seven spirits” correspond to the names of the seven spirits
(the gifts) that rested upon Christ as prophesied by the prophet Isaiah. This Irenaean
construal also clearly echoes the Pauline theology of charismata where he holds that
there is a diversity of spiritual gifts for a diversity of ministrations/services (diakonia) but
all are the workings of the same Spirit (cf. 1 Cor 12:1-11). The same Spirit is present and
manifests herself in diverse and manifold ways in different individuals through the
presence of diverse spiritual gifts. The different gifts (or spirits) bestowed on different
individuals are to be actualized and to be used for service in the community of the
faithful. Of interest to us is how Irenaeus understands the gifts of the Spirit as the
manifold ways and operations (energeia) through which the outpouring of the Spirit is
active in distinct persons for service. After all said and done, the indication of the
capacity of the “seven spirits” to impart the blessing of “grace and peace” much in the
same way as the Father and the Son, coupled with the Pauline greeting formula in 2
Cor13:14, and together with the trinitarian baptismal formula in Matt 28:19, is highly
suggestive “that a reference to the Holy Spirit would have been the likely intention of
Rev 1:4.”91 Thus, the seven spirits or the seven gifts would designate the active manifold
ways of the operations of what the early church would not too infrequently reformulate
and understand as a generalized “Holy Spirit.” The seven spirits leitmotif was, therefore,
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reworked by early Christianity “in the service of pneumatology.”92 If what we have been
trying to articulate in the light of biblical, patristic, and contemporary exegetical materials
makes sense, then it is legitimate to say that a similar line of thinking is also possible and
even fitting for understanding the relationship between the pervasive presence of the
Universal Spirit of God in the whole world and “other spirits” in the spirit-worlds of nonChristian traditions and cultures. Following from this precedence and relevant analogue,
we will be most helped to situate our understanding of developments within African
Christian theology along the continuum of a historical movement that has always given
birth to Christian theology. With this in mind, let me now look into AICs’ rearticulation
and reworking of the Holy Spirit in the light of the multiplicity of spirits of ATR. I will
then build on this insight and expand it in ways that allow for new understandings of the
Spirit from an African Christian perspective.
5.6 Expanding

AICs’ Insight: Toward an African Christian
Relational Pneumatology
A number of factors undoubtedly led to the emergence of AICs. Among others,

they include: European disdain for African culture and values as primitive, the
inferiorization of African personality, colonial political and socio-economic oppression
and exploitation, fragmentation of African sense of wholeness of life via banishment of
numberless Africans from their communal roots and solidarities through the slave trade,
as well as the disruption of the cosmic unity through forced land-grabbing thereby
disinheriting Africans, and so on. At a time when African beliefs in the supernatural
world and spirits were demonized and dismissed as superstition by post-Enlightenment
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Europeans and colonial missionary Christianity, AICs inevitably arose, inter alia, to
rediscover the Bible and a Christianity that rather than alienate Africans, speak and deal
more explicitly with real African concerns while utilizing the traditional African religious
heritage. Because of the genius of the AICs to tap into the core of African cosmoreligious world-views in their rediscovery of the Bible and new reception of Christianity,
they can be said to be behind not only the survival of, but also the boost to an African
Christianity that is growing in leaps and bounds today. In Nigeria particularly, the
popularity and achievements of AICs and later neo-Pentecostal churches, have had
profound impacts on the majority of the mainline missionary churches that can never be
underestimated.93 Such Spiritual churches, for example, in Nigeria today include: “the
Cherubim and Seraphim Church, the Christ Apostolic Church, the Church of the Lord
Aladuras, the Zionist, the Celestial Church of Christ, and the Apostolic Faith, to mention
a few.”94 It is in these churches that we see an expression of Christianity that is in
profound and explicit continuity with ATR. Accordingly, “These churches take crossfertilization seriously.”95 It must be pointed out that these churches did not simply
integrate or add ancestral religious heritage and practices to Christianity. Rather they
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have been able to repackage and transform what have been previously believed in ATR
alongside its concomitant attitudes, actions, and practices and given them Christian
expression. Of particular interest is their understanding of ATR as oriented toward
integral human health and wholeness as well as the dominance of spirit-dimension that
sustains an orbit where spirits and humans are constantly intermingling. It is in this sense
that we can understand how these churches have reworked the belief in multiplicity of
spirits in the traditional ancestral religious space into the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.
In a most remarkable way, the AICs have creatively appropriated the assumptions
and genius of African ancestral mysticism and spirituality in what has emerged as a
radical African reinterpretation and rearticulation of Christianity (closer to Jesus and the
Apostles than to its Western expression). As Mercy Amba Oduyoye suggests,
“salvation/liberation in Africa is primarily…for health and wholeness.”96 Health here
should not be understood as limited to healing from biological or physical illness. In this
African conception, it means more than that. Health in this framework entails a more
encompassing and comprehensive state of well-being of not just the individual but also of
the society, and, of course, of the cosmic order as a whole. Health and wholeness in the
African purview are more integral or multidimensional. They embrace different levels of
well-being: the physical, mental, psychic, emotional, socio-economic, political, moral,
spiritual, ecological, and so forth. Importantly, health and wholeness include being
reconciled and in harmony with oneself, being at rights with each other, at rights with the
world (material environment), and, of course, through sacramental operation, at rights
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with the spirits, and ultimately with God. It is about wholeness and restoring the balance
of nature in an organic universe of which the human person constitutes an integral part if
not the center but of which s/he is not the only inhabitant. Maintaining or restoring health
and wholeness is one of the reasons for spirit-possessions as illustrated in Chapter 2,
geared toward the constant great struggle against violence and all anti-life forces.97 That
the material universe, objects, events, persons, and so on, can be and are carriers of divine
presence does not say all about ATR’s sacramental approach to life. There is more to this
sacramental operation than a flat-out reflection of divine presence. As pointed out above,
the spirits, divinities, and ancestors are understood to guarantee the solidarity, stability,
and progress of the human community in this world. By virtue of their participation in the
dynamic relational hierarchy and devolved power of God, they play a key role in the
realization of divine economy insofar as this results in the actualization of human destiny.
An actualized destiny enables a person to give away him/herself for others. To the extent
that the spirits and divinities keep guaranteeing the realization of human destinies, they
always engender new possibilities which make the sacramental presence of the divine
remain always in a continual process of realization. In this sense, it can be said that
ATR’s sacramental approach to life is eschatological. But all this is the work of the spirits
and the divinities.
Understandably, AICs have appropriated these qualities of the spirits, divinities,
and ancestors in ATR. In a very strategic and creative theological move, AICs, according
to James Fernandez, have refocused these experienced qualities of the multiplicity of
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ATR spirits and divinities (in West African religious universe) by subjecting them to a
“higher order of integration in a Generalized Holy Spirit (emphasis original).”98 They
have, therefore, successfully reconstituted and synthesized the multiplicity of the
benevolent spirits of ATR into the One Holy Spirit. Consequently, all the benevolent
influences, the empowering, healing, and liberative life-giving qualities as well as other
workings of the spirits in ATR have been creatively engaged, reformulated, repackaged,
transformed, and reinterpreted as the gifts of the Holy Spirit for a variety of ministries in
AICs. These gifts are deployed for service to the community in taking care of human
needs and resolving existential life-problems. Fernandez is, however, not unaware of the
problem that may be posed by the spirits manisfesting at times their parallel or even the
uncertainty as to the subordinance of these spirits causing a situation of spiritual
schizophrenia.99 What has been accomplished here is about a local reception and
appropriation of the Christian message in a way that expands its dimensions and allows
for new understandings.
African spirituality as we have seen above is anthropocentric (a human-centered
spirituality, human wholeness and health). An authentic African doctrine of the Holy
Spirit assures the legitimate aspiration of the multiplicity of spirits which is the eminent
fulfillment of the destiny of human beings in the world. Hence, the aspiration of the
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multiplicity of spirits becomes efficacious through the Holy Spirit of Jesus Christ. West
African Christian spirituality is viewed precisely as this-wordly. In this sense, the Holy
Spirit understood as another Paraclete is meaningful and relevant to West African
Christians because it emphasizes the third person of the Trinity as the one who continues
the earthly work of Christ in healing, protecting from evil spirits and witches, giving
abundant life, etc. Thus, an authentic African pneumatology is this-worldly,
incarnational,100 or kenotic. Just as the multiplicity of spirits in ATR are assigned by God
to fulfill different aspects of God’s purpose for human well-being, so in West African
Christianity is “the Holy Spirit believed to be sent from God into the world to accomplish
the purpose of God”101 for human beings. This kenotic understanding finds expression in
spirit possessions, visions, dreams, ecstatic and prophetic utterances believed to be the
manifestation of the Holy Spirit. Through such possessions and utterances, those
mounted by the Spirit suppress their rational faculties in order to allow the Spirit use
them for the good of the community. The Holy Spirit comes down from the supernatural
order and is palpably present in a mighty and mysterious manner in the community in the
midst of singing, clapping, and dancing. In this way, the Holy Spirit in West African
Christianity does not merely indwell persons for contemplating transcendence but is
actually involved in a more holistic way in the quotidian life of not just individuals but
the community as a corporate reality. Like the functionality of the deities and ancestral
spirits, the Holy Spirit is now viewed as the giver of life, and imparts wisdom and
knowledge. Hence, the Spirit is regarded as a person and not merely as the energy/power
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or the essence of God. And just as the multiplicity of spirits enjoy independence within
the matrix of relational and dynamic transcendence, the Holy Spirit, it is believed, also
enjoys independence in bestowing a variety of gifts to different persons and to distinct
communities for a nonthreatening pattern of ministry. The multiplicity of spirits now find
fulfillment in West African Christianity in the many ways in which the gifts of the Spirit
are manifest for the building up of the community.102 This successful reappropriation of
ATR’s spirit-qualities into the overall project of reinterpreting and rearticulating the gifts
and role of the Holy Spirit in Christianity is, to all intents and purposes, nothing short of
an authentic African Christian pneumatology. And as far as this is concerned, AICs have
played a leading role. This project of rereading, reinterpreting, and rearticulating which
allows for new understandings of the Holy Spirit, means for Sanneh, the same process
“whereby the Christian message is appropriated into existing local frameworks but still
remains recognizably Christian, much like what the Greeks in places like Alexandria,
Antioch, Athens, and Ephesus did with the Jewish heritage of Jesus.103
Perhaps it may be important to caution that this reinterpretation or repackaging by
AICs should not be trivialized as syncretism. As Sanneh eloquently explains, the term
“Syncretism represents the unresolved, unassimilated, and tension-filled mixing of
Christian ideas with local custom and ritual, and that scarcely results in the kind of
fulfilling change signaled by conversion and church membership.”104 In keeping with this
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understanding, an example of syncretism may be, offering sacrifice to the God of Jesus
Christ after converting to Christianity and at the same time also offering sacrifice to
Orisa. On a further interesting note, however, Sanneh unpacks the undergirding
motivation behind the facile use and indiscriminate application of the term syncretism:
“Besides, syncretism is the term we use for the religion of those we don’t like. No one
calls himself or herself a syncretist! It’s a name we use of others, and not in a
complimentary way. Unless we use the term as a judgment against our own forms of
religious practice, I suggest we drop it altogether.”105 What the AICs have done is rather
a rearticulation or cross-fertilization resulting from a new reception of the Bible and
Christianity in a manner that deals more profoundly and explicitly with African concerns
and reality. But this should not also come as a surprise to anyone. It may only be a
surprise to someone who thinks that there can only be one expression of the so-called
universal Christianity which is uniform in every respect and in every place. That could
have been possible during the era of Christendom. Today, Christianity is no more
Christendom but World Christianity which speaks the language of people and people
understand it in their own native language and idioms just as it was on Pentecost when
the church was born.
Additionally, this creative interpretation in AICs is by no means unprecedented. A
relevant analogue exists, as indicated above, in the historical continuum of the
development of Christian thought. As I have mentioned previously, evidentiary data
indicate how old Testament priests and prophets did a similar reworking and assimilation
of the Semitic spirits and El into the retinue of Yahweh’s divine council and into God’s
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own name (for example, Elohim) respectively.106 Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria,
and other Fathers of the Early Church did a similar reworking and reinterpreting of the
biblical pre-Incarnate Logos within the framework of extra-biblical traditions; and more
precisely within contexts of paganism and Hellenistic culture.107 These Fathers renounced
the tendency to view Christianity and non-Christian traditions as mutually exclusive.108
Besides, we have also seen above how the “seven spirits” of the Book of Revelation and
the “seven gifts” of Isaiah were theologically reworked by the EarlyChurch and the
Fathers into what came to be generally designated “Holy Spirit.” Indeed, even from a
Catholic perspective, the self understanding of the church has never been constructed in a
vacuum without taking into cognizance and critically reflecting on the multiple religious,
socio-political, and cultural contexts that it inhabits in different epochs.109 This was the
case until the church lost sight of the theology of the local which was only rediscovered
in Vatican II. The converts to African Christianity especially among AICs are able to
creatively navigate their multiple religious heritage in a way that makes their Christian
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faith authentically Christian and truly African. In place of the spirits and divinities, it is
now the Holy Spirit who possesses persons in AICs. The visionaries, prophets, and the
Lord Aladuras or healers are mounted by the Holy Spirit and empowered to bring
healing, liberation from evil forces, and to restore to wholeness. What is interesting here
is that the modality of spirit-possession is patterned on the assumptions of primal
imagination of ATR except that now it is the Holy Spirit who descends through
invocations, songs, drumming, and dancing, on the mediums. And in all this, the
undergirding core principle remains relationality. In this authentic African Christianity,
God remains the Unoriginate Origin and source of all cosmic powers for health and
wholeness. This power of God for health and wholeness is effectuated and mediated
through the life-giving work of the liberative and resistant Creator Spirit. The life-giving,
liberative, and resistant Spirit actualizes Christ’s solidarity with the poor, the weak and
the powerless, the excluded, the oppressed, and the exploited of the world today. It is for
this life which the Spirit brings, this health and wholeness, this truth and grace which
God has bestowed on all peoples, that the church has been empowered by the Spirit for a
life-giving rather than alienating and life-diminishing mission and witness. The church
needs to work in solidarity with the religious others in a common action of liberating the
world. It is difficult to disagree with Anselm Min when he writes: “The church does not
exist for its own sake; it exists for the other, for the liberating redemption of the world in
solidarity.”110 As has been acknowledged, the Universal life-giving Spirit has been
operative not only in different peoples but also in different religious traditions and in their
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affirmed beliefs. Part of the mission of the church thus becomes to approach these
traditions in the spirit of expectancy with the hope of finding new understandings of
God’s love and grace in an atmosphere of friendship, solidarity, and hospitable encounter
with the other since the truth of God always transcends any given conceptuality. This
should be the proper attitude rather than one of assumed self-sufficiency and superior
vantage point which preclude any possibility of openness, honesty, and humility (devoid
of hubris) in the encounter with the religious others. It is grossly illusional and perhaps
imperialistic to work under the assumption that whatever so-called gravely deficient
elements of truth and grace present in these other religions are already superabundantly
and uniquely present in Christianity and more precisely in the church (Catholic).
Fruitful and genuine interreligious dialogue,as Jürgen Moltmann insists, invites
not only a clear understanding and defending of one’s own faith conviction and
perspective but also an awareness of incompleteness that is the condition of possibility
for religious cross-fertilization.111 The understanding that the Universal Holy Spirit is
present and operative in other religions allows us to rethink and reconceptualize the claim
of Christian uniqueness.
5.6.1 Rethinking the Claim of Christian Uniqueness
Perhaps at this juncture, it might be helpful to take a look at an illuminating
proposal by Peter Phan in his book, Being Religious Interreligiously, concerning
contemporary understandings of religious claims to uniqueness/universality in relation to
the encounter with religious others as well as the issue of multiple religious belonging.
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As a way to get around the exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist impasse in interreligious
dialogue, Phan proposes four basic points. The first is that if the claim to uniqueness and
universality constitutes “a fundamental article of faith of one’s religious tradition [it]
must be maintained in interreligious dialogue.”112 In this way, the pluralist thesis which
holds otherwise is rejected. This pluralist thesis which Phan rejects, states (for Christians,
for example) that Jesus is merely one of the many savior figures in the history of the
world. Contrary to this, Phan’s proposal emphasizes the importance of authenticity in
owning up and holding on to one’s own deepest faith convictions, since one cannot
bracket one’s own perspective and still be able to fully appreciate that of another’s. The
second point which provides the core of the third, is that “A distinction must be made
between the claim of uniqueness and universality of one’s religious founder and that of
uniqueness and universality of one’s religion as a social organization.”113 Phan is of the
view that whereas the former which is an affirmation of faith “must be clearly maintained
and defended” the latter precisely as an empirical statement prone to differing
epistemologies and criteria of verification should be abandoned or significantly qualified.
Phan substantiates this stance by utilizing the Thomistic distinction between knowledge
based clearly on conclusions drawn from self-evident and verifiable principles, and faith
which lacks the perfection of clear sight because only grounded in the will moved by
divine grace. Finally, Phan stresses that maintaining and defending the faith claim of
uniqueness and universality of one’s religious founder need not lead to exclusivism (nor,
for that matter, to inclusivism) rather than an inclusive theology of religions. The fact that
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the uniqueness and universality of particular faith claims lack empirical verifiability does
not imply that faith statements lack veracity or meaning. Rather, their truth is assured
only in terms of the assent of the will and not necessarily because they are so self-evident
as to be exhaustively captured and conceptualized in exclusive secure institutional
proclamations. In point of fact, because of the nature of Christian faith affirmations as not
so self-evident, they are sometimes misconstrued even by Christians and oftentimes do
not necessarily amount to convincing proofs for non-Christians.114
All in all, Phan suggests and rightly so, that our religious faith can have identity
only in relationship with other faiths’ perspective. With the distinction between the
uniqueness and universality of the founder of one’s religious faith and the religion itself,
between Christ and Christianity (which must not be reduced to each other ) clarified,
Phan writes:
There is then a reciprocal relationship between Christianity and the other religions. Not only are the other non-Christian religions complemented by Christianity, but Christianity is complemented by the other religions. In other words,
the process of complementation, enrichment, and even correction is two-way
or reciprocal. This reciprocity in no way endangers the faith confession that the
church has received from Christ the fullness of revelation, since it is one thing
to receive a perfect and unsurpassable gift and quite another to understand it fully
and to live it completely. It is therefore, only in dialogue with other religions that
Christianity can come to a fuller realization of its own identity and mission and a
better understanding of the unique revelation that it has received from Christ, and
vice versa…(emphasis original).115
This very interesting position of Phan is quite in keeping with the understanding of the
thesis of relationality we have been exploring herein; that identity can only be found and
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constructed in difference, in the encounter and relationship with an other. As Christianity
comes to a fuller realization of its identity through encounter with other religions, by the
same token,“other religions can achieve their full potential only in dialogue with one
another and with Christianity.”116
Acknowledging that faith is fundamentally grounded in the assent of the will
(which means that that which reveals or addresses itself to humans may be
received/recognized or could be rejected through the exercise of the faculty of the
will)—and not merely in the hard and fast institutional assertions/claims to secure
certitudes and absolutes—entails that faith possesses an inherent openness that permits or
allows for dialogue (interfaith). This is because as lacking the perfection of clear sight
and verifiable self-evident principles, faith possesses an element of uncertainty (not
untruth) and indeterminacy, and consequently, must continually struggle to take a leap to
search for a clearer picture of the truth that confronts it. Because faith is grounded in the
assent of the will, it can never be premised on imposition but rather on persuasion. No
one can be forced to have faith or be saved against his or her will; for to do so is to deny
and contradict human freedom which even God does not do. Perhaps this explains why it
can be said that religion in a certain sense is the highest guarantor of liberty. This
resonates with an Etche adage which says: “arushi kpagbha ngangha, egoshi ya oshishi
ejiri tuo ya” which literally means “when a deity becomes arrogant by neglecting its part
toward human well-being, then it would be shown the wood used to iconize it.” This
means that for the Etche, not even a deity can compel their allegiance against their will if
they decide not to honor it. This stance throws enormous weight around human liberty. If
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faith is the assurance of things hoped for ([Heb 11:1]; that is, not yet fully possessed
though anticipated), then it must continually adopt the attitude of incompleteness117 and,
therefore, of constant expectancy118 for the surprising arrival of the unexpected God who
comes only as a trace. For faith to be faith and not reduced to mere rational knowledge,
then it invites maintaining an indefinite measure of groping/hope for the unexpected God
in an open-ended fashion. This open-ended nature of faith allows for a questing that
presses onward in hope of a fuller attainment of the plenitude of truth that has always
already grasped the believer but which can only be filled out not merely by selfreferentially looking inwards but more precisely by dialogic engagement with the inward
meanings of the experiences of other faith perspectives. The questing of faith is in view
of understanding. But since some understanding of God’s self-communication to humans
does not render the Mystery which is God less mysterious, then this questing of faith
progresses somewhat asymptotically toward the God who addresses. David Burrell is
right when he writes: “God’s word presents a challenge to understanding rather than a
certitude made easily available.”119 Christian faith affirmations are, therefore, not merely
a matter of hard and fast assertions but rather invitations to experience, to recognize, and
to participate in the truth that is a person (Christ himself who is the way, the truth, and
the life) who confronts humanity and calls for such recognition and assent. Crucially, for
Christians, it is essential to be reminded that Christ is not only the truth but also the way.
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To follow him as the way is to follow a person, to experience, to participate in, and to
respond to the truth of a person. But the uniqueness and identity of such recognition and
assent can only be sharpened and clarified in the light of dialogic engagement with the
religious other. This does not mean that Christian faith affirmations are to be derived
from or determined by the content of other religious traditions. Rather, it means that
Christian faith affirmation can only find its identity and the meaning of its own
uniqueness in relationship to the claims and presuppositions of other faith perspectives.
As Burrell lucidly puts it: “Our location in a world where diverse traditions become
aware of their mutual presence to one another invites us precisely ‘on a voyage of
discovery stripped of colonizing pretensions: an invitation to explore the other on the
way to discovering ourselves.’”120 Out of this encounter emerge greater clarity and a
consequent readiness to make adjustments needed in order to adhere to the truth of God’s
universal salvific will. One is, however, under no illusion that this clarity may, at times,
not occur. Yet, we can still live together as friends in spite of disagreements and
seemingly contradictory viewpoints.
Such an encounter enables faith to continually undertake autocriticism and be
open to new translations and reinterpretations. This is important because the
incomprehensible God through the Spirit of novum and possibilities never ceases to
come or work in strange new ways and can be found in unexpected places beyond all
human calculations, circumscription in dogmatism, and programming. In point of fact,
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Jesus Christ is divine Word translated into humanity via the Incarnation.121 In order to
engage humanity definitively, divine self-disclosure climaxed not in hard and fast
theological formulae and propositions, but rather in a human being, in the person of the
Word incarnate. Jesus is the dialogue of God with humanity. The climatic divine –
human dialogue required that Divinity be translated into humanity, that God become
human. In a similar vein, faith affirmations in dialogue with the others require that they
be constantly translated in order to bear authentic witness to Christ and to provide the
opportunity for others to recognize the significance of Christ for Christian believers.
Through such witness to Christ and as the condition for others to perceive his
significance for Christians, the Spirit might dispose the others to also recognize Christ
and ultimately confess him as Lord. By the same token, it will equally allow Christians
to respect, recognize, and proclaim other religions as revealing the truth of God. Such
encounter must inevitably allow for mutual conversion.
Perhaps I need to also stress that the dynamism of the Spirit which is often
experienced in the emergence of the uncontrollable, the unpredictable, the new, and the
unexpected, does not mean that the Spirit is anti-institution, anti-structure, or anti-dogma.
Rather, it is a way of underscoring that the Spirit cannot be routinized or domesticated
because she blows where she wills. However, it is equally true that when the Spirit
brings about newness, she guarantees its enduring and abiding impact by fructifying it
and ensuring its stability and dependability in a way that is continually and dynamically
transformative of human existence. Hence, newness and uncontrollability do not imply
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disorder, chaos, or unrelated pure succession since the Spirit is equally the Spirit of order
who transforms chaos into promise and into being. As pointed out above, even the
institutional structures of the church—which are vital elements for the fulfilling of the
church’s mission—are coinstituted by Christ and the Spirit. But neither these ecclesial
structures nor the church itself are objects of faith precisely because they are created
realities. They have meaning only in relation to and in dependence on the Holy Spirit. It
is for this reason that structures, institutions, order, traditions, dogmatic proclamations,
and so on, can only be life-giving and not become sterile, anachronistic, oppressive,
alienating, or exclusionary, if and only if they are continually dependent on the Spirit.
For it is the Spirit who makes them come alive and become living traditions and
institutions by being responsive to the signs of the times and attentive to the new ways
and places where the Spirit is at work. Sensitiveness to and dependence on the Spirit who
blows where, when, and how she wills invite traditions to constant self-criticism,
translation, revision, reinterpretation, and creativity. For this is what makes a tradition a
living tradition (a dynamic traditio and not a static tradita) because, in this way, it is able
to proffer relevant answers to questions arising from new contexts and new situations or
otherwise risk paling into insignificance and irrelevancy. Attentiveness to the workings
of the Spirit warrant that traditions be changed or be adapted to fit new situations and
current needs. This does not also mean that traditions or beliefs only matter in the face of
novel circumstances.122 In fact, they impact on our everyday life and quotidian
experiences; they “are constantly exerting pressure on all that we know and do;” and in
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most if not all instances, they profoundly shape “not only how we perceive our world but
also how we engage and respond to it.”123 By and large, it is about faith seeking to
understand itself better in the light of emergent contexts and situations.
Therefore, identity and the truth of any religion are best discovered only in going
beyond itself (the religion) in the encounter and engagement with other faith claims. The
other remains a mystery since that other cannot be exhausted in advance and so opens the
possibility of new awareness and understanding in the encounter. Indeed, it is the other
that brings about the finding of the identity of the self; that is to say, identity is neither
static nor possessed in an essentialist fashion, it is rather constructed in and gifted by the
encounter.124 For without the other, the self ends up in an aching melancholic loneliness
and narcissistic vision of the self. Authentic personhood is “being” understood as
communion,125 being-in-relationship in accordance with the African axiom, “I am
because we are and we are because I am.” Precisely as the subject of freedom and
awareness, one’s personality develops as one becomes aware and relates to others as
equally other centers of freedom, value, significance, and awareness. As we have amply
demonstrated in Chapter 3, it is the relational and life-giving Spirit who creates and
constitutes the interrelatedness and interconnectedness of the created order in a cosmic
harmony.126 The relational Spirit is thus the creator and constructor of personality,

123

Ibid.

124

See Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Simon & Scuster, 1970), 54-5;
idem, Between Man and Man, trans. Maurice Friedman (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), 7
125

See John D. Zizioulas, Being As Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood,
New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985).
126

See Chapter 3, sec. 3.2.6: “The Work of Rûah as Creator Spirit.”

418

drawing human persons ever further beyond themselves, to give of themselves to others.
She is indeed, the principle of “beyondness,”127 ever drawing us beyond ourselves into
deeper relationships with others and with the world. This work of drawing out into
deeper relationships and interconnectedness is a unique role of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit
draws us out beyond ourselves in order to creatively engage the other; to use our
actualized destinies for the well-being of others; and possibly, to dislodge or overcome
whatever oppresses or prevents them from actualizing their own destinies.
AICs know very well this work of the Spirit and have tapped into these helpful
elements of African ancestral heritage to make themselves real familial communities of
brotherhood/ sisterhood where everyone is cared for and recognized for who they are
with regard to their charisms in the spirit of relationality and solidarity. Whereas, in most
mainline missionary churches (ensuing from their colonial legacies), there hangs a pall of
anonymity and an apparent loss of African communalistic and familistic root
paradigm.128 In AICs, the previously marginalized and subalternized have been given
both visibility and audibility. In this way, AICs have shown that ATR can creatively and
fruitfully engage Christianity in a way that benefits and enriches both. Unlike
Christendom and mainline missionary churches which have always subordinated women
and have continued to wield the coloniality of power in oppressive and repressive ways,
for instance, AICs rather harness the dynamism, the plurality, and relational tenets of
ATR (in which women could be priestesses) in a way that empowers everybody (women,
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men, young, and old). This remains a challenge to the mainline churches in Africa in
general and especially to the Nigerian Catholic Church in particular where a conservative
hierarchy and clergy still exercise authority in a Tridentine fashion. It is also a reminder
that because the Christian faith of a majority of African Christians (whether they are
conscious or unconscious of it) is formed against the backdrop of ATR, therefore, its
(ATR’s) religious and spiritual presuppositions must be taken seriously by any African
Christian theology. Accordingly, all that is being accomplished in AICs is attributed to
the work of the Spirit who determines who should be what (whether man or woman) in
these churches. Keeping in mind this emphasis on the Spirit, we now explore certain
ecclesiological implications of an African relational pneumatology.
5.7 African

Relational Pneumatology: Ecclesiological Implications

From all that has been said so far in this work, it should be evident that any
treatment of pneumatology from an African perspective has to include a relational
pneumatology of wholeness and abundant life. As explicated above, on the basis of
relationality as a core tenet and organizing framework of the Etche, and for that matter,
West African cosmo-religious space, wholeness embraces the integral wellbeing of not
only the individual but also the community, the society, and indeed, the whole cosmic
order. Since all of these are interconnected and complementary, true religion, according
to John Pobee, “requires a person to show deep and genuine concern for the well-being
of…[all].129 Wholeness and health touch on the physical, psychological, socio-economic,
political, spiritual, and ecological dimensions of human existence in the world.
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Clearly, on the path toward integral wellbeing is the realization of destiny. But
even the realization of destiny is comprehensible only within the matrix of relationality.
Indeed, Eboussi Boulaga seemingly conceives destiny in terms of death; to die to
oneself, to one’s individuality, to one’s private consciousness, and thus, to become a
presence henceforward to and for others and the community.130 Relationality not only
guides the relationship between God as the Unoriginate Origin and the entire creation but
is also the determining criterion of interaction among the different beings that populate
West African cosmo-religious universe. Reality is construed in a holistic sense as a
complex interplay of multidimensions irreducible simply to a monistic, universalistic, or
dualistic perspective. The oftentimes overemphasized necessity of holiness on earth (in
Christianity) in order to reach heaven, undoubtedly, tends to “drive a wedge between the
sacred and the secular, the former representing God, the latter the world, as if the latter
had no real value in relation to the former.”131 The Etche and West African world-views
rather conceive the universe in sacramental terms and that the whole of life and indeed,
all of reality, are to be seen in the light of God’s relational love and engagement with
humanity and the world. To be sure, the “unseen powers are held to be active also in the
natural world.”132 This understanding dethrones abstract absolutism. Beyond monism,
dualism, universalism/ uniformism that disregards the dignity of equality-in-difference,
reality is composed of a dynamic, fluid complex unity. This relational conception of
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reality has its source in the relational sovereignty of God whose dynamic rather than
static hierarchy allows for the devolution of power to the divinities, spirits, and
ancestors. Within this God’s relational dynamic sovereignty, the wide dispersal of power
allows for “power-with,” plurilateral collaboration, participation, and hence, for
solidarity and freedom rather than a unidimensional consumerism. In this relational
framework which creates space for pluriversality, flexibility, and multiplicity, the
multiplicity of spirits speaks to God’s manifold ways of executing or fulfilling his
universal salvific purpose andthe actualization of destinies in life with regard to the
wellbeing of humanity and all creation.
The Etche/West African cosmo-religious conception of God’s dynamic
sovereignty and diffusion of power, in a way, preserves God’s hiddenness or
transcendence. God’s presence is neither experienced as a direct presence nor is it
limited to any particular privileged place but rather pervasive. God’s mode of relating to
humans and the world is experienced as a presence-absence or a transcendenceimmanence. God who is pervasively present through the Universal Spirit is at the same
time distant. This way of conceiving God preserves the divine mystery without reducing
God to an idol contrary to the early missionary impulse and to the current fulfillment
paradigm of the Catholic Church (which tends to suggest that we can control or
manipulate where or not God is to be fully present). If God’s love and infinite goodness
is made available to everyone and to all peoples, then ATR is no exception. The human
orientation to the divine which, of course, is always originally initiated by the divine
itself, is no prerogative of any group or tradition. As Bernard Lonergan puts it: “it is the
grace that God offers to all humans that underpins what is good in the religions of
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humankind….”133 Perhaps it is worth stressing that this pervasive presence of God’s
immanence in the world mediated by the Spirit is, in all circumstances, a saving grace.134
An awareness of the pervasive availability of saving grace allows for openness to
plurality and collaboration in the understanding of the fulfilling of divine economy. Such
a relational understanding projects an African matrix that internally constitutes not only a
rich repertoire of wisdom, knowledge, deep mystical and spiritual experience, but also a
vital space for welcoming otherness and diverse modes of reasoning, creativity and other
perspectives from without. Furthermore, the hiddenness of God allows for the
actualization of human destiny and responsibility, as well as for the translatability and
reconfiguration of narratives in the light of the encounter with other cultures in a
dynamic and pluralistic context.
With regard to human destiny, the Etche and other West African anthropological
assumptions present an interesting perspective. An important concept in the Etche
anthropological framework is what is known as chi. Chi, as indicated in Chapter 2,135 is a
term which captures, among others, all that God has in store for each person from
conception: gifts, talents, fortune, plans, and indeed, destiny. However, even though a
person is assigned a unique chi (as destiny) at conception, the Etche also believe that
God equally sends his own spirit (that is, chi as guardian-spirit) to indwell that person in
order to guard, administer, activate, and implement God’s plans and destiny for that
person. The guardian-spirit as chi, without seeking to conflate all persons into sameness,
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rather activates and empowers each particular person to actualize his/her own distinctive
possibilities, peculiar gifts, talents, and indeed, specific destiny. Chi is thus the symbol of
individual creativity. Individuals are the architects of their own destiny, albeit, in
collaboration with their guardian-spirit, for “onye kwe chi ya ekwe” (by implication, if
one is not ready to actualize one’s destiny, neither will one’s chi do otherwise), and one
can actually bargain or negotiate with one’s chi. The upshot is that the guardian-spirit
mobilizes each person to use his/her actualized particular destiny for the service of others
and the community. Put another way, destiny realization always has a social orientation.
Again, it is also interesting to note that the divinities and other spirits, depending on their
area of competency, can mount or possess certain individuals in order to call them to
special vocations, for example, as dibias, priests/priestesses, diviners, and healers. Such
vocations usually require some form of apprenticeship over a period of time in order to
be equipped through the actualization of such vocation and to in turn use it to serve
others.136 By and large, the spirit engenders persons to go beyond themselves and to
dissipate themselves for others; to use their actualized destinies to defend and promote
life, and to dislodge all evil and death-dealing forces; and to ensure wholeness and
cosmic harmony in our interconnected world. Each person is therefore, considered to be
of value and with actualized destinies that have a social and cosmic orientation.
Additionally, an Etche apothegm says: “chi abughi otu” meaning that chi is not
one but that there is a multiplicity of chi in the sense that each person is uniquely and
136
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differently gifted and endowed by God. Through the modality of beyondness and selfdissipation for others, everybody and the community benefit from actualized individual
particular destinies.If one of the ways to the divine is by prayer, self-sacrifice, and love
of one’s neighbor (including the stranger, Oghaghaa), then one might even describe
these as acts of faith insofar as they are oriented to the Mystery who is both love and awe
(tremendum et fascinans).137 Faith, as Lonergan suggests, is “the eye of religious love, an
eye that can discern God’s self-disclosure.”138 Through the actualization of destiny, a
person becomes oriented toward love of others and God particularly in the case of the
Oghaghaa as revelatory of Divinity. Thus love of God is inseparable from love of others.
The actualization of destiny enables love through self-transcendence and self-dissipation.
Since one of the fruits of the Universal Holy Spirit is love, then one here discovers or
rather discerns in Etche/West African religious space, evidence of the presence or
working of the Holy Spirit and what is truly of God because God is love. John, in his
Epistle is right on target when he writes: “‘let us love one another, for love comes from
God. Everyone who loves has been born of God and knows God. Whoever does not love
does not know God, because God is love.’ ‘No one has ever seen God; but if we love one
another, God lives in us and his love is made complete in us.’ ‘God is love. Whoever
lives in love lives in God, and God in him’” (1 Jn 5:7-8,12,16). At the heart of Etche
religious universe, therefore, is self-transcendence obtained through destiny realization
for love of God and neighbor. Although there may be aberrations sometimes, such do not
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detract from the positive use of destiny. Destiny realization thus promotes relationality
and diversity which lie at the core of human-divine confrontation. When individuals in a
community or society realize their destinies and put them at the service of all, then, the
society itself, by so doing, realizes its collective destiny especially under the guidance of
good leadership.
In the light of these excellent qualities of spirit-experience in Etche/West African
cosmo-religious matrix, an authentic African Christian pneumatology will not be
complete without appropriating and cross-fertilizing itself with them. One sees in such a
pneumatology a rich source for renewing the church, a church that will become an agent
of social transformation and the re-envisioning and building of a new and healthy
African society. If chi is a symbol of destiny, creativity, and resourcefulness for
reinventing our future, and if we are all endowed with it, what then has been stifling our
creativity as Africans? Could it be that the radical value and core tenet of relationality
has been eroded away by the onslaughts of neoliberal individualism and the tyranny of
enduring coloniality and corruption? What can we do to overcome all the forces of evil,
death, and decay that have been stifling our creativity in order to transform our societies?
How can the church be instrumental toward this needed change and transformation? In
what follows, these questions will guide our exploration in the light of the relational
Creator Spirit and Giver of life who is as well the resistant and prophetic God’s Holy
Spirit. It should be clear at this point that from an African Christian pneumatological
perspective, the excellent qualities discernible in Etche/West-African spirit experiences
are assimilated and reworked into the work of the Universal Holy Spirit who has been
operative in different cultures in manifold ways even before the coming of Christ. But as
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Christians, the Holy Spirit leads us to Christ, and through him we have access to the
Father; indeed, “it is through the Spirit that one experiences the Son and the Father.”139
She is the relational Spirit of communion. And as the Spirit of communion, she does not
nullify diversity and difference. Indeed, communion is possible because of difference. To
be sure, what the Spirit of communion engenders is equality-in-difference just as she is
the principle of communion in the Tri-unity. The ecclesiological implications of this for
the African church in general and the Nigerian local church in particular cannot be
overemphasized. In order to avoid speaking too generically, I will focus more on the
Nigerian context here as a case in point. The following points to be made would serve
both as a highlight of the issues as well as my suggestions as to a way forward.
Areas of Progress: The Nigerian local church that would bear authentic witness
and be a prophetic instrument for the Spirit the Giver of life in the Nigerian milieu, to my
mind, has to necessarily actualize its own destiny. There is no question that in the
aftermath of the recovery of the place and theology of the local church during the Second
Vatican Council, the Nigerian church has made some progress toward becoming a truly
local church. I have dealt with this issue elsewhere.140 Other areas include the role of
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria (CBCN) in speaking out through a series of
communiqués in defense of democracy and human rights especially during the
oppressive military dictatorships in Nigeria; and in the face of ethnic and religious
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violence and hostility.141 These and more are indeed signs of hope for a local church that
is evolving to become truly viable and relevant to the local concerns and needs of
Nigerian Christians. However, in certain important and core areas of church life, the
Nigerian church does not seem to be too ready to radically and boldly become truly a
local church. Some of those areas and what needs to be done would be highlighted in
what follows.
Ecclesial Structures and Authority: One of such core areas has to do with the
leadership and power structure of the Nigerian church. Notwithstanding the
achievements of Vatican II, the pyramidal structure of the Nigerian church (and other
West African churches) modeled on colonial Christianity, has been, the greatest
impediment to the emergence of a dynamic adult local church. Aylward Shorter rightly
avers: “The [African] churches seem to be very reluctant to change, operating as they do
through outmoded authoritarian structures and impersonal law systems”142 bequeathed as
colonial Christian legacies. It is not an overstatement that the Nigerian church hierarchy
or leadership is too power and authority conscious and operates according to a command
structure that remains faithful to European feudalistic Christianity with no sign of
readiness for change by de-cloaking itself of such enervating garb. This is a reminder
that coloniality is still well and alive everywhere and in our time. Such a structure
continues to stifle local creativity, initiative, critical thinking, and responsibility—in
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order to keep in step with doctrinal assertions143 that oftentimes have not the
African/Nigerian contexts in mind in their phraseology—without which a dynamic and
mature local church may not emerge. All this is in a bid to be more in conformism to
Rome than a bold effort to confront the local situation. Hence, Roma locuta est causa
finita appears to be the lodestar as the Nigerian church leadership tends to cling to an
uncritical conservatism and traditionalism144 at the expense of new interpretations and
radical reworking of an inherited post-Western Christianity that is increasingly becoming
a World Christianity. The Nigerian church appears to have taken refuge in conservatism
perhaps as the only way to preserve the unity of the church. What is eliminated from
view is that “the role of the church is not to preserve unity at all costs”145 but to preach
and stand by the liberating good news at all costs, and sometimes at the cost of unity
(especially imposed unity that has no relevance to a local context). After all, Jesus was
not concerned to preserve unity at all costs: “Do not suppose that I have come to bring
peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to turn a
man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her
mother-in-law; a man’s enemies will be the members of his own household” (Matt
10:34-36). Jesus did not ignore the status quo in order to preserve unity at all costs. How
can a truly local church emerge and actualize its own destiny if it does not take a bold
143
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step to unleash its own creative imagination and unsubjugate its own epistemic potential
that have been subalternized for too long? Decolonizing church structures in the Nigerian
church today remains, according to Chukwudum Okolo, an imperative.146
Perhaps it might be helpful to suggest that for the church in Africa on the whole
and in Nigeria in particular to bear credible prophetic witness to Christ and to be
instrument for the life-giving Spirit, it needs to seriously reform its leadership structures
especially in the light of traditional African leadership structures.147 Besides, to my mind,
church structures would benefit from the dynamic, relational, pluralist, dispersed, and
collaborative model as I have delineated in Etche/West African cosmo-religious
universe. For a church that must contribute to the transformation of the legacy of the
coloniality of power which has simply metamorphosed into neocolonial autochthonous
oppressive elitism in Nigeria and Africa; for a church that must be instrumental in
working out an alternative for the building of a new African society, transforming its
own authoritarian and power conscious structures is a necessity.
Autonomy and Financial Self-Reliance: Another core area where the Nigerian
church has been failing to grow into an adult status as a local church is in the aspect of
financial self-reliance. Recognizing the paramount importance of this with regard to
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autonomy, it is no wonder that the church of East Africa, for instance, under the auspices
of Association of Member Episcopal Conferences of East Africa (AMECEA) made a
resolution to groom their own autonomy expressed in a three-point initiative: to become
a responsible church that would be self-ministering, self-propagating, and selfsupporting. It is not surprising that the East African church has made more progress in
terms of reworking Christianity in the light of local needs. Apart from more inculturation
and theological exploration taking place there, one of the areas of serious progress
include the establishment of Small Christian Communities (SCCs) in 1976 for grassroots mobilization of the church. But this very initiative is also imperiled by the problem
of clerical exercise of power and control. A lot more is required not only for the
Nigerian church but for all African churches. The veracity of the maxim that “he who
pays the piper dictates the tune” cannot be truer in the Nigerian, and for that matter, the
African context. I have equally treated elsewhere the issue of the funding of all African
bishops entirely by the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples and its
implications for the local church.148 It only needs to be said that “this type of scenario
undoubtedly creates a vicious circle of dependency which saps the African church
leadership of the nerve for boldness, self-confidence, and for standing its ground in the
face of contentious issues”149 as well as in engaging African creative imagination in
experimenting in order to give Christianity a true and not artificial African face. The
Nigerian/African church cannot contribute effectively in fashioning a new destiny for the
African society if does not first of all reform its own structures and take control of its
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own creative ingenuity and power of imagination.
Therefore, we suggest that the Nigerian church should seek for ways to become
more self-supporting in order to overcome the whole mentality of mendicancy and logic
of extroversion (always looking outward for the scraps falling from the master’s table). It
needs to achieve a certain level of self-reliance for its normal organization and for the
task of promoting every aspect of its catechesis and overall evangelization without
looking outward. I do not intend here to suggest that not looking outward is antipathetic
to relationality or the “beyondness” inspired by the relational Spirit. Rather, it is a way of
insisting that any outward orientation has to be about solidarity of others—which is
devoid of any form of paternalism that creates dependency—necessary to engaging in
such relationships genuinely within the matrix of equality-in-difference. Undoubtedly,
genuine friendship is only possible within a framework of a balance of power, lest it
degenerates into an ideology, domination, and totalization. It is understandable in times
of emergency that the church can receive from elsewhere and perhaps for special tasks;
but not for Nigerian/African bishops to rely or depend greatly on the outside by carrying
caps in hand begging Rome and the churches in Europe and North America for its
funding. Until the Nigerian church becomes financially self-reliant, the leadership will
continue to be timid and fearful of making bold and radical attempts in carving a niche
for its own contextual theologies (as it seeks to understand and express its own concrete
lived faith experiences), church life, structures, catechesis, spirituality, and so forth. It is
time to start resisting and rejecting the disguised ecclesiastical economic structures that
support the coloniality of power with its production of knowledge about Africa as a
perpetual mission territory. As Matthew Kukah has admonished, we must not “continue
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to pretend that we can found an African church without proposing a comprehensive
programme of economic survival in Africa.”150 This must be the course of action in order
to liberate African churches from the clutches of paternalism and to break the cycle of
dependency. The African churches will continue to be emasculated and their dignity and
self-respect remain elusive until they attain a certain level of economic self-reliance. Kä
Mana is right in saying that when a people, and for that matter, a church, fails to
actualize its own destiny and claim its autonomy, then no one takes it seriously: “When a
people exhibits a lack of faith in their own worth, they devalue themselves and are
reduced to an inferior status where they receive and do not give in return. This gives
others the impression that they have nothing to offer or that what they have to give is so
insignificant that it does not add any value to their presence in the world.”151 It is
difficult to disagree with Marx that the one who controls the material or economic power
(structure) also controls the spiritual power.
Unless the Nigerian church is able to actualize its own destiny which fosters its
own autonomy, it would not be able to go beyond itself to adequately help others to
actualize theirs. It is only by striving to attain certain level of self-reliance that the
Nigerian local church can become a giving church to other local churches in more need.
The church will be hampered or will fail to bear authentic prophetic witness especially in
the current Nigerian situation where people are confronted with the dead-dealing forces
of corruption, hunger, poverty, and other spiritual malaise in need of healing and
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wholeness without becoming self-reliant and self-reforming. A church that actualizes its
own destiny is not afraid of engaging in prophetic witness. The outpouring of the Spirit
is for boldness, not timidity, and to jolt the church to move beyond itself to reach out and
to dissipate itself for others, to proclaim salvation and liberation in continuation of the
mission and in imitation of Jesus who was anointed and sent by the Spirit to preach the
good news to the poor, liberty to captives, freedom to the oppressed, and to give away
himself completely for others.
Middle-Class Image and Alignment with Power: Because of the inability of the
Nigerian church to attain a certain level of self-support, among other things, there have
been, not infrequently, cases of recourse to politicians who dole out fat cash and material
gifts to churches; the same duplicitous politicians who embezzle public funds meant for
the development and wellbeing of their people. Perhaps a certain prestige and other
fringe benefits that come with forging such unwholesome ties with those in the corridors
of power may have been stifling the churches’ prophetic power to subvert life-denying
forces. This remains a part of the legacy of coloniality which goes back to the colonial
times when the missionary churches “often worked closely with the colonial government
in various areas….”152 In connection with the alignment of most of those missionaries of
Africa and the colonial powers, Shorter observes with candor “that the flag followed the
cross in the initial process of colonization.”153 Although active colonialism is ended, and
today, we have historic churches led by African church leaders; the truth of the matter
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remains that there still has been, according Dickson, “a tendency, consciously or
unconsciously, to perpetuate something of that colonial era alignment between the
church and the ruling powers. For one thing the church in Africa tends to have a middleclass image.”154
In our post-colonial times, the Christian church today, particularly in Nigeria,
continues to perpetuate the coloniality of power that characterized the church in the
colonial situation.155 It is not surprising that beyond denunciations in communiqués by
the Nigerian church leadership, prophetic witness, in the face of injustice and
unacceptable poverty in the midst of plenty, is negligible if not nonexistent. It is also not
surprising that certain church officials sing the praises of politicians instead of standing
up practically and prophetically against their political abuses. Whatever constitutes
obstacles in the way of people’s actualizing their God given destiny and wellbeing must
never be tolerated by the church. If the Nigerian church must become an instrument for
the life-giving and resistant Spirit, then it must go beyond mere verbal communiqué156
denunciations to a more active commitment in the struggles of the people. Most church
officials, because of the structure or mechanism through which they are provided for, are
shielded from the actual quotidian experiences of their poor flock in the society. In point
of fact, it has been noted that “Some bishops have actually ceased to be pastors and ‘have
become mini governors [as in a political sense], ruling vast conglomerate of agencies and
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offices and schools….’”157 Church leaders as shepherds must realize that they are called
to serve and to give away themselves totally for others rather than to be served or be selfserving. For self-interest and aggrandizement, church leadership—either in the church
itself, in Religious Houses and Congregations, or in other ecclesiastical institutions—has
not infrequently been enmeshed in the throes of dirty politics in the church all in a bid to
cling to power. In this way, it cannot bear effective prophetic witness that would
transform society. If the Nigerian church must be a credible witness then, we suggest, it
must not only be a church of the poor but also a church on the side of the poor, the
marginalized, and the powerless and voiceless by sharing much more intimately in their
miseries and sufferings. The Nigerian church leadership, to be credible, must “have a
fuller understanding of living in the Holy Spirit, for this also means being committed to a
lifestyle of solidarity with the poor and oppressed and involvement in action with
them.”158 This is what it means to say that the church is the “Flesh of Christ,” the
sacrament of Christ, as aforementioned.
The Challenge of Holistic Gospel: The Nigerian church must appropriate the
values of ATR and as assimilated by AICs. ATR has a more holistic view of life and
reality in the sense that religion is not limited to the supernatural but actually
interpenetrates every segment of life and creation as a sacramental universe. This saves
ATR and AICs from Marx’s indictment of religion as the opium of the masses. As JeanMarc Èla has put it succinctly: “Here religion is not reducible to a relationship with the
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supernatural. It emerges as a social force as well. It provides the wherewithal for a
protest against the established order.”159 It is in this way that the Nigerian church
becomes a leaven. In order for the church’s prophetic denunciations to be valid, incisive,
effective, and to not be reduced to mere hollow booming gongs, then they must emerge
truly and “only from within the heart of the struggle for a more human world.”160 Only
by sharing intimately in the sufferings of the people and participating deeply in their
struggles against oppression, domination, poverty, and injustice “can we understand the
implications of the gospel message and make it have an impact in history. The preaching
of the word will be empty and ahistorical if it tries to avoid this dimension.”161 Donatus
Udoette is right on the mark when he underlines: “If the message of the Gospel is to be
good news to the poor it has to be accompanied by practical solutions to the problems of
the poor. In fact, verbal preaching of the good news and its concrete realization by way
of alleviating the deplorable human conditions of the poor are inseparable.”162 Again, the
church has often taken refuge in rituals, liturgy, and sacramental celebrations that are
divorced from the hard realities of quotidian experiences of the people. Did not the Old
Testament prophets repudiate and “confront the religious establishment of their own time
with the irrelevance, emptiness, and even the blasphemy of their sacrifices and
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ceremonies”163 while being blind to injustice and lack of right judgment? (cf. Isa 1:1117; 58:1-12; Jer 6:19-20; Amos 5:21-24). The church engages in this role in society not
because it (the church) is an alternative to political structure and power but simply as a
part and parcel of its mission in service of the public good. In a very fascinating and
reassuring way, the post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Africae Munus captures it all
when it states that in faithfulness to the lesson of life Christ taught us (which includes not
only the gift of abundant life through the Spirit but also the prophetic resistance to
whatever diminishes that life), the church in Africa:
feels the duty to be present wherever human suffering exists and to make heard
thesilent cry of the innocentwho suffer persecution, or of peoples whose
governments mortgage the present and the future for personal interests. Through
her ability to seethe face of Christ on the face of children, the sick, the needy and
those who suffer, the Church is helping slowly but surely to forge a new Africa.
In her prophetic role, whenever peoples cryout to her: “Watchman, what of the
night?” (Is 21:11), the Church wants to be readyto give a reason for the hope she
bears within her (cf. 1 Pet 3:15), because a new dawn is breaking on the horizon
(cf. Rev 22:5). Only by rejecting people’s dehumanization and every compromise
prompted by fear of suffering or martyrdom can thecause of the Gospel of truth be
served.164
This very important statement has profound implications for the Nigerian and
African church. The lesson of life which Jesus taught us is, among others, that he
matched his words with deed/action. He did not speak in one way and act another way.
He spoke out in defense of the subaltern, the oppressed, the marginalized, the silenced,
and the rejected of the society in his time from both social and especially religious
oppression and suppression (in the name of purity of religious traditions of the system of
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purity and holiness). Indeed, “Jesus identified himself with the victims of oppression,
thus exposing the reality of sin. Liberating them from the power of sin and reconciling
them with God and with one another, he restored them to the fullness of their
humanity.”165 One of the reasons for his martyrdom was not only his predilection for the
poor, the so-called sinners, and the excluded, but more so because of his solidarity and
total identification with them. This brought him into conflicts with the establishment and
the powers that be. To be sure, “what brought Jesus to his death…is precisely the
coherence [of his] message and commitment.” 166 Martyrdom today entails the church
leadership dying to itself, dissipating itself, and not merely in predilection for the poor
and the oppressed suffering, but in actual concrete gesture of standing up for the poor
against the established order even to the point of death. Unless and until church
shepherds, in imitation of Christ, are ready to die in defense of the poor and oppressed in
the power of the Spirit, as well as inextricably engaged in the mission “for the realization
of the wholeness of the human person,”167 the transformation of African society will keep
receding from the horizon. The fear of martyrdom or suffering, we suggest, must not
make the church balk at preaching the good news and announcing the reign of God with
all its scandal. The Gospel message should prophetically unveil sin that lies at the roots of
social evils and injustice, and call it by its name as well as its perpetrators. This is what
the church is empowered by the prophetic and resistant Spirit to do in order to unearth
and perhaps to overcome the alienations that rupture our koinonia as the adopted children
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of the one Father. For without doing this, then the perpetrators will carry on oppressing
and exploiting, and the apathy of those who sin by doing nothing will go on
unchallenged.
The Challenge of Diversity and the Empowerment of the Laity: From a
relational pneumatological vantage point, the Nigerian church is invited to recognize
difference and diversity. This applies both ad intra and ad extrain relation to the church.
Internally, the Spirit of communion invites a model of being church in which both the
institutional and charismatic aspects and gifts which are both coinstituted by Christ and
the Spirit are organized and put at the service of the community. The outpouring of the
Spirit anoints and empowers all for service to the common good. As Apostle Paul says it:
“Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of service,
but the same Lord; and there are varieties of working, but it is the same God who inspires
them all in every one. To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common
good” (1 Cor 12:4-7). Nigerian church leadership must come to appreciate the
significance of this biblical teaching coupled with the African relational understanding of
reality as has been amply x-rayed in this corpus: “I am because we are and we are
because I am.” We all need the gift of each other for the good of all. This means also that
“One can never be a Christian alone. The gifts given by the Lord to each – bishops,
priests, deacons and religious, catechists and lay people – must all contribute to harmony,
communion and peace in the Church herself and in society.”168 This also means that each
person, especially the lay faithful must be given the opportunity to actualize and use their
own gifts maximally in the building up of the church without the clergy feeling
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threatened and clamping down on them. While proper discernment must not be neglected,
ulterior motives must not be disguised to quench the Spirit. Rather, wherever and in
whomever the Spirit is at work, the church is invited to join in and celebrate it. A
Nigerian local church of the future that would be viable and stand the test of time is a
church that harnesses the talents of all the members especially the lay faithful by
involving them at the level of church decision-making and implementation as well as in
the very process of defining what authentic Christian faith is about, rather than being
treated as mere spectators of the clergy. Vatican II is right in designating the church the
“people of God” which includes both clergy and the laity. The model of the church as the
people of God invites that sensitiveness and respect must be shown to the human dignity
and equality of all the people in the church by virtue of the common baptism of all in
Christ. The Nigerian church is challenged to become a family of God expanded beyond
kinship ties by the Holy Spirit through whom we have become the adopted daughters and
sons of the one Father in Christ; a family where everyone is made welcomed in spite of
our differences.
In addition, part of the empowerment of the laity that would foster a virile
Nigerian local church is for the leadership of the church to educate the laity on their
rights both ecclesiastical/canonical rights as well as civil rights. Our lay men and women
who are not schooled in the seminary have no clue to what their rights and obligations as
enshrined in canon law are all about. Many of us who never passed through law schools
and colleges in Nigeria are ignorant of what our constitutional and civil rights are because
they are not taught in our primary and secondary schools at least even rudimentarily. In
this way, our people perish for lack of knowledge as both the clergy and the political
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elites take advantage of this ignorance to be insensitive to the dignity of the people. The
onus rests on the church leadership to educate the faithful properly to their rights
(canonical and civil). Catechesis and evangelization should go beyond mere
memorization of catechism and doctrines, beyond mere verbal preaching to enabling the
people to discover their own ability and agency to organize themselves, protect their own
basic rights, and take control of their own future by holding their leaders, ecclesiastical
and civil, accountable.169
In the face of today’s circumstances, for the Nigerian church to become a virile
local community, pastoral agents must confront the issue of empowering the people.
Everything we do must involve conscientizing and convincing “the people that they can
change their situation, and…restore their power”170 to resist oppression and injustice.
Civic education (not necessarily formal) is a key avenue that can bring about this needed
change. An educated faithful would be an asset to the church to the society. Another
aspect of this empowerment and education of the faithful is for pastoral agents to
incorporate a program aimed at transforming the imagination of Nigerians with
alternative narratives. The Nigerian imagination is one that has been battered and warped
so much by corruption, beginning from the colonial times through the long regimes of
military dictatorships to the dawn of duplicitous neocolonial political elites, that it has
become a tragic evil. The cankerworm that Kä Mana describes as “the dictatorship of the
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belly” 171has come to have a firm grip on the Nigerian psyche. Men and women in both
public and private service are ready to devalue themselves and accept the unacceptable in
view of the quest for quick wealth. This is, of course, what the people see the politicians
do everyday as they cart away public funds in bags to stash away and to line their private
pockets. The abnormal has become normalized as most people no more appear to take
objection to such an anomaly. Rather, most people strive to become politicians or to be
affiliated to a politician so as to get a piece of the national cake as the shortest path to get
rich quick. That is why some communities are ready to reward a politician from their
constituency with chieftaincy titles for embezzling from the public coffer and not
necessarily because of what he has done for his community in terms of development.
This devaluation of values has assumed astronomical proportions and the
degeneration is no longer excusable. Such traditional values as hardwork, honor, and the
reward for hardwork seem to have had the epitaph laid on their grave a long time ago.
Because the imagination is so distorted and the people are not ready to hold their leaders
accountable, little wonder they are ready to allow dubious politicians who only think and
care about their selfish interest to deceive them with paltry gifts of money to shortchange
their only power for change, their right to vote. At other times, the same politicians who
want to grab the reins of power either by hook or by crook, resort to politicizing religious
and ethnic differences for cheap political gains and get away with it at all times. Not
surprisingly, the Cameroonian philosopher-theologian, Eboussi Boulaga rightly says: “the
people have the leaders they deserve.”172 The same people who go to churches on Sunday
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are some of the people who on Monday morning accept bribe in their offices in order to
render service to someone. Meanwhile, they still receive their salary at the end of the
month. It is even worst in the educational sector as teachers would not pass students be
they most brilliant in the class except if they give him bribe and buy his handouts. The
virus is everywhere in every sector. The driving factor behind all this, to my mind, is the
quest for quick wealth without hardwork. It is this very dictatorship of the belly that is
also behind the terrible phenomenon of 419 (obtaining by trick) that has sadly given
Nigeria a bad image in the world. Because of 419 more so than any other, Nigeria is as
one the countries on the United States’ FBI crime list. The Nigerian church has enormous
responsibility to begin a program of transformation of imagination by educating
especially the young and the next generation on the importance of values and virtues such
as relationality, hardwork, faith in oneself and the courage to be oneself, promotion of
human dignity and creativity, the courage to dream big and for the long term, rectitude,
patience and perseverance shunning shortcuts, the courage to think beyond oneself (to
think of how one’s actualized destiny may benefit others and ones country), hospitality
and friendship, respect for difference, respect for the rule of law, and above all, love of
God and neighbor. This is a death-dealing situation that invites an urgent attention and
the sooner the Nigerian church leadership recognizes it and rises to the occasion, the
better for the society. Emphasis on narratives that embody virtues such as those
enumerated above would go a long way to help in unlearning these bizarre habits and
transforming the imagination. This situation calls for the church to become an instrument
for the life-giving Spirit, to become a catalyst for changing lives and a ferment for
bringing to birth a new society. The Nigerian imagination is groaning in birth pangs,
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waiting for liberation and to be recreated anew by the Creator and life-giving Spirit. “Let
anyone who has ears listen to what the Spirit is says to the churches!” (Rev 2:7). The
church is urgently summoned to this task of building a new Nigeria, and a new African
society.
The Challenge of Interreligious Dialogue and Ecumenism: Ad extra, the
Nigerian church will become truly a local church and find its own identity only by
engaging other faith perspectives both in ecumenical and interreligious encounter. From
colonial times Nigeria has been home to different Christian traditions as they were
transplanted from Europe in their splintered conditions and groupings. Ever since then,
numerous other Christian groups initiated in Africa (AICs) have also emerged on the
scene. Islam has also been there and, as a matter of fact, preceded the advent of
Christianity in Nigeria.173 Nevertheless, there are still many in Nigeria who practice ATR
and those who have no religious persuasion whatsoever. However, as we have established
above, the Universal Holy Spirit is operative in the whole world as well as in nonChristian religions. It becomes an invitation to the Nigerian church to become truly local
by discovering how to live and witness to its own Christian faith in the context of such a
religious plurality in Nigeria. This calls for mutual respect, cooperation, and solidarity of
others in the common action of working to resist oppression, injustice, poverty, and the
transformation of society. The church has a lot to learn from ATR through crossfertilization. One such great quality is the value of tolerance, flexibility, and openness to
plurality characteristic of God’s dynamic hierarchy.
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In Etche and other West African cosmo-religious narratives, there exists no
theogony or theomachy such as is the case in the Mesopotamian myth of the violent war
between the gods Marduk and Tiamat or the Roman myth recounted by James Frazer
about the god Virbius, the king of the Wood and a lover of Diana the goddess of hunt,
who possessed the wood by killing the previous king. It becomes glaring that underneath
“the surface of the culture we like to think civilized,” lay violence and barbarism.174 In
Etche/West African cosmologies, albeit God enjoys unparalled sovereignty as the Creator
of all, God is, nonetheless, conceived to be tolerant of and congruous and compatible
with the coexistence of a multiplicity of other divinities and spirits who participate in his
devolved and dispersed power. The Supreme God is thus projected as accommodating of
other deities without usurping their relative independence. It is also this quality of
welcoming and accommodating that, among others, made ATR to be open to tolerating
other religions. As Turaki rightly argues: “the ready acceptance of Western civilization,
Christianity…and Islamic influence proves the fact that the [Nigerian traditional cosmoreligious and cultural space] was accommodative to others and should not be viewed as
primitive or inferior.”175 In fact, Sanneh is on target when he presses home the point that
“Africans best responded to Christianity where the indigenous religions were strongest,
not weakest, suggesting a degree of compatibility with the gospel;”176 even though Islam,
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like colonial regimes, was suppressive of indigenous religions with brutal force. Different
groups may have been involved in conflicts but there was never war in the name of the
Supreme God of ATR. The whole question of Jihad, holy wars, and Crusade in the name
of God—which is not only strange but also a scandal to ATR’s concept of a relational
dynamic sovereignty of God—was introduced by Islam and Christianity with each
fronting a universal claim to exclusive possession of the only true God. Such an attitude
dangerously modifies the image of ATR’s God. It also smacks of religious chauvinism
and hubristic triumphalism which is not only disrespectful and exclusive of otherness, but
also reduces God to an idol. The unspeakable loss of life and property stemming from a
series of dastardly Islamic-Christian conflicts in Nigeria has been of epic proportion. A
proper African Christian inculturation of ATR’s experience of a relational God should
tame the concept of the god of war prevalent in Islam and the Christian inherited Hebrew
Scriptures with its narratives of wars and gruesome decimations of whole populations in
the name of the one true god. This agonistic tendency is still been espoused today, albeit
in a different form, especially in the militant rhetoric of Nigerian neo-Pentecostalism.177
However, the perennial significance of the Igbo aphorism cannot be underestimated,
which says: “egbe bere ugo bere; nke si ibe ya ebela, nku kwaa ya” meaning “may the
eagle perch and may the kite perch; let the one that denies the other the right to perch
have its wings dislocated.” This is about justice, it is about respect for otherness, it is
about recognition of difference, it is about hospitality, friendship, and harmonious living.
Despite their differences, both the eagle and the kite all have their space on the same tree.
Each has a right to be. It is a reminder that relationality is always the matrix in which
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difference and identity are constructed, negotiated, and reconstructed. There is little doubt
that a people who espoused such a wisdom emanating from their lived experience and
knowledge would be welcoming to other perspectives. The Nigerian church would
benefit from these values by assimilating and translating them into Christian practice in
terms of relating with the religious other who is different. Relational pneumatology
requires that all manner of proselytizing that demonizes another religious perspective (the
kind espoused by neo-Pentecostalism) in order to win a case for God as though, the
whole world does not already belong to God, is to be discountenanced. Since West
African cosmo-religious world-views present a holistic view of interconnected reality, the
relational Spirit also invites respect for creation and the ecosystem. This issue will be
taken up in a later work.
The Challenge of Deeper Mystical and Spirit Awareness: One more implication
of relational pneumatology for being church in Nigeria and Africa is that a
pneumatological vantage point resonates with West African cosmo-religious spirit
experience. Whether it is as chi or through spirit possession, the notion of spirit in
Etche/West African experience brings to mind the nearness of God who is approached as
Spirit. The essence of spirit possession or the bestowal of chi is for the actualization of
destiny, for human divinization, wellbeing, health, and wholeness in the cosmic
community as we have illustrated above. As already noted, health and wholeness are
important aspects of West African world-view. Health which entails healing, is not
merely limited to individual but also to social, communal, and cosmic (which embraces
both creation and the supernatural) relations. Mystical power, as we have seen, is in and
of itself neutral. But it can be used either negatively to diminish and harm life
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orpositively to promote life. To the former belong witches, sorcerers, who employ power
for destructive purposes. To the latter, on the other hand, belong mediums, dibias,
babalawos, medicine men/women, priests/priestesses, diviners, seers, healers, bonesetters, and so on. The dibias are mounted by the spirit and empowered to bring healing
of illnesses, diagnose their root causes (especially those linked to witchcraft, sorcery, nsi
or poison), and prescribe measures for healing relations with the community, the
environment, and the supernatural in order to restore harmony. World Christianity in its
West African repackaging is taking this spirit experience seriously. As Bediako, who has
always endeavored to put developments in African Christianity and theology within the
framework of the historical continuum which has always given birth to Christian thought
in the New Testament through the early church, writes: “An authentic tradition of literary
Christian scholarship can exist only where a living reality of Christian experience is, and
is felt to be, relevant to daily life.”178 The experience of the impact of the negative use of
power for evil purpose as well as the possibility of counteracting such evil through the
mediation of diviners, dibias, ngangas, has come to play into the narrative of African
Christian understanding of Jesus’ healing ministry in the Bible. The image of the dibia or
nganga with regard to holistic healing, liberating power, and restoration of diminished
human life has been assimilated into African Christianity. Such image and other similar
concepts open new avenues as they allow a privileged access to African understandings
of the meaning and relevance of Jesus and God’s Holy Spirit in relation to sin/evil,
salvation, and liberation. African mystical and spiritual experience constitutes a locus
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theologicus that calls for critical reflections in order to nurture an authentic local or
contextual theology.
Among West Africans, albeit many have become Christians, the experience of the
harmful effect of the negative use of mystical power is one that still looms large in their
consciousness. This is helpful in appreciating the mission of Jesus in the power of the
Holy Spirit as the Savior, liberator, and healer par excellence in African Christianity. The
Spirit as the Giver of life anointed Jesus as Savior and as the one who brings integral
liberation. Thus, during his ministry, Jesus’ mission of liberation included, among others,
forgiveness of sins, casting out demons, healing the sick, welcoming the excluded, and
restoring or reintegrating them into the community. Did Jesus not actually stretch out his
hand to touch and heal lepers who were ostracized and stigmatized (because ritually
unclean) in the name of purity of tradition and sent them to go and show themselves to
the priest for reintegration into the community? (cf. Matt 8:1-4; Mk 1:40-44; Lk 5:12-14;
17:11-14; see Lev 13:1-2,44-46). It is also legitimate to contend that the gesture of Jesus
stretching out his hand to lepers designated as untouchables without fear of becoming
ritually unclean himself is a symbol of restoration of friendship and transforming
exclusive boundaries into sites for hospitality and love. In this way, Jesus did not only
heal people from their physical, spiritual, and psychological brokenness but also healed
broken social relationships by restoring the silenced and ultimately, engendering
reconciliation with God. This is holistic liberation. Perhaps at this point I need to stress
the fact that Jesus was not merely a miracle or wonderworker. Nor did he simply settle
for the miraculous. Rather, the miracles, the healings, and exorcisms, were signs as well
as parts and parcel of his overall mission as the one who definitively inaugurates in
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history the dawn of the reign of God with its scandals and unmaskings as elaborately
articulated in Chapter 3. Therefore, it is difficult not to be in agreement with Canadian
theologian, Diane Stinton, when she writes: “the holistic approach to healing in African
tradition may foster insight into biblical affirmations regarding Jesus’ healing ministry as
signifying the inauguration of the kingdom of God in all its individual, corporate, and
cosmic dimensions.”179
Beyond the limitations of modern medical science (without discounting its
usefulness and advantages) which shows no interest in the social, spiritual, moral, and
environmental dimensions of integral healing, dibias and healers in African tradition not
only look at possible physical causes of sickness but also consider the spiritual,
psychological, social, and cosmic aspects in order to bring about holistic healing.
Moreover, the traditional conception of the interconnectedness of reality and the
continual traffic between the invisible and the visible realms engender the belief among
West Africans that what happens in the physical, social, economic, and political order can
be influenced spiritually through the manipulation of mystical powers for evil ends. This
African conception is by no means misplaced. It resonates with the Pauline conception of
the powers, dominions, thrones, principalities that incarnate physically in political and
economic structures, institutions, and systems that oppress, dominate, and diminish
human lives. Walter Wink, Professor of New Testament Interpretation, in his trilogy, has
labored for years to prove this fact through a painstaking work of getting to the meaning
of this Pauline theology of powers; he argues that Jesus’ approach to dealing with such
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evil powers was to name, unmask, and engage them in order to dislodge their
stranglehold on their victims, however, non-violently.180 In African Christianity today, all
of these qualities are now valorized and assimilated into Jesus as the only one who carries
them infinitely further in every ramification in the power of the Spirit, and hence, the
healer and liberator par excellence, and the true giver or restorer of abundant life and
wholeness wherever they have been diminished. One frequently hears, for instance,
Nigerian Christians in their prayers address Jesus as: “Dibia ka dibia” meaning “the
healer, the divine physician or medicine man who is greater than the ordinary medicine
man because he is God;” or “ogwo mgbe onyiri dibia” meaning “He (Jesus) who cures
the sickness that the medicine man or doctor is unable to cure.” In expressions like these,
the image of the dibia, valorized and assimilated into Jesus truly functions in a
meaningful way for African Christians in the very “substratum of vital Christian
experience and consciousness.”181 While this basic African ancestral spiritual and
mystical assumption functions meaningfully in African Christian experience, at the same
time, some of those same Christians do not want to be associated with such words as
dibia, nganga, medicine man, and so on. For such Christians, these words are linked to
the devil, demons, the occult, juju, superstition, idolatry, syncretism, and so forth. These
are Christians who have been influenced significantly and, of course, uncritically, either
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by the domination of the languages of colonial and missionary Christianity or neoPentecostalism. History, however, testifies to the distortion and hostility of colonial
regimes, Western anthropologists/ philosophers in their evolutionary thought, and
missionary Christianity toward African traditional values. Everything, including
traditional healing mechanisms, was dismissed as fetish, devilish, demonic, superstitious,
idolatrous, black magic, and with an only option to discard it all. This colonial and
missionary stance imposed a Manichean dualism that is strange to Etche/West African
religious space which lacks any conception of the Devil as the arch-rival of the Supreme
God. Rather, God’s dynamic hierarchy and sovereignty is tolerant of the other spirits and
divinities who share in his dispersed power for the wellbeing of humanity and cosmic
harmony. It is therefore, not surprising that such African Christians who, unfortunately,
are still held sway by the continued dominance of such colonial and missionary
vocabularies and languages aimed at inferiorizing all that is African have continued to
resent the need to come to terms with their own local memories/histories; and the dignity
of difference, by a continual use of such words in those negative connotations. At any
rate, the existence of numerous healing and deliverance Christian ministries and
churches, Charismatic Renewals and priest-healers in West Africa today, speaks volumes
about the living and vibrant faith experiences of African Christians with regard to the
operation of mystical powers. All this is in realization that Jesus through the power of the
Holy Spirit is the one who has the overall power that conquers all evil, brings total
healing, restores diminished lives, and ultimately brings salvation to all. This sustains the
faith and hope of African Christians in their struggles in the face of suffering,
exploitation, and oppression.
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While it is important to acknowledge the interest aroused with regard to
deepening theological reflection in this aspect of vital African Christian experience as a
right step in the right direction, it is equally necessary to call for caution to watch out for
the tendency to undue emphasis on faith healing and the reduction of the missions of
Jesus and the Holy Spirit to the miraculous. It is the task of critical theological thinking
and reflection to correct and purify such a tendency. What must be kept in mind is that
miracles and the miraculous were only part of Jesus’ overall mission of inaugurating the
reign of God. Upon his announcement of the dawn of the reign of God, Jesus invited the
people to metanoia, to turn away from sin and give their hearts to love of God and love of
neighbor. Why change of heart? As Jesus says: “For out of the heart come evil thoughts,
murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false testimony, slander” (Matt 15:19-20). It is
these things that Apostle Paul calls the works of the flesh; murder, greed, theft, idolatry,
dissension, exclusion, and so on. To indulge in them is to reject God and koinonia with
fellow human beings. Thus, as one anointed and empowered by the Spirit, Jesus’ mission
entails not only getting to the root of sin and healing the human heart from the inside out,
but also to prophetically confront the incarnations of sin in its manifold manifestations in
dehumanizing and oppressive religio-cultural, socio-economic, and political structures
and institutions. Hence, we can understand Jesus’ predilection to stand in solidarity with
the weak, the poor, the oppressed, the excluded, and those silenced and pushed to the
margin and bottom of society in name of purity of tradition. It is in giving himself away
completely for their sake and for daringly and prophetically speaking from a subaltern
epistemic location outside the coloniality of power when he should be silent, that Jesus
runs into conflicts with the domination and totalizing system at his time which will lead
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to his murder (martyrdom). But his death has validity for all humanity. Therefore, any
treatment of holistic healing in the African Christian experience which appropriates and
assimilates the sterling traditional qualities to Jesus but ignores this aspect of the sociopolitical structures that diminish life by inflicting crushing and unspeakable poverty to
the vast majority of the people is not holistic.
It is not surprising that many Christians resort to faith healing and turn to the
miraculous when they are sick because of grinding poverty and thus, their inability to
afford health care costs which only the rich can get. What does one expect a number of
poor African Christians living in many communities (rural, for example) with lack of
functional hospitals, health centers, basic drugs, as is the case in Nigeria, to do when they
are sick or in emergency? Many, not surprisingly, get sick because of poor living and
sanitary conditions, overcrowding, lack of drains and sewers, lack of potable water,
unemployment, illiteracy, poor nutrition, politically induced famine and hunger due to
politically motivated socio-cultural and ethnoreligious conflicts, and so on.182 Meanwhile,
the rich, politicians and the clerical class alike, often have the means to fly out to Europe,
America, or Asia to get the best treatment when they are sick. Why do they not stay back
in Nigerian and other African hospitals for treatment? They desire the best for themselves
but not for the poor masses who are left to their fate. The political class has failed to
utilize public funds to make basic institutions work in Nigeria. It is the mission of the
church, as instrument for the Spirit to prophetically speak out and side with the poor in
concrete commitments to hold leaders accountable and to overcome the root causes of
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injustice. If there are demons to be exorcized, certainly, the greatest of them must be the
powers that have incarnated themselves in religious, social, and political structures that
diminish human life and dignity, deprive human rights, and preclude the actualization of
people’s destiny and potentials. Therefore, the life-giving and resistant Spirit calls the
churches to show solidarity with the weak, the broken, the poor, and the traumatized, by
following the vision of Jesus in preferentially opting for the poor and oppressed to restore
their full humanity. In a particular way, this holistic liberation embraces the emancipation
of women in Africa from exclusion and marginality, and giving them their rightful place
in both church and society. To reduce the ministry of Jesus to faith healing, casting out
demons, and to the miraculous is to simply turn Jesus into a dues ex machina (who does
everything miraculously or even magically), and it is to shy away from dealing with and
fighting to remove the structures that institutionalize and perpetuate poverty, oppression,
misery, ignorance, and injustice.183 Such a stance would also fail to empower the people
to take control of their future, to struggle for their rights to decent living conditions, for
their integral development, and human promotion. In the present state of the dislocation
of Africa, the church must bear a prophetic witness in word and in praxis that Jesus is
truly the Savior and liberator, and that God’s Holy Spirit is frankly the Lord and Giver of
life to African “men and women who live in situations close to death.”184 When all is said
and done, the church must not forget, however, that the victory that Jesus has already
won for us has an eschatological dimension. It is this eschatological hope that should
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sustain our struggle for an alternative, better, and just world. This way, the church will
become instrumental in the social transformation and building of a new African society.
5.8 African

Christian Theology in World Christianity: A Way
Forward
Beyond Christendom, beyond Global Christianity/church, African Christian

theology locates itself within the borders of World Christianity/church. Perhaps it might
be helpful to establish a distinction between these concepts. Global Christianity
implicates and embodies the faithful replication and transplantation of a particular
epistemic and cultural framework as well as Christian forms and patterns as they are
developed in Western Christianity to other parts of the world. It represents the view that
Europe is Christianity and Christianity is Europe which was characteristic of the colonial
missionary impulse. Global Christianity thus suggests: “that growing communities of
professing Christians around the world…and…that churches everywhere are a religious
expression of Europe’s political reach, or else a reaction to it.”185
Understood in this sense, Global Christianity embodies the vestiges of
Christendom which refers to when the church became a domain of the state as an
imperial Christianity and a Christian empire with imperialistic propensities to enforced
uniformity, universalism, and autarchic unilateralism. This is a clear case of the
expression of the coloniality of power. World Christianity, unlike empire which operates
on an ideology of unquestioning totalizing linearity that is intolerant to complexity,
pluriversality, or the seemingly contradictory (which may not necessarily be false),
suggests a framework or space that embodies diverse epistemic centers, pluriversal
185
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macronarratives, a variety of faith expressions, and Christian forms and shapes, with
local or indigenous characteristics. World Christianity displays a plurifocal cultural flow
not only from the West to the rest (as in passive recipients) but also from the South to the
North especially through migration facilitated by globalization process.186 Accordingly,
“‘World Christianity’ is the movement of Christianity as it takes form and shape in
societies that previously were not Christian…. World Christianity is not one thing, but a
variety of indigenous responses through more or less effective local idioms, but in any
case without necessarily the European Enlightenment frame.”187 Because World
Christianity allows for the simultaneous existence of plurality of particular epistemic
locations, local expressions and models of faith, indigenized Christian practices, as well
as the inhabitation of multiple relationships, Sanneh is right on target when he asserts that
“Indigenizing the faith meant decolonizing its theology, and membership of the
fellowship implied home rule.”188 Decolonizing our theology means that it must be a
critical and reasoned reflection on the faith experience and confrontation with the divine
in our geographical location and in the light of Scriptures but in such a way that its
outcome is not limited to our space. That is to say, World Christianity is welcoming of
equality-in-difference, diversity, and indeed, pluriversality in a way that enriches and
enhances communion. It is against this background that African theology in World
Christianity/church, emerges as a border thinking from the colonial wounds to foreground
186
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and legitimate African silenced and subalternized epistemic potential in articulating
Africans’ faith experiences. This rearticulation of the African faith experiences should be
given a hearing and no longer silenced. Nevertheless, one is not under any illusion that
the coloniality of power is still at work. But this must not stop the African churches from
growing and transforming themselves in order to become a leaven to contribute to the
transformation of the African society.
Above all, the whole question of pluriversality that enriches communion has been
greatly endorsed by the 1994 Synod of Bishops for Africa which proposed the metaphor
of the church as the family of God. The African Synod recognizes that “it is in the power
of the Spirit of the same risen Jesus that we are built into the body of Christ, God’s
household, and participants in Christ (cf. Heb 3:1, 6, 14; 1 Cor 12:27; Col 1:18, 24) to
become therefore, the one undivided family of God in the image of the Trinitarian
Family.”189 The family of God is not strictly biological but mystical. To be sure, the early
Christian community understood itself as the family of God. This adopted metaphor is
aimed at introducing into ecclesial life such qualities of the African family as: “care for
others, solidarity, warmth in human relationships, acceptance, dialogue, and trust.”190 In
our church-family, we have the same blood (of Christ) coursing in our veins. And we are
sisters and brothers because we have the same Mother (the church – the Spouse of Christ)
and the same Father.191 In this new Trinitarian family, relationships transcend ethnic
frontiers. Through the Holy Spirit who indwells all the baptized, members of the Family
189
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of God are mystically linked to one another and ontologically linked to God just as has
been demonstrated in the Etche African relational notion of person. The Spirit of Jesus
who reigns in this family bestows diverse gifts to each individual and to each community
in the Christian commonwealth (à la Tertullian) for the upbuilding of the body of Christ
(1 Cor 12; Rom 12:4-8). The metaphor of the church as the Family of God imaged on the
Trinitarian Family underscores the need to promote mutuality, respect for otherness,
solidarity, interdependence, and recognition of equality-in-difference. Genuine
communion is only possible where the dignity of each is recognized and upheld. Hence
the African synod avers:
Christ has come to restore the world to unity, a single human Family in the
image of the Trinitarian family. We are the family of God…. It is for the
Church-as-Family that the Father has taken the initiative in creation of Adam.
It is the Church-as-Family which Christ, the New Adam and Heir to the nations, founded by the gift of his body and blood. It is the Church-as-Family
which manifests to the world the Spirit, which the Son sent from the Father
so that there should be communion among all.192
Therefore, just as individuals are graced, all communities and local churches have also
been graced by the Spirit of Christ with their particular gifts which they are to harness
and be allowed to bring to the communion of churches. By and large, conceiving the
church as the Family of God imaged on the Trinitarian Family provides a paradigm for
living out the relationality engendered by the Spirit of Jesus Christ both within and
beyond the Christian community. There is no gainsaying the fact that a self-reliant
African church would serve as a leaven in the social transformation of the African
society.
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5.9 Conclusion
The burden of this chapter has been to construct an authentic African relational
pneumatology. An understanding of the dimension of spirit experiences in West African
world-views paved the way for us to gain new understandings of the Universal Holy
Spirit. The relational Spirit empowers the African churches to become church in new
ways that would be relevant and responsive to the genuine aspirations of the African
people toward the realization of their full humanity and destinies. By attaining a more
adult status, the African churches would become a leaven for the social transformation of
Africa.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this work has been to reinterpret the Third Article of the NicenoConstantinopolitan Creed (381) which affirms the Holy Spirit as the “Lord and the Giver
of Life” in the light of African context. The objective has been to recover the relational
quality of the Spirit (as enshrined in the Scriptures) that has been lost sight of during the
long sojourn of Christianity in the West. The consequences of the loss of the category of
relationality particularly with regard to the question of differences are hard to overlook.
Hence, in this work, I have tried to utilize relationality which is a core tenet of West
African world-views as an interpretive framework to accomplish the task I set my self
herein.
It has been amply demonstrated in this work that the making of the
modern/colonial world system brought about the classification of the populations of the
planet into essentialized categories on the basis of European local cultural, historical, and
epistemological normativity. Whereas European humanity and historicity were viewed as
the apex and norm of history and humanity, those who fall outside this norm, particularly
Africans, had, according to this reasoning, to be colonized and enslaved as a way of
bringing them the torch of civilization. In this very process, Africans were not only
treated as subhuman and savage, but also exploited, oppressed, and their epistemic
potential suppressed and silenced, discredited as unscientific, inadequate, trivial, and only
worth discarding.
This explains why the overall goal of this work has been to utilize the category of
relationality to reinterpret and reconceptualize the Spirit as the Creator and Sustainer of
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differences in a way that allows or rather compels us to strive to live together in spite of
our differences. The urgency of this challenge comes to the fore in the present
circumstances of the ambivalence of globalization. The process of globalization, no
doubt, has turned the world into a global neighborhood of interconnectedness, yet it is
fraught with experiences of fragmentation and dislocation. Thus, the Creator Spirit is not
only the Giver of life but also the defender of that life as the Prophetic Spirit.
It is in this sense that the Spirit anointed Jesus as the Messiah who defends the
defenseless and speaks for the voiceless who are oppressed, exploited, subalternized, and
silenced by the social and religious structures of his time. In doing this, Jesus embodied
the hospitality and friendship of God toward the excluded by restoring their humanity and
including them in the koinonia of God’s kingdom. The reign of God which Jesus
proclaimed necessarily entails a preferential option for the poor and the denunciation of
the ways of the powers that be and the establishment. This stance, of course, brought him
into conflicts with the status quo and eventually led to his death.
As in the case of Jesus, the church as the “flesh of Christ” (body of Christ) has
equally been empowered by the relational Spirit to embody the hospitality of God to
others, especially the poor, the oppressed, and the suppressed. However, from what we
have x-rayed so far in this work, it is evident that the church fails in her weakness, in this
mission of preaching the good news which entails liberating the oppressed, by sometimes
colluding with oppressive powers and stifling the movement of the Spirit. Hence, the
“Discussion of the Seventh Assembly” of the World Council of Church is ad rem: “In our
world, the powerful dictate how things are to be, might is right and truth is determined by
coercive force and violence. The churches, more often than not, seek to accommodate
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themselves to the prevailing order out of concern for institutional survival.”1 This is so
true, that oftentimes, in a bid to preserve institutional survival, unity, and purity of
tradition, absolutizing canons and interpretations have been imposed on all regardless of
social locations, local contexts, histories, and epistemic frameworks and meaning making
systems (at times with political force, as in Christendom). Sadly enough, such coloniality
of power is still alive and well today in many aspects of the church’s life. What must
never be eliminated from view is that Jesus never sacrificed human liberation in order to
preserve unity or purity of tradition at all costs. This fact has been amply demonstrated in
this work.
A recovery of the relational quality of the Holy Spirit has serious implications for
the church and particularly for the African church as illustrated in Chapter 5.2 In
rearticulating an African Christian relational pneumatology, it allows us to gain new
understandings of the person and work of the Holy Spirit and the implications for being
church today. It challenges all absolutizing tendencies in our manner of theologizing and
allows for the foregrounding and legitimizing of all subalternized and silenced epistemic
potentials and loci as sites of divine revelation and encounter. Basically, relational
pneumatology invites a recognition of the dignity of difference according to the manner
of equality-in-difference. As Nigerian theologian, Theresa Okure puts it, there is need
for: “A clearer awareness of the need for us to do a theology that is situated in life and is
oriented towards the betterment of the quality of human life and environment. This is
necessary if our theologizing is indeed to be at the service of the people of God and be
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authentically Christian.”3Authentic Christian theology is, therefore, necessarily
pluriversal and multilingual. As Kwesi Dickson underscores: “the various authentic
reactions to the same faith could be a means of arriving at a…greater vision of the Christ
who, in the final analysis, is too big for our theologies. The church universal must be one
whose diverse tongues complement one another as they express the Lordship of Jesus
Christ.”4 The time of the naïve attempt to suppress the wealth and variety of faith
experiences and to reduce them to the regime of sameness or to supplant them with
absolute abstract summaries as in the days of the Summa in the production of knowledge,
is long over.
The need for authentic theologizing, therefore, calls for the decolonization of
African Christian theology. This present work is a contribution toward an authentic
African Christian theology as a heterogeneous discourse emanating from the wounds of
coloniality while instrumentalizing border thinking. Out of the colonial difference
through border thinking emerges authentic theology which should not be discounted but
recognized as an enrichment of the church universal which always remains a communion
of churches. Let me end which a quote from Mercy Amba Oduyoye: “We…are
confronted with this fact: those who were for a long time content to be consumers of
theology have begun to be producers of theology and it is Christian theology. They are
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widening the panorama of symbols, heightening the color of issues, and demanding
commitment and action.”5

5

Mercy Amba Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing: Theological Reflections on Christianity in Africa
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1986), 76.
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